Ajit Kumar Sen Gupta, J.:—The short but interesting question of law which calls for determination in this case is whether s. 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would govern the investigation into an offence falling within the ambit of s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 as amended in 1981.

2. Shortly stated the facts are that the petitioner Jnan Prasad Agarwalla was arrested on 9th June, 1985. On 11th June 1985, FIR was lodged with the Officer-in-Charge, Nalhati P.S On 17th June 1985, Biswanath Agarwalla, the owner of the godown where search was conducted by the District Enforcement Branch, moved a writ application before this Court challenging, inter alia, the legality and validity of the seizure of Kerosene Oil made on 9th June, 1985, as well as FIR dated 11th June 1985. An interim order was passed by this Writ Court staying the proceeding under the FIR till 24th June 1985. The said interim order was thereafter extended and the Special Officer was appointed by the Learned Single Judge for reverification of the stock. An appeal was preferred against the said interim order in FMAT no. 2268 of 1985 and stay application was also filed in the said appeal by the State. The Appeal Bench directed the authorities to go on with the investigation. On 24th July 1985, the said stay application was disposed of by directing the authorities to continue with the investigation but the authorities were restrained from filing the charge sheet without the leave of the Court and from arresting the said Writ petitioner.

3. On 26th September, 1985, an application was made on behalf of the State for granting leave to file charge sheet in connection with the aforesaid case and the Appeal Bench granted leave to file the charge sheet. On 7th November, 1989, the petitioner moved the Special Court at Birbhum with a prayer made under s. 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for dropping of the proceedings. In dealing with the said application the learned Special Judge observed that the charge sheet being no. 41 dated 17.7.89 said to have been submitted by the Investigating Officer, before S.P Headquarters, Enforcement Branch by letter no. 1395.EB had not been received by the Court till then. The learned Judge, inter alia, observed that “the Court is still in the dark if the Chargesheet had actually been sent to Court.” The learned Judge directed that a copy of his order be sent to the S.P, Headquarters, Enforcement Branch, West Bengal, and the said S.P to be impressed upon for the necessity of submission of the chargesheet. The Learned Judge further observed that “in due course of the procedure chargesheet ought to have been received by the Court by then.” The Learned Judge fixed 7th December, 1989, for the appearance of the accused persons and report by S.P

4. On 7th December, 1989, the Learned Judge observed that the charge-sheet had not yet reached the Court. On perusal of R.T Message sent by the Investigating Officer it appeared to the learned Judge that the chargesheet had been received by one Gour Gopal Goswami, S.I Rampurhat P.S who has been directed to arrange production of the chargesheet along with the Case Diary before the learned Judge as far back as 7th November, 1989. Yet no step was taken for production of the chargesheet. The learned Judge directed the Superintendent of Police, District Enforcement Branch, to direct Rampurhat Police Station to arrange submission of the chargesheet and further directed for sending copy of his order to the Court Inspector of Suri Court, asking the said Court Inspector to negotiate with the Circle Inspector, Rampurhat so that the chargesheet may be received by the learned Judge within a fortnight. The learned Judge also directed the learned Public Prosecutor to send R.T Message to Enforcement Branch, Headquarters, West Bengal, Calcutta quoting the substance of order.

5. Ultimately on 14th December, 1989 chargesheet was submitted before the Special Court at Birbhum whereupon cognizance of the offence was taken.

6. The fact that the chargesheet was filed beyond the period of six months has not been disputed on behalf of the State. But the contention on behalf of the State is that the provisions of s. 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure have no manner of application in respect of the investigation of the present case, and reliance has been placed on a decision of learned Single Judge of this Court in Lakshmi Kanta Dey v. State Of West Bengal reported in 1986 (2) CHN page 267, wherein the view has been expressed that s. 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is inapplicable to the investigation into an offence under s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, as amended uptodate (hereinafter referred to as the Act), although the provisions of that Act provides for summary trial into the offences under the said Act, within the meaning of Ss. 262 to 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

7. On the other hand, Mr. Sekhar Bose, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that regard being had to the change in law, both substantive and procedural in the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the Scheme of the amended Act, the provisions of s. 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable to an investigation into an offence under s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Act as amended in 1981.

8. To appreciate the rival contentions it is necessary to get out the relevant provisions of the Act. It may be mentioned at this stage that s. 12A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 as it stood before the amendment in 1981, contained the provisions for summary trial. Section 12A was inserted in the Act by the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act, 1964, Section 12A was amended by the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act, 1974, whereby sub-s. (2) of s. 12A was substituted. Section 12A empowered the Central Government to issue notification specifying violation of certain orders passed under s. 3 of the Act which shall be tried summarily. Sub-section (2) of s. 12A provides as follows:

“(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, all offences relating to—

(a) the contravention of an order made under s. 3 with respect to—

(i) Cotton or woollen textiles, or

(ii) Foodstuffs including edible oilseeds and oils; or

(iii) drugs; and

(b) Where any notification issued under sub-s. (1) in relation to a special order is in force, the contravention of such special order shall be tried in a summary way by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of ss. 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial;

Provided that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under the Section, it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.

