1. This appeal by the plaintiffs arises out of a suit for setting aside the sale of a 2 annas 8 pies share in village Kausalpur, bearing separate account No. 2 under tauzi No. 654, on 8-1-1948, for arrears of revenue due for the September kist of 1947. The only point which arises for determination in this appeal is whether the sale is liable to be annulled in accordance with the provisions of Section 33 of the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act (XI of 1859). Section 33 of Act XI provides that no sale for arrears of revenue shall be annulled except on the ground of its having been held contrary to the provisions of the Act and on proof that the plaintiff has suffered substantial injury by reason of the irregularity which has been committed. I may also refer to the provisions of Section 8 of the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act (VII of 1868) which are to the effect that a certificate of tile given to a purchaser under S. 28 of Act XI of 1859, or S. 11 of Act VII of 1868, shall be conclusive evidence of the fact that all notices required to be served, or posted under the two Acts have been duly served and posted. It is obvious that both these sections have to be given then full effect. If that is done, the following points emerge;

1. A revenue sale is liable to be annulled if it has been held contrary to the provisions of Act XI of 1859 and if it is proved in addition that tile plaintiff, who has instituted the suit for annulments of the sale, has suffered substantial injury by reason of the irregularity complained of.

2. An allegation of non-service or non-posting of notices required to be served or posted under Act XI of 1859 and Act VII of 1868 cannot be entertained by the Court if a certificate of title has been granted to the purchaser because the certificate is, under S. 8 of Act VII of 1868, conclusive evidence of the fact that requisite notices have been duly served and posted.

3. An allegation that the sale has been held contrary to the provisions of Act XI of 1859 can only be entertained and enquired into if it does not relate to non-service or non-posting of notices.

2. The decision in the case of Badrinarain v. Benimadho*, AIR 1945 Pat 186 (A) fully supports the view which I have expressed above, and, indeed, Mr. S.C Ghosh, who has appeared before me on behalf of the appellants, has not argued that there has been any irregularity in this case in service or posting of any notice of the kind contemplated by S. 8 of Act VII of 1868.

3. The point which Mr. Ghose has argued is that the sale in question was held contrary to the provisions of Act XI of 1859 because the names of all the proprietors were not given in the notices (exhibits F(2) and F(4)) which were issued under Ss. 6 and 13 of that Act. It appears that, in column 6 of those notices, the name of only one proprietor, namely, Ram Janam Singh, has been given, and the word “wogairah” has been added after it. There is nothing in the provisions of Act XI of 1859 which can be held to require that the names of all the proprietors of a tauzi, part of which is to be sold, should be mentioned in the notices issued under Ss. 6 and 13.

4. From the form of notification to be issued under those two sections, as given at page 168 of S. 5 of the rules made by the Board of Revenue, under the Revenue and the ??? Sale Laws, it appears that all that is necessary to be mentioned in column 6 is the name of one proprietor with addition of the words “and others” after it. A similar point arose for decision in Secry. of State v. Rasbehary Mookerjee, ILR 9 Cal 591 (B). It was held that a revenue sale could not be vitiated merely because the name of only one recorded proprietor was, and those of others were not, mentioned in the notification under S. 6. Mitter, J., who delivered the judgment of the Bench, observed as follows:

“The District Judge is of opinion that unless the names of all the recorded proprietors are given, an estate, or share of an estate, cannot be considered to be specified within the meaning of S. 6. We are unable to agree in the view of the law. The section distinctly says that it is the estate or the share of an estate which is to be specified. If it were the intention of the Legislature that the names of the recorded proprietors should be also inserted, the section would have contained a provision to that effect in distinct words.”

5. The same view was taken in this Court in the cases of Shama Kant Lal v. Kashi Nath Singh, AIR 1926 Pat 549 (C) and Ram Rijhan Sahi v. Musammat Razia Begam*, AIR 1943 Pat 88 (D). In each of these cases, the name of only one recorded proprietor followed by the words “and others” was given in the notification, and it was held that the sale was not vitiated for that reason. It is, therefore, clear that the omission to mention the names of all the recorded proprietors in column 6 of the notifications under Ss. 6 and 13 cannot lead to the conclusion that the sale is liable to be annulled as having been held contrary to law.

6. Mr. Ghose has next made the submission that village Kausalpur lies within the jurisdiction of Garkha Police Station but it has been erroneously shown in the notifications (exhibits F(2) and F(4)) to he under Chapra Police Station. He has contended that this is a misdescription of the property in the notifications, and the sale made in accordance with those notifications must be held to have been vitiated. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge, who decided the appeal in the Court below, appears to have held that the village in question lies under Chapra Thana for revenue purposes and under Garkha Thana for purposes of law and order, and that the name of the revenue thana has been correctly given when it has been seated in the notifications (exhibits F(2) and F(4)) that the village lies under Chapra Thana. Assuming, however, that the name of the thana has been wrongly given in those notifications, the question which arises for determination is whether that amounts to a misdescription which would have the effect of vitiating the sale.

