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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, along with Daljeet Singh and Ganeshi, was tried before the Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Sri Ganganagar for offences under Section 302 IPC and Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The prosecution case was that the three arrived on a motorcycle; the appellant and Ganeshi caught hold of Kailash Soni (the deceased) and exhorted Daljeet Singh to strike him, after which Daljeet inflicted 2–3 blows with a kripan, causing instantaneous death.

The trial court convicted Daljeet Singh under Section 302 IPC and convicted the appellant and Ganeshi under Section 302/34 IPC, sentencing each to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs 500 (with six months' rigorous imprisonment in default). The High Court, by judgment dated 17-3-1992, upheld the convictions and sentences. The appellant then filed this appeal by special leave.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant's acts of catching hold of the deceased and exhorting Daljeet Singh to “strike” established a common intention to kill so as to sustain a conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.
  2. If not, what lesser offence, if any, was made out against the appellant on the proved facts.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The only overt act attributed to the appellant was catching hold of the deceased and exhorting Daljeet by saying “maro”; this, by itself, did not prove a common intention to kill.
  • The exhortation to “maro” did not necessarily mean “to kill”; therefore, conviction under Section 302/34 IPC was unwarranted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jai Narain Mishra v. State of Bihar (1971) 3 SCC 762, AIR 1972 SC 1764 This information was not available in the provided opinion. Cited in support of the conclusion that mere exhortation to “strike” (without proof of common intention to kill) does not sustain liability under Section 302/34 IPC on the facts found.
Matadin v. State of Maharashtra (1998) 7 SCC 216, JT (1998) 5 SC 264 This information was not available in the provided opinion. Cited alongside the above precedent to support setting aside the appellant's conviction under Section 302/34 IPC for lack of shared intention to kill.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the appellant's contention by referring to the first information report and the deposition of Mohan Mujral (PW 1). The FIR alleged that the appellant and Ganeshi told Daljeet to “strike at him”; PW 1 similarly stated that they instigated Daljeet Singh to “strike” Kailash, after which Daljeet produced a short kripan from under his stockings and delivered 2–3 blows.

On this material, the Court held that it could not be concluded that the appellant shared a common intention to kill the deceased. The Court specifically reasoned that the appellant might not have known that Daljeet Singh had a kripan concealed under his stockings, and the instigation attributed to the appellant was limited to “strike.” Therefore, the mental element required to fasten liability for murder with the aid of Section 34 IPC was not established against the appellant, rendering his conviction under Section 302/34 IPC unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

PARTLY ALLOWED / MODIFIED: The appellant's conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC was set aside. Instead, he was convicted under Section 324 read with Section 110 IPC and sentenced to the period already undergone.

The appellant's bail bonds were cancelled and he was directed to be released forthwith unless required to be incarcerated in any other case. The appeal was disposed of. The opinion does not discuss broader implications beyond this modification of the appellant's conviction and sentence.

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    Ajay Sharma v. State Of Rajasthan .

    S.S.M Quadri, J.— The appellant and two others, namely, Daljeet Singh and Ganeshi were tried for offences under Section 302 and Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC by the learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Sri Ganganagar. The gravamen of the charge against them was that the said three persons came on a motorcycle; Ganeshi and the others caught hold of Kailash Soni and exhorted Daljeet Singh to strike him. On that, Daljeet Singh gave 2-3 blows with his kripan to Kailash Soni which resulted in his instantaneous death (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”). On considering the evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted Daljeet Singh under Section 302; the appellant and Ganeshi under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced each one of them to life imprisonment and a fine of rupees five hundred, in default thereof to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. Against their conviction and sentence, they filed appeal in the High Court. By judgment and order of 17-3-1992, the High Court upheld the conviction and sentence of the appellants. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the High Court, by special leave the appellant has filed this appeal.

    2. Mr Jayant Bhushan, the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that as the only overt act attributed to him was that he caught hold of the deceased and exhorted Daljeet by saying “maro”, so it cannot be said that there was a common intention to kill the deceased; the appellant only said “maro”, which did not mean “to kill”, therefore, he ought not to have been convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. To examine the contention of the learned counsel, we have perused the first information report and the statement of Mohan Mujral (PW 1). The relevant allegation in the FIR reads as follows:

    “At this, both Pappu (appellant) and Ganeshi said — ‘strike at him, Daljeet’.

    PW 1 deposed before the Court:

    ‘When we raised the alarm, both Pappu Pandit and Ganeshi instigated Daljit Singh to “strike”. They exhorted him to strike at Kailash. At this Daljit took out a short kripan from under the stockings he had worn. He, then, in a jiffy, struck at Kailash 2-3 blows on the left portion of his body.’ ”

    Thus, from the averments in the FIR as well as from the statement of PW 1, it cannot be said that the appellant had shared a common intention to kill the deceased. The appellant might not have been known that Daljeet Singh was having a kripan under his stockings. The instigation was only “to strike” and as such, his conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC is not sustainable. (See Jai Narain Mishra v. State of Bihar (1971) 3 SCC 762, AIR 1972 SC 1764 and Matadin v. State of Maharashtra (1998) 7 SCC 216, JT (1998) 5 SC 264.) The conviction of the appellant under Sections 302/34 IPC is, therefore, set aside; instead, he is convicted under Section 324 read with Section 110 IPC and sentenced to the period already undergone. His bail bonds shall stand cancelled and he be released forthwith unless he is required to be incarcerated in any other case. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.

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    Comments

    Ajay Sharma v. State Of Rajasthan .
    (Sep 15, 1998)