Provided further that when at the commencement, of, or in the course of, a summary trial under this section, it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is, for any other reason, undesirable to try the case summarily the Magistrate shall, after hearing the parties, record an order to that effect and thereafter, recall any witness who may have been examined and proceed to hear or re-hear the casein the manner provided in the said Code.”

9. Sub-section (3) provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, certain punishments inflicted by a Magistrate will not be subject to appeal. Sub-section (4) relates to cases pending on the date of the Notification mentioned in sub-s. (1) and provides that if no witness has been examined before the date of such notification, the offences concerned will be tried in a summary way under s. 12A and if any such case is pending before a Magistrate who is not competent to try the same in a summary way under this section, it shall be forwarded to a Magistrate so competent.

10. The Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act, 1981 was amended thoroughly and substantially, both substantive and procedural law. Section 2 of the Amending Act of 1981, runs as follows:—

“During the continuance in force of this Act, the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act) shall have the effect subject to the amendments specified in ss. 2 to 11.”

“Provided that the amendments specified in ss. 7 to 11 shall not apply to or in relation to, any offence under the Principal Act committed before the commencement of this Act and the provisions of the Principal Act shall apply, and in relation to, such offence as if those amendments had not been made.”

11. Section 7 of the Principal Act contains the law relating to punishment for commission of offences under the Essential Commodities Act. Before the amendment introduced by the Amending Act of 1981 s. 7 so far as material for our purpose stood as follows:—

“S. 7. Penalties

(1) If any person contravenes any order made under s. 3—

(a) He shall be punishable—

(i) in the case of an order made with reference to Cl. (h) or Cl. (i) of sub-s. (2) of that Section, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year and shall also be liable to fine, and

(ii) in the case of any other order, with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than three months but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

Provided that the Court may, for any adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than three months.

(b) Any property in respect of which the order has been contravened shall be forfeited to the Government.

(c) Any packing, covering or receptacle in which the property is found and any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance vesed in carrying the property shall if the Court so orders, be forfeited to the Government.

(2) If any person to whom a direction is given under clause (b) of sub-s. (4) of s. 3 fails to comply with the direction, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shill not be less than three months but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine:

Provided that the Court may, for any adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than three months.

(2-A) If any person convicted of an offence under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-s. (1) or under sub-s. (2) is again convicted of an offence under the same provision, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for the second and for every subsequent offence for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine:

Provided that the Court may, for any adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.

(2-B) For the purpose of sub-ss. (1), (2) and (2-A) the fact that an offence under sub-clause (ii) of cl. (a) of sub-s. (1) or under sub-s. (2) has caused no substantial harm to the general public or to any individual shall be an adequate and special reason for awarding a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than three months or six months, as the case may be.

By the Amending Act of 1981, proviso to sub-clause (ii) of Clause (a) of sub-s. (1), proviso to sub-s. (2), proviso to sub-s. (2A) and sub-s. (2B) have been deleted.

11. Simultaneously with the amendment of sections, the Amending Act of 1981 has introduced s. 12AA which contains the law relating to prosecution for commission of offences punishable under the provisions of the Amending Act of 1981, the procedure to be followed therefore, the forum of trial, the quantum of punishment that can be inflicted upon the convicted accused, the forum of appeal and revision.

12. Section 12AA so far as material for our purpose is reproduced below:

“12AA. Offences triable by Special Courts—

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code,

(a) all offences under this Act shall be triable only by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed or where there are more Special Courts than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the High Court.

(c) The Special Court may, subject to the provisions of Clause (d) of this sub-section exercise, in relation to the person forwarded to it under clause (b), the same power which a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try a case may exercise under section 167 of the Code in relation to an accused person in such case who has been forwarded to him under that Section.

(e) a Special Court may, upon a perusal of police report of the facts constituting an offence under this Act take cognizance of that offence without the accused being committed to it for trial.

(f) all offences under this Act shall be tried in a summary way and the provisions of ss. 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial:

Provided that in case of any conviction in a summary trial under this Section, it shall be lawful for the Special Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.

13. A comparative study of the law before and after the amendment of 1981, takes us to the question whether the provisions of s. 167(5) do apply in respect of an investigation carried on by the police in respect of an offence under the Act of 1981.

13A. At this stage it is necessary to consider the difference between the summons case and warrant case, the rights and the power of a Court trying a summons case and the limitation imposed on the sentencing power of the Court. Before the amendment of 1981 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the offences under s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the post-Amendment Act were triable as warrant cases, subject to the application of s. 12A of the Act of 1955.

14. Section 2(w) and s. 2(x) of the Code of Criminal Procedure defined the summons cases and warrant cases as follows:

“‘summons case’ means a case relating to an offence and not being a warrant case. ‘Warrant case’ means a case relating to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years.”

