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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — B.R. Tuli, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Bant Ram (alias Sant Ram), a displaced person from West Pakistan, was allotted agricultural land (1 standard Acre and 11½ Units) in village Pehowa, Tehsil Guhla, Karnal district, in 1950 as compensation in lieu of land left in Pakistan.

The Managing Officer (respondent 4) cancelled that allotment by an order dated 10 September 1962. On 11 September 1962 the land was allotted to Chuha Mal (respondent 5), and a proprietary sanad was issued in his favour on 25 February 1963. Chuha Mal subsequently sold the land to Avtar Singh (father of the petitioners) by a registered sale deed dated 3 April 1963.

Bant Ram appealed the Managing Officer's cancellation; the Assistant Settlement Commissioner accepted the appeal on 9 August 1963 and remanded the case. Chuha Mal filed a review which was accepted on 5 June 1963, restoring the Managing Officer's cancellation. Bant Ram then filed a revision to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, which was dismissed by the Authorised Chief Settlement Commissioner, Haryana, on 24 October 1967. The matter was forwarded with directions for alternative allotment.

Bant Ram filed Civil Writ No. 44 of 1968 in the High Court challenging the orders, which was dismissed by the High Court on 5 January 1968 with a brief order reading only “dismissed.” Thereafter Bant Ram filed a petition under section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, before the Central Government. The Central Government delegate accepted that petition on 10 November 1970, set aside the order of 24 October 1967 and restored the original allotment in favour of Bant Ram.

The present writ petition was filed by the sons of Avtar Singh challenging the Central Government delegate's order restoring Bant Ram's allotment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court's summary dismissal of Civil Writ No. 44 of 1968 operated as res judicata and therefore barred Bant Ram from invoking the statutory remedy under section 33 of the Displaced Persons Act before the Central Government.
  2. Whether, following the High Court's dismissal, the order of the Authorised Chief Settlement Commissioner merged into an operative order of the High Court such that the Chief Settlement Commissioner's order ceased to be independently challengeable by statutory remedy.
  3. On the merits, whether the allotment to Bant Ram could be cancelled and whether the subsequent allotment and proprietary sanad in favour of Chuha Mal could stand (including whether lack of notice under section 19 of the Act or fraud/undue advantage vitiated the cancellation and subsequent transfer).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (sons of Avtar Singh)

  • After the dismissal of Civil Writ No. 44 of 1968 by the High Court, a petition under section 33 of the Act before the Central Government was not competent because the High Court's decision operated as res judicata.
  • All tribunals within the High Court's jurisdiction are subject to its superintendence under Article 227, and the High Court's order dismissing the writ had the effect of affirming the order of the Authorised Chief Settlement Commissioner so that the Chief Settlement Commissioner's order merged into the High Court's order and became the operative order.
  • On the merits, it was emphasised that proprietary sanad issued to Chuha Mal on 25 February 1963 could not be cancelled unless there had been a finding that Chuha Mal had obtained the allotment or proprietary rights by fraud.

