Umamaheswaram, J.:— This is an appeal directed against the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge, Warangal, dismissing the plaintiff's suit O.S No. 34/1 of 1956. The plaintiff advanced moneys to the defendant on four occasions. On 3-1-1953 the defendant borrowed a sum of Rs. 4,000/- on a promissory note. On 28-4-1953 he borrowed another sum of Rs. 3,500/- on a promissory note. On 18-5-1958 he borrowed a farther sum of Rs. 1,000/- and executed an agreement. The last borrowing was of Rs. 1,500/- on 22-5-1953 on a promissory note. The defendant contended that he had repaid the loans to the husband of the plaintiff and that no amount was due by him. He further raised a plea that in as much as the plaintiff did not obtain a licence under the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act (Act V of 1349F.) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the suit was not maintainable. The learned Subordinate Judge found that the defendant did not repay the amounts borrowed by him. He, however, dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff was a money-lender within the meaning of Sec. 2(7) of the Act. The learned judge took the view that she satisfied the definition of moneylender on the ground that she advanced the moneys to the defendant on four occasions. The question that falls to be determined in the present case is whether the plaintiff is a money-lender within the meaning of Sec. 2(7) of the Act?
2. According to Sec. 2(7) “money-lender” means a person including a pawn-broker who, within the meaning of this Act, only advanced loan in the ordinary course of his business, or dose so along with other business, and shall also include the legal representatives of such person and the person claiming to be his representative on the ground of succession or assignment or otherwise. It is now well settled that the burden of proof lies upon the defendant to establish that the plaintiff is a moneylender within the meaning of the Act and that the suit is consequently hit at by the provisions of the Act. This view is supported by the decision of this Court in Munagala Yadgiri… v. Pittala Veeriah…. 1958 A.L.T 543. The observations of Subbarao, C.J, are as follows:—
“Under this Act, a professional money-lender, who has not obtained a licence, cannot maintain a suit in a civil Court for recovery of the amount due to him. The Court shall dismiss his suit. But a person who seeks to non-suit the plaintiff should necessarily allege and establish that the plaintiff is a professional money-lender. Indeed, sub-section(2) of sec. 9, in clear terms, says that if it is proved that the plaintiff is a money-lender as defined in sub-sec. (7) of see. 2 but does not hold a licence, the court shall dismiss his suit. Obviously, the plaintiff cannot prove the negative, viz; that he is not a professional money leader. It is for the defendant to allege and prove that the plaintiff is a professional money-lender.”
3. This decision was followed by Manoher Pershad and Srinivasachari, JJ. in Wangapalli Laschiah v. Peddi Lakshmayya A.I.R 1960 A.P 272. The learned judges referred to an unreported decision of this court in Ram Cowd v. Ganti Reddy F.A No. 17/1/1954 dated 31-8-1959.. The contrary view taken by Qamar Hasan, J. in Hanmantrao v. Nulliah I.L.R 1952 Hyd. 17. is no longer good law. The learned Subordinate judge followed the decision of Qamar Hasan, J. in I.L.R 1952 Hyderabad 17, and wrongly cast the burden of proof on the plaintiff to establish that she was not a money-lender. His criticism that as the plaintiff has not entered the witness box every adverse inference should be drawn against her, is consequently erroneous. We have to decide on the facts of this case whether the defendant has established that the plaintiff was a money lender within the meaning of the Act. Plaintiff's husband was examined as D.W I. He deposed that the plaintiff had no other money lending transaction apart from the four transactions that she had entered into with the defendant at his (D.W 1's). instance and on his recommendation. The defendant who was examined as D.W 3 merely stated that he heard that the plaintiff had money-lending business. When cross-examined further, he admitted that he did not know to whom others she had lent moneys. What therefore is established in the particular case is that the plaintiff had on four different occasions during the months of April and May 1953 advanced moneys to the defendant at the instance of her husband who was well-known to him. It is strenuously contended by Sri Madhava Reddy, the learned advocate for the appellant-plaintiff that the four stray and isolated transactions do not attract the definition of moneylender.
4. As to what constitutes business of money lending is discussed in Hals-bury's Laws of England in the following terms:
“In order to establish that he is carrying on such a business it is not sufficient to prove that he had occasionally lent money at a remunerative rate of interest; it is necessary to prove some degree of system and continuity in his money lending transactions and some thing more that loans to friends or relatives. In considering whether a person is carrying on a business of money-lending all loans made by him must be taken into account.”
5. In Litchfield v. Dreyfus an identical question arose in regard to the construction of sec. 6 of the Moneylenders Act, 1900. Section 6 defines a money lender co be every person whose business is that of money-lending, or who……. holds himself out in any way as carrying on that business”. Dealing with that section Farewell, J., observed at page 589 as follows:—
“But not every man who lends money at interest carries on the business of money-lending Speaking generally, a man who carries on a money-lending business is one who is ready and willing to lend to all and sundry, provided that they are from his point of view eligible. I do not of course mean that a money-lender can evade the Act by limiting his clientele to those whom he chooses to designate as “friends” or otherwise: It is a question of fact in each case.”
