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  • Delhi Rent Control Act
  • West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956
  • Saurashtra Barkhali Abolition Act, 1951
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
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  • Delhi Rent Control Act
  • West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956
  • Saurashtra Barkhali Abolition Act, 1951
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant purchased two parcels of agricultural land (Survey No. 34, 8 acres 7 gunthas and Survey No. 35, 9 acres 8 gunthas) together with a house by a registered sale deed dated 12 February 1968 for Rs 6,000. The vendors were the recorded heirs of the original owner, Gopalji. After the purchase, the respondents—sons and widow of the previous tenant Vashram Vasta—remained in possession. A notice demanding possession (14 April 1968) elicited no response, prompting Special Civil Suit No. 54 of 1970 before the Civil Judge, Jamnagar.

The respondents contended that (i) the civil court lacked jurisdiction under the Saurashtra Barkhali Abolition Act, 1951, (ii) the Mamlatdar’s certificate was fraudulent, and (iii) the suit was defective for non-joinder of other co-owners of the property.

The trial court held that it had jurisdiction but dismissed the suit solely for non-joinder of necessary parties (other co-owners). The Gujarat High Court, in First Appeal No. 194 of 1972, affirmed that dismissal, relying on Nanalal Girdharlal v. Gulamnabi Jamalbhai Motorwala (AIR 1973 Guj 131). The Supreme Court granted leave and heard the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit for recovery of possession was liable to dismissal on the ground of non-joinder of alleged co-owners.
  2. Incidental to the above, whether sufficient evidence existed to establish the presence and interest of any co-owners not joined as parties.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • A co-owner is legally entitled to sue for recovery/eviction without impleading all other co-owners, as recognised by several Supreme Court precedents (Sri Ram Pasricha; Kanta Goel; Pal Singh; A. Viswanatha Pillai).
  • The written statement contained only vague, unsupported assertions about other co-owners; no evidence was produced to prove their existence or specific shares.
  • The sale deed conveys the entire right, title and interest; its recitals confirm that no other sharers exist and indemnify the purchaser.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The action seeks possession of the whole property; without bringing all co-owners on record, complete recovery is impossible and the suit is bad.
  • The appellant “took the risk” of proceeding without impleading the alleged co-owners despite the specific objection in the written statement, and must face the consequences.
  • Precedents cited by the appellant are inapposite to the present factual matrix.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nanalal Girdharlal v. Gulamnabi Jamalbhai Motorwala, AIR 1973 Guj 131 A suit by one co-owner is not maintainable in absence of other co-owners. Relied upon by the High Court below; the Supreme Court found the factual basis for applying this rule absent and overturned the reliance.
Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, (1976) 4 SCC 184 A co-owner/landlord may sue for eviction without joining other co-owners. Cited by appellant; Court noted but rested decision on lack of proof of other co-owners, rendering deeper analysis unnecessary.
Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak, (1977) 2 SCC 814 Absence of other co-owners does not defeat a landlord’s eviction suit. Referenced in support of appellant’s position; court did not expressly apply because factual issue was decisive.
Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh, (1989) 1 SCC 444 A single co-owner can seek eviction when others raise no objection. Cited by appellant; acknowledged by Court but not determinative of outcome.
A. Viswanatha Pillai v. Special Tahsildar (LA No. IV), (1991) 4 SCC 17 Any co-owner can recover possession against strangers. Used illustratively by appellant; Court resolved case on evidentiary grounds, so detailed application was unnecessary.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court confined itself to the pivotal question of non-joinder. It scrutinised the pleadings and found:

  • The written statement alleged “many heirs” of Gopalji but failed to name them or specify their shares.
  • Revenue records recorded only the four sons of Gopalji and his grandson Mansukhlal; all except Mansukhlal were executing vendors. Mansukhlal had also joined the sale deed.
  • The sale deed expressly stated that no other sharers existed and indemnified the purchaser.
  • No evidence—documentary or oral—was led by the respondents to establish the existence or interest of any additional co-owners.

Given the absence of concrete proof, the trial court’s and High Court’s conclusions that undisclosed co-owners were necessary parties were held “unsupportable both on facts and law.” The Court therefore ruled that the suit should not have been dismissed for non-joinder. Having so decided, it found it unnecessary to pronounce on the broader legal proposition whether a sole co-owner may always sue independently.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; concurrent judgments of the courts below set aside.