15. Both Summons case and Warrant case relate to “offence”. The Code of Criminal Procedure divides the cases into two categories only. Any offence which is not punishable for a term exceeding two years is a summons case. The word ‘punishable’ although not defined in the Code, has been interpreted by the Courts.

16. The word “Punishable” carries a meaning ‘liable to be punished’.

The Supreme Court in Sube Singh v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1988 SC 2235, observed as follows:

“The word ‘punishable’ is ordinarily defined as deserving of or capable or liable to punishment, punishable within statute providing that defendant may have ten peremptory challenges if offence charged is ‘punishable’ with death or by life imprisonment; means deserving of or liable to punishment; capable of being punished by law or right, may be punished, or liable to be punished, and not must be punished”.

17. Section 29 of the Criminal Procedure Code enumerates the sentence which Magistrates may pass. The Section runs as follow:—

“29. Sentences which High Courts and Sessions Judges may pass.—

(1) A High Court may pass any sentence authorised by law.

(2) A Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorised by law; but any sentence of death passed by any such Judge shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court.

(3) An Assistant Sessions Judge may pass any sentences authorised by law except a sentence of death or of imprisonment for life or of imprisonment for a term exceeding ten years”.

18. The provisions of Summary trials find place in Chapter XXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 260 of the Code confers a judicial discretion on the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Metropolitan Magistrate and Magistrate of the first class to try in a summary way all or any of the offences enumerated in clause (i) to (ix) of s. 260. It appears from the enumeration of those offences that even a case which is otherwise triable as a Warrant case, may be tried in a summary way. The Magistrate has to apply his mind and exercise judicial discretion to decide if the case is fit for summary trial. Where in course of trial it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that it is undesirable to try it summarily, he may proceed to re-hear the case under the Warrant Procedure. In holding the summary trial, the Court has to follow, as per the mandate of s. 262 of the Code, the procedure specified for the trial of Summary cases, with the exception that the sentencing power of the Magistrate has been curtailed from two years to three months only.

19. A Summons case relates to an offence not punishable with imprisonment exceeding two years. If any of the offences categorised in Clause (1) to Clause (ix) of s. 269(1) of the Cr. P.C is tried in a summary way, then the Magistrate has the power to impose sentence of imprisonment on the accused being convicted upto the period of three months only. His sentencing power in a Summons case is curtailed to the maximum period of 3 months' imprisonment.

20. When a case, which is otherwise triable as a warrant case, is tried as a Summons case or tried summarily under procedure specified for Summons case, the following consequences may ordinarily follow:

(a) The accused will not have the right to pray for his discharge either in a case instituted on complaint or in a case instituted on police report. Upon the accused being produced before the Court or upon the appearance of the accused before the Court, the Court in a summary trial or in a trial of Summons cases will proceed to state to the accused the substances of the accusations and will then ask him whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make.

In a case instituted on police report, the accused will have no right to pray, for discharge, although he has such a right if the warrant procedure is followed.

In a case tried as a warrant case instituted on complaint the accused can profitably make use of his right under sub-s. (2) of s. 245 of the Code. But no such right is available to an accused in a case tried summarily or in accordance with the procedures specified for trial of Summons cases.

(b) In a warrant case instituted on complaint, the accused has a right to cross-examine the witnesses, when they are examined before the framing of the charge. Although this is not a right conferred by the Code, such a right follows from the principles of natural justice.

(c) The accused has no right to claim that each and every word deposed to or spoken by the witness in Court shall be recorded by the Magistrate in a summary trial, inasmuch as s. 264 of the Code provides that the “Magistrate shall record the substance of the evidence and a judgment containing a brief statement of the reasons for the finding. Thus the right of an accused to have the evidence recorded in extenso is denied to him in a summary trial. Instead of the court assigning reasons for recording each of its findings and/or observations, the duty of the Court will extend to the recording of a “brief statement of the reasons for the finding”.

21. These are some of the consequences which may ordinarily follow when a case which is otherwise triable as warrant case is tried summarily following the procedure prescribed for trial of a Summons case as enjoined by law.

22. We may now turn to the amendments of the Essential Commodities Act in 1981. Section 2 of the Amending Act of 1981 provides that during the continuance in force of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, as amended in 1981, the Principal Act, i.e the Essential Commodities Act 1955, shall have effect subject to the amendments specified in ss. 3 to 11 of the Amending Act of 1981. Section 11 of the Amending Act of 1981 inserts s. 12AA to the Principal Act.

