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2001 INSC 131
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2001 INSC 131
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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns three accused (A-1, A-2 and A-3). During the early hours of the morning A-1 and A-2, armed with an axe and choppers, inflicted fatal injuries on the deceased. A-3, who is the wife of A-1 and sister of A-2, was seen standing on the road near the scene; her house is situated very close by. The trial court convicted all the accused and imposed the death penalty on A-1 and A-2. The High Court affirmed the capital sentences but acquitted A-3 of all charges under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The present opinion reviews the correctness of (i) A-3’s acquittal and (ii) the confirmation of the death sentences awarded to A-1 and A-2.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether A-3 could be held vicariously liable for the murder with the aid of Section 34 IPC (common intention).
  2. Whether the death penalty imposed on A-1 and A-2 satisfies the “rarest of rare” standard and should be confirmed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Aydroos v. Emperor, AIR 1923 Mad 187 Interpretation of Section 34 IPC Relied on while outlining that participation—overt or covert—is necessary for common intention liability.
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1 Scope of joint liability under Section 34 IPC Relied on to emphasise that every participant must perform some act connected with the offence.
Mahbub Shah v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 118 Differentiating “common intention” from “similar intention” Explained and distinguished while stressing that mere presence without participation is insufficient.
Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216 Requirements for invoking Section 34 IPC Cited to support the conclusion that an accused must contribute to the criminal act.
State of U.P. v. Iftikhar Khan, (1973) 1 SCC 512 Constructive liability principles Explained and distinguished on facts.
Satrughan Patar v. Emperor, AIR 1919 Pat 111 Participation as the dominant feature of Section 34 Approved for the proposition that physical presence coupled with intention suffices.
Panchhi v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177 Sentencing guidelines for capital punishment Distinguished; the present acts judged to fall within the “rarest of rare” category.
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 “Rarest of rare” doctrine for death sentence Referred to as the controlling precedent for confirming the capital punishment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

On Section 34 IPC: The court analysed Sections 32, 33, 34, 35, 37 and 38 IPC as a cognate group governing joint criminal liability. Two indispensable postulates were reiterated: (i) the criminal act must be done by more than one person, and (ii) each participant’s act—overt or covert—must be in furtherance of the common intention. Passive presence, without any act that facilitates the offence, cannot attract Section 34. Applying this test, the court noted that A-3 neither carried a weapon nor marched with the assailants, and her mere presence on the road, possibly out of curiosity or proximity to her house, did not constitute participation. Consequently, Section 34 could not be invoked against her.

On Death Penalty: The trial court and High Court had “very cogent reasons” for imposing the extreme penalty, mindful that death punishment is confined to the rarest of rare cases where the lesser alternative is “unquestionably foreclosed.” The brutality of the attack by A-1 and A-2 brought the case within that limited category. Distinguishing Panchhi v. State of U.P., the court found no grounds to interfere with the capital sentences, holding that the requirements outlined in Bachan Singh were satisfied.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court CONFIRMED the death sentences of A-1 and A-2 and UPHELD the High Court’s acquittal of A-3.

Implications: The decision reinforces that (i) liability under Section 34 IPC demands some participatory act, however small, and mere passive presence is insufficient; and (ii) the “rarest of rare” doctrine continues to limit the imposition of capital punishment to exceptionally heinous offences. No new legal principle was created, but existing standards on joint liability and capital sentencing were emphatically reaffirmed.

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    Suresh And Another v. State Of U.P .

