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  • Section 114, 111(e) of the Evidence Act,
  • Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 114, 111(e) of the Evidence Act,
  • Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act

    Vallibhai Ibrahim Accused v. Emperor Opposite Party.

    Beaumont, C.J:— This is an application in revision in which the accused persons ask us to set aside their convictions under the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act No. 4 of 1887. The learned Magistrate held that the burden was upon the accused to prove their innocence, relying upon the presumption against the accused which is raised by S. 7 of the Act. Now the learned Magistrate was quite right in raising that presumption if the premises of the accused had been searched under a warrant lawfully issued under S. 6 of the Act, but the presumption under S. 7 does not arise unless there has been a proper search warrant under S. 6. It is said that the warrant of search purported to be issued in this case under S. 6 is invalid on two grounds. In the first place it is said that the warrant, although it states that a complaint on oath has been made, does not state that the Assistant I Superintendent of Police who issued the warrant had reason to suspect that the house in question was used as a common gaming house, that is to say, that the warrant does not show on the face of it 1 that the conditions precedent under S. 6 have been complied with. In my opinion there is no validity in the objection. It is I think, usually desirable that a warrant issued under the terms of a particular statute should show on its face that the conditions precedent required by the statute have been complied with, but it is not in my view essential that the warrant should so show. There is a presumption under Section 114, 111(e) of the Evidence Act, which enables us to presume that the officer issuing the warrant has performed his duty correctly, and until that presumption is displaced, it is not, in my opinion, necessary for the officer to give any evidence in the matter. In point of fact merely stating on the warrant that particular things have been, done would not afford any evidence that those things had been done.

    2. The other point taken is that the warrant incorrectly describes the house searched. The warrant recites that a complaint on oath has been made that a, house situate in census Nos. 4082 and 4083 in Kalupur Motimakeriwad and which is occupied by one Valibhai Ibrahim (who is accused 1) is used as a common gaming house.

    3. Now, in point of fact the two census numbers which were searched were census Nos. 1021 and 4082. It appears that on the first floor of this house are census Nos. 1021 and 4082, and on the ground floor are Nos. 1022 and 4083, and the warrant was intended to apply to the first floor, that is to say, Nos. 1021 and 4082, which are proved to be in the occupation of accused 1. It is, I think, clear on the authorities which Mr. Thakor has cited that if the warrant wrongly described the property to be searched, then it is a had warrant. But a description may be good in part and had in part, and it may be possible for the Court to reject the had part on the principle of “falsa demonstration non nocet.” The learned Government pleader suggests that we can do that here. He says that the property is described as census Nos. 4082 and 4083 occupied by accused 1, and he says that the governing part of the description is the statement of the occupation of the premises by accused 1, but I do not take that view. It is proved that No. 1021, which was the particular room in which the gaming instruments were found, is occupied by accused 1, but it is not proved that he does not occupy other numbers in the street, and it is not proved that he does not occupy 4082. It is not therefore proved that the description 4082 and 4083 occupied by accused 1 is an inaccurate description of any premises, and until it is shown that the description used is inaccurate in part no case for applying the maxim falsa demonstratio non nocet arises. I think therefore we have got here a warrant which incorrectly describes the premises to be searched and therefore the search of the room No. 1021, which is not included in the warrant is not a search in respect of which any presumptionch can arise under S. 7 of the Act. That being so, I think the learned Magistrate was in error in putting the burden of proof upon the accused and I think the conviction must be but aside.

    Nanavati, J.:— I agree.

    R.K

    4. Order accordingly.

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    Vallibhai Ibrahim Accused v. Emperor Opposite Party.
    (Aug 3, 1932)