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  • 8, 11, 12, 17 of the First Schedule, read with section 2 (n) (vi),
  • section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • sub-clauses (vi) of section 2 (n). Items 8, 11 and 12
  • sub-clause (vi) of section 2 (n).
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • section 33 (2) (b)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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  • 8, 11, 12, 17 of the First Schedule, read with section 2 (n) (vi),
  • section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • sub-clauses (vi) of section 2 (n). Items 8, 11 and 12
  • sub-clause (vi) of section 2 (n).
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • section 33 (2) (b)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, Hari Shanker Namdeo (respondent No. 1), was employed as a temporary lower division clerk at the Security Paper Mill, Hoshangabad, an establishment of the Central Government engaged in manufacture of paper for currency-notes. The Paper Mill's attestation form required disclosure of antecedents including prior employments; the form warned that furnishing false information or suppressing facts could lead to termination of service.

The respondent did not disclose a prior temporary employment as a lower division clerk in the office of the District and Sessions Judge, Hoshangabad (28 April 1962 to 26 October 1964). An enquiry led to his dismissal by order dated 23 November 1973. The respondent successfully challenged that dismissal in Miscellaneous Petition No. 369 of 1974 before the High Court, which set aside the dismissal on 25 August 1975 for want of reasonable opportunity. A fresh enquiry resulted in a second dismissal dated 23 November 1976.

At the time of the second dismissal an application by the respondent under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was pending before the Labour Court. The General Manager applied to the Labour Court under section 33(2)(b) for approval of the dismissal; the respondent argued he was a "protected workman" under section 33(3) and that the dismissal was mala fide victimization for his trade union activities. The Labour Court accepted the respondent's contentions and dismissed the General Manager's application by order dated 4 May 1977. The General Manager challenged the Labour Court's order by petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court (the present petition).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to grant or refuse approval/permission under section 33(2) or (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act in respect of the petitioner's dismissal of the respondent.
  2. Whether the Security Paper Mill, Hoshangabad — an undertaking run by the Central Government in the exercise of sovereign functions — falls within the statutory definition of "industry" under the Industrial Disputes Act.
  3. Whether, on the date the dismissal was passed, there was any conciliation proceeding or other proceeding in respect of an "industrial dispute" pending within the meaning of section 33(2), so as to render the Labour Court's jurisdiction inappropriate.
  4. Whether the Labour Court's finding that the dismissal was mala fide (amounting to victimization for trade union activities) was inconsistent with the earlier High Court finding in Misc. Petition No. 369 of 1974 and therefore unsustainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (General Manager / Petitioner)