23. According to the sub-clause (c) of S. 122AA, the Special Court shall have all the powers conferred on a Magistrate under s. 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The power assigned to the Special Court under the said sub-clause is neither conditional nor curtailed by any restriction. The Special Court trying an offence under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, as amended in 1981, is vested with the power conferred by s. 167 of the Code. Notwithstanding the provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, all offences under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 as amended in 1981, shall be tried in a summary way and the provisions of Ss. 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial. All offences would include offences falling both under Clause (i) and Clause (ii) of s. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. It makes no distinction between the nature of the offences. It does not empower the Court to decide which one will be triable under the summons procedure or which one will be tried under the Warrant procedure. It is significant that the Legislature did not incorporate the whole of Chapter XXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the provisions of Essential Commodities Act, 1955 when the Act was amended in 1981. It incorporated only the provisions of Ss. 262 to 265 of the Code. The reason for excluding Ss. 260 and 261 of the Code from the ambit of the Essential Commodities Act 1955, as amended in 1981, is not far to seek. Firstly, the legislature did not intend to confer any discretionary power on the Special Court in course of a summary trial to adopt any other procedure for the trial under other provisions of the Code as it may appear to be just and proper to the Court regard being had to the nature of the case. A Special Court has no such power which a Magistrate enjoys under s. 262(2) of the Code. The Special Court has no authority or jurisdiction to invoke the procedure with reference to the nature of the offence committed. It cannot convert a proceeding in which procedure for trial of Summons case is being followed into one for trial of cases under the warrant procedure. This is precisely the reason why the legislature did not include Ss. 260 and 261 of the Code of criminal Procedure in the Amended Act of 1981. In our view this exclusion was necessitated by the inclusion of the provisions of s. 12AA(f) in the Essential Commodities Act 1955, by the amendment in 1981, which provides that “all offences under the Act shall be tried in a summary way.”

24. It is evident that whatever may be the nature of the offences, once the trial begins in a Special Court under the amended provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, as they now stand, the Court has to follow the procedure for summary trial of the offence with the aid of Ss. 262 to 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as far as applicable. The trial of Warrant cases and the procedure for such trial cannot be applied in a trial of offences by the Special. Court under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, as amended in 1981. Section 2 of the Amending Act controls the application of the provisions of the Principal Act. The Principal Act before the amendment of 1981 provided in respect of certain offences not falling within the ambit of s. 12A of the principal Act (after its amendment in 1964), for trial as Warrant cases, but that procedure is not applicable now. As indicated the legislature has specifically provided for trial in a summary way with the application of the provisions of Ss. 262 to 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is true that invocation of the procedure for summary trial may take away some of the rights and privileges of the accused. But when the statute takes away the rights and privileges by amending the law or by introduction of a new law, then all that is left to the accused for his protection must be strictly applied and implemented notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary in the Code. The provisions of the Essential Commodities Act as amended in 1981 have taken away some of the rights of the accused which were available to him in a trial of Warrant case. By the same Amending Act, the legislature curtailed the sentencing power of the Court from 7 years under s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Principal Act to 2 years as provided by Clause (f) of s. 12AA and proviso thereunder as inserted by the Amending Act.

25. In our view, s. 2 of the Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act, 1981, read with s. 12AA Clause (f) and the proviso thereunder has modified the provisions of s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Principal Act regarding the imposition of sentence of imprisonment.

26. The Special Court has been empowered to deal with all offences under the Principal Act including s. 7(1)(a)(ii) subject to the amendment made by the Amending Act of 1981. The power of the Special Court regarding imposing sentence of imprisonment his been curtailed and accordingly, even if an offence comes within the purview of s. 7(i)(a)(ii), the Special Court has to follow the provisions of the Amending Act and may pass a sentence upto two years' imprisonment. It has no power to impose a sentence of seven years' imprisonment. In view of the provisions of 12AA(f) and the proviso thereunder, the power to impose sentence on the convicted accused under the Principal Act is subject to the amendment made by the Amending Act, Section 2 of the Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act, 1981 not only controls the operation of the Principal Act including s. 7(1)(a)(ii). On a harmonious construction of the provisions of s. 7(1)(a)(ii) and s. 12AA(f) and the proviso thereunder it would be manifestly clear that the sentencing power of the Special Court in respect of an offence covered by 7(1)(a)(ii) stands modified to the extent provided in 12AA(f).

27. At this stage, we may refer to the Objects and Reasons. The statement of Objects and Reasons may and do often furnish valuable historical material in ascertaining the reasons which induced the Legislature to enact a statute. They thus indicate the background and the reasons for introducing a particular piece of legislation and serve the purpose of helping in the search for the intendment of the Legislature in enacting the Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons can be used for the purpose of understanding the background and the antecedent state of affairs leading up to the legislation.

28. The Supreme Court in Utkal Contractors & Joinery Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1954, observed as follows:

“A statute is best understood if we know the reason for it. The reasons for a statute is the safest guide to its interpretation. The words of a statute take their colour from the reason for it. How do we discover the reason for a statute? There are external and internal aids. The external aids are Statement of Objects and Reasons when the Bill is presented to Parliament, the reports of Committees. Occasional excursions into the debates of Parliament are permitted. Internal aids are the preamble, the scheme and the provisions of the Act. Having discovered the reason for the statute and so having set the sail to the wind, the interpreter may proceed ahead.”

