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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960
  • The 1983 Income Tax Act, Section 5, Subsection 2
  • Section 25 of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960
  • The 1983 Income Tax Act, Section 5, Subsection 2
  • Section 25 of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant purchased Door Nos. 24-A and 25, Ward II, Block III, Thanjavur Road, Tiruvarur, from Ramanathan Chettiar on 7-3-1980. The respondent had been a tenant in the premises under the former owner but refused to acknowledge the appellant’s title and ceased paying rent. The appellant filed an eviction petition before the Rent Control Authority on two grounds: (i) denial of title and (ii) wilful default in payment of rent. Both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority, after examining documentary and oral evidence—including the appellant’s account books and the respondent’s admission that he did not own the premises—concluded that a landlord-tenant relationship existed and ordered eviction. The respondent’s statutory appeal was dismissed, but his revision under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (“the Act”) was allowed by the High Court, which held that the landlord had failed to prove the relationship. The landlord appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, may reassess evidence and overturn concurrent factual findings of the authorities below.
  2. Whether the appellant had, in fact, established the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship with the respondent.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The revisional power under Section 25 is narrower than appellate power; the High Court cannot conduct a fresh appraisal of evidence.
  • Concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority on the landlord-tenant relationship were binding absent jurisdictional error.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The High Court may interfere with erroneous findings of fact in revision, relying on Asram Motors v. Bina Kumari (1995 Supp (4) SCC 679).
  • The landlord failed to file the original lease deed and therefore did not discharge the burden of proving the relationship.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Asram Motors v. Bina Kumari, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 679 The High Court in revision can examine the correctness of factual findings. Cited by respondent; Supreme Court distinguished the decision, observing that “examination” does not permit wholesale reassessment of evidence.
Dr. D. Sankaranarayanan v. Punjab National Bank, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 675 Revisional jurisdiction is not appellate; reassessment of evidence is impermissible. Relied on by Supreme Court to hold that the High Court had acted beyond its powers by treating the revision as a second appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court emphasized that Section 25 of the Act confers only a limited supervisory power on the High Court. While the High Court may correct errors of jurisdiction, legality, or propriety, it may not re-appreciate evidence as an appellate body.

Both lower authorities had concurrently found a landlord-tenant relationship on the basis of: (i) account books evidencing rent payments; (ii) the respondent’s admission that the premises did not belong to him; and (iii) the appellant’s registered sale deed. The High Court, however, reassessed this evidence and relied heavily on the absence of the original lease deed, concluding that no relationship was proved.

The Supreme Court held that the lease deed was allegedly missing and not within the appellant’s knowledge or possession; its non-production could not negate other substantial evidence. Moreover, the High Court’s statement that the sale deed did not cover Door Nos. 24-A and 25 was factually incorrect—those numbers were expressly included in the deed produced before the Court.

Accordingly, the High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction and erred both in law (scope of revisional power) and on facts (misreading the sale deed).

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside; eviction order restored with costs.

Immediate Effect: The respondent is liable to be evicted per the Rent Controller’s order, and the appellant’s ownership and landlord status are affirmed. Broader Implication: The decision reinforces the confined scope of High Court revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, underscoring that re-appreciation of evidence is impermissible.

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    Ramdoss v. K. Thangavelu .

    V.N Khare, J.— The appellant herein alleged himself to be the landlord of Doors Nos. 24-A and 25 situated in Ward II, Block III, Thanjavur Road, in the city of Tiruvarur. Originally the said premises was owned by Ramanathan Chettiar. Subsequently, the aforesaid premises was purchased by the appellant on 7-3-1980. The respondent is the tenant in the said premises from the time of the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant. It appears that the respondent did not recognise the appellant as the owner of the premises and rent was also not paid for the said premises. Under such circumstances, the appellant filed a petition before the Rent Control Authority for eviction of the respondent on the grounds of denial of title and also for wilful default of payment of rent. Before the Rent Controller, the appellant filed various documents including the sale deed executed in his favour for establishing that he is the owner of the said premises and the respondent is the tenant. Similarly evidence was also led by the respondent in support of his case. The Rent Controller, after assessing the evidence, came to the conclusion that there existed the relationship of landlord-tenant between the appellant and the respondent and the tenant having denied the title and also having committed default in payment of rent was liable to be ejected. Consequently, the order of eviction was passed by the Rent Controller. The appeal preferred by the respondent tenant was dismissed. However, the revision filed by the respondent tenant was allowed by the High Court on the ground that the landlord had failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. In view of that matter, the revision was allowed and the orders of the courts below were set aside. It is against the said order the landlord is in appeal before us.

