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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950 (No. XVII of 1950),
  • Bombay Rents, Hotel and Loading House Rates Control Act (LV II of 1947)
  • DELHI AND AJMER RENT CONTROL ACT 1952
  • Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act,
  • Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950 (No. XVII of 1950),
  • Bombay Rents, Hotel and Loading House Rates Control Act (LV II of 1947)
  • DELHI AND AJMER RENT CONTROL ACT 1952
  • Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act,
  • Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (P. Jain, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent plaintiff, Smt. Chand Devi, purchased a building (AMC No. 16/394, near Madar Gate Ajmer) on 16-11-1962. The suit property formed part of that building and comprised a shop, three kothries on the ground floor and two tinsheds on the first floor. Om Prakash was the tenant under the previous owner, attorned to Smt. Chand Devi, and paid rent up to 31-5-65.

The plaintiff sought eviction of the defendant on the ground that she required the shop and the residential portion for her own use and that of her family. Despite notice and determination of tenancy the defendant did not surrender possession. The plaintiff instituted a suit on 17-7-1965 in the court of Munsif, Ajmer City (West) claiming eviction and arrears of rent and mesne profits. After trial the learned Magistrate (trial court) decreed the suit by judgment dated 31-1-68. On appeal by the defendant Om Prakash, the first appellate court dismissed the appeal on 28-8-1968, upholding the trial court's findings. The present opinion arises on the defendant's second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff's failure to disclose the nature of the business she or her family intended to carry on in the shop is fatal to establishing a reasonable and bonafide requirement for eviction.
  2. Whether, where a tenancy covers both residential accommodation and shop premises as a single indivisible tenancy, a landlord who establishes a bonafide need for a substantial portion (e.g., residential portion) is entitled to eviction of the tenant from the entire premises.
  3. Whether the Court can, under the applicable statutory scheme (Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950), grant a partial decree for ejectment (i.e., ejectment from part of the tenanted premises only).
  4. Whether the appellant's application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. to place additional documents on record should be permitted when not supported by an affidavit and raising matters needing factual investigation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant Om Prakash) Arguments (as advanced by Shri S.N. Bhargava)

  • The plaintiff did not disclose in the pleadings the nature of the business her husband or son proposed to carry on in the shop; on that basis she is not entitled to a decree for ejectment from the shop.
  • The appellant relied on authorities (Jodhraj v. Suleman; Birdhichand v. Ram Prashad; Ramchand v. Naraindas — unreported) to support the proposition that non-disclosure of the nature of the intended business may be fatal to the landlord's claim to evict.
  • During hearing he applied under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. to place on record copies of an affidavit and application of Mahadeo (husband of plaintiff) to show Mahadeo was a partner, not an employee — an application that was not supported by an affidavit.

Respondent's (Plaintiff Smt. Chand Devi) Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Sunderlal Sogani)