28A. We may usefully refer to the reasons for the introduction of the Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act, 1981 which has amended radically and substantially both substantive and procedural law, relating to essential commodities. These reasons are contained in the Statement of Objects and Reasons which are as follows:—

“The Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act) provides for regulation of production, supply and pricing of essential commodities. This Act had been amended from time to time.

1. In spite of extensive amendments made to the Principal Act in 1976, experience has shown that some of the existing provisions of that Act have not been adequate and effective for expeditious disposal of cases as well as for ensuring the availability of essential commodities at fair prices and for curbing hoarding and blackmarketing of, and profiteering in, such commodities. There are large number of court cases pending under the Principal Act all over the country and the price rise has continued unabated in the years 1979 and 1980. For dealing more effectively with persons indulging in anti-social activities like hoarding and blackmarketing and the evil of vicious inflationary prices, it is considered necessary to make the following special provisions by way of amendments to the Principal Act for a temporary period of five years, namely:—

(a) in order to expedite the process of prosecutions under the Principal Act, it is proposed to provide—

(i) for the trial, in a summary way, of all offences under that Act;

(ii) for the constitution, for the purposes of such trial, of Special Courts, consisting of a single Judge who shall be appointed by a High Court and who shall be a person who is qualified to be a Judge of a High Court or who is or has been a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge, for not less than one year;

(b) to strengthen the penal provisions of the Principal Act with a view to deterring persons indulging in hoarding and blackmarketing the essential commodities from contravening the provisions of the Principal Act, it is proposed to provide for—

(i) minimum mandatory imprisonment for a period of not less than three months for all offences under the Principal Act except an offence of abetment in regard to procuring of footstuffs or drugs by them for their own use or for the use of any member of their family, and not for the purpose of carrying on any business of trade which is proposed to be punishable with fine only;

(ii) enhancement of a term of imprisonment awardable in case of conviction in a summary trial for one year to two years;

(iii) making of all offences under the Principal Act to be non-bailable;

(iv) granting of bail by the trial court, after giving the prosecution an opportunity to oppose the application and only in the exceptional cases specified in the new s. 12A proposed to be inserted, to a person accused or suspected of the commission of an offence under the Principal Act if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he is guilty of the offence concerned; and

(v) in order to ensure availability of essential commodities to the consumers provision is being made—

(i) for sale of all seized essential commodities, the retail sale prices whereof have been fixed by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, through the public distribution system by enlarging the scope of s. 6A(2). The existing provisions covers only foodgrains to be sold through fair price shops; and

(ii) for preferring appeal against the order of confiscation passed by the Collector of a district to the State Government instead of to a judicial authority.”

28B. The statement of objects and reasons clearly indicate that the “failure of the existing provisions of the Act to be adequate and effective for expeditious disposal of cases necessitated the amendment of the Act”. While amending the Principal Act the Legislature took into account, inter alia, the fact that “there are large number of Court cases pending under the Principal Act all over the country and the price rise has continued unabated in the years 1919 and 1980”.

(emphasis supplied)

29. The objects and reasons, inter alia, show that the Parliament intended to enhance the term of imprisonment in of case conviction in a Summary Trial from one year to two years and that it was felt necessary by the Parliament that the amendment is essential to “strengthen the penal provisions of the Principal Act with a view to deter persons indulging in hoarding and blackmarketing any essential commodities from contravening the provisions of the Principal Act……”

(emphasis supplied)

30. If the object was to speedy disposal of large number of pending Court cases within a span of five years, as the Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act, 1981 was to continue for a period of five years, the provisions of the Principal Act so far as they are inconsistent with the temporary provisions contained in s. 12AA have to be kept in abeyance and provisions contained in the temporary Act have to be pressed into service to regulate the procedure and punishment.

31. It is necessary to consider how far s. 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies to an investigation under the Essential Commodities Act after its amendment in 1981. As indicated earlier, sub-s. (2) of s. 12AA empowers the Special Court to exercise the same power which a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try a case may exercise under s. 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to an accused person. It thus leaves no room for doubt that Clause (c) of s. 12AA empowers the Special Court to exercise the powers under s. 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The objects and reasons for the amendment as extracted hereinbefore are mainly expeditious disposal of the cases and curbing of hoarding activities of the traders. The Legislature realized that amendments from time to time failed to achieve the goal and cases have accumulated. It was, therefore, necessary to effect changes with regard to the substantive and procedural law in the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The condition precedent for a speedy trial and disposal of cases is completion of investigation with utmost expedition. Investigation precedes the trial. Unless investigation ends, trial cannot commence. If the legislation has been brought in to achieve the goal of expeditious disposal of summary procedure cases the object will be frustrated if the investigation preceding trial is allowed to continue for an indefinite period. The very object for which summary procedure was introduced will be rendered illusory had the Legislature intended to allow investigation of offences coming within the purview of s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act to continue for any length of time. The legislature could have categorised such offences falling under s. 7(1)(a)(ii) as one triable as a Warrant Case. On the contrary, the Legislature intended to provide in keeping with its objects and reasons and in fact provided summary trial in respect of all offences under the Essential Commodities Act by insertion of Clause (f) of s. 12AA offences under the Amended Act to be tried in a summary way.