6. On the facts of the particular case the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not carrying on money-lending business. This decision was followed by Walton J. in Newton v. Pyke. The learned judge held that in order to fall within the definition of money-lender it was not enough merely to allow that a man had on several occasions lent money at remunerative rates of interest; there must be a certain degree of system and continuity about the transactions. Dealing with the question as to what amounts to exercising a trade or carrying on a business, Lord Morris held in Grainger & Son v. Cough at page 343 as follows:—
“There can be no definition of the words “exercising a trade”. It is only another mode of expressing “carrying on a business” but it certainly carries with it the meaning that the business or trade must be habitually or systematically exercised, and that it cannot apply to isolated transactions.”
7. The same view was expressed by Mc. Cardie, J., in Edelow v. Mac Elwee though on the facts of the particular case the learned judge came to the conclusion that the solicitor was carrying on money-lending business. At page 206 arc the relevant observations, and they arc as follows:—
“A man does not become a money-lender by reason of occasional loans to relations, friends, or acquaintances, whether interest be charged or not. Nor does a man become a money-lender merely because he may upon one or several isolated occasions lend money to a stranger. These must be more than occasional and disconnected loans. There must be a business of money lending, and the word “business” imports the notion of system, repetition, and continuity; See Bewton v. Pyke (XXV Times Law Reports 127) per Walten J., Fagit v. Fine, (1911) 105 L.T 583 per Bankes and Lush JJ and Newman v. Oughton, (1911) I K.B 792 per Ridely and Avory JJ. The line of demarcation cannot be defined with closeness or indicated by any specific formula. Each case must depend on its peculiar features. It is ever a question of degree. But it appears that the transactions are sufficiently numerous to require the inference that a system and business of money-lending is carried [on, then the requirements of the definition in section 6 of the Act of 1900 are fulfilled………”
8. The principles so laid down in the English decisions have been followed by the Hyderabad High Court in C. Bhadrayya v. Balaji Singh, At page 237 reference is made to the decision of Farewell, J. in Litohefiled v. Dreyfus and the learned Judges point out that a person does not become a money lender within the definition of the Act by lending on two or three isolated occasions. A similar view is expressed by this Court in Dhoosa Narasimloo v. Yalala Rajanna. Srinivasachari, J., delivering the judgment of the Bench referred to the corresponding definition of money-lender in the Punjab Debtors Protection Act (Punjab Act II of 1936). According to the learned Judge the definition envisages only those classes of persons whose regular business is to advance moneys and not those who advance moneys casually. At page 8 the decisions of Lithfiled v. Dreyfus and Granger & Sons v. Cough 1896 L.R.A.C 325. are referred to and followed.
9. Reliance was placed by Sri Madhava Reddy to the decisions of the Allahabad, Nagpur and Patna High Courts which have taken the same view. In the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in In re, Bhairo Dutt Dhandar6 the question arose as to whether the Advocate was carrying on mosey lending business. Iqbal, J., delivering the judgment of the Full Bench held at page 2 that “the investments of the savings by an advocate do not necessarily amount to engagement in money-lending business; the more so when such investments are few and far between and are mostly made to relations and friends”. The test pointed out by the learned judge is that “if investments by way of loan are made as a matter of regular business and for gain there can be no escape from the conclusion that such investments constitute engagement in money-lending business”. The decisions of the English Courts already referred to were relied on in support of this view. Reliance was placed on an earlier Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Sarup v. Tika Ram Vakil in support of the view that to constitute the exercise of a profession or business an element of continuity and habit was essential. The Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Chinnarappa v. Timma Reddi was distinguished on the ground that there were nearly a hundred (money-lending transactions carried on by the Advocate in his own name and in that of his minor son. The decision of the Nagpur High Court in Sitaram Shrawan v. Bajua Parnua is also to the same effect. Vivian Bose, J., held at page 177 that the Money-lenders Act did not apply inasmuch as there was no proof that the loan was advanced in the regular course of business. The learned judge points out that the word “regular” shows that the plaintiff must have been in the habit of advancing loans to persons as a matter of regular business and that an isolated act of money-lending does not attract the definition of moneylender under the Act. The decision of the Patna High Court in Sano Kashinath v. Patitto Sabuto is also to the same effect.
10. Following these decisions we hold that the four isolated transactions of money-lending to the defendant during the months of April and May 1953 on the recommendation of her husband do not attract the definition of money-lender within the meaning of the Act. The evidence points to the conclusion that the defendant and the plaintiff's husband we good friends and that they had transactions with each other.
11. As the plaintiff's husband was not in a position to lend, he requested his wife to lend those moneys to the defendant. We consequently hold that the provisions of the Act do not apply to the case and that the suit was consequently maintainable by the plaintiff without obtaining a licence under the Act.
12. In the result, we set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate judge and hold that the plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs. 12,815-8-0 as claimed in the plaint with interest at 6% p.a on the principal amount of Rs. 10,000/- from the date of suit up to the date of realisation of the amount. The respondent will pay the costs of the appellant both in this Court and in the Court below.
13. Appeal Allowed with costs.