  • The Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to grant or refuse approval under section 33(2) or (3) because the Security Paper Mill, being an undertaking of the Central Government in the exercise of sovereign functions, is not an "industry" within the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • There was no conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer or Board, nor any proceeding before an arbitrator or Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute pending within the meaning of section 33(2) on the date when the petitioner dismissed the respondent.
  • Procedurally, the petitioner had acquiesced in the Labour Court's jurisdiction by itself applying under section 33 for approval of dismissal and did not raise jurisdictional objections before the Labour Court; nevertheless, the petitioner later raised the jurisdictional point before the High Court after an adverse decision.
  • The Labour Court's finding of mala fides was said to be contrary to the earlier High Court decision which had held the first dismissal could not be characterized as mala fide.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent contended before the Labour Court that he was a "protected workman" falling under section 33(3) of the Act and that the dismissal was mala fide and constituted victimization on account of his trade union activities.
  • The respondent relied on the fact that the omission in the attestation form related to an earlier, innocuous employment; his service record from 1968 to 1973 was satisfactory; the imposition of the severest penalty (dismissal) for that omission after long blemish-free service pointed to victimization rather than legitimate disciplinary necessity.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M Is. Pannalal Bhinjraj v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397 (p. 412) Where a party acquiesces in the jurisdiction of a tribunal, that conduct disentitles it to relief later on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The Court relied on this principle to hold that the petitioner could not challenge the Labour Court's jurisdiction after having applied to it under section 33 and pursued the application without objection.
Sohan Singh v. The General Manager, Ordnance Factory, Khamaria, Jabalpur, C.A. No. 914 of 1972 (decided 18 March 1975) If the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not challenged before it, the point of want of jurisdiction cannot be raised for the first time in the High Court under Article 226. The Court cited this authority to reinforce that the petitioner, having not challenged jurisdiction before the Labour Court, could not raise it anew in Article 226 proceedings.
Arunachalam filial v. M/s. Southern Roadways Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 1191 (p. 1194) In some circumstances, an objection to jurisdiction that goes to the root of the matter and is founded on a subsequent decision may be raised despite non-raising earlier. The Court treated this precedent as permitting consideration of a jurisdictional objection based on a later Supreme Court decision (Bangalore Water Supply), and therefore examined whether the Security Paper Mill was an "industry".
The Moon Mills v. Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450 (pp. 1453–1454) Similar to Arunachalam filial: a later decision may permit a jurisdictional objection to be raised even if not raised earlier where the objection goes to the root. Used alongside Arunachalam filial to justify examination of the "industry" question in light of the subsequent Bangalore Water Supply decision.
Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, AIR 1978 SC 548 (and related opinions) Consideration of the "dominant nature" test and the treatment of sovereign functions; propositions that sovereign functions alone may not be included, and that severable units discharging industrial functions can be industries; observations by other judges that public utility activities may be treated as industries. The Court examined and applied the reasoning in Rajappa, noting that where the statute expressly or by necessary implication includes governmental undertakings (e.g., items in the First Schedule and section 2(n)(vi)), they fall within "industry". The Court concluded the Security Paper Mill is covered because it is included under "India Security Press" in the First Schedule and was declared a public utility service.
Management of Bank Note Press, Dewas v. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court & others, M.P. No. 80 of 1978 (Division Bench, decided 6 May 1978) Authority holding a Bank Note Press to be an "industry" within the meaning of the Act. The Court relied on this Division Bench decision as supporting the position that establishments like Bank Note Press (and by implication the Security Paper Mill) are industries under the Act.
Management of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. Their Workmen, AIR 1972 SC 763 When punishment is so disproportionate that no reasonable employer would impose it in like circumstances, a Tribunal may treat such punishment as evidence of victimization or unfair labour practice. The Court applied this principle to uphold the Labour Court's conclusion that the dismissal was disproportionate and therefore indicative of victimization/unfair labour practice.
Hind Construction & Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1965 SC 917 Earlier authority relied upon to support the view that disproportionate punishment may indicate victimization or unfair labour practice. Referenced as supportive precedent for the proposition applied by the Labour Court and accepted by this Court in upholding the mala fides/victimization finding.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two main analytical strands: (A) whether the petitioner could now challenge the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, and (B) whether, substantively, the Security Paper Mill was an "industry" and whether the Labour Court's mala fides finding was sustainable.

(A) Waiver/Acquiescence and Jurisdictional Challenge

The Court observed that the petitioner itself filed an application under section 33 seeking approval of the dismissal and pursued that application through the Labour Court without raising any objection to jurisdiction. Relying on M Is. Pannalal Bhinjraj and Sohan Singh, the Court held that a party who acquiesces in the jurisdiction of a tribunal disentitles itself to later contend want of jurisdiction in Article 226 proceedings. The Court emphasized prejudice to the respondent if the petitioner were permitted to contend belatedly that section 33 did not apply.

(B) Whether the Security Paper Mill is an "Industry"

The petitioner additionally argued that the Industrial Disputes Act did not apply because the Mill was run by the Central Government as part of sovereign functions. The Court engaged the Bangalore Water Supply (Rajappa) reasoning and related authorities, noting the distinction that where the Legislature has expressly or necessarily impliedly included governmental undertakings within the definition of "industry", the general principle excluding sovereign activity does not apply.

