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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
  • Section 23 of the Contract Act
  • Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
  • Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (the Act)
  • Section 34 of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
  • Section 23 of the Contract Act
  • Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
  • Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (the Act)
  • Section 34 of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, Hindustan Copper Ltd., issued a global Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) for recommissioning and operating the Surda Mine and Mosabani Concentrator Plant. The appellant, an Australian mining company, submitted technical and financial bids stating that the bid price was “base price + 55%” and that all excise duty, service tax, or future levies were to be reimbursed on an actual basis.

Following negotiations on 18-1-2007 and 19-1-2007, the appellant reduced its percentage to 50%, and later to 49%. A letter of intent dated 3-3-2007 referenced the terms of the NIT and subsequent discussions. A formal contract was executed on 26-3-2007, and a detailed work order was issued on 14-4-2007. Clause 4.9.1 of both the NIT and the work order stated that quoted rates were inclusive of all taxes.

The appellant sought reimbursement of excise duty and other taxes through invoices dated 31-12-2007. When the respondent refused, the dispute was referred to sole arbitration pursuant to the contract’s arbitration clause. On 24-7-2009 the arbitrator held that the appellant’s bid was inclusive of taxes and rejected its claim.

The appellant filed a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Calcutta High Court, alleging perversity and legal error. The learned Single Judge dismissed the petition. The Division Bench also dismissed the appellant’s appeal on 19-9-2012, leading to the present special-leave appeal before the Supreme Court of India.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the arbitral award, which treated the appellant’s bid price as inclusive of all statutory taxes, is vitiated by patent illegality or perversity so as to be set aside under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
  2. Whether the award is contrary to the public policy of India because it allegedly deviates from the parties’ agreed allocation of tax liability.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The price bid expressly stated that any excise duty, service tax, or levy would be reimbursed by the respondent; negotiations never altered this position.
  • Clause 4.9.1 of the work order is a unilateral insertion lacking consensus ad idem and is therefore inoperative and void.
  • The arbitrator ignored material evidence—namely the offer, counter-offer, and letter of acceptance—resulting in patent illegality.
  • Relying on ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5 SCC 705, the award should be set aside because it is contrary to the terms of the contract and therefore against public policy.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The award can only be set aside for patent illegality apparent on the face of the record, which is absent here.
  • All contractual documents—including the NIT, revised bids, letter of intent, and work order—confirm that the appellant accepted liability for all statutory taxes.
  • The Single Judge and Division Bench re-appraised the evidence and found no error; the Supreme Court should not interfere.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 An arbitral award may be set aside under Section 34 if it is patently illegal, contrary to substantive law, or opposed to public policy. The Court held that the standard in Saw Pipes was not met: the present award was neither patently illegal nor contrary to fundamental policy, and therefore could not be interfered with.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court reviewed the contractual chain—NIT clauses 4.9.1-4.9.5, the letter of intent, and the work order—finding that each document made the contractor (the appellant) responsible for all statutory taxes. The appellant’s representative signed every page of the 14-4-2007 work order, acknowledging its terms, including tax liability.

The Court reiterated the limited scope of judicial intervention under Section 34. An arbitrator is the final judge of facts and contract interpretation; courts cannot substitute their own view unless the award is patently illegal or perverse. The Court found no inconsistency between Clause 4.9.1 and other contractual terms and agreed with the arbitrator that the appellant had accepted tax liability.

Addressing the public-policy objection, the Court cited ONGC v. Saw Pipes to note that an award can be set aside only if it violates fundamental policy, the interests of India, or is patently illegal. None of these grounds was established. Consequently, both the arbitrator’s findings and the High Court’s concurrence were upheld.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

The arbitral award stands, and the appellant remains liable for the disputed taxes. The decision reinforces the Supreme Court’s restrained approach to interference with arbitral awards under Section 34, but it sets no new legal precedent beyond affirming established principles of limited judicial review.

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    Swan Gold Mining Limited v. Hindustan Copper Limited .

    M. Yusuf Eqbal, J.— Leave granted. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated 19-9-2012 (2013) 2 Cal LJ 609 passed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court whereby the appeal preferred by the appellant against the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court was dismissed. The learned Single Judge had dismissed the appellant's petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (in short “the Act”) challenging the award of the arbitrator.

