AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the principal Act
  • The 1999 Act
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the principal Act
  • Section 10(6) of the 1976 Act
  • Sections 10(3) and 10(5) of the Act
  • Section 20, sub-section (1) of the principal Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976
  • Section 3 of the Repeal Act
  • Section 10, sub-section (3) of the principal Act
  • Section 2 of the Repeal Act
  • Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the principal Act
  • The 1999 Act
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the principal Act
  • Section 10(6) of the 1976 Act
  • Sections 10(3) and 10(5) of the Act
  • Section 20, sub-section (1) of the principal Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976
  • Section 3 of the Repeal Act
  • Section 10, sub-section (3) of the principal Act
  • Section 2 of the Repeal Act
  • Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court seeking a declaration that proceedings initiated under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULCRA) with respect to Survey No. 195, Hissa No. 2 (New 195/1), Village Parsik, District Thane had abated consequent to the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. He asserted continuous possession of the land and contended that the State had never taken actual possession.

The Additional Collector and Competent Authority, Thane, filed a reply-affidavit stating that notices under Section 10(5) ULCRA had been issued on 25-2-2005 and that the land had therefore vested in the State. The Bombay High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that possession had already been taken by the State Government.

Aggrieved, the appellant sought relief before the Supreme Court of India, which granted leave to appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 survive after the adoption of the Repeal Act, 1999 by the State of Maharashtra when actual possession of the land has not been taken by the State.
  2. Whether the Bombay High Court erred in concluding that possession of the subject land had been taken over by the Government of Maharashtra.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The High Court’s finding on possession is factually incorrect; no material shows that the State had taken actual possession.
  • Mere vesting under Sections 10(3) and 10(5) ULCRA without physical possession is insufficient to save the proceedings after the Repeal Act.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Conceded that the record contains no evidence of the State having taken physical possession from the appellant.
  • Clarified that the High Court’s observation on possession was based solely on averments regarding statutory vesting, not on proof of physical takeover.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ritesh Tewari v. State of U.P., (2010) 10 SCC 677 Proceedings under ULCRA abate upon repeal if physical possession has not been taken by the State. Formed the core ratio relied upon to hold that the appellant’s land proceedings had abated because possession remained with the appellant.
Pt. Madan Swaroop Shrotiya Public Charitable Trust v. State of U.P., (2000) 6 SCC 325 Supports the principle that lack of physical possession leads to abatement after repeal. Cited as corroborative authority aligning with Ritesh Tewari.
Ghasitey Lal Sahu v. Competent Authority, (2004) 13 SCC 452 Same principle regarding the necessity of possession for saving proceedings post-repeal. Used cumulatively to affirm the legal position adopted.
Mukarram Ali Khan v. State of U.P., (2007) 11 SCC 90 Reiterates that vesting without possession is inadequate to defeat abatement. Referenced to strengthen the reasoning in line with Ritesh Tewari.
Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport, (2010) 8 SCC 467 Endorses the requirement of actual possession for continuation of ULCRA proceedings. Included as further precedent supporting the Court’s conclusion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court analyzed Sections 2 and 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999. Section 3(1)(a) preserves State rights only where physical possession of the land had been taken before repeal. The Court found no material indicating that such possession had been effected; the respondents themselves acknowledged this deficiency.

Relying chiefly on Ritesh Tewari and allied precedents, the Court held that mere statutory vesting under Section 10(3) ULCRA, absent actual possession, cannot prevent abatement. Therefore, proceedings respecting the appellant’s land could not survive post-repeal.

Consequently, the Court declared that the ULCRA proceedings concerning Survey No. 195/1 stood abated and set aside the contrary view of the High Court.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; proceedings under ULCRA declared abated; no order as to costs.

Immediate Effect: The appellant retains undisrupted possession of the land, and all ULCRA proceedings relating to it are terminated.

Broader Implication: The judgment reinforces that, in Maharashtra, statutory vesting without demonstrable physical possession before 29-11-2007 is insufficient to survive the Repeal Act, aligning with the national jurisprudence laid down in Ritesh Tewari and related cases. No new precedent was established beyond reiterating this principle.

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    Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v. Deputy Collector And Competent Authority And Others

    R.M Lodha, J.— Leave granted. The appellant herein was the writ petitioner before the High Court. In the writ petition, he prayed that the proceedings in respect of the land bearing Survey No. 195, Hissa No. 2 (New 195/1) of Village Parsik, District Thane under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short “the Act”) on the basis of the return filed by Nabibai Tukaram Patil may be declared as abated in view of the repeal of the Act. The appellant asserted that the possession of the subject land was with him and at no point of time, his possession was ever disturbed or attempted to be taken by the respondents.

