Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 125(4) Cr. P.C
  • Section 488(4) Cr. P.C
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 125(4) Cr. P.C
  • Section 488(4) Cr. P.C
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Baishnab Charan Jena, married the opposite party, Ritarani Jena, in 1980. They cohabited until they parted ways around 1985. In March 1988 the opposite party filed an application under Section 125, Cr. P.C. claiming maintenance of Rs. 300 per month, alleging dowry-related demands, ill-treatment, assault, denial of basic needs and that the petitioner had sent her to her father's house. The opposite party alleged the petitioner later agreed (by a documented instrument in March 1986) to pay Rs. 150 per month, paid for two to three months and then discontinued payments; she also alleged that she learned the petitioner had remarried and that she was living with her father who was a rickshaw puller. The petitioner in his written objection admitted the marriage but denied the material allegations, asserting in particular that the opposite party had extra-marital relationships (naming Babuli Jena and Laxmidhar Jena), that he was coerced into signing the agreement, and that he lacked means to pay maintenance.

At trial the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate (S.D.J.M.) on 19 July 1989 rejected the application for maintenance, finding the opposite party had failed to prove dowry demand, assault, forcible driving out, and concluding she was living in adultery; consequently the application was dismissed. The opposite party filed a revision. The Addl. Sessions Judge, Jajpur, by revisional order dated 29 July 1991 set aside the S.D.J.M.'s order and directed the petitioner to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs. 200 per month with effect from 30 March 1988 (the date of presentation of the petition under Section 125). The petitioner filed the present revision petition challenging the revisional court's order. The high court (present opinion) ultimately dismissed the petition, upholding the revisional court's decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the revisional court erred in setting aside the trial court's order rejecting the maintenance application and in directing the petitioner to pay maintenance.
  2. Whether the opposite party (wife) is entitled to maintenance under Section 125, Cr. P.C. where the husband alleges she was living in adultery but those allegations were not proved.
  3. Whether the wife was justified in refusing the petitioner's offer to take her back into his house (i.e., whether refusal to accept an offer to return defeats her claim for maintenance).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The revisional court erred in setting aside the S.D.J.M.'s order without proper consideration of the materials on record.
  • The learned Magistrate had found that the wife failed to prove assault, torture, forcible driving out, or refusal by the husband to accept her or pay maintenance; on that basis the revisional court should not have interfered.
  • The petitioner alleged the opposite party led an adulterous life, relying on specific incidents (e.g., being seen with Babuli Jena at night) and contended the document by which he purportedly agreed to pay maintenance was obtained under threat and is not binding.
  • The petitioner also contended he lacked means to pay maintenance due to family obligations and limited income.