  • While admitting the plaintiff had not disclosed the nature of the business to be done in the shop, that omission was not fatal in the circumstances of the case.
  • The residential portion and the shop constitute one indivisible tenancy. The plaintiff proved a reasonable and bonafide need for the residential portion (she was living in rented accommodation and had purchased the suit building) and, because the tenancy was indivisible, she was entitled to seek eviction from the entire premises even if proof concerning the shop was not specific.
  • Relied on the authority Ramdayal v. Ram Narayan (1952 RLW 315) in support of the indivisibility principle and the right to evict the tenant from the whole premises once bona fide need for a substantial portion is established.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jodhraj v. Suleman (1970 RLW 170) Holds that non-disclosure of the nature of proposed business can assume importance and be fatal where evidence is inconsistent or the plaintiff's case lacks credibility. The Court distinguished Jodhraj on its facts: here the plaintiff's witnesses were consistent, the nature of business was not challenged in cross-examination, and therefore the non-disclosure was not fatal.
Birdhichand v. Ram Prashad (1970 RLW 297) Considered the question whether it is necessary for a landlord to disclose the nature of the business; appellate court thought mere statement of intent to carry on business was enough; Bhargava J. criticized that view. The Court observed this decision had some bearing but noted Bhargava J.'s conclusion that the first appellate court's approach was erroneous; it did not treat Birdhichand as controlling here.
Ramchand v. Naraindas (Second Appeal No.82/66, unreported, Shinghal J., 11 Aug 1967) Records a reversal where statements of plaintiff's witnesses were misread; discusses non-disclosure in notice and pleading but does not clearly hold non-disclosure to be necessarily fatal. The Court stated Ramchand did not clearly establish that non-disclosure of the nature of business is always fatal; the case was distinguishable and not decisive here.
Ramdayal v. Ram Narayan (1952 RLW 315) Establishes that if a landlord proves bonafide need for a substantial portion of leased premises, he is entitled to ejectment of the lessee from the entire premises; tenancy cannot be split by the court into separate lettings. The Court relied on this principle to hold that because the plaintiff proved bonafide need for the residential portion, she was entitled to eviction from the entire premises under the Rajasthan Act as the tenancy was indivisible.
Motilal & Anr. v. Nanak Chand & Ors. (1970 RCJ 99; Supreme Court) Affirmed the indivisibility of the contract of tenancy and that courts should not split the contract into residential and non-residential parts for relief in the absence of statutory provision. The Court cited this Supreme Court authority (and its reference to S. Sanval v. Gian Chand) to reinforce the indivisibility principle and to support the conclusion that partial ejectment was not permissible under the Rajasthan Act.
S. Sanval v. Gian Chand (1966) 1 S.C.R. 536 Earlier Supreme Court authority referenced for the principle that tenancy is a single indivisible contract. Referenced (through Motilal) as part of the foundation for treating the tenancy as indivisible and for refusing to split relief between residential and non-residential parts.
Jeevanlal v. Anant (1972 RCJ 266; Madhya Pradesh High Court) Holds that ejectment can only be of the entire rented premises where tenancy is indivisible and no statute permits partial ejectment; proof of need for part establishes need for whole for eviction purposes. The Court treated this decision as supporting the respondent's position and relied on its reasoning to hold that partial ejectment was not available under the Rajasthan statute.
Kasturbhai v. Mohanlal (1968 GLR 729; Gujarat High Court) Under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, the court may, if no hardship would be caused, pass a decree in respect of part of the premises. The Court distinguished this authority because the Bombay statute contains an express provision permitting partial decrees; no similar provision exists in the Rajasthan Act, so Kasturbhai was held not applicable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded step-by-step as follows:

  1. Recounted the material facts and procedural history: plaintiff's purchase of the building, the tenant's attornment, arrears of rent, institution of suit for eviction and mesne profits, trial court decree and dismissal of the first appeal.
  2. Recognised the appellant's principal contention — that the plaintiff's failure to disclose the nature of the business to be carried on in the shop rendered her claim for eviction in respect of the shop unsustainable — and reviewed authorities cited for that proposition.
  3. Examined the evidence given at trial: the plaintiff did not specify the nature of business in her pleadings or at trial; witnesses (including plaintiff's husband and son) testified to an intention to do business but did not specify its nature; the defendant did not cross-examine witnesses on that point.
  4. Distinguished Jodhraj v. Suleman on the facts: in Jodhraj inconsistent statements and contradictory evidence made non-disclosure significant; in the present case the plaintiff's witnesses were consistent and were not challenged by cross-examination on the nature of business, reducing the weight of the non-disclosure objection.
  5. Considered Birdhichand and Ramchand but found they did not mandate non-suiting here; in particular, Ramchand did not clearly announce a rule that non-disclosure of business is necessarily fatal.
  6. Accepted the alternative argument advanced by the respondent: the tenancy in the present case was indivisible (covering both residential accommodation and the shop). The Court invoked Ramdayal v. Ram Narayan and later authorities (including Supreme Court authority in Motilal and references to S. Sanval) establishing that where a landlord proves a bonafide need for a substantial portion of the leased premises, the landlord is entitled to a decree for ejectment of the lessee from the entire premises.
  7. Examined the statutory framework: under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, Section 13 (and clause (h)) requires that the premises be required reasonably and bonafide by the landlord. There is no provision in that statute permitting partial decrees for ejectment. The Court therefore concluded that partial ejectment was not available under the Rajasthan Act and that proof of bonafide need for the residential portion sufficed to sustain eviction from the whole premises.
  8. Addressed and rejected the appellant's procedural application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. to file copies of documents (an affidavit and application of Mahadeo) because the application lacked an affidavit, raised issues of genuineness of signatures and concerned matters requiring further factual investigation.
  9. Concluded that the appellant had not satisfied the Court that the plaintiff's requirement for the residential portion was not reasonable and bonafide and that, consequently, the decree below could be maintained on the ground of indivisibility and established bonafide need for the residential accommodation.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED — the decree of the trial and first appellate courts granting the plaintiff eviction of the tenant from the suit premises is maintained. The appellant's application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. is rejected.

