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Case Number

Writ Petn. No. 77 of 1962

Advocates

V.S.Malhotra
for Petitioners
Advocate General and L.D.Grover
for Opposite Parties.

Judges

Hon'ble Sh. Justice K.V. Gopala Krishnan Nair

Acts

Section 153-C of the Companies Act. Sub-clause 3(a)(1) to Sec. 153-C
1961 Mad 244, Section 55(2) of the Muslim Wakfs Act, 1954,
Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act (1947),
Section 10(4) of the Factories Act (1934)
provisions of section 92 of the Code

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The four petitioners obtained written consent from the first respondent (the Deputy Commissioner, Jammu) to institute a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) against the second respondent and others. Acting on that consent, the petitioners instituted a suit in the court of the District Judge at Jammu. While that suit was pending, the second respondent applied to the Deputy Commissioner to revoke the earlier consent. The Deputy Commissioner issued notice to the petitioners, who contended that the Deputy Commissioner was not competent to revoke the consent during the pendency of the suit. The Deputy Commissioner overruled the petitioners' objection and concluded that he had power to review or revoke the consent previously given. The petitioners therefore filed the present writ petition seeking certiorari or another appropriate writ, order or direction to prevent the Deputy Commissioner from revoking the consent.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Deputy Commissioner, in granting consent under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity (so as to make his act amenable to review by certiorari), or whether he performs an administrative/executive function.
If the Deputy Commissioner acts in an administrative capacity, whether he may nonetheless revoke or review his consent after a suit has been validly instituted on the basis of that consent and while the suit is pending in a civil court.
What is the appropriate writ remedy (for example, certiorari or mandamus) to restrain the Deputy Commissioner from revoking consent in the present circumstances.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented)

Counsel for the petitioners (Mr. Vidya Sagar) contended that the Deputy Commissioner, in according the sanction required by Section 92, was exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function and therefore could not review or revoke his order except where a statutory right of review is expressly provided.
The petitioners also argued that the Deputy Commissioner was not competent to revoke the consent while the suit instituted on that consent was pending in the civil court, and that such a revocation would improperly affect the jurisdiction and course of the pending litigation.

Respondents' Arguments (as presented)