    2. In response to the writ petition, a reply-affidavit was filed by the Additional Collector and competent authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, Thane before the High Court. In Para 3 of that affidavit, it is stated that notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued to the appellant on 25-2-2005 calling upon the appellant to hand over the possession of the subject land within 30 days from the receipt of the said notice and, thus, the subject land had vested with the State Government. In Para 10 of the said affidavit, it is stated that the competent authority had already taken action under Sections 10(3) and 10(5) of the Act and, therefore, the subject land is deemed to have vested in the State Government.

    3. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissed WP (C) No. 4867 of 2008 the writ petition by observing that the possession of the subject property had already been taken by the Government of Maharashtra under the Act.

    4. Mr U.U Lalit, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the finding of the High Court that the possession of the property had been taken by the Government of Maharashtra was factually incorrect. He submitted that, as a matter of fact, even in the reply-affidavit before the High Court filed on behalf of Respondent 1, no such statement about possession was made. The subject land although had vested in the Government of Maharashtra on action having been taken under Sections 10(3) and 10(5) of the Act, learned Senior Counsel submitted but actual possession continued with the appellant.

    5. Mr Uday B. Dube, learned counsel for the respondents submitted and, in our view fairly that there was nothing on record to indicate that actual possession of the subject land had been taken over by the respondents from the appellant. He further submitted that the observation of the High Court that the possession of the subject land had already been taken by the Government of Maharashtra was based on the assertion made in the reply-affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent 1 that the land had vested in the State Government on action having been taken under Sections 10(3) and 10(5) of the Act and for no other reason.

    6. The Act came to be repealed by the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (for short “the Repeal Act”) on 22-3-1999. However, the State of Maharashtra did not adopt the Repeal Act immediately. On resolution having been passed by the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly as well as the Maharashtra Legislative Council that w.e.f 29-11-2007, the Repeal Act came to be adopted and became operative in the State of Maharashtra.

    7. Section 2 of the Repeal Act reads as follows:

    “2. Repeal of Act 33 of 1976.—The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act) is hereby repealed.”

    8. Section 3 of the Repeal Act reads as follows:

    “3. Savings.—(1) The repeal of the principal Act shall not affect—
    (a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of Section 10, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority;
    (b) the validity of any order granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20 or any action taken thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the contrary;
    (c) any payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20.
    (2) Where—
    (a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; and
    (b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land,
    then, such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the State Government.”

    9. It is clear from the above provisions that where the possession of the vacant land has not been taken over by the State Government or by any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority, the proceedings under the Act would not survive. Mere vesting of the vacant land with the State Government by operation of law without actual possession is not sufficient for operation of Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act.

    10. We are fortified in our view by a recent decision of this Court in Ritesh Tewari v. State of U.P (2010) 10 SCC 677 This Court in Ritesh Tewari (2010) 10 SCC 677 considered the matter thus:

    “14. Shri Jayant Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that as the State Government had not taken possession of the land in exercise of its powers under Section 10(6) of the 1976 Act, on coming of the 1999 Act into force, the proceedings stood abated and the respondents have no business to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property.
    15. We find full force in the submissions so made by Shri Jayant Bhushan to a certain extent, and hold that all proceedings pending before any court/authority under the 1976 Act, stood abated automatically on coming of the 1999 Act into force, provided the possession of the land involved in a particular case had not been taken by the State. Such a view is in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in Pt. Madan Swaroop Shrotiya Public Charitable Trust v. State of U.P (2000) 6 SCC 325; Ghasitey Lal Sahu v. Competent Authority (2004) 13 SCC 452; Mukarram Ali Khan v. State of U.P (2007) 11 SCC 90 and Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport (2010) 8 SCC 467.”
    (emphasis in original)

    11. In view of the legal position enunciated by this Court in Ritesh Tewari (2010) 10 SCC 677 and the factual situation that the possession of the subject land has not been taken by the Government of Maharashtra, we are satisfied that the appellant was entitled to the relief in terms of Para 9(b) in the writ petition and the High Court ought to have declared that the proceedings under the Act in relation to the subject property stood abated. Now it is declared accordingly.

    12. The appeal is allowed as above with no order as to costs.

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    Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v. Deputy Collector And Competent Authority And Others
    (Feb 29, 2012)