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  • S. 14 of the Arbitration Act (Act No. X of 1940) (for short the Act herein)
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  • S. 14 of the Arbitration Act (Act No. X of 1940) (for short the Act herein)
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Revision under S.115 Civil P.C. (District Judge, Jodhpur judgment dated 31 May 1983)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code challenges the Judgment and decree dated 31 May 1983 of the District Judge, Jodhpur in Civil Original Suit No. 231 of 1981.

The petitioner had been awarded a contract (Agreement No. 217/70-71) for construction of the lower Kodra Dam at Mt. Abu. Disputes arose regarding measurements, rates and items, and the parties referred the matter to sole arbitration (Ram Singh) by reference dated 7 Nov. 1979 under Clause 23 of the agreement. The Arbitrator delivered an award on 7 Nov. 1981 at Jodhpur; the award included the express provision:

“(4) Petitioner is not entitled to any interest due to the amount of payment as per this award.”

The petitioner applied under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act to have the award and related papers filed in the District Judge's court. The award was filed on 15 Sep. 1982. The petitioner then filed objections under Sections 15 and 16 of the Arbitration Act seeking modification and a decree in the terms of the award with interest at 2% per month from the date of the award. The State (non-petitioner No. 2) did not file objections in the trial court.

The District Judge, by judgment and decree dated 31 May 1983, decreed the award but directed that if the State did not pay the awarded amount of Rs. 8,26,552/- by 31 Aug. 1983, the petitioner would be entitled to interest at 6% per annum from 31 May 1983 until payment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner (plaintiff) was entitled to interest from the date of the award (7 Nov. 1981) or from the date of the demand/notice up to the date of the judgment and decree (31 May 1983).
  2. Whether the petitioner was entitled to interest from the date of the judgment and decree (31 May 1983) to 31 Aug. 1983 (the conditional period specified by the District Judge) and on what rate.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner demanded payment of the award by registered letter (dated 8 Nov. 1981; delivered to Additional Chief Engineer, PHED, Jodhpur on 9 Nov. 1981) and payment was not made thereafter.
  • The petitioner claimed interest at 2% per month from the date of the award or, alternatively, from the date of the demand, relying upon the Interest Act, 1978 (No. XIV of 1978), and requested that the District Judge award interest from those earlier dates.
  • The petitioner contended that the District Judge gave no reasons for denying interest from the earlier dates and that it was improper to grant the State time until 31 Aug. 1983 to pay without awarding interest from the award date or demand date; the petitioner characterised the District Judge's approach as an illegal exercise of jurisdiction and materially irregular.

Non-petitioners' Arguments

  • The Deputy Government Advocate supported the District Judge's judgment regarding the award of interest (i.e., the District Judge's order that interest would be payable from 31 May 1983 if payment was not made by 31 Aug. 1983).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Srikantia & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1967 Bom 347 Interpreting Section 29 of the Arbitration Act as exhaustive on "interest on awards" and holding that a court cannot award interest for any period prior to the date of passing of the decree under Section 29. The court relied on this decision to conclude that under Section 29 the District Judge was correct in not awarding interest prior to the date of the decree; the decision supports the negative import that interest cannot be awarded for periods prior to decree under S.29.
Union of India v. A.L. Rallia Ram, AIR 1963 SC 1685 On the Interest Act (No. XXXII of 1839): the court may allow interest to the plaintiff if the amount claimed is a sum certain payable at a certain time by virtue of a written instrument; the Act contains a proviso that interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is then payable by law. The decision was cited to explain the conditions under which courts may award interest under historical interest statutes and to support limitations on awarding interest by courts not adjudicating the underlying debt.
Hogarth Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Mitsui Bussan Ltd. Kaisha, AIR 1926 Cal 1119 Held that where a court is acting as an executing court for an award, it is not the court which adjudicates on the actual debt or claim for the purposes of awarding interest under the Interest Act; the words "the Court before which such debts or sums may be recovered" refer to a court that adjudicates on the debt. The opinion relied on this reasoning (and Srikantia's reliance on it) to conclude that a court which had not adjudicated upon the actual debt (i.e., where the Arbitrator had decided the debt and had not awarded interest) could not award interest under Section 3 of the Interest Act of 1978.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two analytical stages corresponding to the two principal questions before it.

First, the court examined the scope of Section 29 of the Arbitration Act (Act No. X of 1940), which provides that where an award is for payment of money the court may, in the decree, order interest "from the date of the decree at such rate as the court deems reasonable" on the principal sum adjudged by the award and confirmed by the decree. The court treated Section 29 as limiting the power of the court to award interest only from the date of the decree; it noted that Section 2(c) defines "court" and that Sections 29 and 41 read together show Section 34 C.P.C. (pendente lite and future interest in ordinary suits) is not applicable to awards brought before the court. The court paraphrased the principle from Srikantia & Co.'s case that S.29 is exhaustive and carries the negative import that interest for any period prior to the date of the decree is not permissible under that section.