The learned Advocate General for the first respondent argued that the Deputy Commissioner, in giving consent under Section 92, acted in a purely administrative capacity (not judicial or quasi-judicial).
The second respondent sought revocation of the consent; the Deputy Commissioner accepted the view that he was competent to review or revoke the consent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R. v. Electricity Commissioners, (1924) 1 KB 171 (Atkin, L.J.)	When a body with legal authority to determine questions affecting rights and having a duty to act judicially acts in excess of its authority, it is subject to the King's Bench Division's writ jurisdiction.	The Court applied the test embodied in this decision to examine whether the Deputy Commissioner satisfied the conditions of being a quasi-judicial functionary; the Court concluded those conditions were not met in the context of Section 92.
R. v. Legislative Committee of Church Assembly, (1928) 1 KB 411 (Hewart, C.J.)	Decisive test: whether the statute requires the tribunal to act judicially determines whether it is quasi-judicial.	The Court relied on this test to determine that, since Section 92 does not require the Deputy Commissioner to act judicially, he is not a quasi-judicial authority for these purposes.
Shantanand v. Advocate General, AIR 1955 All 372	Advocate General's act in giving consent under Section 92 is administrative/executive, not quasi-judicial.	The Court cited this Division Bench decision as direct authority supporting the view that consent under Section 92 is administrative.
Shrimali Lal v. Advocate General, AIR 1955 Raj 166	Same proposition: consent by Advocate General under analogous provision is administrative.	Used as further High Court authority in support of the administrative characterization of Section 92 consent.
Abu Backer Adam Sait v. Advocate General of Trav-Co. State, AIR 1954 Trav-Co 331	Held that consent by Advocate General under the provision in question was quasi-judicial (contrary line of authority).	The Court noted this decision but considered it to be in a minority line and ultimately preferred the other authorities which treated consent as administrative.
A.K. Bhaskar v. Advocate General, AIR 1962 Kerala 90 (Full Bench)	Overruled the Travancore decision (AIR 1954 Trav. Co. 331).	The Court relied on the Full Bench overruling to strengthen its conclusion that the consent is administrative rather than quasi-judicial.
Sadhu Singh v. Mangalgir Mohatmim Dera, AIR 1956 Pepsu 65	Followed the Travancore decision (i.e., found consent to be quasi-judicial under the relevant provision).	The Court mentioned this decision but rejected that line of authority and preferred the decisions finding the act administrative.
Abdul Kasim v. Md. Dawood, AIR 1961 Mad 244	Granting consent under Section 55(2) of the Muslim Wakfs Act, 1954 is an administrative act.	Presented as an analogous statutory example supporting the administrative character of consent to sue under statutory schemes; the Court relied on it as persuasive authority.
Gajadhar Lakshiram v. Emperor, AIR 1948 Nag 277	Sanction by District Magistrate for prosecution under Section 10(4) of the Factories Act is an executive function, not judicial.	Quoted to demonstrate that statutory sanctions or permissions may be administrative even if a hearing opportunity exists; used to support the conclusion about Section 92.
In the matter of Kalagava Bapiah, ILR 27 Mad 54	Granting sanction under Section 197 CrPC is an executive, not a judicial, act.	Used as another analogous authority to show that statutory sanctioning powers are frequently administrative in character.
State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy, AIR 1953 SC 53	Reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act is administrative; forming an opinion as a preliminary step does not convert it into a judicial act.	Relied upon to emphasize that forming an opinion or applying the mind does not necessarily make a function judicial; supports the administrative characterization.
Nanhoobeg v. Gulam Hussain, AIR 1951 Nag 394	In that case the Collector's later order was an amplification of the original order, and crucially the suit had not been filed before the "amplification"; thus not a revocation during pendency.	The Court held this authority did not support the respondents because the facts differed: in Nanhoobeg the so-called review was an amplification prior to filing, whereas in the present case the attempted revocation was while the suit was already pending.
Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. I. A. Nageshwara Rao, AIR 1956 SC 213	Validity of a petition or application must be judged by facts at the time of presentation; subsequent withdrawal of required consents does not, absent statutory provision, defeat maintainability.	The Court applied this principle by analogy to conclude that a suit duly instituted after obtaining consent under Section 92 remains maintainable even if consent is subsequently revoked.
State of Bihar v. D.N. Ganguly, AIR 1958 SC 1018	Authority for issuing writs such as mandamus in appropriate circumstances (cited by the Court in relation to choice of remedy).	The Court referred to this Supreme Court decision when determining that a writ of mandamus (rather than certiorari) was the appropriate remedy to restrain the Deputy Commissioner from revoking consent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two main analytical stages: first, whether the Deputy Commissioner acted judicially or administratively in granting consent under Section 92; and second, whether the Deputy Commissioner could revoke that consent after a suit had been instituted on its basis.

1. Characterisation of the function under Section 92:

The Court examined Section 92 and found nothing in its terms that imposed a duty on the Deputy Commissioner to act judicially in granting consent.
Relying on authorities (including English authorities such as R. v. Electricity Commissioners and R. v. Legislative Committee of Church Assembly), the Court applied the test of whether the statute requires a judicial standard and process. The Court emphasised that an act is not rendered quasi-judicial merely because it affects rights or requires application of mind; rather, a quasi-judicial act presupposes the application of judicial process and procedural safeguards, and typically entails adjudication of rights.
The Court concluded that the Deputy Commissioner under Section 92 is only required to satisfy himself prima facie whether consent should be given; he is not required to adjudicate rights, and he is not even bound to hear the persons against whom the suit is proposed. The court alone decides rights between parties.
The Court surveyed Indian High Court and other authority decisions (Shantanand, Shrimali Lal, Abdul Kasim, Gajadhar Lakshiram, Kalagava Bapiah, State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy) and found persuasive support for treating the consent as administrative in character. The Court expressly preferred the line of authorities holding the function to be administrative and rejected the contrary Travancore line (Abu Backer Adam Sait and the related Pepsu decision) as unpersuasive, noting that a Kerala Full Bench had overruled the Travancore decision.