    (1) Common Intention

    As Section 34 IPC speaks of doing “a criminal act by several persons”, Section 33 IPC has to be looked at. As per it, the word “act” denotes as well a series of acts as a single act. This means a criminal act can be a single act or it can be the conglomeration of a series of acts. How can a criminal act be done by several persons? In this context a reference to Sections 35, 37 and 38 IPC, in juxtaposition with Section 34, is of advantage. Those four provisions can be said to belong to one cognate group wherein different positions when more than one person participating in the commission of one criminal act are adumbrated. The special feature of Section 34 is only that such participation by several persons should be “in furtherance of the common intention of all”. Hence, under Section 34 one criminal act, composed of more than one act, can be committed by more than one persons and if such commission is in furtherance of the common intention of all of them, each would be liable for the criminal act so committed. Section 34 is intended to meet a situation wherein all the co-accused have also done something to constitute the commission of a criminal act.
    (Paras 16 to 19 and 21)
    Thus to attract Section 34 IPC two postulates are indispensable: (1) The criminal act (consisting of a series of acts) should have been done, not by one person, but more than one person. (2) Doing of every such individual act cumulatively resulting in the commission of criminal offence should have been in furtherance of the common intention of all such persons.
    (Para 23)
    Looking at the first postulate pointed out above, the accused who is to be fastened with liability on the strength of Section 34 IPC should have done some act which has a nexus with the offence. Such an act need not be very substantial, it is enough that the act is only for guarding the scene for facilitating the crime. The act need not necessarily be overt, even if it is only a covert act it is enough, provided such a covert act is proved to have been done by the co-accused in furtherance of the common intention. Even an illegal omission to do a certain act in a certain situation can amount to an act. But an act, whether overt or covert, is indispensable to be done by a co-accused to be fastened with the liability under the section and if no such act is done by a person, even if he has common intention with the others for the accomplishment of the crime, Section 34 IPC cannot be invoked for convicting that person. In other words, the accused who only keeps the common intention in his mind, but does not do any act at the scene, cannot be convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC. There may be other provisions in the IPC like Section 120-B or Section 109 which could then be invoked to catch such non-participating accused. Thus participation in the crime in furtherance of the common intention is a sine qua non for Section 34 IPC. Exhortation to other accused, even guarding the scene etc. would amount to participation. Of course, when the allegation against an accused is that he participated in the crime by oral exhortation or by guarding the scene the court has to evaluate the evidence very carefully for deciding whether that person had really done any such act.
    (Paras 24, 22 and 25)
    Aydroos v. Emperor, AIR 1923 Mad 187 : 24 Cri LJ 360; Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1 : 26 Cri LJ 431 : 52 Cal 197, relied on
    Mahbub Shah v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 118 : 46 Cri LJ 689; Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216 : 1955 Cri LJ 572; State of U.P v. Iftikhar Khan, (1973) 1 SCC 512 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 384, explained and distinguished
    It is difficult to conclude that a person, merely because he was present at or near the scene, without doing anything more, without even carrying a weapon and without even marching along with the other assailants, could also be convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC for the offence committed by the other accused. In the present case, the FIR shows that A-3 was standing on the road when the incident happened. Either she would have reached on the road on hearing the sound of the commotion because her house is situated very close to the scene, or she would have merely followed her husband and brother out of curiosity since they were going armed with axe and choppers during the wee hours of the night. It is not a necessary conclusion that she too would have accompanied the other accused in furtherance of the common intention of all the three. There is no substance in the contention that if she remained at the scene without sharing the common intention she would have prevented the other two accused from doing the ghastly acts because both of them were her husband and brother respectively. The inaction of A-3 in doing so need not necessarily lead to the conclusion that she shared a common intention with the others. There is nothing to show that she had not earlier tried to dissuade her husband and brother from rushing to attack the deceased.
    (Paras 31 and 32)
    It is, therefore, not possible to hold that A-3 shared common intention with the other accused and hence her remaining passively on the road is too insufficient for reversing the order of acquittal passed by the High Court in order to convict her with the aid of Section 34 IPC.
    (Para 33)
    (2) Death Sentence
    The trial court and the High Court have given very cogent reasons and quite elaborately for choosing the extreme penalty. Knowing fully well that death penalty is now restricted to the rarest of rare cases in which the lesser alternative is unquestionably foreclosed, it is not possible to hold that the acts committed by A-1 and A-2 should be pulled out of the contours of the extremely limited sphere and that this is not a rarest of rare cases in which the lesser alternative is unquestionably foreclosed.
    (Para 34)
    Panchhi v. State of U.P, (1998) 7 SCC 177 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1561, distinguished
    Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580, referred to
    Per Sethi & Agrawal, JJ.
    (1) Common Intention