    2. The case of the appellant is that a notice inviting tender (NIT) was issued by the respondent Hindustan Copper Ltd. inviting offers for the operation of its Surda Mine and Mosabani Concentrator Plant. The respondent Company was having several mines rich with natural resources being metallic ores. The global tender floated by the respondent provided that it shall be the responsibility of successful bidder for payment of all statutory duties. The appellant Company submitted its technical and financial bids. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that NIT contained a techno-commercial bid and a separate price bid. Price bid of the appellant provided that any excise duty/service taxes or any levy presently applicable or any variation or new levy in future to be reimbursed on actual basis.

    3. After negotiation and acceptance of the final price offer, on 3-3-2007 the respondent issued a letter of intent to the appellant on the terms and conditions of NIT and other terms agreed during subsequent discussions/negotiations. Finally, on 26-3-2007 a contract was executed between the parties for recommissioning and operation of the Surda Mine and Mosabani Concentrator Plant. Thereafter, a work order was issued on 14-4-2007 and the appellant raised its invoices on 31-12-2007, by which reimbursement of basic excise duty and other duties payable by the appellant to the Government was sought. On refusal by the respondent to make payment in respect of excise duty and other taxes paid by the appellant relating to the work executed, the arbitration clause was invoked and the dispute was referred to a sole arbitrator, who after considering the pleadings and evidence led by the parties, held that the price bid of the appellant was not exclusive of applicable taxes. The learned arbitrator held that the clause relating to payment of taxes was deleted by the appellant's representative Mr Ahlawat on 19-1-2007 and since work order was acknowledged, it is binding on the appellant.

    4. The appellant challenged the award by way of filing petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the Calcutta High Court on the grounds, inter alia, of perversity and contrary to law. The learned Single Judge of the High Court upholding the award and reasons assigned by the learned arbitrator, dismissed the appellant's petition. Aggrieved by the decision of the learned Single Judge, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court, which although upheld the contention of the appellant relating to the evidence on the issue of deviation in price bid on 19-1-2007, dismissed the appeal on the ground of terms contained in NIT and work order being in consonance with each other. Hence, this appeal by special leave by the Australian company.

    5. Mr Amarendra Sharan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, assailed the award and the impugned order (2013) 2 Cal LJ 609 passed by the High Court on various grounds. The learned counsel contended that the appellant is a reputed Australian Mining Company and it submitted its bid in response to NIT. The price bid submitted by the appellant provided for “base price plus 55%” and that any excise duty/service tax or any levy to be reimbursed on actual basis. A meeting of the Tender Evaluation Committee of the respondent Company with the bidders was held on 18-1-2007 and 19-1-2007 and the respondent did not object to the price bid submitted by the appellant which was exclusive of taxes. It is further contended by the Senior Counsel that after the opening of price bid, although the respondent made a request to lower the bid price, there was no request to change the provision relating to taxes mentioned in the price bid by which the respondent was liable to reimburse the taxes. The appellant Company submitted the revised bid on 27-1-2007 and reduced the percentage from 55% to 50% (over the base price) and reiterated its earlier offer of payment of taxes by the respondent. After further negotiation and reduction of price bid to “base price plus 49%”, the respondent issued letter of intent on 3-3-2007 and the contract was signed between the parties on 26-3-2007.

    6. The learned Senior Counsel contended that on 14-4-2007 work order was issued with its Clause 4.9, which provided for payment of taxes by the appellant. For the settlement of disputes pertaining to taxes and duties, the appellant invoked Clause 4.14 of NIT and sought appointment of arbitrator where it was claimed by the appellant that price bid submitted by the appellant is exclusive of taxes and Clause 4.9.1 of work order is inoperative and void. This claim was dismissed by the learned arbitrator on the ground that the clause relating to payment of taxes was denied by the appellant's representative Mr Ahlawat on 19-1-2007 and since the work order was acknowledged, it is binding on the appellant.