2. Power to revoke consent after suit is instituted:

Even assuming the Deputy Commissioner acted in an administrative capacity, the Court addressed whether he may revoke his consent while a suit instituted on that consent is pending.
The Court held that once a suit is laid pursuant to the sanction accorded under Section 92, the authority that granted the sanction becomes functus officio with respect to the suit and no longer has jurisdiction to take action which would affect the suit. The civil court becomes seised of the matter and the Deputy Commissioner cannot, by revoking consent, affect the jurisdiction or course of the pending litigation.
The Court reasoned that permitting such revocation would allow an executive authority to interfere indirectly with the judicial process and could result in interference at any stage (even up to the ultimate appeal), a result inconsistent with the scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure and not apparently contemplated by the legislature.
The Court applied the principle from Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. I. A. Nageshwara Rao that the validity of proceedings must be judged by facts at the time of institution and that subsequent withdrawal of required consents does not, absent statutory provision, affect maintainability. From this, the Court concluded that a subsequent revocation of consent would not render a suit invalid or non-maintainable.
The Court examined Nanhoobeg v. Gulam Hussain and found it distinguishable because in Nanhoobeg the later order was an amplification of the original sanction and the suit had not been filed before the amplification; thus it did not support the respondents' position that a revocation while a suit is pending is permissible.

3. Choice of remedy:

The petitioners had sought certiorari or other writs; the Court observed that certiorari traditionally issues against bodies performing quasi-judicial functions. Since the Court concluded the Deputy Commissioner was an administrative authority, certiorari was not the most appropriate remedy.
Given the facts and the relief sought, and with reference to State of Bihar v. D.N. Ganguly, the Court determined that a writ of mandamus restraining the Deputy Commissioner from revoking the consent was the appropriate and effective remedy.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed and a writ of Mandamus is issued restraining the Deputy Commissioner from revoking the consent which he had earlier accorded and on the basis of which the suit in the District Court has been instituted. The Court declined to issue certiorari because the Deputy Commissioner was held to be exercising an administrative, not quasi-judicial, function.

Implications:

Direct effect on parties: The Deputy Commissioner is restrained from revoking the consent he had given; the suit instituted in the District Court remains maintainable and must be proceeded with in accordance with law.
Legal consequence articulated by the Court: Once a suit is instituted pursuant to a statutory consent, the authority granting that consent becomes functus officio with respect to the suit and cannot, by subsequent revocation, affect the jurisdiction or course of proceedings in the civil court.
Remedy guidance: For administrative authorities who grant consent under Section 92, a subsequent attempt to revoke consent while litigation is pending should be resisted by the court by way of mandamus where appropriate, because certiorari is not the correct remedy against administrative acts of this nature.
Precedential statement: The Court expressly preferred and followed the line of authorities treating such statutory consents as administrative acts and rejected contrary decisions from another line. The opinion thus records the Court's reliance on multiple authorities in support of the administrative character of Section 92 consent and the proposition that later revocation does not defeat a validly instituted suit.

Disposition: Petition allowed. No order as to costs.

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Desraj And Others v. Deputy Commissioner, Jammu And Others Opposite Parties.

1. The four petitioners ask for a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ, order or direction for the purpose of ensuring that the first respondent, the Dy. Commissioner Jammu, does not revoke the consent which was accorded by him to the petitioners for instituting a suit under Section 92 of the CPC against the second respondent and some others. The facts leading up to this petition lie within a brief compass and are not in dispute. The petitioners successfully applied to the first respondent for necessary consent for instituting a suit under Section 92 of the CPC against the second respondent and others. After obtaining the consent, they instituted the suit in the court of the District Judge at Jammu. While the suit was pending, the second respondent moved the first respondent for revoking the consent. The first respondent thereupon caused notice to issue to the petitioners. The petitioners resisted the application of the second respondent on the ground, inter-alia, that the first respondent was not competent to revoke during the pendency of the suit the consent which was validly given by him. The first respondent over-ruled that objection and held that he was competent to review or revoke the consent which was previously accorded by him to the petitioner. The petitioners have therefore moved this court in writ.