Opposite Party's Arguments

  • The learned Addl. Sessions Judge was justified in setting aside the S.D.J.M.'s order and the view taken by him was legal and valid, requiring no interference.
  • Implicit in the opposite party's case (as accepted by the revisional court) was that allegations of adultery and other imputations by the husband were not proved, entitling her to maintenance and justifying her living separately.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Anjali Behera v. Lingaraj Behera, (1990) 69 CLT 259 Wife is justified in refusing to return to husband's house unless she can reasonably hope to live with decency and dignity under his roof. The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that the opposite party was justified in refusing the petitioner's offer to receive her back when allegations and circumstances made living with dignity unlikely.
Mst. Khatoon v. Mohd. Yamin, (1982) 2 SCC 373 (AIR 1982 SC 853) An unreasonable threat by the husband (e.g., to treat wife as divorced) constitutes a sufficient reason for the wife to refuse to live with him; such refusal does not disentitle her to maintenance. Used as authority (via Anjali Behera) to underline that threats or unreasonable conduct justify a wife's refusal to return and support maintenance entitlement despite refusal.
Smt. Pramila Dei Alias Kuni v. Sanatana Jena, 1989 (2) Crimes 288 (1990 Cri LJ (NOC) 59) If allegations of unchastity are made by the husband to avoid maintenance but such pleas fail, the allegation itself is sufficient to entitle the wife to claim maintenance; the allegation causes deep mental anguish and shatters marital peace. The Court applied this principle to hold that the unsuccessful attempt by the husband to prove adultery operated in favour of the opposite party and justified her claim and separation.
Smt. Rachita Rout v. Basanta Kumar Rout, 1987 Cr. LJ 655 "Living in adultery" denotes a course of adulterous conduct more or less continuous; occasional lapses are insufficient; the husband bears the burden to prove such continuous adultery. The Court applied this rule to conclude that the petitioner's evidence did not establish continuous adulterous conduct and thus did not disentitle the wife to maintenance.
Saraswati Meher v. Jadumani Meher, (1986) 62 CLT 92 Right of a wife to maintenance under S.125 arises from the marital status; S.125 is independent of personal law; justifying cause for living separately is not confined to ill-treatment; uncorroborated testimony of the wife can suffice if credible. The Court applied these principles to reinforce that the statutory right to maintenance exists irrespective of personal law and that credible testimony from the wife may support maintenance even without corroboration.
Madan Mohan Rai v. Sm. Niladri Dei, (1966) 32 CLT 827; following M. Kanniappan v. Akilandammal, AIR 1954 Madras 427 "Living in adultery" implies continuous adulterous conduct; occasional isolated acts are not enough; husband is relieved of obligation only when the wife has a de facto protector who maintains her. The Court invoked this authority to emphasize that isolated lapses do not deprive the wife of maintenance and that the petitioner's allegations did not amount to the continuous course of adultery necessary to defeat the maintenance claim.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by recounting the factual matrix and the conflicting findings between the S.D.J.M. and the Addl. Sessions Judge. The S.D.J.M. had rejected the maintenance petition, concluding the opposite party had failed to prove dowry demand, assault or forcible driving out and had held that she was living in adultery; consequently maintenance was refused.

On revision, the Addl. Sessions Judge re-examined the materials and did not accept the husband's allegations. The revisional court concluded that the husband's imputations of adultery and unchastity were not proved and that the wife therefore had reason and justification to live separately from her husband.

This Court then considered a number of precedents addressing: (a) when a wife may refuse an offer to return and still claim maintenance; (b) the meaning and quantum of proof required to establish that a wife is "living in adultery"; and (c) the statutory character of a wife's right to maintenance under Section 125, Cr. P.C. Applying those authorities, the court made the following analytical points:

  • The petitioner's allegations of adultery rested on isolated incidents (for example, an instance when Babuli Jena was allegedly seen in the opposite party's room at night) and assertions that the opposite party later lived with Babuli Jena for some months. The revisional court correctly found that such materials did not establish a continuous course of adulterous conduct at the relevant time.
  • Following Smt. Rachita Rout and Madan Mohan Rai, the court reiterated that occasional lapses do not suffice to disentitle a wife to maintenance; the husband bears the burden of establishing living in adultery under Section 125(4).
  • Further, relying on Smt. Pramila Dei, the court noted that when a husband makes unsuccessful allegations of unchastity, that very attempt can justify the wife living separately and claiming maintenance because such allegations cause deep mental anguish and destroy marital peace.
  • Regarding the petitioner's contention that the revisional court ignored relevant evidence, this Court examined the depositions and was not satisfied that any relevant evidence had been ignored such that the revisional court's findings were vitiated or caused a failure of justice.
  • On the contention that the wife had refused to accept an offer to return, the Court applied Anjali Behera and Mst. Khatoon to hold that refusal is permissible where the wife could not reasonably hope to live with decency and dignity — particularly where humiliating imputations have been made against her.

On the whole, the court found the Addl. Sessions Judge's conclusions legally sound and supported by the authorities: the evidence did not establish continuous adultery; the wife's refusal to return was justifiable in the circumstances; and there was no basis to fault the revisional interference with the trial court's order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition fails and is DISMISSED. The revisional court's order dated 29-7-1991 (which set aside the S.D.J.M.'s order and directed payment of maintenance of Rs. 200 per month from 30-3-88) is upheld.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner remains liable to pay maintenance to the opposite party at the rate ordered by the Addl. Sessions Judge (Rs. 200 per month from 30-3-88), and the trial court's order rejecting maintenance is set aside.
  • The court applied established principles concerning the scope of Section 125 Cr. P.C., the meaning of "living in adultery," and the circumstances in which a wife may justifiably refuse to return to her husband's home. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond applying and following earlier decisions; no broader novel precedent was announced in this judgment beyond the application of cited authorities to the facts of this case.