The Court pointed to section 2(j) (definition of "industry") and section 2(n) (definition of "public utility service"), and to the First Schedule to the Act which lists industries (items 8, 11, 12, 17 were mentioned in the quoted material). Items 8, 11 and 12 include defence establishments, India Government Mints and India Security Press — the latter encompassing the Security Paper Mill. The Court noted a Notification dated 13 April 1973 declaring the Security Paper Mill to be a public utility service under section 2(n)(vi). On this basis the Court concluded that the Act does apply and that the Security Paper Mill is an "industry" within the Act; accordingly the jurisdiction of the Labour Court could not be excluded on the ground that the Mill performed sovereign functions.

(C) Labour Court's Finding of Mala Fides and Victimization

On the merits of the mala fides finding, the Court explained that the Labour Court has a wider jurisdiction than the High Court under Article 226 when determining whether an order of dismissal amounts to victimization or an unfair labour practice. The earlier High Court writ decision (setting aside the first dismissal for want of reasonable opportunity and refusing to characterize that action as mala fide) did not bind the Labour Court in its broader inquiry under section 33.

The Labour Court's reasons — that the omitted employment was innocuous, that the respondent's subsequent service from 1968–1973 was satisfactory, that the manner and timing of the verification and the severity of the penalty (dismissal) were disproportionate and indicative of victimization — were treated as cogent by the Court. The Court applied authorities (Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. Their Workmen and Hind Construction) holding that a punishment so disproportionate as to be one no reasonable employer would impose could itself show victimization or unfair labour practice. Consequently, the Court concluded the Labour Court acted within jurisdiction in holding the dismissal to be mala fide and in rejecting the petitioner's application for approval.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The petition is dismissed. The Labour Court's order dated 4 May 1977 rejecting the General Manager's application under section 33 for approval of the dismissal is upheld.

Direct consequences on the parties:

  • The Labour Court's finding that the dismissal amounted to victimization/unfair labour practice stands.
  • The petitioner's challenge to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was rejected on the ground of its prior acquiescence in that jurisdiction; accordingly the Labour Court's order remains operative.
  • Costs were imposed on the petitioner (including counsel's fee Rs. 100, if certified), and the balance of the security deposit was ordered to be refunded to the petitioner.

Broader implications (as derived from the opinion):

  • The opinion affirms that a government undertaking expressly or by necessary implication included in the Act's provisions or in the First Schedule (and declared a public utility service) falls within the statutory definition of "industry" despite being run by the State in exercise of sovereign functions.
  • The Court emphasises the wider scope of Labour Court jurisdiction under the Industrial Disputes Act to inquire into victimization and unfair labour practices, distinct from the narrower writ-review jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 in cases concerning dismissal of government servants.

    General Manager, Security Paper Mill, Hoshangabad (M.P) v. Hari Shankar Namdeo And Another