The Court granted a decree for possession of the entire suit property minus six acres, which—by consent recorded during hearing—are to be selected by the appellant and vested in the respondents as full owners (not tenants). No order as to costs.

Implications are principally factual: the appellant gains possession of most of the land, while the respondents secure ownership of six acres. The judgment underscores that vague, unsubstantiated assertions of co-ownership are insufficient to defeat a suit on grounds of non-joinder, but it sets no new rule on the substantive right of a co-owner to sue alone.

    Laxmishankar Harishankar Bhatt v. Yashram Vasta (Dead) By Lrs. .

    S. Mohan, J.— Undaunted by the failure in both the courts below, the appellant has come up in appeal before this Court. The facts lie in a narrow compass.

    2. The appellant filed Special Civil Suit No. 54 of 1970 in a court of Civil Judge at Jamnagar for recovery of possession together with mesne profits, of suit properties which are survey No. 34 measuring an extent of 8 acres 7 gunthas and survey No. 35 measuring an extent of 9 acres 8 gunthas. There is also a house situate in survey No. 34. According to the appellant, he purchased the property from Naranshankar Velji and others by a registered sale deed dated February 12, 1968 for a sum of Rs 6,000. As such, he became the sole owner of the suit property. Vashram Vasta was originally the tenant of the appellant's predecessor in title. After the death of said Vashram Vasta, defendants 1 to 4 his sons and defendant 5, his widow continued in possession of the suit property. A suit notice was issued on April 14, 1968 demanding possession but that did not evoke any response. Therefore, the suit.

    3. The respondents in the written statement questioned inter alia the jurisdiction of the civil court to try the suit as it was barred by the provisions of the Saurashtra Barkhali Abolition Act, 1951. The certificate issued by Mamlatdar was without jurisdiction, as a matter of fact, the same had been obtained by fraud. Even otherwise, assuming the suit was maintainable, the appellant had not become the owner of the suit property under the sale deed dated February 12, 1968. There were other co-owners of the suit properties. They had not been impleaded in the suit and, therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties.

    4. The learned trial judge found that the court had jurisdiction to try the suit and the same was not barred under the provisions of Saurashtra Barkhali Abolition Act, 1951. However, it was held that all the co-owners of the suit property were necessary parties. Hence, for non-joinder of necessary parties, the suit would be bad. In this view, he dismissed the suit.

    5. Aggrieved by the dismissal, the matter was taken up in First Appeal No. 194 of 1972 filed in High Court of Gujarat. The division bench relying on Nanalal Girdharlal v. Gulamnabi Jamalbhai Motorwala AIR 1973 Guj 131, 1972 Ren CJ 889 held:

    “In the absence of other co-owners, the plaintiff suit cannot be held to be maintainable.”

    Thus, it dismissed the appeal. Hence, this appeal by leave.

    6. Shri P.H Parekh, learned counsel for the appellant would urge that the courts below have completely misdirected themselves as to the maintainability of the suit and the non-joinder of necessary parties. First and foremost, it is not correct to state that a co-owner cannot maintain a suit. This Court has taken a view in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath (1976) 4 SCC 184, (1977) 1 SCR 395 that for the purpose of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, a co-owner can maintain a suit. In Kanta Goel v. B.P Pathak (1977) 2 SCC 814, (1977) 3 SCR 412 again for the purpose of Delhi Rent Control Act, it has been held that the absence of other co-owners cannot disentitle the landlord from suing for eviction. In Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh (dead) by Lrs. (1989) 1 SCC 444, (1989) 1 SCR 67 it is stated that when the other co-owner did not object to the eviction, one co-owner could maintain an action for eviction even in the absence of the other co-owner. In A. Viswanatha Pillai v. Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition No. IV (1991) 4 SCC 17 relying on such propositions, this Court has taken the view that any co-owner could file a suit and recover the property against strangers. This being the law, the legal proposition as laid down in these cases ought to have been applied.

    7. Factually speaking, the written statement does not specifically say as to who are the other co-owners and the nature of interest they possessed. A vague allegation that there are other co-owners would not be enough. The case of the appellant throughout was that there was nobody else who had any interest in the suit property. The respondents ought to have let in evidence in this regard. They have failed to do so. The courts below proceeded on the assumption as though there were co-owners who were required to be impleaded and on that basis, wrongly dismissed the suit as not maintainable as the necessary parties had not been joined. The judgments are unsupportable both on facts and law and hence warrant interference.