Second, the court considered the petitioner's reliance on Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 (No. XIV of 1978). It identified the four conditions required under Section 3 (as recited in the judgment): (i) there must be a debt or a sum certain; (ii) it must be payable at a certain time or otherwise; (iii) the debts or sums must be payable by virtue of some written contract at a certain time; and (iv) there must have been a demand in writing stating that interest will be demanded from the date of the demand. The court held that the power under Section 3 to award interest is vested in the court that adjudicates the debt (and that the statutory definition of "court" includes a tribunal and an arbitrator). Because the Arbitrator in this case had explicitly not awarded interest and the trial court (District Judge) was functioning as the executing court for the award, the court held that the District Judge could not award interest under Section 3 of the 1978 Act. This conclusion was reached by following the reasoning in Hogarth Shipping Co.'s case and Srikantia & Co.'s case.

While the court agreed that interest prior to the decree could not be awarded (i.e., the petitioner was not entitled to interest before 31 May 1983), it found that the District Judge had failed to exercise his Section 29 power properly in awarding a conditional post-decree entitlement to interest without stating reasons for the absence of a broader award from the date of the decree. The District Judge had directed that if payment was not made by 31 Aug. 1983, interest at 6% p.a. would run from 31 May 1983; the appellate court concluded that when awarding interest under Section 29 the District Judge should have awarded interest from the date of decree until payment at a reasonable rate and should have given reasons. The court found the 2% per mensem claimed by the petitioner to be exorbitant and concluded that a reasonable rate in the circumstances was 6% per annum.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The revision is partly allowed. The decree dated 31 May 1983 of the District Judge, Jodhpur is modified to award interest to the petitioner on the sum of Rs. 8,26,552/- from 31 May 1983 (the date of the decree) until payment at the rate of 6% per annum.

Practical consequence in the present case: Counsel for the petitioner stated that the awarded amount was paid on 31 Aug. 1983; accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to recover interest at 6% per annum on Rs. 8,26,552/- for the period 31 May 1983 to 31 Aug. 1983.

Costs and broader implications:

The parties are directed to bear their own costs. The court's decision applies the existing statutory scheme and precedent to limit pre-decree interest on arbitration awards (under Section 29) and to restrict the application of the Interest Act (1978) to courts/tribunals/arbitrators that adjudicate the debt. The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond applying prior authorities and statutory provisions to the facts; no broader precedent beyond the direct effect on the parties is announced in the text of this opinion.

Revision partly allowed.

    Ram Singh v. Ram Singh And Another

    1. This revision petition under S. 115 of the Civil P.C is directed against the Judgment and decree dt. May 31, 1983 of the District Judge, Jodhpur passed in Civil Original Suit No. 231 of 1981.

    2. A contract for construction of lower Kodra Dam at Mt. Abu, District Sirohi was granted to the petitioner. Agreement No. 217/70-71 was entered into between the parties. A dispute arose in respect of measurements, rates, items etc. and the matter was referred to the sole arbitration of non-petitioner No. 1 (Ram Singh) vide letter dt. Nov. 7, 1979 of non-petitioner No. 2 (State of Rajasthan through the Chief Engineer, P.H.E.D, Jaipur). The reference was made to the sole arbitration in accordance with Cl. 23 of the aforesaid agreement. The Arbitrator gave the award on Nov. 7, 1981 at Jodhpur in the presence of both the parties and it was signed. The material portion of the award with which I am concerned in this revision petition is as under:

    “(4) Petitioner is not entitled to any interest due to the amount of payment as per this award.”

    The petitioner submitted an application under S. 14 of the Arbitration Act (Act No. X of 1940) (for short ‘the Act’ herein) for a direction to the Arbitrator to file the Award, the Agreement and other relevant papers in the court of District Judge, Jodhpur. The Award was filed on Sept. 15, 1982. Thereafter, the petitioner moved an application containing objections under Ss. 15 and 16 of the Act within time for modification of the Award. It was prayed therein that the decree in terms of the Award along with interest @ 2% per month from the date of the Award may be passed. Non-petitioner No. 2 did not file any objection. The learned District Judge, Jodhpur by his judgment and decree dt. May 31, 1983 passed the decree in terms of the Award and awarded interest @ 6% p.a from May 21(31), 1983 in case non-petitioner No. 2 does not pay the amount payable under the Award by Aug. 31, 1983.