    Baishnab Charan Jena v. Ritarani Jena Opposite Party.

    1. In this revision petition the petitioner assails the revisional order dated 29-7-91 of the Addl. Sessions Judge, Jajpur in Criminal Revision No. 150 of 1989 requiring him to pay to the opposite party maintenance at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month with effect from 30-3-88 the date of presentation of the petition under S. 125, Cr. P.C By the said order the Addl. Sessions Judge set aside the order dated 19th July, 1989 of the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Jajpur in Misc. Case No. 41 of 1988 rejecting the application for maintenance.

    2. The relevant facts, shorn of unnecessary details, may be stated thus:

    The petitioner Baishnab Charan Jena married the opposite party Ritarani Jena in 1980 according to Hindu rites and customs. They lived as husband and wife till they parted company sometime in 1985. The opposite party filed the application under S. 125, Cr. P.C claiming maintenance at the rate of Rs. 300/- per month in March, 1988. Therein, she alleged that differences had developed between her parents and the family of the petitioner due to non-fulfilment of dowry demand by the former. On account of that the petitioner ill-treated and assaulted her and denied her basic needs of life like food and clothing and finally sent her to her father's house. Thereafter on the intervention of some gentlemen of the village the petitioner agreed that the opposite party will live separately and that he will pay Rs. 150/- per month for her maintenance. He executed a document to this effect in March, 1986. For two to three months he paid the stipulated amount and thereafter discontinued payment. On enquiry the opposite party learnt that the petitioner has married again. The oppsite party alleged that under such compelling circumstances she has been living with her father who is a rickshaw puller. According to her the petitioner earns about Rs. 1200/- per month, Rs. 900/- towards salary as a peon in Narasingha Choudhury College at Jajpur and about Rs. 300 from agricultural land and other sources. On these allegations she prayed for maintenance at the rate of Rs. 300/- per month.

    3. The petitioner in his objection to the application for maintenance denied the allegations made by the opposite party. While admitting the marriage he denied that there was any rift between the two families on account of dowry demand and that he had ill-treated and assaulted the opposite party on that account. He alleged that the opposite party was a girl of questionable character. She had extra marital relationship with one Babuli Jena, a resident of the same village and her brother-in-law Laxmidhar Jena. In 1985 one night at about 12 p.m during the absence of the petitioner the opposite party and Babuli Jena had been seen together in a room by father and brother of the petitioner. On being questioned by them the opposite party and Babuli Jena had admitted their extramarital relationship. Thereafter the opposite party insisted that the petitioner should send her to her father's house and even threatened that if her request was not acceded to she will commit suicide. In such circumstances the petitioner had to leave the opposite party at her father's house. He subsequently learnt that the opposite party lived with Babuli Jena for about six months and thereafter left him. The opposite party is leading an adulterous life in her father's house. The petitioner denied to have agreed to pay Rs. 150/- per month to the opposite party. It is his case that he was compelled under threat and coercion to execute the document dated 3-4-86. The document is not binding on him. It was further stated in the objection that the petitioner was not in a position to pay any amount towards maintenance to the opposite party since his income is inadequate to maintain the large family including his old parents. Both parties led oral evidence, in support of their respective cases. From each side four witnesses including the party concerned were examined.

    4. The learned Magistrate on sifting the evidence on record held that the opposite party had failed to prove her allegations of dowry demand, assault and forcibly driving her out from the house; that the agreement (Ext. 1) was not binding on the petitioner: that the opposite party had also failed to establish her allegation of second marriage by the petitioner and that the opposite party was living in adultery during the subsistence of her marriage with the petitioner and had continued it which resulted in her marriage with her paramour Babuli Jena. The learned Magistrate concluded that the opposite party is a lady of shady and shabby character and the petitioner is not bound to maintain her although he is a man of means. He therefore rejected the application for maintenance.

    5. The said order was challenged by the opposite party in revision before the Addl. Sessions Judge, Jajpur. The revisional court on a fresh look at the materials on record did not accept the pleas taken by the petitioner. He took the view that the wild imputations of adultery and unchastity made by the husband against his wife have not been proved; therefore the latter had reason and justification to live separately from her husband notwithstanding his offer to take her back.