    8. Mr Vimal Dave, learned counsel for the respondents submits that as the courts below have rightly held this is a suit for recovery of the entire properties; unless and until, all the necessary parties are before the Court, recovery of possession was impossible. Objection relating to non-joinder of necessary parties viz. the other co-owners was taken in the written statement itself. In spite of that the appellant would proceed on the basis that he had acquired the entire ownership. Therefore, he took a risk which proved to be fatal on account of non-joinder of necessary parties. The cases cited do not have any bearing on the issue in this appeal. Hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

    9. Having regard to the above submissions, the only point that requires to be decided is whether the suit of the appellant was liable to be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties. This is a case of recovery of possession. The original owner was Gopalji who died leaving behind four sons. The names of all these four sons had been recorded in the revenue record in place of Gopalji. Out of four sons, one of them namely Prabha Shankar died. In his place, the name of his son Mansukhlal Prabha Shankar has come to be substituted. As per the revenue records, no other name as co-owner is found. The sale deed dated February 12, 1968 had been executed by three sons of Gopalji and a grand son in favour of the present appellant. Mansukhlal had also subscribed to the sale. The sale deed contains a recital that there are no claimants or sharers except the vendors. The vendee, the appellant is also indemnified against any such claim. Thus, it will be clear that the appellant took the stand that he has come to purchase the entire right, title and interest in the suit property. As such owner, he sought the recovery of possession.

    10. In the written statement about the other co-owners what is stated is interesting. Page 10, paragraph 14 reads thus:

    “At present the plaintiffs have got no right or authority to bring the suit regarding disputed land. It is unauthoritative that it is mentioned to the plaintiff that the disputed land has heirs obtained under the so-called sale-deed. Originally this land belonged to one Barkhalidar Gopalji. He had got four heirs — Kala, Velji, Bhavanishanker and Tribhovan. There are many heirs of these four heirs. And the land cannot be sold fully without consents and signatures of all those heirs. And therefore, the plaintiffs do not get the right of entire ownership on the entire land and therefore the plaintiffs do not get entire right or authority on the disputed land. All these heirs have got right title and interest in this disputed land they are necessary party in this suit. Their pedigree is annexed herewith and the same may be considered as a part of this written statement. The plaintiff's suit for obtaining possession in absence of the owner is not maintainable. And therefore, on account of the said reason also the plaintiff's suit is liable to be dismissed.”

    11. A careful reading of above clearly discloses that there is no clear averment as to who are the co-owners and what exactly is the nature of right claimed by them. A vague statement of this character, in our considered opinion, could hardly be sufficient to non-suit the appellant on the ground of non-joinder of parties. We are unable to comprehend as to how the trial court had come to the conclusion that the executants of the sale deed dated February 12, 1968 could not pass a full title when it itself points out that the shares of the other co-owners were not known. Maybe the appellant took the stand that it was not necessary to implead others but that does not mean the appellant is liable to be non-suited. The stand of the appellant is consistent with his case that he has come to acquire the entire ownership of the suit property. Therefore, the courts should have insisted on some material or record as to the existence of other co-owners and their rights pertaining to suit properties. In juxtaposition to revenue record, there must be some worthwhile evidence for the court to conclude that there are other co-owners. Genealogical tree filed along with the written statement cannot point to the existence of co-owners without specific evidence in this regard. Such an evidence is totally lacking in this case. Therefore, we find it equally impossible to accept the finding of the High Court when it endorsed the view of the trial court in this regard. Accordingly, we conclude that in the absence of a specific finding as to whether there are other co-owners and how they are necessary parties, the suit could not have been dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties. On this conclusion, we think it is unnecessary to go into the legal aspect as to whether in the absence of other co-owners, one co-owner could maintain a suit.

    12. In view of the above, the appellant would be entitled to succeed. However, during the hearing, Mr P.H Parekh, learned counsel for the appellant responding to a suggestion from the Court agreed to give 6 acres to the respondents in view of their long enjoyment and possession as tenants. This suggestion was acceptable to the learned counsel for the respondents Shri Vimal Dave. Therefore, the concurrent judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside. There will be a decree for possession of the suit properties less six acres in favour of the appellant. These six acres shall be given at the option of the appellant to the respondents who will hold the said extent, as full owners thereof and not as tenant. In the result, the appeal stands allowed in the above terms. There will be no order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Laxmishankar Harishankar Bhatt v. Yashram Vasta (Dead) By Lrs. .
    (Feb 26, 1993)