    G. P. Singh C.J.:-

    Hari Shanker Namdeo, who is respondent No. 1 in this petition, was employed as a temporary lower division clerk in the Secu­rity Paper Mill, Hosahangabad, which is a Paper Mill established by the Central Government for manufacture of paper for printing currency-notes. Under the Rules of the Paper Mill, a person, before he is employed, is required to fill in a form known as 'Attestation Form' wherein he is required to furnish details of his antecedents including all previous employments. The attestation form contains a warning that if the fact that false information has been furnished or that there has been suppression of any factual information in the attestation form comes to notice at any time during the service of the person, his services would be liable to be terminated. Respondent No. 1 in his attestation form did not disclose that he was employed temporarily as a lower division clerk in the office of the District and Sessions Judge, Hoshangabad, during the period from 28th April 1962 to 26th October 1964. An enquiry was held against the respondent for suppression of this information and he was dismissed from service by order dated 23rd November 1973. The respondent challenged the order of dismissal before the High Court in Miscel­laneous Petition No. 369 of 1974 which was allowed by a Division Bench by order dated 25th August 1975 on the ground that the respondent was not given reasonable opportunity to meet the charge on which he was dismissed. A fresh enquiry was thereafter held against the respondent and he was again dismissed by order dated 23rd November 1976. At the time when the second order of dismissal was passed, an application made by the respondent under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was pending before the Labour Court. The General Manager of the Security Paper Mill applied to the Labour Court under section 33 (2) (b) for approval of the order of dis­missal. The respondent contended before the Labour Court that he was a "protected workman" and so his case fell under section 33 (3) and that the order of dismissal was passed mala fide to victimize him for his trade union activities. Both the contentions raised by the respondent were accepted by the Labour Court and the application made by the General Manager was dismissed by order dated 4th May 1977. It is this order which the General Manager challenges by this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    2. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to grant or refuse approval or permission to the petitioner for dismissing the respondent under sub-sec­tion (2) or (3) of section 33 of the Act and the entire proceeding taken by the petitioner for obtaining the approval or permission by the Labour Court was without jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction for two reasons : (i) that the Security Paper Mill, Hoshangabad, being an undertaking established by the Central Government in the exercise of its sovereign functions, was not an "industry"; and (ii) that there was no conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or any proceeding before an arbitrator or a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute pending within the meaning of section 33(2) on the date when the petitioner dismissed the respondent. The first hurdle before the learned counsel for the petitioner in advancing the contention of want of jurisdiction is that the petitioner him­self made the application before the Labour Court for approval of the dis­missal order and did not at any stage question the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It was only when the decision of the Labour Court went against the petitioner that he took up the point of want of jurisdiction in this petition before us.

    3. In M Is. Pannalal Bhinjraj v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397 at p. 412 it was held by the Supreme Court that if the petitioners acquisced in the jurisdiction of the tribunal, their conduct would disentitle them to any relief on the ground of want of jurisdiction. More recently in Sohan Singh v. The General Manager, Ordnance Factory, Khamaria, Jabalpur, C. A. No. 914 of 1972, decided on the 18th March 1975 the Supreme Court again held that if the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not challenged, the point of want of jurisdiction cannot be raised for the first time in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The conduct of the petitioner in filing the application under section 33 of the Act for approval of the dismissal order and in pursuing that application till the end without raising any objection as to jurisdiction completely disentitles the petitioner to challenge the jurisdic­tion of the Labour Court in passing the impugned order. Had the petitioner not filed the application under section 33 of the Act or had he withdrawn it on the ground that no permission for or approval of the dismissal order was necessary for the reason that there was no proceeding in respect of an indus­trial dispute pending within the meaning of section 33 on the date when the dismissal order was passed, the respondent could have challenged the order by raising an industrial dispute under section 2-A of the Act and could have obtained a decision on the dispute under section 2-A. If the petitioner is now allowed to contend that the conditions for the applicability of section 33 were not satisfied and, therefore, the application made by him ought to have been dismissed by the Labour Court, that would seriously prejudice the res­pondent. In our opinion, therefore, the petitioner cannot be allowed to contend before us that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application made by the petitioner as there was no proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute pending before it at the time when the order of dismissal was passed.

    4. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court is, however, also attacked on the ground that the Industrial Disputes Act as a whole had no application because the Security Paper Mill in which the respondent was employed is not an "industry" as it is being run by the Central Government in the exercise of its sovereign functions. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that this argument became available to the petitioner in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, AIR 1978 SC 548 after passing of the order by the Labour Court. There is some authority for the proposition that if an objection as to jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter and is based on a decision rendered after the impugned order, non-raising of the objection before the Labour Court or Tribunal does not stand as a bar for raising that objection under Article 226 of the Consti­tution; Arunachalam filial v. M/s. Southern Roadways Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 1191 at p. 1194 and The Moon Mills v. Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450, at pp. 1453 and 1454. In view of these authorities, we have to examine the question whether the Security Paper Mill is an "industry" or not.