32. It has been contended on behalf of the State that offence coming under s. 7(1)(a)(ii), of the Essential Commodities Act is punishable with imprisonment for seven years and is thus a Warrant Case within the meaning of s. 2(x) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We are unable to accept this contention having regard to the provisions of the Amending Act. As the punishment for the offence under s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act has been curtailed to 2 years, 7 years' imprisonment cannot be imposed by the Special Court. Even in s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of principal Act, the term of imprisonment for 7 years is the maximum one and the mandatory term of imprisonment is only three months. Whatever be the term of imprisonment—mandatory or extended, it can operate subject to the amendments made by the Amending Act of 1981. Whether the offence comes within the ambit of s. 7(1)(a)(ii) or 7(1)(a)(i) it has to be tried in a summary way and the period of imprisonment cannot go beyond two years. In fixing the outer limit of the imprisonment to two years, Legislature has not made any distinction between the offence under s. 7(1)(a)(i) and an offence under s. 7(1)(a)(ii). The reason is that although before the amendment, an offence coming within s. (7)(1)(a)(i) of the Essential Commodities Act could have been punished by imposing a maximum sentence of one year, such offence can now be punished by awarding a punishment of 2 years. This is one of the aspects which cannot be lost sight of in interpreting the changes made in the Principal Act. In our view, the sentencing power of the court as provided in s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act has no manner of application. Since the Amending Act of 1981 contains special provision for a temporary period of five years the question of implied or express repeal of the provisions of the Principal Act being the Permanent Act, does not arise. The Amending Act has affected the procedure and the extent of punishment only. So long the Amending Act remains in force the Principal Act and its provisions including s. 7 of the Principal Act shall have effect subject to the provisions contained in s. 12AA, in particular Clause (f) thereof and the proviso thereunder. We are therefore, of the view that it is manifestly clear that an offence coming under the purview of the Essential Commodities Act has to be tried in a summary way so long as the Special Provision remains in operation and cannot be categorised even if it falls within the ambit of s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Principal Act as a Warrant case. Unless the interpretation placed by us on the Amending Act is accepted, the legislative intention of providing for expeditious disposal of cases and to avoid unnecessary delay both at the stage of investigation and at the stage of trial cannot be given effect to.

33. It has been contended, referring to the decision of a Learned Single Judge in Lakshmi Kanfa Dey (supra) that an offence coming within the ambit of s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act is not triable as a summons case, and the provisions of s. 167(5) will not apply in respect of investigation of such an offence. We are unable to accept this contention.

34. In Lakshmi Kanta Dey (supra) the attention of the learned Judge was not drawn to s. 2 of the Essential Commodities (Special Provision) Act, 1981, and the objects and reasons for amendment of the Essential Commodities Act, nor was the attention of the Learned Judge drawn to the difference in the rights and privileges of an accused in a case triable as a Summons case. It appears that the Learned Judge relied upon sub-s. (6) of s. 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and observed that the inapplicability of the provisions of sub-s. (6) of s. 167 of the Code in respect of an investigation into an offence under s. 7(1)(a)(ii) renders sub-s. (5) of the said section equally inapplicable. The learned Judge proceeded to hold that under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, as it now stands, a Special Court is equated with the Court of Sessions and accordingly sub-s. (6) cannot apply or cannot be applied in case of an investigation which had been stopped by the Special Court under sub-s. (5). With respect, we are unable to accept this view. In conferring the powers of a Magistrate under s. 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the Special Court, the Legislature did not impose any condition or reservation about exercise of such power by the Special Court. In fact, not only sub-s. (6) but sub-s. (4) of s. 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be applied in respect of a proceeding before the Special Court. Sub-section (4) of s. 167 runs as follows:—

“Any Magistrate other than Chief Judicial Magistrate making such order shall forward a copy of his order, with his reasons for making it to the Chief Judicial Magistrate.”

Special Court having been equated with a Court of Sessions is definitely not under any obligation to inform the Chief Judicial Magistrate about its order authorising the detention of the accused in police custody. But then sub-s. (4) is a part of s. 167 and it has not been kept out of the said Section by the Legislature when the powers of a Magistrate under s. 167 of the Code were conferred on the Special Court. In a situation like this, the provisions of s. 167, so far as may be, apply to a trial in a summary manner. There is no warrant for the proposition. Each and every part of s. 167 of the Code has to be applied to a case third summarily. An interpretation which brings about an absurd result has to be avoided. To fulfil the purpose of the Amending Act, part of s. 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is incapable of being applied, shall not be applied.