    7. Mr Sharan has submitted that there had never been any negotiation with regard to the liability of payment of excise duties and taxes as the same was finally concluded to the effect that the taxes shall be liable to be reimbursed by the respondent. The negotiation was only with respect to the percentage which was finally reduced to 49%. It is submitted that the respondent gave a calculation which does not include taxes. All these backgrounds have neither been considered by the arbitrator nor by the High Court. It was submitted that non-consideration of the offer, counter-offer and letter of acceptance by the arbitrator amounts to serious error and patent illegality in the award. NIT is only invitation to offer, which has been superseded by subsequent offers and counter-offers and hence, NIT cannot become the contract. Lastly, Mr Sharan contended that work order is a unilateral document and there was no consensus ad idem on the work order.

    8. Mr Sharan, learned counsel put heavy reliance on the decision of this Court in ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5 SCC 705, and submitted that if the award is contrary to the substantive provision of law, or the provisions of fact or against the terms of contract, it would be patently illegal and could be interfered under Section 34 of the Act. Mr Sharan finally contended that the parties have expressly agreed that the bid price shall be exclusive of the duty of taxes, deviation from such contract will go to the root of the matter and on that ground award could be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable. This will also be opposed to the public policy and required to be adjudged void.

    9. Per contra, Mr P.P Rao, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, firstly submitted that the award cannot be set aside except where the award on the face of it suffers from patent illegality and perversity. As the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench after reappreciation of the entire facts and documents came to the conclusion that no ground exists to set aside the award, this Court should not interfere with the order of the High Court.

    10. The learned Senior Counsel has drawn our attention to various documents including NIT, initial bid proceedings of the meeting, revised bid, offer and counter-offers, on the basis of which the letter of intent was issued. Finally, the work order was issued and a contract was signed by both the parties. These documents would show that the appellant was made liable for payment of duty and taxes, which were inclusive of the bid price arrived at between the parties.

    11. Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 corresponds to Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 making a provision for setting aside the arbitral award. In terms of sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the Act, an arbitral award may be set aside only if one of the conditions specified therein is satisfied. The arbitrator's decision is generally considered binding between the parties and therefore, the power of the court to set aside the award would be exercised only in cases where the court finds that the arbitral award is on the fact of it erroneous or patently illegal or in contravention of the provisions of the Act. It is a well-settled proposition that the court shall not ordinarily substitute its interpretation for that of the arbitrator. Similarly, when the parties have arrived at a concluded contract and acted on the basis of those terms and conditions of the contract then substituting new terms in the contract by the arbitrator or by the court would be erroneous or illegal.

    12. It is equally well settled that the arbitrator appointed by the parties is the final judge of the facts. The finding of facts recorded by him cannot be interfered with on the ground that the terms of the contract were not correctly interpreted by him.

    13. We have gone through the facts of the case and perused the documents on the basis of which the arbitrator gave the award on 24-7-2009.

    14. The respondent issued a notice inviting tender (NIT) for the operation of its mine. Clauses 4.9.1 to 4.9.5 of NIT are extracted hereinbelow:

    “4.9.1 The rates quoted by the successful bidder shall be deemed to be (inclusive) of the sales taxes, other taxes and service tax that the successful bidder will have to pay in India and abroad for the performance of this contract. HCL will perform such duty regarding the deduction of such taxes at source as per applicable laws.
    4.9.2 The successful bidder shall also be responsible to bear and pay any taxes, cess, fees and/or duties levied including but not limited to interest, penalty and/or fine imposed by any authorities including revenue authorities in India and/or abroad at any time even beyond the expiry of the contract period with respect of the work to be performed by the successful bidder in accordance with the contract.
    4.9.3 The successful bidder shall also be responsible for filing income tax return and/or complying with necessary procedure and/or formalities as required or may be required under the fiscal laws of India and/or abroad in respect of the work to be performed by the successful bidder in accordance with the contract.
    4.9.4 Corporate tax and/or income tax, if any applicable/levied in India and/or abroad on the successful bidder and/or its personnel and/or on the sub-contractors engaged by the successful bidder and/or the personnel of such sub-contractors in respect of this contract will be the responsibility of the successful bidder. All the necessary return and other formalities will be the responsibility of successful bidder.
    4.9.5 All the other statutory levies including but not limited to custom duties/excise duties, sales taxes, works contract and other levies of whatsoever nature payable in accordance with the law of India, levied/leviable on the successful bidder and/or its sub-contractors in respect of performance of this contract shall be the responsibility of the successful bidder or any of its sub-contractors.”