Respondents' and Other Contentions

  • Respondents 6 to 13 (heirs of Bant Ram) filed a written statement and asserted that no notice as required by section 19 of the Act was issued to Bant Ram before cancellation — a fact not denied by the petitioners.
  • The official respondents did not appear or file returns; Chuha Mal, though represented, did not file a return and it was not shown on what basis the allotment was made to Chuha Mal after cancelling Bant Ram's allotment.
  • The Financial Commissioner (delegate of Central Government) found that the cancellation of Bant Ram's allotment was made to give an undue advantage to Chuha Mal and described the cancellation as unjustified — a finding relied upon in support of restoring Bant Ram's allotment under section 33.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Daryao v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1457 Held that a writ petition under Article 226 dismissed in limine without a speaking order is not an order on merits and does not necessarily operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings. The court relied on its observations that summary dismissal in limine without a speaking order cannot safely be treated as dismissal on merits and therefore did not bar Bant Ram from filing a statutory petition under section 33 before the Central Government.
Bansi v. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Rohtak, ILR 1966 2 Punj. 824 (Full Bench) Held that dismissal in limine of a writ petition by a Bench of the High Court would bar a second petition by the same petitioners to the same High Court on similar facts; emphasised finality before the same Court. The court distinguished that ruling to hold that, while a second petition to the same High Court on identical grounds may be barred, it did not prevent Bant Ram from pursuing other remedies in other fora (i.e., a statutory petition under section 33 to the Central Government).
Mst. Chandra Kali v. Sitaram, A.I.R. 1971 Allahabad 236 Expresses similar position to the Full Bench decision that a second petition on same facts to the same High Court is barred. Cited as supporting authority for the proposition that the High Court's summary dismissal bars repetition before the same High Court but does not preclude other proceedings in other forums.
Shanker Ram Chandra Abhyankar v. Krishanaji Dattatraya Bapat, 1969 2 SCC 74 Discussed the principle of merger: where statutory appeals/revisions exist in a hierarchy, an inferior court's order may merge into the order of the superior court when that superior court hears and decides the matter on merits. The court applied the distinction to hold the merger principle inapplicable to writ petitions under Article 226 (an extraordinary remedy). Thus dismissal of the writ did not amount to the High Court affirming the Tribunal's order or merging it into its own order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two stages: (A) jurisdictional/procedural questions about res judicata and merger; and (B) merits concerning the validity of the cancellation and subsequent allotment/sanad.

A. Jurisdictional and Res Judicata Analysis

  1. The court reiterated that Articles 226 and 227 provide extraordinary remedies; the rehabilitation authorities under the Act (including the Central Government under section 33) are not courts or tribunals subordinate to the High Court, and the statute does not provide an appeal to the High Court as of right.
  2. The court emphasized that remedies under the statute (section 33) coexist with extraordinary constitutional remedies and that a decision of the High Court on a petition under Articles 226/227 operates as res judicata against other tribunals or courts only if the High Court decided the matter on the merits after hearing both parties.
  3. Relying on Daryao, the court held that a writ petition dismissed in limine without a speaking order is not an adjudication on the merits and therefore does not operate as res judicata to bar the statutory remedy under section 33.
  4. The Full Bench decision in Bansi was considered: while it bars refiling the same petition on identical facts before the same High Court, it does not prevent a party from pursuing other remedies in different fora. Therefore, Bant Ram could legitimately invoke section 33 before the Central Government despite the High Court's summary dismissal.
  5. The court rejected the merger argument (reliance on Shanker Ram Chandra Abhyankar) by distinguishing the context: the principle of merger applies where statutory hierarchies of appeal/revision exist; it is inapplicable to extraordinary writ petitions under Article 226 that may be dismissed (especially in limine) without affirming the Tribunal's order on merits.
  6. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the High Court's brief dismissal did not make its order operative as an affirmation of the Chief Settlement Commissioner's order, and consequently the statutory remedy under section 33 remained available to Bant Ram and could be entertained by the Central Government delegate.

B. Merits Analysis

  1. The petitioners argued that the proprietary sanad issued to Chuha Mal could not be cancelled absent a finding of fraud by Chuha Mal. The court found this contention misconceived because on 10 September 1962 (the date of the cancellation of Bant Ram's allotment) Chuha Mal was not yet in the picture: the allotment in his favour and sanad flowed from the cancellation. If the cancellation itself was invalid, subsequent allotment and sanad in favour of Chuha Mal would necessarily fall with it.
  2. Respondents 6 to 13 stressed that the statutory notice required by section 19 of the Act before cancellation had not been served on Bant Ram. The petitioners did not deny this fact on the record; official respondents largely did not file returns; Chuha Mal did not file a substantive return explaining the basis for his allotment.
  3. The Financial Commissioner (Central Government delegate) expressly recorded that the cancellation of Bant Ram's allotment appeared to have been made to give undue advantage to Chuha Mal, describing the cancellation as unjustified. The court found this finding to be within the delegate's competence and admissible as a basis for restoring Bant Ram's allotment under section 33.
  4. On possession, the Financial Commissioner noted that possession was delivered to Bant Ram on 15 June 1950 (daily diary report No. 2/3) and that revenue records showed continuing possession thereafter; this supported the view that cancellation on the ground of non-possession was unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition filed by the sons of Avtar Singh challenging the Central Government delegate's order restoring Bant Ram's allotment is DISMISSED.