Implications / Consequences:

  • Direct effect: The plaintiff's decree for eviction (which was decreed by the lower courts) is upheld; the landlord is entitled to evict the tenant from the entire premises because she proved a reasonable and bonafide need for the residential portion of the leased premises.
  • Statutory consequence: Under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, and in the absence of any provision for partial decrees, the Court will not grant ejectment of the tenant from only part of an indivisible tenancy when the landlord has established bonafide need for a substantial portion.
  • Procedural note: Documentary material tendered late and without necessary supporting affidavit was not admitted; the Court refused to assume genuineness or to consider materials requiring further factual inquiry absent proper procedure.
  • Precedential impact: The opinion applies established authority on the indivisibility of tenancy and on the consequences of proving bonafide need for part of leased premises. The judgment resolves the appeal on those grounds; the opinion does not purport to lay down any broader novel principle beyond the authorities and statutory scheme cited.

Result announced in the opinion: the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

    Om Prakash v. Smt. Chand Devi

    P. Jain, J.

    1. This is a second appeal by the defendant and it arises out of a suit instituted by the respondent Smt. Chand Devi for the eviction of the appellant from the suit property and for arrears of rent.

    2. Smt. Chand Devi purchased a building bearing AMC No. 16/394 situated near Madar Gate Ajmer on 16-11-1962. The suit property forms part of this building and consists of one shop, three Kothries in the ground floor and two tinsheds on the first floor. Admittedly, Om Prakash was the tenant of the previous owner and he attorned to Smt. Chand Devi as his landlady. He paid rent upto 31-5-65 at the rate of Rs. 21/- per menses. Plaintiff Smt. Chand Devi sought eviction of the defendant Om Prakash on the ground that she required the shop and the residential portion for use and occupation of herself and the members of her family. Inspite of notice and the tenancy having been determined, the defendant tenant did not surrender possession. Accordingly, on 17-7-1965 she instituted the suit in the court of Munsif, Ajmer City (west) claiming eviction of the defendant from the suit property and Rs. 53(SIC)20 as arrears of rent and mesne profits. She also prayed for mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 21/- per menses from the date of the suit.

    3. Om Prakash, while admitting the tenancy, alleged that the requirement of the plaintiff was not reasonable and bonafide and it was only on account of her desire to get more rent.

    4. After trial, the learned Magistrate accepted the case of the plaintiff and decreed her suit by his judgment dated 31-1-68 On appeal by the defendant Om Prakash, the findings of the learned trial Judge were upheld and the appeal was dismissed on 28th August, 1968. It is this decree that has been challenged before me in second appeal.

    5. Shri S.N. Bhargava, learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the plaintiff in not having disclosed the nature of the business her husband or her son proposed to do in the shop, is not entitled to a decree for ejectment of the defendant from the suit shop. He has placed reliance on Jodhraj v. Suleman 1970 RLW 170, Birdhichand v. Ram Prashad 1970 RLW 297 and an unreported decision in Ramchand v. Naraindas and Ors. Second Appeal No. 82/66 decided by Hon'ble Shinghal J. on August 11, 1967. On the other hand, Mr. Sunderlal Sogani learned Counsel for the respondent, while admitting that the plaintiff had not disclosed the nature of the business that her husband and her son wanted to do in the shop in question argued that in the circumstances of the case, it is not fatal to the case. It has been urged by him that the residential, portion and the shop are the subject matter of one tenancy. The plaintiff has been able to establish that she has been living with her family in a rented house and her requirement is reasonable and bonafide. The tenancy being indivisible, she is entitled to seek the eviction of the defendant from the suit property even if it is found that the plaintiff has not been able to prove her requirement as bona fide for shop. In support of this contention, he relies upon Ramdayal v. Ram Narayan 1952 RLW 315.