35. It does not appear that in Lakshmi Kanta Dey (supra) sub-s. (6) of s. 167 was considered in the background of the amendments of the Essential Commodities Act. Section 167(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for making an application before the Sessions Judge in respect of the investigation into an offence which has been stopped under sub-s. (5) and the Sessions Judge, if satisfied, can direct further investigation to be made into the said offence by vacating the order passed under sub-s. (5). The Special Court being a Court of Sessions, no such application can be filed. But the party aggrieved by the order of stopping of the investigation is not without any remedy. Section 12AC of the Amending Act empowers the exercise of inherent power by the High Court under s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to a proceeding before a Special Court. We may also note that the Learned Judge observed that although in respect of the offence falling under s. 7(1)(ii), s. 167 sub-s. (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply but the provision of s. 167(5) applies in respect of an offence coming within the mischief of s. 7(1)(a)(i) of the Essential Commodities Act and if an order is passed by a Special Court under s. 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an aggrieved party can move this Court under s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In our view when summary procedure is invoked for all offences, s. 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would apply irrespective of the fact whether the offence comes under s. 7(1)(a)(i) or s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Principal Act. All offences under the Principal Act are to be tried alike which have to be tried in a summary way under the procedure mentioned in Ss. 262 to 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Special Court is empowered to impose punishment upto 2 years only, which is in excess of the term of imprisonment that a Magistrate can impose in respect of a summary trial. We find no reasonable differentiation between s. 7(1)(a)(i) and 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Principal Act in applying the provisions of s. 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That an aggrieved party cannot press into service sub-s. (6) of s. 167 is not a ground to hold that sub-s. (5) of s. 167 is not applicable in a case tried summarily for an offence under s. 7(1)(a)(ii). An aggrieved party is not without any relief or without any forum. If there is a wrong, there is a remedy. The provisions of s. 12AB and 12AC make the Special Court amenable to jurisdiction of the High Court under its appellate, revision and inherent power. We have not been able to persuade ourselves to hold that the intention of the legislature is to deprive an accused of the rights and privileges as provided in the Amending Act while much of the rights and privileges available to him in a case tried as a Warrant case have been taken away. All the powers of a Magistrate under s. 167 of the Code Criminal Procedure, without reservation, have been conferred on the Special Court. To deny to an accused the rights embodied in s. 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure will amount to denial of fair treatment to the accused. We may also note that a case tried in a summary way by following the provisions for trial of summons cannot be converted into one for trial of warrant cases under the existing provisions. Had the legislature intended to do so, it could have specifically conferred such authority on the Court as it has done in s. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and s. 16A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. No such provision has been introduced by the Legislature in the Essential Commodities Act and it has retained its only mandate in Clause (f) of s. 12AA that all offences under the Principal Act shall be tried in a summary way.

36. Our attention has been drawn to a decision of a Learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Iswarappa Magundappa Aribenchi v. Stale of Karnataka reported in (1987) EFR 563. There the Court was concerned with the question of application of s. 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of an investigation into an offence punishable under s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act. After considering the effect of s. 12AA(1)(f) and s. 12AC of the amended Act, the Learned Judge expressed the view that the application of the provisions of s. 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has not been excluded. Although the Sessions Judge is conferred with the special jurisdiction of trying such cases, nevertheless, the Special Judge is a Court of original criminal jurisdiction. Whatever may be the description, the special Judge enjoys, unless specifically excluded, all the powers of a court of original criminal jurisdiction. It was held that the Special Judge was not right in refusing to stop further proceedings in the case before him on ground of non-filing of the chargesheet within the period of six months from the date of the arrest of the accused.

37. Our attention has also been drawn to a later decision of a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in State v. Abdul Razzak Mohamed Saheb, reported in (1989) EFR 98 where the earlier view has been reiterated.

38. The Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in The Public Prosecutor v. Anjaneylu reported in 1987 EFR 40 considered a similar case and held that a ‘Special Court’ constituted under s. 12-A of the Essential Commodities Act (as amended in 1981) is empowered to exercise powers under s. 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the accused forwarded to it under Clause (b) of sub-s. (1) of s. 12-AA of the Act as contemplated by Clause (c) of that sub-section. Clause (f) makes it obligatory for the Special Court to try cases summarily and hence by virtue of s. 262 of the Cede of Criminal Procedure, the procedure for for summons cases will apply for the trial of the offences under the Act. After considering the provisions of the Amended Act of 1981, the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held that in view of the scheme of the Amending Act the imposing of sentence of over two years under s. 7 is not permissible where Special Courts are established, as they have to follow summary procedure for the period of the temporary Amendment. For both reasons, viz., because under s. 262 of the Code a summary trial is to be by a summons case procedure, and also because the temporary Act provides for a maximum period of two years sentence only where cases are tried by the Special Courts, the procedure for warrant cases will not apply.