2. The first contention urged by Mr. Vidya Sagar learned counsel for the petitioners is that the first respondent in according the sanction for laying an action under Sec. 92 of the Code exercised a judicial or a quasi-judicial function and could not therefore seek to review his order unless a right of review was expressly conferred by statute. The learned Advocate General appearing for the first respondent has on the other hand contended that in giving consent under Sec. 92 the first respondent acted purely in an administrative capacity it, therefore, falls for determination whether the first respondent in according sanction under S. 92 of the CPC acted as a judge or a quasi-judge. There is nothing in the terms of Sec. 92 itself which enjoins upon a Dy. Commissioner the duty to act judicially in granting the required consent. Nor does the essential nature of the function he has to exercise under this section partake of any judicial process. In R. v. Electricity Commrs., (1924) 1 KB 171, Atkin, L.J pronounced the rule as follows:

“Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs.”

3. Hewart, C.J in R. v. Legislative Committee of Church Assembly, (1928) 1 KB 411 at p. 415 pointed out that the decisive test to determine whether a Tribunal set up under a statute is required to act in a quasi-judicial or merely in an administrative capacity is to see whether the statute requires the Tribunal to act judicially.

4. Cases where the statute itself requires the authority to act judicially can hardly present any difficulty. But from the mere circumstance that a statute does not expressly so require, one cannot infer that the authority is not bound to act judicially. An act is not necessarily quasi-judicial merely because it affects the rights of subjects, nor does the circumstance that the statutory authority has to apply its mind to the materials before it afford an infallible criterion. Even in Performing an administrative act the authority will have to apply its mind to the materials before it. But the distinction seems to lie in the method and manner of its arriving at the determination. A quasi-judicial act necessarily presupposes the application of some judicial process there is an unmistakable distinction between forming a personal or subjective opinion about a matter and arriving at a conclusion judicially. This necessary element of judicial procedure marks off the region of administrative action from that of quasi-judicial determination.

5. Even if the statute does not say so in express and explicit words, it must be possible to spell out from its relevant provisions that a certain judicial standard was required to be observed and a degree of Judicial process to be followed by the statutory functionary. If the existence of this crucial element cannot be inferred from the provisions of the statute, it will be wrong to hold that the statutory authority is a quasi-judge. There is, as I already indicated, nothing in the provisions of section 92 of the Code to warrant the inference that the Dy. Commissioner in according his consent under that section is bound to follow any judicial process or to act in conformity with recognized judicial norms. Because stress the absence of any duty to act judicially on the part of the Dy. Commissioner, I should not be understood as saying that the Dy. Commissioner acting under section 92 is called upon to determine any question affecting the rights of the parties. His function, is only to satisfy himself prima facie whether consent should be given to the institution of a suit under Sec. 92 and not to adjudicate upon any right of a party. Indeed, he is not bound before giving his consent to hear the persons against whom the suit is proposed to be laid. It is for the court and the court alone to decide upon the Tights of the respective parties and not for the Dy. Commissioner.

6. It cannot, therefore, be said that any of the conditions postulated by Atkin, L.J in (1924) 1 KB 171 (supra), is satisfied in a case of giving or declining to give consent under Sec. 92. I am, therefore, unable to hold on principle that the Dy. Commissioner in exercising functions under Section 92 of the CPC acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. The decisions of several High Courts also point in the same direction.

7. In Shantanand v. Advocate General, (S) AIR 1955 All 372 a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the act of the Advocate General in giving his consent to the institution of the suit under Sec. 92 cannot be called a quasi-judicial act but that it is merely an administrative and executive act.

8. To the same effect is the decision of a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Shrimali Lal v. Advocate General, (S) AIR 1955 Raj 166.

