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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner worked with the Department from January 1, 1986, to April 1, 1991, and alleges that his services were terminated in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. A demand was raised and the Labour Authorities were approached for referring the matter to the appropriate Labour Court. The Conciliation Officer, acting under Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, submitted a failure report stating that the petitioner had not completed 240 days of service and therefore no dispute existed between the parties. Based on this report, the Government passed the impugned order dated April 13, 1994, which the petitioner challenged.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner’s termination constitutes an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act despite the petitioner not completing 240 days of service.
  2. Whether the Government or Labour Authorities can adjudicate the merits of termination or abandonment of service in such cases.
  3. Whether the failure report based on non-completion of 240 days of service justifies the Government declining to refer the dispute to the Labour Court.
  4. The applicability of Sections 25F(b), 25G, and 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act in the context of termination and compensation rights.
  5. The jurisdiction of Labour Courts in adjudicating industrial disputes including claims of unfair labour practices, victimisation, and discrimination.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petitioner worked for over five years and his termination violated mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • The termination order was challenged on grounds that the petitioner’s rights were infringed, including claims of unfair labour practices.
  • The petitioner contended that the failure report and the Government’s order ignored the substantive legal protections afforded under the Act.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The respondents argued that since the petitioner had not completed 240 days of service, no industrial dispute existed.
  • They contended that the petitioner had abandoned the job rather than being terminated.
  • The respondents relied on the Conciliation Officer’s report and the Government order to support non-referral of the dispute to the Labour Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1985 S.C. 1915 Whether completion of 240 days is a matter of evidence for Labour Court; Government authorities cannot adjudicate merits of termination. The Court held that the question of whether the petitioner completed 240 days is to be determined by the Labour Court on reference; Government or Conciliation Officer cannot decide this threshold.
1964 AIR (SC) 1617 Industrial disputes involving questions of fact or law must be adjudicated by Tribunals constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, not by the Government. The Court reinforced that the Government’s role is not to adjudicate merits but to refer disputes to Labour Courts for determination.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the statutory framework under the Industrial Disputes Act, emphasizing that the definition of industrial dispute under Section 2A includes termination of service. The petitioner’s termination, regardless of whether he completed 240 days, falls within this definition. The Court rejected the respondents’ contention that absence of 240 days of service negates the existence of a dispute. It noted that the 240-day requirement only confers an additional right to compensation under Section 25F(b) but does not bar the worker from raising a dispute on other grounds such as unfair labour practices, victimisation, or non-compliance with Sections 25G and 25H. The Court underscored that the question of whether the petitioner’s service was terminated or abandoned is a factual issue to be decided by the Labour Court. It further held that the Government and Conciliation Officer erred in declining to refer the matter for adjudication based on the petitioner’s length of service or delay in raising the demand. The Court mandated referral of the dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication within a specified timeframe, aligning with the principle that industrial disputes must be resolved by the appropriate Tribunal or Labour Court.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition is allowed.

The impugned order declining to refer the dispute to the Labour Court is set aside. The respondents are directed to refer the matter to the appropriate Labour Court within one month of receipt of this order. The Labour Court is encouraged to decide the matter within six months of the reference. The decision ensures that disputes involving termination of employment, regardless of the length of service, are adjudicated by the competent Labour Tribunal rather than being dismissed at the Government or Conciliation Officer level. No new precedent beyond the direct effect on referral and adjudication procedures is established. Costs of Rs. 500/- are imposed on the respondents.

    Laxman Singh v. State Of Rajasthan

    J.C Verma, J.:— The petitioner has challenged the impugned order Annex. 3 dated 13.4.94 According to the petitioner, he had worked with the Department for 5 years i.e from 1.1.86 to 1.4.91 His services were terminated as per the petitioner, in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. A demand was raised on the respondents and the Labour Authorities were moved for referring the matter to the appropriate Labour court. The Conciliation Officer acting under Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act (in short the Act hereinafter) had sent the failure report. On receipt of the failure report, the Government had passed the impugned order to the fact that it has been found by the Conciliation Officer that the petitioner has not completed 240 days of service, therefore, no dispute exists, between the parties. This order has been challenged by the petitioner.

    2. The respondents had filed the reply and has tried to support the order on the ground that in case the petitioner has not completed 240 days of service as has been found by the Conciliation Officer there is no existence of the dispute at all. The contention of the respondents is to be straight away rejected on the ground that section 2 A of the Act defines the industrial dispute as termination, retrenchment and discharge. Admittedly the services of the petitioner was terminated and his case falls under the term of Industrial dispute. The petitioner had alleged that he has worked for more than 5 years. The Conciliation Officer had given the report on the record produced by the respondent to the effect that the petitioner had not worked 240 days preceeding the 12 months from the date of termination.

    3. Counsel for the respondents states that as a matter of fact there was no termination, but it was a case of abandonment on the part of the petitioner. May it be so, it has been repeatedly held by the Apex Court that so far as the termination of the services of the workman is concerned the Government authorities cannot adjudicate upon the merits of the case. A reliance has been placed on AIR 1985 S.C 1915 (1), to support the proposition whether the petitioner has completed 240 days or not is a matter of evidence to be gone into by the appropriate authority i.e the Labour Court on the reference being made by the State in this behalf. It is a mis-nomer on the part of the Labour authorities evenotherwise to say that if the employee has not completed 240 days there is no case for adjudication or there does not exits any dispute. Even employee having much less service can definitely raise a dispute and can allege before the appropriate authorities that his rights have been violated by retaining the junior persons and not complying with the provisions of Section 25 G and 25 H of the Act. The worker can also allege the unfair labour practice of hire and fire policy being adopted by the employers in certain cases. The workman can also allege in the given case of victimisation and discrimination. Completion of 240 days service only gives and bestows an additional right on the workman for payment of compensation as required under Section 25 F(b) of the Act violation of which renders the order of termination as void ab-initio, as has been held by the Apex Court. Therefore the plea of Section 25F(b) of the Act, is an extra plea apart from challenging the termination on the other grounds. The employers are to justify the termination of the services as industrial legislation, specifically prohibits the hire and fire policy victimisation or unfair labour practice at the whims of the employer. The fact whether services were terminated by the respondent or he had voluntarily abandoned the job is also a fact which is to be determined by the Labour Court. The Apex Court in 1964 AIR (SC) page 1617 (1), has categorically held that the question of fact or question of law arising out of the industrial matters is to be determined adjudicated by the Tribunals constituted under the Act and not by the Government.

    4. Even if demand notice is given at a belated stage, it has been repeatedly held by the Courts that reference cannot be declined on the ground of delay only because in that situation, if any relief is to be curtailed, that is also the jurisdiction of the Tribunals constituted under the Act.

    5. In the present case, the period of service rendered by the petitioner was to be adjudicated to the effect whether he had completed 5 or 6 years or less then 240 days which could only be proved by leading evidence before Labour Court. While passing the order Annex. 3 the authorities have totally ignored the existing Law and same is to be set aside.

    6. A direction is given to the respondents to refer the matter without any further delay within a period of one month from the date of the receipt of this order and in case the matter is referred for adjudication to the appropriate Labour Court it shall be highly appreciable if the Labour Court decide the matter within six months from the receipt of the reference order.

    7. With the aforesaid directions, the writ petition is allowed with a cost of Rs. 500/-.

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    Laxman Singh v. State Of Rajasthan
    (Jan 8, 1997)