    3. Aggrieved by the Judgment and decree dt. May 31, 1983, the petitioner has filed this revision petition praying that the Judgment and decree dt. May 31, 1983 of the District Judge, Jodhpur may be modified by awarding interest from the date of the Award or from the date of filing of the Award or any other date @ 2% per month.

    4. A show cause notice was issued to the non-petitioners, in pursuance of which, appearance has been put in on behalf of non-petitioner No. 2. On Aug. 8, 1984, when the revision petition was taken up, learned counsel appearing for the parties submitted that in view of the order dt. Jan. 17, 1984, the revision petition may finally be disposed of without requisitioning the record.

    5. I have heard Mr. M.C Bhoot, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Rajendra Vyas, learned Deputy Government Advocate.

    6. It may be stated that the learned District Judge directed in his judgment dated May 31, 1983 that if non-petitioner No. 2 does not pay the amount of Rs. 8,26,552/- by Aug. 31, 1983, the petitioner would be entitled to interest @ 6% p.a from May 21(31), 1983 until payment.

    7. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner requested for the payment of the amount of Award awarded by the Arbitrator on Nov. 8, 1981 by registered letter, the copy of which was also delivered in the Office of the Additional Chief Engineer, PHED, Jodhpur on Nov. 9, 1981. Despite that, the amount was not paid and so the petitioner has claimed interest @ 2% per month from the date of the Award or from the date of the demand under the Interest Act, 1978 (No. XIV of 1978) (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1978”). According to the learned counsel, the learned District Judge has not assigned any reasons whatsoever in disallowing the interest. He further contends that there was no justification in granting time to non-petitioner No. 2 for making payment by Aug. 31, 1983. Learned counsel, therefore, contended that the learned District Judge has exercised his jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity when he did not award interest from the date of the award or from the date of the demand made by registered notice up to Aug. 31, 1983. On the other hand, the learned Deputy Government Advocate supported the judgment of the District Judge in respect of the award of interest.

    8. I have given my anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.

    9. The first question is whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest from the date of the Award i.e Nov. 7, 1981 or from the date of the notice to the date of the judgment and decree dt. May 31, 1983. The second question is whether the petitioner is also entitled to interest from the date of the judgment and decree i.e May 31, 1983 to Aug. 31, 1983 as the learned District Judge has ordered that if the amount of Rs. 826,552/- is not paid by Aug. 31, 1983, the petitioner would be entitled to interest @ 6% p.a from May 21(31), 1983 (Date of Judgment and decree is May 31, 1983). The notice which was given by the petitioner is under S. 3 of the Act of 1978.

    10. Before proceeding further, it will be relevant to notice S. 29 of the Act:

    “29. Interest on awards.— Where and in so far as an award is for the payment of money, the Court may in the decree order interest, from the date of the decree at such rate as the court deems reasonable, to be paid on the principal sum as adjudged by the award, and confirmed by the decree.”

    S. 29 of the Act empowers the court where the award is for payment of money to award the reasonable rate of interest from the date of the decree. S. 34 C.P.C provides for award of pendente lite and future interest. It is thus clear that under S. 29 of the Act, the court can only award interest from the date of the decree of the court till the realisation of the amount. The ‘court’ has been defined in S. 2(c) of the Act. It reads as under:

    “2(c). “Court” means a Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not, except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under S. 21, include a Small Cause Court;”

    S. 41 of the Act deals with procedure and powers of Court. If the two provisions of Ss. 29 and 41 of the Act are read together, the inevitable conclusion is that S. 34 C.P.C cannot be applied to a case of an award brought before the court. Under S. 34 of the Act (C.P.C?) interest from the date of the suit to the date of the decree and from the date of the decree until realisation can be awarded S. 29 of the Act, however, does not grant that power to the court inasmuch as the court can grant interest only from the date of the decree at such rate as the court deems reasonable and that too, on the principal sum as adjudged by the award and confirmed by the decree. The court can only award interest from the date of the decree and not from any prior date. S. 29 of the Act was considered by Tulzapurkar, J. (as he then was) in Srikantia & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1967 Bom 347. In that case, it was observed as under (at p. 354):

    “In my view, S. 29 of the Act also is exhaustive of the whole law upon the subject of “interest on awards” and since the said section enables the court to award interest on the principal sum adjudged by an award from the date of the decree onwards, it must be held that it carries with it the negative import that it shall not be permissible to the court to award interest on the principal sum adjudged by an award for any period prior to the date of the passing of the decree.”

    It is, thus, clear that under S. 29 of the Act, the District Judge was right in not awarding interest prior to the date of the decree.