    6. The main thrust of the argument of Shri S.K Sahu, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the revisional court erred in setting aside the decision of the trial court without proper consideration of the materials on record. In other words, his contention is that since it is clear from the evidence and it was so held by the learned Magistrate that the wife had failed to establish her case of assault, torture, driving out from the marital home and refusal to accept her in the house or pay maintenance to her, therefore the revisional court ought not to have interfered with the decision of the trial court.

    7. On the other hand Sri S.K Ray appearing for the opposite party contended that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge was fully justified in setting aside the decision of the learned S.D.J.M and the view taken by him being legal and valid warrants no interference.

    8. Before considering the merits of the case it will be helpful to notice a few decisions which lay down certain principles relevant for appreciating the present case.

    9. This Court in the case of Anjali Behera… v. Lingaraj Behera…Opp. Party., reported in (1990) 69 CLT 259 considering the question whether the wife was justified in turning down the offer made by her husband during the course of the enquiry to take her back to his house observed that unless the wife could reasonably hope to live with decency and dignity under the roof of her husband, she is justified in refusing to accede to the offer of the husband to receive her back. This Court relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mst Khatoon v. Mohd. Yamin, reported in (1982) 2 SCC 373 : AIR 1982 SC 853 (1982 All LJ 360) wherein the Court upheld the right of the wife for maintenance notwithstanding her refusal to live with her husband because he wrote a letter to her asking her to come back to him otherwise she would be treated as divorced. The Apex Court held that such an unreasonable threat constitutes sufficient reason tor the wife to refuse to live with her husband.

    10. In the case of Smt. Pramila Dei Alias Kuni… v. Sanatana Jena…Opp. Party., reported in 1989 (2) Crimes 288 : (1990 Cri LJ (NOC) 59 this Court took the view that if the allegation of unchastity is made by the husband against the wife and payment of maintenance is sought to be avoided on the ground of her living in adultery but the plea fails, such plea by itself is sufficient to entitle the wife to claim maintenance under S. 125, Cr. P.C It was observed therein that such allegation by the husband against the wife which causes mental anguish of the deepest character, and is a grave psychic assault on her, shatters the marital peace and makes living together incompatible.

    11. In the case of Smt. Rachita Rout… v. Basanta Kumar Rout…Opposite Party., reported in 1987 Cr. LJ 655 this Court interpreting the words “living in adultery” in section 125(4) Cr. P.C held that the expression undoubtedly connotes a course of adulterous conduct more or less continuous; and occasional lapse would not be sufficient reason for refusing maintenance within the ambit of sub-sec. (4). Therefore the Magistrate has to probe and find out whether at or about the time of application, there has been adulterous conduct on the part of the wife. Further, there must be clear proof of the adultery. A suspicion nurtured by the husband will not disentitle the wife to receive maintenance under the Code. This Court further held that since sub-sec. (4) is in the nature of an exception to the main section, it is for the husband claiming protection under the said provision to show that the said subsection is applicable, that is to say the husband must establish that the wife is living in adultery.

    12. In the case of Saraswati Meher… v. Jadumani Meher…Opp. Party., reported in (1986) 62 CLT 92 this Court interpreting S. 125(1) and (4) Cr. P.C held that the right of a wife for maintenance is an incidence of the status or estate of matrimony. According to the text of Hindu Law to which the parties belong, the obligation to maintain the wife arises from the very existence of the relationship between the parties. Apart from the liability which the husband incurs under the personal law of maintaining his wife, the provisions of S. 125, Cr. P.C are independent of personal law or any custom governing the parties. The right to be maintained under the section is a distinct statutory right which has been recognised as a part of the law irrespective of the nationality or the creed of the parties. The only condition precedent for application of the section is the existence of the relationship of the petitioner with the opposite party as his wife. All that is said in sub-sec. (4) of S. 125 Cr. P.C is that a wife shall not be entitled to live separately from her husband without any justifying cause and claim maintenance from her husband. The justifying cause need not always be confined to ill-treatment or cruelty on the part of the husband. This Court further held that in fit cases it is permissible for a court to rely even on the uncorroborated testimony of the wife to grant her maintenance under S. 125, Cr. P.C provided her evidence is truthful and believable.