    2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has urged that in the present case it was not open to the High Court in exercise of its revisional power to reassess the evidence and record a finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below and, therefore, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside. However, this was disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent. He submitted that the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction can interfere with the incorrect finding of fact recorded by the courts below and, therefore, the judgment of the High Court has to be maintained. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent referred to a decision of this Court in the case of Asram Motors v. Bina Kumari 1995 Supp (4) SCC 679 wherein this Court held that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional power under Section 25 of the Act, can examine the correctness of the findings of fact. There is no quarrel as regards this proposition, but the question that arises for consideration is whether, while examining the correctness of the findings of fact, is it open to the revisional court to reassess the evidence. It is not disputed before us that Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) confers revisional jurisdiction upon the High Court which is not an appellate power. The High Court, under Section 25 of the Act, can call for and examine the record of the appellate authority in order to satisfy itself as to regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or orders passed therein. In D. Sankaranarayanan (Dr) v. Punjab National Bank 1995 Supp (4) SCC 675 it was held as thus:

    “We are of the view that learned counsel for the appellant is right when he contends that the revision petition was treated by the High Court as if it were a second appeal and, upon a reassessment of the evidence, the findings of facts of the first appellate court were reversed.”

    Thus, in our view, the revisional power of High Court under Section 25 of the Act not being an appellate power, it is impermissible for the High Court to reassess the evidence in a revision petition filed under Section 25 of the Act. In this appeal what we find is that, the High Court in the revision petition filed by the tenant proceeded to decide the revision as if it was deciding an appeal. In the present case the Rent Control Authority and the appellate court on assessment of evidence concurrently recorded a finding of fact that there existed the relationship of landlord-tenant between the parties. The Rent Control Authority and the appellate authority both for purposes of determining the relationship of landlord-tenant placed reliance on accounts-books produced by the appellant to show that the respondent tenant had been paying rent in respect of the said premises. The Rent Control Authority also took note of the fact that the respondent tenant admitted in his evidence that the disputed premises i.e Doors Nos. 24-A and 25 do not belong to him and Doors Nos. 24-A and 25 had been constructed on the land covered by Survey No. 592-93. Curiously, the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction acting as an appellate court reassessed the evidence of the parties and held that since the appellant landlord having undertook to file the lease deed for showing that the respondent was a tenant of the erstwhile landlord failed to file the same, the relationship of landlord and tenant therefore is not established between the parties. This view of the High Court is legally and factually not correct. The relevant paragraph of the petition filed by the appellant landlord thus runs as under:

    “The petitioner learns that Kuppuswamy Chettiar has executed a lease deed in favour of Ramanathan Chettiar at the time of taking the building on lease. The lease deed is missing and will be filed after it is traced.”

    A perusal of the said paragraph would show that the lease deed executed between Kuppuswamy Chettiar and Ramanathan Chettiar was neither in the personal knowledge of the appellant nor was in his possession which could have been filed. The only allegation that was made in the petition was that the appellant has learnt that a lease deed has been executed which is missing and the same would be filed after it is traced. Mere non-filing of lease deed, which could not be traced, would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that there existed no landlord-tenant relationship between the parties at least when there were numerous documents on record to show that the appellant purchased this premises from Ramanathan Chettiar. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by the two courts below.

    3. The second reasoning given by the High Court for upsetting the judgment of the two courts below was that the sale deed filed by the landlord does not mention Doors Nos. 24-A and 25. This finding of the High Court is contrary to the evidence on record. A copy of the sale deed has been filed before us and the said sale deed shows that it was also in respect of Doors Nos. 24-A and 25.

    4. For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment of the High Court is not sustainable in law. We, accordingly set aside the judgment and order under appeal. The appeal is allowed with costs.

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    Comments

    Ramdoss v. K. Thangavelu .
    (Nov 24, 1999)