    5. As earlier stated, the learned counsel for the petitioner strongly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board's case (supra) for the proposition that undertakings of the Government of India in the exercise of its sovereign functions do not fall within the definition of "industry". Our attention in this connection was drawn to propositions IV (b) and IV (c) in the judgment of K. Iyer J. at page 596 of the report. These propositions read as follows;

    "IV. The dominant nature test:

    (a) * * *

    (b) Notwithstanding the previous classes, sovereign functions, strictly understood, (alone) qualify for exemption, and not the welfare activities or economic adventures undertaken by Government or statutory bodies.

    (c) Even in departments discharging sovereign functions, if there are units which are industries and they are substantially severable, then they can be considered to come within section 2 (j)."

    The learned counsel for the petitioner did not dispute that it is open to the Legislature to include even undertakings established by the Government in the exercise of its sovereign functions within the definition of "industry". The general observations of K. Iyer J. quoted above, cannot be read to mean that even if an industry is expressly or by necessary implication included in the definition of "industry", it should be excluded on the ground that it is an undertaking established in the exercise of sovereign functions. It is only when there is no express or necessarily implied mention of a Governmental undertaking as an industry that the tests laid down by K. Iyer J. have to be applied. The definition of "industry" as given in section 2 (j) of the Act does not expressly exclude the Governmental undertakings established in the exercise of sovereign functions. Section 2 (n) of the Act defines "public utility service". Sub-clause (vi) of this definition includes within it any industry specified in the First Schedule which the appropriate Government may, if satisfied that public emergency or public interest so requires, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a public utility service for the purposes of the Act, for such period as may be specified in the notifica­tion. The First Schedule to the Act contains a list of industries which may be declared to be public utility services under sub-clauses (vi) of section 2 (n). Items 8, 11 and 12 of the First Schedule specify defence establishments, India Government Mints and India Security Press respectively as the industries which can be declared to be public utility services. Even assuming that these industries are established by the Central Government in the exercise of its sovereign functions, yet it is clear that the intention of the Act was to include them within the definition of "industry", otherwise they would not have been mentioned in the First Schedule. By necessary implication, there­fore, Defence establishments, India Government Mints and India Security Press are industries within the Act. The Security Paper Mill is included within "India Security Press" mentioned at item No. 12 in the First Schedule as is clear from the Notification, dated 13th April 1973, under which the Central Government declared the Security Paper Mill to be a public utility service under sub-clause (vi) of section 2 (n). We may also mention that Chandrachud C. J. in the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board's Case, AIR 1978 SC 969, pp. 972, 973 observed that he sought no justification for excepting the categories of public utility activities in the definition of "industry". He further observed that it should make no difference whether, on the one hand, an activity is under­taken by a corporate body in the discharge of its statutory functions or, on the other, by the State itself in the exercise of its inalienable functions. He then stated:

    "If the water supply and Sewerage schemes or fire righting establish­ments run by a municipality can be industries, so ought to be the manufac­ture of coins and currency, arms and ammunition and the winning of oil and uranium. The fact that these latter kinds of activities are, or can only be, undertaken by the State does not furnish any answer to the question whether these activities are industries. When undertaken by a private individual they are industries. Therefore, when undertaken by the State, they are industries. "He also observed that items 8, 11, 12, 17 of the First Schedule, read with section 2 (n) (vi), rendered support to this view. We may also refer to the observations of Beg C. J. in the same case where he said that he was "impressed by the argument that certain public utility services which are carried out by Governmental agencies or Corporations are treated by the Act itself as within the sphere of industry." (p. 556 of the report). We are not here concerned with the general principle ennunciated by K. Iyer J. That principle, as earlier stated, has no application where a Governmental undertaking is, by express or necessary implication, treated as an "industry" by the provisions of the Act. As pointed out by us, the Security Paper Mill, with which we are concerned here, is, by necessary implication, included as an "industry" under the Act. The application of the Act to this Governmental under­taking cannot be excluded on any general principle that it is undertaken in fulfilment of the State's sovereign functions. We may also mention that a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Management of Bank Note Press, Dewas v. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court and others, M. P. No. 80 of 1978, decided on the 6th May 1978 held that the Bank Note Press, Dewas was an "industry" within the meaning of the Act. We have, therefore, no hesita­tion in rejecting the argument that the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction on the ground that the Security Paper Mill is not an "Industry."