9. Both these decisions have expressly dissented from a decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Abu Backer Adam Sait v. Advocate General of Trav-Co. State, AIR 1954 Trav-Co 331.

10. A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in A.K Bhaskar… v. Advocate General…., AIR 1962 Kerala 90, has since over-ruled the decision in AIR 1954 Trav. Co. 331 (supra).

11. In Sadhu Singh v. Mangalgir Mohatmim Dera, AIR 1956 Pepsu 65 the decision in AIR 1954 Trav. Co. 331 (supra), has been followed. But these two decisions stand in the same category and do not commend themselves to me. I prefer to follow the other line of decisions already noticed.

12. The decisions rendered on analogous provisions of other statutes also point to the unacceptability of AIR 1954 Trav. Co. 331 and AIR 1956 Pepsu 65 (supra). In Abdul Kasim v. Md. Dawood, AIR 1961 Mad 244, Section 55(2) of the Muslim Wakfs Act, 1954, was considered. Under this provision no suit to obtain any of the reliefs referred to in Sec. 55(1) of that Act relating to a Wakf could be instituted by any person or authority other than the Board without the consent in writing of the Board. The question arose whether in granting or withholding sanction to a person to file a suit the Wakf Board acts in a judicial or a quasi-judicial capacity. The Madras High Court held that the granting of consent under Sec. 55(2) was only an administrative act.

13. In Gajadhar Lakshiram v. Emperor, AIR 1948 Nag 277, the question was whether a District Magistrate sanctioning prosecution under Section 10(4) of the Factories Act (1934) acts in a judicial capacity or not Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) held:

“The action of the District Magistrate who acts under Sec. 10(4) of the Act as an Inspector is not a judicial function.

Thus, sanction by the District Magistrate to prosecute the manager of a factory for offences under the Act is not a judicial but an executive function. It is true that the rules give the manager of the factory concerned an opportunity to represent his case but that is entirely with a view to avoiding unnecessary prosecutions. Indeed there is no warrant for such a hearing in the Act itself.”

14. In In the matter of Kalagava Bapiah, ILR 27 Mad 54 it was pointed out that granting of sanction under Section 197 of the Cr PC is not a judicial act but only an executive act.

15. In State of Madras v. C.P Sarathy, AIR 1953 SC 53, the Supreme Court held that in making a reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act (1947), the appropriate Government is doing an administrative act and the fact that it has to form an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial dispute as a preliminary step to the discharge of his function does not make it any the less administrative in character.

16. In view of these authorities it does not appear to me to be tenable to contend that in according his consent to the institution of a suit under Section 92 of the CPC the Dy. Commissioner is exercising a quasi-judicial function and is not performing merely an administrative act.

17. This does not, however, dispose of the controversy between the parties. The question arises whether even if the Dy. Commissioner first respondent has given his consent under Sec. 92 in his administrative capacity it is open to him to revoke that consent while a suit instituted in pursuance of that consent is pending in a civil court. The consent is a necessary preliminary or a condition precedent to the institution of a suit. If the suit has been validly instituted on a duly obtained consent, it does not appear to me to be open to the Dy. Commissioner to seek to revoke his consent and thereby seek to affect the fortunes of the pending litigation. Once the civil court has seisin of the matter, I do not think the Dy. Commissioner can on any principle do any act so as to affect the court's jurisdiction to deal with the suit according to Law. The suit Has to take its course according to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the Dy. Commissioner or any other authority empowered to accord consent under Sec. 92 cannot interfere with its course. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to saying that an executive authority is entitled to interfere although indirectly with the normal course of a suit of which a civil court is seized. It seems to me that such an unusual result cannot be supported on any reasoning or any construction of Sec. 92.