    11. The matter does not rest at that. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that notice was given to non-petitioner No. 2 and it did not make payment although it was specifically stated in the notice that they would recover interest under S. 3 of the Act of 1978. The amount was not paid. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner filed an application under S. 14 of the Act on Sep. 15, 1982 for a direction to the Arbitrator to file the award. Non-petitioner No. 2 did not file any objections to the award. The petitioner, however, filed an application containing objections under Ss. 15 and 16 of the Act praying that while passing the decree in terms of the award, interest @ 2% per mensem from the date of the award may be awarded.

    12. S. 3 of the Act of 1978 gives powers to the Civil Court to award interest. In awarding interest under S. 3 of the Act of 1978, the following conditions must be fulfilled:

    (i) there must be a debt or a sum certain;

    (ii) it must be payable at a certain time or otherwise;

    (iii) these debts or sums must be payable by virtue of some written contract at a certain time;

    (iv) there must have been a demand in writing stating that interest will be demanded from the date of the demand.

    If these conditions are not fulfilled, the court cannot allow interest under the Act of 1978.

    13. In Union Of India v. A.L Rallia Ram, AIR 1963 SC 1685, a contention was raised that the interest may be awarded on grounds of equity and reliance was placed upon the Interest Act (No. XXXII of 1839). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under:

    “Under that Act, the court may allow interest to the plaintiff if the amount claimed is a sum certain which is payable at certain time by virtue of a written instrument. The Act, however, contains a proviso that interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is now payable by law.”

    S. 1 of the Interest Act, 1839 came up for examination before a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Hogarth Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Mitsui Bussan Ltd. Kaisha, AIR 1926 Cal 1119. The learned Judge observed as under:

    “It appears to me that as regards the award, this court is now in the position of an executing court and is not a court in which such sums or debts may be recovered to employ the language of the section. These words in my opinion refer to the court which adjudicates as to actual debt or claim.”

    (Underlining is mine).

    Hogarth Shipping Co's case was relied upon in Srikantia & Co's case (AIR 1967 Bom 347) and it was held that the words “the Court before which such debts or sums may be recovered” in S. 1 of the Interest Act means the court which adjudicates on the actual debt or claim. It is, thus, obvious that the court which had not adjudicated upon the actual debt or claim cannot award interest under the Act of 1978. In the Act of 1978, the court has been defined as under:

    “2(a) ‘Court’ includes a tribunal and an arbitrator.”

    So it is clear that under S. 3 of the Act of 1978, the court which includes the Tribunal or an Arbitrator is the Court which adjudicates upon the debt and it can only award interest. In this case, the Arbitrator has not awarded any interest. Respectfully following Hogarth Shipping Co.'s case (AIR 1926 Cal 1119), and Srikantia & Co.'s case, I am of opinion that the District Judge could not award interest to the petitioner under S. 3 of the Act of 1978. It follows from the discussions made hereinabove that the petitioner was not entitled to any interest before the date of the judgment and decree.

    14. The other question is whether the learned District Judge while exercising the jurisdiction did not commit any illegality or material irregularity in ordering that if the amount is not paid by Aug. 31, 1983, the petitioner would be entitled to recover interest @ 6% p.a from May 21, 1983. It may be recalled here that the decree was passed on May 31, 1983. Under S. 29 of the Act, the Court could award interest when the award was for the payment of money at reasonable rate from the date of the decree. No reasons whatsoever have been given by the learned District Judge in not awarding interest from the date of decree. No reasons have been shown by the learned Deputy Government Advocate either. In the circumstances narrated above, the learned District Judge should have awarded interest from the date of decree at a reasonable rate which he had not done. 2% per mensem is an exorbitant rate of interest, which has been claimed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the reasonable rate of interest will be 6% p.a and in my opinion, under S. 29 of the Act, the petitioner should have been awarded interest from the date of the decree until the amount was paid @ 6% p.a

    15. The result is that I allow the revision in part and modify the decree dt. May 31, 1983 of the District Judge, Jodhpur. The petitioner will be entitled to recover interest from non-petitioner No. 2 on the amount of Rs. 8,26,552/- from May 31, 1983 until the amount was paid at the rate of 6% per annum.

    16. Learned counsel states that the amount was paid on Aug. 31, 1983. It follows, therefore, that the petitioner will be entitled to recover interest from non-petitioner No. 2 on the amount of Rs. 8,26,552/- @ 6% per annum from May 31, 1983 to Aug. 31, 1983.

    17. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

    Revision partly allowed.

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    Comments

    Ram Singh v. Ram Singh And Another
    (Aug 21, 1984)