7. Section 6 of Act XI of 1859 requires, apart from other matters, specification in the notifications of the estates or shares of the estates which are to be sold: but there is nothing in the section which can be held to require that the name of the thana under which the estate lies must also be given. In my judgment, the requirements of the section relating to specification of the estate, or a share of it, must be held to have been fully satisfied if, in a case where the entire estate is to be sold, the name of the village and the tauzi number are mentioned, and, in a case where a share of an estate is to be sold, that share of the estate and the separate account, if they are mentioned in addition.

8. In support of his argument, Mr. Ghose has drawn my attention to the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ravaneshwar Prasad Singh v. Baijnath Ram Goenka, ILR 42 Cal 897 : (AIR 1915 PC 24) (E). In the notification issued under Ss. 6 and 13 of Act XI of 1859 in that case, the specification of the share to be sold was as follows: “Ijmali share which cannot be specified excluding the separate accounts number”. The Nos. of 148 separate accounts were then given followed by the words: All other shares besides that specified are excluded from the sale. The specification of the property in Column 5 of the sale notification was as follows:

“The ijmali share cannot be particularised owing to separate accounts having been opened. The share to be sold are those (sic) given in a separate sheet after excluding the share in respect of which the separate accounts have been opened.”

9. It is manifest that the ijmali share to be sold was not specified at all: only the shares under separate accounts which were excluded from sale were specified. It was only by looking into the Collector's records and by going through an elaborate process of elimination that the intending purchaser could get an idea as to the property which he was expected to bid for. In these circumstances, their Lordships held that the property to be sold had not been specified in accordance with law. Mr. Ameer Ali, who delivered the opinion of their Lordships, stated

“As already observed, each case must depend on its own particular facts; what has to be considered is whether, having regard to all the circumstances, the specification was sufficiently definite and clear to induce likely buyers to appear and bid at the, sale. It is not enough that they may go and obtain the requisite information from the Collector's office. In their Lordships' opinion the particulars in the notice should be sufficient in themselves to tell purchasers what they are invited to bid for.”

10. In the light of the test laid down in the above observation, it is perfectly clear that there is nothing wrong with the specification of the property in the notifications (exhibits F(2) and F(4)). The name of the village and the no. of the tauzi with the share and the separate account no having been fully stated in those notifications, there can be no doubt that sufficient and clear particulars were given for identification of the property to be sold and for inducing likely purchasers to bid at the sale. They were not left to gather any information from the Collector's office. The mere fact that a wrong thana was mentioned could not mislead any intending purchaser. There is no village bearing the name of Kausalpur and tauzi No. 654 under Chapra Thana, and hence they could not have been led to believe that a village other than the village in question which lies under Garkha Thana was being sold. It is clear that the facts of the case before their Lordships were quite different from those of the present case; but, on applying the test laid down in that case, I am satisfied that the property in question was sufficiently and clearly specified in the notifications (exhibits F(2) and F(4)), and the mere mention of a wrong thana could not make the property unidentifiable.

11. Mr. Ghose has also drawn my attention to the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Krishna Dayal Gir v. Abdul Gaffur, 2 Pat LJ 402 : AIR 1917 Pat 555 (2)) (F). In that case, separate accounts had been opened for payment of revenue of different shares of an estate. The residuary 4 share which remained after the opening of these separate accounts, referred to as the ijmal share, was put up for sale on account of arrears of revenue. In the sale notification, the word “Ijmal” was first set down, and it was followed by a list of shares in 38 villages. The plaintiff was the proprietor of 8 anna shares in two villages. The list of shares given in the sale notification did not include the plaintiffs share in one village, and included only a 2 ??? 3 pie share in the other village. Mullick and Atkinson, JJ., two of the Judges who constituted the Full Bench, held that the sale did not affect the plaintiff's interest in the two villages as it was a nullity owing to the Collector having put up for sale only a part of the revenue unit in respect of which there was an arrear of revenue. The facts of that case are thus clearly distinguishable, and hence that decision has no application to the present case.

12. In the case of Bhupendra Chandra Deb v. Rash Mani Gope (AIR 1945 Cal 477) (G), the question arose whether the specification of a property to be sold as given in the notification under S. 6 was sufficient. Their Lordships observed as follows:

“…………there is nothing in the provisions of S. 6 or in the forms prescribed by the board which requires that the district in which the tauzi is situated should be specified. A touzi may be situated in more districts than one, and the lands may be entirely outside the particular district on the collectorate roll of which the touzi is borne. It is sufficient compliance with the Act if the name of the mahal and the number of the touzi are specified’.”

13. The words which I have underlined (herein ???) fully support the view which I have expressed above. In the circumstances mentioned above, it is clear that there is no material misdescription in the notifications (exhibits F(2) and F(4)) issued under Ss. 6 and 13 of Act XI of 1859. It is also clear that the property in question has been fully and sufficiently specified in them. I am, therefore, unable to hold that the revenue sale has, in this case, been held contrary to law. Mr. Ghose has not been able to urge any other point in support of the appeal. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails, and it is dismissed with costs.

V.S.B

14. Appeal dismissed.