The court ordered costs in favour of respondents 6 to 13 (counsel's fee Rs. 100/-).

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The High Court upheld the availability and validity of the statutory remedy under section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, and the Central Government delegate's restoration of Bant Ram's allotment stands against the challenge by the petitioners. The petitioners' challenge is dismissed with costs.
  • On precedent and scope: The court applied established principles (as summarized from Daryao, Bansi, Shanker Ram Chandra Abhyankar and related decisions) to clarify that a summary dismissal in limine by a High Court does not automatically operate as a decision on merits for all purposes and does not bar statutory remedies before other fora. The opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond applying and distinguishing prior authorities.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the content and legal reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond the text.

    Rajwant Singh Etc. v. Financial Commissioner Haryana Etc.

    B.R Tuli, J.:— Bant Ram alias Sant Ram (since deceased), husband of respondent 6 and father of respondents 7 to 13, was a displaced person from West Pakistan and was allotted a parcel of agricultural land measuring 1 standard Acre and 11½ Units in village Pehowa, Tehsil Guhla, district Karnal, in 1950, in lieu of the land left by him in Pakistan. This allotment was cancelled by the Managing Officer, respondent 4, by his order dated September 10, 1962, and the land was allotted to Chuha Mal, respondent 5, on the following day and the proprietary rights in respect thereof were transferred in his favour by Sanad dated February 25, 1963, Chuha Mal thereafter sold the said land to Avtar Singh, the father of the petitioner, by means of a registered sale deed dated April 3, 1963. Bant Ram filed an appeal against the order of the Managing Officer dated September 10, 1962, cancelling his allotment which was accepted by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner with powers of Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, Jullundur, on August 9, 1963, and the case was remanded to the Managing Officer for re-decision. Against that order, Chuha Mal filed a review petition which was accepted on June 5, 1963, and the order of the Managing Officer cancelling the allotment if Bant Ram dated September 10, 1962, was restored. Against that order. Bant Ram filed a revision petition to the Chief Settlement Commissioner which was dismissed by the Authorised Chief Settlement commissioner, Haryana, at Jullundur by order dated October 24, 1967. The case was forwarded to the Tehsildar (Sales) Cum Managing Officer, Kaithal, with the direction that an alternative allotment in village Pehowa or in any nearby village, according to his choice, may be given to Bant Ram. Bant Ram then filed Civil Writ No. 44 of 1968 in this Court challenging the order of the Managing Officer dated September 10, 1962, the order of the Assistant Settlement Commissioner passed on review dated June 5, 1963, and the order of the Authorised Chief Settlement Commissioner, Haryana, dated October 24, 1967. This writ petition was dismissed by the Motion Bench on January 5, 1968, with the only word ‘dismissed’. Bant Ram then filed a petition under section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, (hereinafter called the Act), before the Central Government, which was accepted on November 10, 1970, by Shri Damodar Dass, Commissioner Revenue and Secretary to Government, Haryana, Rehabilitation Department, exercising the powers under section 33 of the Act. The order of the Authorised Chief Settlement Commissioner dated October 24, 1967, was set aside and the allotment of the land originally made in favour of Bant Ram was restored. The present writ petition has been filed by the sons of Avtar Singh challenging that order, and praying that it should be quashed.

    2. Written statement has been filed by respondents 6 to 13, who are the heirs of Bant Ram deceased. The learned counsel, for the petitioners has very strenuously argued that after the dismissal of Civil Writ No. 44 of 1968 by this Court, a petition under section 33 of the Act was not competent before the Central Government as the decision of this Court operated as res-judicata. It is submitted that all the Tribunals within the jurisdiction of this Court are subject to its super, intendance under Article 227 of the Constitution and the order passed by this Court dismissing Civil Writ No. 44 of 1968 had the effect of affirming the order of the Authorised Chief Settlement Commissioner, dated October 24, 1967, and in fact the order of the Authorised Chief Settlement Commissioner merged into the order of the High Court and thereafter it was the order of the High Court that was operative. The matter having been decided by this Court, the Central Government had no further jurisdiction in the matter. I have given my careful thought to this submission made by the learned counsel, but I do not find any substance therein.