    6. I have considered the rival contentions. It is true that the plaintiff failed to disclose the nature of business, she wants her husband and her son to do in the shop in question. In her statement at the trial as well, she did not state the nature of her requirement for the shop. For the residential portion, of course, it was made clear that she was living in a rented house and she wanted to go to her own house which she had newly purchased. It is equally true that the defendant did not cross-examine her on that aspect of the matter. She examined Anand Prakash P.W. 2, who stated that Smt. Chand Devi has been living in the house of Birji Bai on rent and she is being asked to vacate that house Mahadeo, plaintiff's husband, has also been examined as P.W. 3. He supported the plaintiff's version that the suit house was required for the residence of the plaintiff and her family members. As regards the shop, it was stated that he and his son Prem Prakash will do their business. He did not state as to what type of business he proposed to carry in the said shop. He was not as well cross-examined on that aspect of the matter. Prem Prakash was also examined as P.W. 4. He deposed that he wanted to do some business on the shop as he was without any work. Moolchand P.W. 5 stated that Mahadeo did not do any independent work and he was working at his shop as an employee. In my opinion, the case Jodhraj 1970 RLW 170 is distinguishable on facts In that case, Suleman alleged in the plaint that he required the shop for his personal necessity. In the course of evidence, he tried to prove that the shop was required for his son Gafoor. Gafoor himself stated in his statement that he would do business either in cycles or in dyeing. Another witness Nanu, son-in-law of the plaintiff Suleman stated in cross-examination that Gafoor wanted to do business in 'kirana,' whereas Ghisu PW 3 stated that the shop in question was required by Suleman and he would do some business in the shop. In view of this evidence, the learned Judge did not believe the evidence and the non-disclosure of the nature of business in the plaint assumed importance. In the present case, as indicated above, there has been no inconsistency in the statements of the plaintiff's witnesses. The nature of business was not disclosed either in the plaint or in the statement at the trial. No attempt was made by the defendant to cross-examine the witnesses on that aspect of the matter.

    7. In the case of Birdichand, the nature of business was not disclosed in the plaint and it was only stated that the plaintiff required the shop for his own use and occupation as he purchased it for starting his own business. In the statement as well, he did not go beyond that. The learned trial Judge was not satisfied as regards the bona fide requirement of the plaintiff. He dismissed the suit. In appeal, the finding was reversed and it was held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to have disclosed the nature of business and it was enough if the plaintiff had said that he wanted to carry on business on the shop in question. The question in the second appeal, therefore, that came for consideration was whether the view taken by the first appellate court was right. It was in that context that Bhargava J. held that the learned first appellate court misdirected itself on the question that it is enough for the land lord to say that he required the premises for his own business without disclosing its nature and it is upon this premise that he has found the statement of the plaintiff sufficient to discharge the burden that the shop was required reasonably and bonafide for his personal use and occupation. He was of the opinion that this view was erroneous. This case has no doubt some bearing on the question involved in this case.

    8. In the case of Ramchand decided by Shinghal J. the statements of the plaintiff's witnesses were misread and on that ground, the learned Judge held that the finding of fact arrived at by the appellate court stood vitiated and no reassessed the evidence. In addition to the ground, he also observed that the plaintiff did not disclose the nature of the need in the notice nor did he disclose it in the plaint. And what he disposed in his statement at the trial was misread by the appellate court. This case does not clearly beat out that the learned Judge meant to lay down that non-disclosure of the nature of business will be fatal to the plaintiff in establishing his requirement as reasonable and bonafide.

    9. In view of the alternative argument submitted by Mr. Sogani, I need not express my opinion on this question as the decree can be maintained on that point. Learned Counsel for the appellant has not been able to satisfy me that the plaintiff's requirement for the residential portion was not reasonable and bonafide. As a matter of fact, he confided his argument that the plaintiff has not been able to establish her requirement as reasonable and bonafide so far as the shop is concerned inasmuch as the nature of business which was proposed to be done was not disclosed and the pleading in that respect was vague. The tenancy being one both for residential accommodation and for the shop, the ejectment of the tenant can only be for the entire rented out premises and not from a part of it. Bapna J. in the case of Ramdayal 1952 RLW 315 referred to above held that once the needs are bonafide in respect of a portion of the leased premises, the landlord has a right to come to court to ask for the eviction of the tenant from the entire premises. His Lordship observed:

    The other contention that the defendant may be allowed to retain possession of such part of the first storey as had not been proved to be required by the plaintiff, is not correct. It is not necessary in such cases for the plaintiff to prove that every portion of the premises leased to the defendant was required for occupation by the plaintiff since the court cannot make out a new arrangement of tenancy between the parties for the property which may not immediately be required by the plaintiff. If the plaintiff succeeds in proving that any substantial portion of the leased premises are required by him for his own use, he would be entitled to a decree for ejectment of the lessee from the entire premises leased to him. If the leased premises, for instance, consisted of several rooms, out-houses, it would be absurd to think that the landlord stood in the necessity of proving his requirement in respect of every room or garage or out-house, or every inch of the court-yard or garden.

    In the recent Act known as the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950 (No. XVII of 1950), the matter of eviction of tenants is provided under Section 13 and Clause (h) thereof requires the Court to see that the premises are required reasonable & bonafide by the landlord for the use or occupation of himself or his family. What is important, therefore, to see is that the needs of the landlord are bonafide, and once the needs are bonafide in respect of a portion of the leased premises, the landlord has a right to come to court to ask for eviction of the tenant from the entire leased premises. The contention of the defendant, that he may be allowed to retain possession of a small portion of the first storey for which no definite evidence has been led by the plaintiff as to his own requirement, has, therefore, no force.

    I have no manner of doubt left in my mind that the plaintiff cannot be non-suited on the ground that she has not been able to establish her requirement for the shop as reasonable and bonafide for her failure to disclose the nature of business proposed to be carried in that shop. Here, a reference may also be made to Motilal and Anr. v. Nanak Chand and Ors. 1970 RCJ 99; a Supreme Court decision. Their Lordships while referring to their earlier decision in S. Sanval v. Gian Chand (1966)1 S.C.R. 536 observed:

    The Court held in that case that the contract of tenancy was single and indivisible contract and in the absence of a statutory provision to that effect it is not open to the Court to divide it into the two contracts, one of letting for residential purposes, and the other for non-residential purposes, and to grant relief under Section 13(1)(e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, in respect of the portion of the property used for residential purposes.

    On the other hand, Mr. Bhargava referred to a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Jeevanlal v. Anant. 1972 RCJ 266. This decision, in fact, supports the view urged by Mr. Sogani. Dixit C.J., held in a case with similar facts:

    The ejectment of a tenant can only be from the entire rented out premises and not from a part of it, unless a special statute regulating tenancies contains provisions permitting the ejectment of a tenant from a part only of the tenanted premises.

    It was again observed:

    When the tenancy is indivisible and cannot be split up and the tenant cannot be evicted from a portion of the rented out premises, it necessarily follows that when the landlord proves his requirement in respect of a part of the accommodation, then for the purposes of eviction his requirement for the entire premises must be held to be established. If a part which is needed cannot be had without the whole, then the whole thing must be given.

    There is no provision in the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, permitting the court to grant a partial decree for ejectment, and in the absence of such a statutory provision, I am unable to non-suit the plaintiff so far the shop in question is concerned. Since she has established her requirement as reasonable and bonafide with regard to the residential portion, she is entitled to evict the defendant from the entire premises.

    10. Again, Mr. Bhargava has referred to a single Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court Kasturbhai v. Mohanlal 1968 GLR 729. Suffice it to say that the view taken in the Gujrat High Court is of no avail to the facts of the present case. Bombay Rents, Hotel and Loading House Rates Control Act (LV II of 1947) empowers the Court, if satisfied, that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing a decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court shall pass a decree in respect of such part of it. Such a provision does not exist in the Rajasthan Act.

    11. Learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted an application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. during the course of hearing of the appeal. By this application he has sought to file copies of the affidavit and an application of Mahadeo, husband of the plaintiff to show that he was not an employee of Moolchand, but a partner in the business. This application is not accompanied by an affidavit. I cannot assume the genuineness of the signatures of Mahadeo on the copies allegedly submitted by him. That apart, I cannot take notice of those events which need further investigation of facts. This application has to be rejected.

    12. No other point for my consideration has been raised. In the result the appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed with costs.

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    Comments

    Om Prakash v. Smt. Chand Devi
    (Nov 2, 1972)