    13. In the case of Madan Mohan Rai v. Sm. Niladri Dei reported in (1966) 32 CLT 827 this Court interpreting the expression “living in adultery” in Section 488(4) Cr. P.C held that the expression does not connote either a single act of adultery or even several such isolated acts. It means the following of a course of continuous adulterous conduct. The principle is that occasional lapses from virtue are not a sufficient reason for refusing maintenance. The husband is absolved from the obligation to maintain his wife when she has a de facto protector, i.e with whom she lives and by whom she is maintained as if she were his wife. Therein this Court further observed that the obligation of a husband to maintain his wife arose from the anxiety of the legislature to protect deserted wives from the bitter necessity of earning and living by trading on their sex. That obligation however ceases when it has been voluntarily assumed by some men other than the woman's husband. No woman can fairly claim a right to be kept by two men. The approach to S. 488 is relieving of destitution. In taking this view this Court followed the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of M. Kanniappan v. Akilandammal, reported in AIR 1954 Madras 427 : (1954 Cri LJ 516).

    14. I shall next consider the correctness of the findings of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in the light of the principles laid down in the aforementioned decided eases. From the facts of the case stated earlier, it is clear that right from the inception of the proceeding while admitting that the opposite party is his wife the petitioner had tried to avoid his liability to pay maintenance to her mainly on the ground that she was leading an adulterous life while living in his house and continued to lead such life after she had left his house. In support of the plea he relied on the alleged incident in which during the night Babuli Jena was seen in the bed room of the opposite party and that the opposite party after parting company with the petitioner had lived with Babuli Jena for a certain period. The petitioner had also alleged that the opposite party had an extra-marital affair with her brother-in-law, Laxmidhar Jena. On sifting the evidence led on behalf of the petitioner the learned Addl. Sessions Judge held, in my view, rightly, that the materials do not establish that the opposite party was leading an adulterous life at the material point of time. As held in the case of Smt. Rachita Rout (Supra) merely proving one or more instances of lapses in the character of the wife is not sufficient to absolve the husband from his liability to pay maintenance to her. Therefore even assuming that the instances alleged by the petitioner are held to have been established still he will not be entitled to succeed to deny his liability for payment of maintenance. The entitlement of the opposite party to maintenance which flows from the marital relationship, which is admitted in this case, subsists. Further, as held in the case of Smt. Pramila Dei alias Kuni (supra) the unsuccessful bid by the husband to castigate the wife as a person living in adultery entitles; her to live separately from her husband and claim maintenance from him.

    15. Coming to the plea of the petitioner that notwithstanding the lapses on the part of the opposite party he had offered to take her back to his house but she refused the offer, it has to be held that on the fact and in the circumstances of the case she was fully justified in refusing the offer. It is clear from the evidence on record that in the proceeding serious allegations of extra-marital relationship with persons other than her husband were made against the opposite party. Indeed it was the case of the petitioner that when she and Babuli Jena were found in the same room during the night the opposite party insisted to be sent to her father's place. Such conduct in the situation has also to be held to be justified. The opposite party was entitled to lead a life of peace and harmony without insult and humiliation. The very allegation by the husband and members of his family that the opposite party is having extra-marital relationship with a person other than her husband is insulting and humiliating enough and in such situation if the wife refuses to remain in her house, she cannot be said to have forfeited her right to maintenance.

    16. Shri S.K Sahoo, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has ignored certain relevant evidence while coming to the findings in the impugned order.

    17. Though it is not the practice of this Court to sift the evidence in a revisional proceeding, in order to satisfy myself about the correctness of the contention raised by Shri Sahoo, I have perused the depositions of the P.Ws and O.P.Ws copies of which were supplied by the learned counsel. I am not satisfied that any relevant evidence has been ignored by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge on account of which the findings recorded by him can be said to have been vitiated or it can be held that there has been failure of justice on that count.

    18. In the result the revision petition fails and it is dismissed.

    19. Petition dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Baishnab Charan Jena v. Ritarani Jena Opposite Party.
    (Jul 3, 1992)