    3. It has to be remembered that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution has been conferred by the Constitution by way of extraordinary remedy. The Rehabilitation authorities mentioned in the Act, including the Central Government under section 33 thereof, are not Courts or Tribunals subordinate to the High Court and against their orders, no appeal, as a matter of right, lies to the High Court nor has been provided by the statute. The orders passed by any of the authorities under the Act can be challenged in this Court by way of a writ of certiorari, it is not a statutory remedy but council urinal remedy. While exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court exercises equitable jurisdiction and is not bound to interfere unless there is an inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Tribunal or Court which passed the order or gross injustice has been done or on some other well-recognised grounds. This extraordinary remedy provided by the Constitution does not oust the remedies provided under the statute and the decision of this Court on a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution will operate as res judicata before any other Tribunal or Court only if the matter is decided on merits after hearing both the parties. An ex-parte order dismissing the petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in limini is neither an order on merits nor operates as res judicata, as has been ruled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Daryao v. State of U.P . AIR 1961 SC 1457.. That was a case in which a writ petition had been dismissed by the High Court under Article 26 of the Constitution and petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was filed in the Supreme Court on the same facts and for the same reliefs. A question arose whether the decision of the High Court operated as res-judicata. Their Lordships held that the order having been passed by the High Court on merits operated as a bar to the making of the petition under Article 3, of the Constitution. In paragraph 19 of the report, their Lordships observed as under:—

    “If the petition filed in the High Court under Article 226 is dismissed not on the m; its but because of the laches of the party applying for the writ or because it is held that the party had an alternative remedy available to it, then the dismissal of the writ petition would not constitute a bar to a subsequent petition under Article 32 except in cases where and if the facts thus found by the High Court may themselves be relevant oven under Article 32. If a Writ petition ts dismissed in limine and an order is pronounced in that behalf, whether or not the dismissal would constitute a bar would depend upon the nature of the order. If the order is on the merits, it would be a bar if the order shows that the dismissal was for the reason that the petitioner was guilty of laches or that he had an alternative remedy, it would not be a bar, except in cases which we have already indicated. If the petition is dismissed in limine without passing a speaking order, then such dismissal cannot be treated as erecting a bar of res judicata. It is true that, prima facie, dismissal in limine even without passing a speaking order in that behalf may strongly suggest that the Court took the view that there was no substance in the petition at all; but in the absence of a speaking order it would not be easy to decide what factors weighed in the mind of the Court and that makes it difficult and unsafe to hold that such a summary dismissal is a dismissal on merits and as such constitutes a bar of res judicata against a similar petition filed under Article 32.”

    4. These observations clearly lay down that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution dismissed in limine by the High Court without passing a specking order does not operate as res judicata, in other proceedings. Doubt was raised whether such a dismissal would bar a second petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the same High Court. This matter was considered by a Full Bench of this-Court in Bansi v. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Rohtak . ILR 1966 2 Punj. 824., and it was held:—

    “……that the dismissal in limine of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by a Bench of the High Court would bar a second petition by the same petitioners to the same High Court and based on similar facts. To entertain the second petition on the same grounds would amount to by passing the remedies by way of a review petition or taking steps to file an appeal to the Supreme Court apart from recourse to the petition to the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution Such a course would also be wrong not only on principle but also on grounds of propriety and public policy which, subject the well recognised exceptions require finality of judicial proceedings so far as the same Court is concerned.”