    6. The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the find­ing of the Labour Court that the order of dismissal was mala fide is contrary to the finding reached by the High Court earlier in Miscellaneous Petition No. 369 of 1964. The Labour Court in support of its finding relied on the following circumstances : The information that the respondent was employed in the office of the District and Sessions Judge, Hoshangabad at some stage prior to his entering service in the Security Paper Mill was an innocuous information. The record of service of the respondent from 1968 to 1973 when the disciplinary proceedings were first started against him for omission to give the aforesaid information in the attestation form was entirely satis­factory. These was nothing on the record to show as to how the Manage­ment became interested to the history of the respondent and how and why an occasion arose for seeking a verification of the attestation form. Digging out a technical omission to furnish an innocuous stale factual information followed by the most severe penalty of dismissal from service was shocking and such a shocking punishment was clear evidence of victimization. The Labour Court further observed that in its opinion the punishment was harsh, unjust and oppressive and was indicative of mala fides and unfair labour practice, the ulterior motive being to victimize the employee for his trade union activities even when he was performing his official duties faith­fully and with devotion. In the earlier writ petition which was decided by the High Court the respondent challenged the first order of dismissal also on the ground of mala fides. The High Court observed that the organisation where the respondent was employed dealt with the manufacture of paper for being used as currency-notes and that in such an organisation it was expected that persons would be allowed to enter into service only after through and strict scrutiny about their antecedents. It was also observed that had the petitioner disclosed that he was earlier employed in the District Court establishment, his conduct and antecedents during that period could have been got verified and that it did not matter that the respondent's service was terminated as no longer required. The Court further observed that it was not possible to hold that the action taken by the Management was mala fide in any manner. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that this finding of the High Court in respect of the first order of dismissal of the respondent should have been accepted by the Labour Court for decid­ing the application made by the petitioner under section 33. We are unable to agree The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in adjudging the validity of an order of dismissal of a Govern­ment servant is not the same which the Labour Court exercises in deciding whether permission or approval regarding an order of dismissal of an employee should or should not be granted under section 33. The jurisdic­tion of the Labour Court is much wider. The Labour Court can go into the question whether the dismissal of an employee amount to victimization or unfair labour practice. It is in this context that the finding of mala fides has been reached by the Labour Court. The questions of victimization and unfair labour practice are not matters for adjudication under Article 226 of the Constitution when a writ petition is filed by a Government servant. In our opinion, the Labour Court was not concluded by the finding reached in the earlier writ petition and could examine the question whether the order of dismissal, in the circumstances of the case, amounted to victimization or unfair labour practice and was, therefore, tainted with mala fides. The reasons given by the Labour Court for holding that it was a case of victimiza­tion are cogent. Even before us the learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to say as to how the omission to state in the attestation form that the respondent was previously employed in the District Court establishment, Hoshangabad, was so serious a lapse that it justified the award of the severest penalty of dismissal after sufficiently long service which was otherwise without any blemish. It was also not explained as to what was wrong with the respondent's antecedents and as to how the omission in the attestation form was dug out in 1973. The Labour Court had thus enough material to con­clude that the respondent was being victimized for his trade union activities. In the Management of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. Their Workmen, AIR 1972 SC 763 it was held by the Supreme Court that when the punishment was so disproportionate that no reasonable employer would ever have imposed it in like circumstance, the Tribunal may treat the imposition of such punishment as itself showing victimization or unfair labour practice. In holding so, the Court relied upon its earlier decision in Hind Construction & Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen ., AIR 1965 SC 917 In our opinion, the Labour Court acted within its jurisdiction in holding that the dismissal of the respon­dent amounted to victimization or unfair labour practice and in rejecting the application for approval.

    7. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 100, if certified. The balance amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner.

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    General Manager, Security Paper Mill, Hoshangabad (M.P) v. Hari Shankar Namdeo And Another
    (Jan 20, 1979)