39. The learned Counsel for the State has drawn our attention to a decision of a Learned Single Judge of this Court in Satyanath Dey v. State, reported in (1987) EFR 649. There the learned Single Judge followed the decision in Lakshmi Kanta Dey (supra) and came to the conclusion that s. 167(5) of the Code is not attracted when the offence committed by the accused falls within the ambit of s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act. It may be pointed out that the provisions of the Amending Act of 1981 had no manner of application to the facts and circumstances of the case decided by the learned Single Judge. In Satyanath Dey (supra) the offence was committed on 5th December, 1979 and in view of the proviso to s. 2 of the Amending Act of 1981, the provisions of the Amending Act had no manner of application. It will appear from the judgment that the petitioner in that case was arrested on 5.12.1979 and the petition under s. 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for his discharge from the case was submitted before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Arambag, and not before the Special Court constituted under the Amending Act of 1981. The learned Judge did not consider the Scheme of the Amending Act and the objects and reasons therefor.

40. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Babulal Agarwal v. State, reported in 1987 (1) CHN 218. It was submitted in that case that once in a case relating to an offence failing within s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, an accused has been discharged by a Special Court in terms of s. 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it becomes a final order and subsequently the Court cannot recall the order and permit the investigating officer to complete investigation within a period fixed by the Court. Although the offence in that case fell within the ambit of s. 7(1)(a)(ii) the learned Single Judge did not interfere with the order of stopping of the investigation under s. 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and discharging the accused. If the provisions of s. 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not have any application in respect to an offence under s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, there was no bar in directing the continuance of the investigation.

41. There is another aspect of the matter. As indicated earlier, the provision under s. 7(1)(a)(i) and s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Principal Act have been omitted by the Amending Act of 1981. Those provisos empowered the Court to impose a sentence of imprisonment for a period which may be less than 3 months by assigning special reasons. These provisos have been totally done away with, inasmuch as the Amending Act of 1981 empowers the Special Court to inflict on a convicted accused a term of imprisonment extending from 3 months to 2 years. This overrides the provisions relating to maximum term of imprisonment contained in the Code in a summary trial. For maintaining uniformity in the sentencing power of the Special Court by the Amending Act of 1981, the provisos under s. 7(1)(a)(i) and 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Principal Act have been deleted. This demonstrates that the Legislature intended that the sentencing power of the Special Court should remain limited upto a limit of 2 years' imprisonment only. An accused convicted of any offence under the Essential Commodities Act can (not?) be sentenced beyond that period. This again is an indication of the legislative intention of interfering with the law regarding imposition of sentence as embodied in s. 7 of the Principal Act.

42. Lord Denning, in Seaford Court Estates v. Asher, reported in (1949) 2 All ER 155 at p. 164 said thus:

“…When a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament……and then he must supplement the written word so as to give “force and life” to the intention of the Legislature……A Judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across, this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.”

43. The Supreme Court in State Of Tamil Nadu v. Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd.. (1) Ltd. reported in AIR (1986) SC 1973, after quoting the aforesaid observations of Lord Denning with approval, held thus:

“The Courts must always seek to find out the intention of the Legislature. Though the courts must find out the intention of the statute from the language used, but language more often than not is an imperfect instrument of expression of human thought. As Lord Denning said it would be idle to expect every statutory provision to be drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. As Judge Learned Hand said, we must not make for trees out of dictionary but remember that statutes must have some purpose or object, whose imaginative discovery is judicial craftsmanship. We need not always cling to literalness and should seek to endeavour to avoid an unjust or absurd result. We should not make a mockery of legislation. To make sense out of an unhappily worded provision where the purpose is apparent to the judicial eye “some” violence to language is permissible, (see K.P Varghese v. Income-tax Officer, Ernakulam, 131 ITR 597 at 604 to 606 (AIR 1981 SC 1922 at pp. 1921 to 1928) and Luke v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, (1964) 54 ITR 692)”.

44. The Supreme Court in H. Shiva Rao v. Cecilia Pereira, reported in AIR (1987) SC 284, observed as follows:

“Courts must find out the literal meaning of the expression in the task of construction. In doing so if the expressions are ambiguous then the construction that fulfils the object of legislation must provide the key to the meaning Courts must not make a mockery of legislation and should take constructive approach to fulfil the purpose and for that purpose, if necessary, iron out the creases.”

A construction, which promotes the objectives for which the enactment is intended, must be adopted. The Court's interpretation, must be in keeping with the purpose for which the legislation was promul-gated. It is needless to emphasize that in order to get its true import, it is necessary to view the enactment, in retrospect, the reason for enacting it, the evil it was to end and the object it was to subserve.

45. The purpose of an enactment has an overall reference to the mischief which the enactment is designed to remedy. Therefore, a construction which furthers the purpose or object or promotes remedy Parliament has provided to cure a particular mischief must be preferred. On an analysis of the provisions of the Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act and having regard to the purpose and the mischief intended to be cured by the said enactment, we are of the view that the said enactment has curtailed the sentencing power of the Special Court while dealing with the offences under the Principal Act in a summary way. The general provisions contained in the Principal Act must yield to the special provisions contained in the aforesaid enactment.

46. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be held that the proceedings cannot be continued any further as s. 167(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code will govern the present investigation. Rule is, therefore, made absolute. Proceedings are quashed.

Manabendra Nath Roy, J.:—I agree.

Rule made absolute; proceeding quashed.