18. Once a suit is laid pursuant to the sanction accorded by the authority specified under Sec. 92, that authority becomes functus officio and does not have jurisdiction to take any action in respect of the suit which he would be doing if he were permitted to revoke his consent to the institution of the suit. No provision of law clothes the person competent to accord consent under Sec. 92 with such a far-reaching power to interfere with proceedings in a court of law. To allow any such power would run counter to the entire scheme and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and will amount to permitting a person to do indirectly what he is forbidden from doing directly. Furthermore, if such a power is conceded to the Dy. Commissioner it will be open to him to exercise it at any stage of the litigation even when it has reached the stage of ultimate appeal. The conferment of a power the exercise of which would involve such extraodinary consequences could not have been in the contemplation of the legislature. I, therefore have no doubt that in the present case the Dy. Commissioner has no jurisdiction or authority to revoke his consent and thereby seek to affect the suit which is pending in the district court.

19. The learned Advocate General has however pressed upon me a ruling of a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Nanhoobeg v. Gulam Hussain, AIR 1951 Nag 394. This decision does not seem to support him. There, the Collector did not seek to review or revoke his consent pending a suit. The following passage from the judgment at p. 395 clearly demonstrates this:

“The original sanction is dated 17-12-1934 and what has been termed a review is nothing more than an amplification of the original order. That was on 19-1-1935. The suit was not filed till 12-2-1935, so the two read together constitute a valid sanction.”

20. This decision cannot, therefore, avail the respondents in the present case.

21. The instant case presents another aspect as well. The validity of a suit so far as the present question of consent is concerned has to be judged at the time of its institution and if it was instituted after obtaining the required consent under Section 92 of the CPC, a subsequent withdrawal of that consent affect (sic) the maintainability or the validity of the suit. This is the principle which was adopted in Rajahmundry Electric Supplycorporation Ltd. v. 1. A. Nageshwara Rao, (S) AIR 1956 SC 213. There an application was made under Section 153-C of the Companies Act. Sub-clause 3(a)(1) to Sec. 153-C provided that a member of a company is entitled to apply for relief only if he has obtained the consent in writing of not less than 100 members of the company or not less than 1/10th in number of the total members, whichever is less. One of the contentions raised before the Supreme Court was that after the application was made, 13 of the members who had consented to the filing of the application had withdrawn their consent and that therefore the application was incompetent as not being supported by the consent of the requisite number of members. This contention was repelled by the Supreme Court which held:

“The validity of a petition must be judged ort, the facts as they were at the time of to presentation, and a petition which was valid when presented cannot, in the absence of a provision to that effect in the statute, cease to be maintainable by reason of events subsequent to its presentation.

Thus where the applicant under Sec. 153-C has obtained the consent of not less than one-tenth in number of the members and has presented the application, the withdrawal of consent by some of those members subsequent to the presentation of the application cannot affect either the right of the applicant to proceed with the application or the jurisdiction of the Court to dispose of it on its own merits.”

22. The principle of this decision indicates that even if the Dy. Commissioner revokes his consent the suit will continue to be maintainable in law and has to be proceeded with according to law by the court in which it is pending. From this point of view it appears to be futile for the Dy. Commissioner to seek to continue proceedings for revoking the consent accorded by him. Thus, from more than one point of view this seems to me to be a fit case for forbidding the Dy. Commissioner to revoke the consent.

23. The question now is as to what order I, should issue to the Dy. Commissioner. The petitioners have asked for a writ of certiorari. But that writ can issue only to authorities entrusted with quasi-judicial functions. As the Dy. Commissioner, in the instant case is only an administrative functionary, I do not think a writ of certiorari is the appropriate writ to issue. But the petitioners have prayed for any other writ, order or direction as the circumstances of the case justify. I think the appropriate writ is a writ of Mandamus, restraining the Dy. Commissioner from revoking the consent which was accorded by him and on the basis, of which a suit has been instituted and is now pending in the district court (Please see State of Bihar v. D.N Ganguly, AIR 1958 SC 1018 at p. 1026). This petition is allowed and a writ of Mandamus will issue accordingly. I make no order as to costs in this proceeding.

FF/D.H.Z

24. Petition allowed.

Desraj And Others v. Deputy Commissioner, Jammu And Others Opposite Parties.

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented)

Respondents' Arguments (as presented)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Desraj And Others v. Deputy Commissioner, Jammu And Others Opposite Parties.

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