    The dominant feature for attracting Section 34 IPC is the element of participation in absence resulting in the ultimate “criminal act”. For appreciating the ambit and scope of Section 34, the preceding Sections 32 and 33 have always to be kept in mind. Under Section 32 acts include illegal omissions. Section 33 defines the “act” to mean as well a series of acts as a single act and the word “omission” denotes as well a series of omissions as a single omission. The “act” referred to in the later part of Section 34 means the ultimate criminal act with which the accused is charged of sharing the common intention. The accused is, therefore, made responsible for the ultimate criminal act done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all. The section does not envisage the separate act by all the accused persons for becoming responsible for the ultimate criminal act. If such an interpretation is accepted, the purpose of Section 34 shall be rendered infructuous. Participation in the crime in furtherance of the common intention cannot conceive of some independent criminal act by all accused persons, besides the ultimate criminal act because for that individual act law takes care of making such accused responsible under the other provisions of the Code. What is required under law is that the accused persons sharing the common intention must be physically present at the scene of occurrence and be shown not to have dissuaded themselves from the intended criminal act for which they shared the common intention. Culpability under Section 34 cannot be excluded by mere distance from the scene of occurrence. The presumption of constructive intention, however, has to be arrived at only when the court can, with judicial servitude, hold that the accused must have preconceived the result that ensued in furtherance of the common intention.
    (Paras 53, 39 and 40)
    Satrughan Patar v. Emperor, AIR 1919 Pat 111 : 20 Cri LJ 289, approved
    Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1 : 26 Cri LJ 431 : 52 Cal 197; Mahbub Shah v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 118 : 46 Cri LJ 689; King Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose, AIR 1924 Cal 257 : 25 Cri LJ 817 (FB); Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216 : 1955 Cri LJ 572; Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 287 : 1955 Cri LJ 857; Tukaram Ganpat Pandare v. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 4 SCC 544 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 580 : AIR 1974 SC 514; Lalai v. State of U.P, (1975) 3 SCC 273 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 881 : AIR 1974 SC 2118; Ramaswami Ayyangar v. State of T.N, (1976) 3 SCC 779 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 518 : AIR 1976 SC 2027; Rambilas Singh v. State of Bihar, (1989) 3 SCC 605 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 659 : AIR 1989 SC 1593; State of U.P v. Iftikhar Khan, (1973) 1 SCC 512 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 384; Krishnan v. State of Kerala, (1996) 10 SCC 508 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1375 : JT (1996) 7 SC 613; Surendra Chauhan v. State of M.P, (2000) 4 SCC 110 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 772, relied on
    Abhi Misser v. Lachmi Narain, ILR (1900) 27 Cal 566 : 4 CWN 546; Emperor v. Nirmal Kanta Roy, ILR (1914) 41 Cal 1072 : 15 Cri LJ 460; R. v. Salmon, (1880) 6 QBD 79 : 50 LJMC 25 : 43 LT 573; Rajesh Govind Jagesha v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 8 SCC 428 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1452, cited
    Section 34 IPC recognises the principle of vicarious liability in criminal jurisprudence. It makes a person liable for action of an offence not committed by him but by another person with whom he shared the common intention. It is a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. The section gives statutory recognition to the commonsense principle that if more than two persons intentionally do a thing jointly, it is just the same as if each of them had done it individually. A common intention presupposes prior concert, which requires a prearranged plan of the accused participating in an offence. Such preconcert or preplanning may develop on the spot or during the course of commission of the offence but the crucial test is that such plan must precede the act constituting an offence. Common intention can be formed previously or in the course of occurrence and on the spur of the moment. The existence of a common intention is a question of fact in each case to be proved mainly as a matter of inference from the circumstances of the case.
    (Para 38)
    The distinction between a “common intention” and a “similar intention” which is real and substantial is also not to be lost sight of. The common intention implies a prearranged plan but in a given case it may develop on the spur of the moment in the course of the commission of the offence. Such common intention which developed on the spur of the moment is different from the similar intention actuated by a number of persons at the same time. The distinction between “common intention” and “similar intention” may be fine but is nonetheless a real one and if overlooked may lead to miscarriage of justice.
    (Para 53)
    Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 174 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 100; State v. Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 253 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 691, relied on
    In the present case the High Court was justified in holding that A-3 did not share the common intention with the other accused persons. By her mere presence near the place of occurrence at or about the time of crime in the absence of other evidence, direct or circumstantial, she cannot be held guilty with the aid of Section 34. But in case the prosecution had succeeded in proving on facts of her sharing of common intention with A-1 and A-2, she could not be acquitted of the charge framed against her only on the ground that she had actually not done any overt act.
    (Para 56)
    (2) Death Sentence
    We agree with the conclusions arrived at by Brother Thomas, J.
    (Para 36)
    R-M/TZ/23833.CR

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    Suresh And Another v. State Of U.P .
    (Mar 2, 2001)