    5. To the same effect is the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Mst. Chandra Kali v. Sitaram . A.I.R 1971 Allahabad 236.. The observations of the learned Judges of the Full Bench of this Court clearly bar a second petition on the same facts in the same High Court, but not the taking of any other proceedings available to the petitioners under the law in any other forum. In my opinion, in view of the observations of their Lordships in Daryao's case (supra), it was open to Bant Ram to file a petition under section 3 of the Act before the Central Government and the order dismissing in limine the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution passed by this Court did not operate as res judicata nor did it bar the making of that petition. The delegate of the Central Government could, therefore, entertain and decide that petition on merits.

    6. Another argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, which was impugned in the writ petition in this Court, merged into the order of the High Court and after the dismissal of the writ petition, the operative order was that of the High Court and not of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. For this submission, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shanker Ram Chandra Abhyankar v. Krishanaji Dattatraya Bapat . 1969 2 SCC 74. In that case, the High Court dismissed a revision petition filed against the order of the appellate Court under the Bombay Rents, Hotel an Lodging House Rents Control Act, 1947, after hearing both the parties. Thereafter, the order of the appellate authority was sought to be challenged in the same High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It is in that context that their Lordships observed that the principal of merger of inferior Court's order in the order of the Superior Court would not become affected or inapplicable by making any distinction between a petition for revision and an appeal. The principle of merger of orders is applicable where statutory remedies by way of appeal or revision are provided by statute in a hierarchy of Courts or Tribunals. I have already stated above that the remedy under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is not an ordinary remedy but an extraordinary remedy and in exercise of that jurisdiction, the High Court can either quash the petition wholly or in part or dismiss the writ petition. It does not affirm the order of the Tribunal impugned in the writ petition when the petition is dismissed. The principle of merger of orders of inferior Courts in the orders of the superior Courts is wholly inapplicable to the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. I, therefore, find no merit in the submission of the learned counsel. I may emphasise that after the dismissal in limine of the writ petition, the final and operative order was that of the Chief Settlement Commissioner and not of the High Court and against that order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, the statutory remedy under section 33 of the Act was available to Bant Ram.

    7. Coming to the merits of the case, the learned counsel for the petitioners has emphasised that in consequence of the allotment made in favour of Chuha Mal on September 11, 1972, proprietary Sanad was also issued to him on February 25, 1963, and unless there was a finding that Chuha Mal was guilty of fraud in obtaining the allotment and proprietary rights, the proprietary Sanad issued in his favour could not be cancelled. In my opinion, the argument is misconceived. On September 10, 1962, when the allotment of Bant Ram was cancelled, Chuha Mal was not in the picture and if that order cannot stand, then the allotment made in favour of Chuha Mal and the proprietary sanad granted to him fall with it. It has been stressed by the learned counsel for respondents 6 to 13 that no notice, as required by section 19 of the Act before cancellation of the allotment, was ever issued to Bant Ram, which fact is not denied by the petitioners. The official respondents have not chosen to appear or file any return. Chuha Mal, respondent 5, although represented by counsel, has not chosen to file any return. It is also not known on this record as to in recognition of what right of Chuha Mai, the land in dispute was allotted to him after cancelling the allotment of Bant Ram a day earlier. Respondents 6 to 13 filed their return on September 14, 1972, and the petitioners have not chosen to file any replication, contradicting the facts stated in the return nor has Chuha Mal chosen to file any return. The Financial Commissioner who decided the petition under section 33 of the Act, as delegate of the Central Government, was perfectly justified in observing:—

    “I do not hesitate in saying that allotment of Bant Ram was cancelled in order to give undue advantage to Chuha Mal. It is unjustified and as such it cannot be considered as correct.”

    8. The only ground on the basis of which the allotment in favour of Bant Ram was cancelled was that he had not taken possession of the land and it was in occupation of an unauthorised person. It is stated by the Financial Commissioner in the impugned order that the possession was delivered to Bant Ram on June 15, 1950, vide daily diary report No. 2/3 relating to events. As per revenue paper, the possession of Bant Ram continued thereafter.

    9. For the reasons given above, I find no merit in this petition which is dismissed with costs in favour of respondents 6 to 13. Counsel's fee Rs. 100/-.

    10. Petition dismissed.

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    Comments

    Rajwant Singh Etc. v. Financial Commissioner Haryana Etc.
    (Jul 31, 1973)