    15. The appellant in response to NIT submitted its technical and financial bids. Subsequent to the submission of the technical bid and the price bid, the parties entered into negotiation and thereafter a letter of intent on the terms and conditions of NIT and the other terms agreed during subsequent negotiations was issued. In the said letter of intent dated 3-3-2007, it was specifically mentioned that the execution of work shall be on the terms of notice inviting tender (NIT) and other agreed discussions/negotiations subsequently held between the parties. Finally the work order was issued on 14-4-2007 in continuation with the letter of intent dated 3-3-2007. The relevant portion of the work order is extracted hereinbelow:

    “work order
    Sub.: Reopening and operating of Surda Mine and Mosabani Concentrator Plant at Indian Copper Complex, Ghatsila.
    Dear Sir,
    With reference to the above subject, Hindustan Copper Limited is please to issue work order in continuation with LoI dated 3-3-2007 to re-commission, operate and maintain Surda Mine and Mosabani Concentrator Plant to supply and deliver copper concentrate at rates Rs 1,53,470.00 per tonne of metal in concentrate (excluding royalty) to Maubhandar work of Indian Copper Complex, produced from the operations of these units.
    This work shall be governed by the terms and conditions of the expressions of interest of dated 21-9-2006, Notice Inviting Tender No. HC/HO/GM (M&S)/SURDA dated 11-12-2006 and the other agreed during subsequent discussions/negotiations, and the final offer.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    16. In the course of hearing, Mr P.P Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent produced before us a xerox copy of the work order dated 14-4-2007. Clause 4.9.1 quoted hereinabove specifically mentions therein that the rate quoted by the appellant was inclusive of sales tax, service tax and other taxes. The representative of the appellant signed the work order on each page (20 pages) and acknowledged and admitted the terms and conditions for the said work.

    17. From the facts mentioned hereinabove, it is evident that the appellant has accepted the liability of payment of excise duty, sales tax, service tax and other taxes and hence it cannot be held that Clause 4.9.1 of the work order is inconsistent with the terms and conditions of the contract documents. The learned arbitrator has gone in detail of the dispute raised by the appellant and rightly came to the conclusion that the responsibility on the appellant is to abide by the terms and conditions of the work order. We have also gone through the order passed by the High Court. The Court rightly came to the conclusion that there is no patent illegality in the award passed by the arbitrator which needs interference under Section 34 of the Act.

    18. Mr Sharan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, also challenged the arbitral award on the ground that the same is in conflict with the public policy of India. We do not find any substance in the said submission. This Court, in ONGC Ltd. (2003) 5 SCC 705, observed that the term “public policy of India” is required to be interpreted in the context of jurisdiction of the court where the validity of award is challenged before it becomes final and executable. The Court held that an award can be set aside if it is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law or the interest of India, or if there is patent illegality. In our view, the said decision will not in any way come into rescue of the appellant. As noticed above, the parties have entered into concluded contract, agreeing terms and conditions of the said contract, which was finally acted upon. In such a case, the parties to the said contract cannot back out and challenge the award on the ground that the same is against the public policy. Even assuming the ground available to the appellant, the award cannot be set aside because it is not contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law or against the interest of India or on the ground of patent illegality.

    19. The words “public policy” or “opposed to public policy”, find reference in Section 23 of the Contract Act and also Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. As stated above, the interpretation of the contract is matter of the arbitrator, who is a Judge chosen by the parties to determine and decide the dispute. The Court is precluded from reappreciating the evidence and to arrive at different conclusion by holding that the arbitral award is against the public policy.

    20. We have given our anxious consideration in the matter. In our view the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that no ground exists for setting aside the award as contemplated under Section 34 of the Act.

    21. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit in this appeal, which accordingly stands dismissed with no order as to costs.

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    Swan Gold Mining Limited v. Hindustan Copper Limited .
    (Sep 22, 2014)