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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 115 of the Code read with Section
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Code.
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code
  • Section 115 of the Code
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 115 of the Code read with Section
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Code.
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code
  • Section 115 of the Code
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses the question whether an order rejecting a memorandum of appeal, which follows the rejection of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, constitutes a decree. The case involves a proposed appeal to the first appellate court that was barred by limitation. An application under Section 5 was filed for condonation of delay along with the memorandum of appeal. The application was rejected, and subsequently, an order was made rejecting the memorandum of appeal. The matter was referred to a larger Bench by a Division Bench to resolve the issue of the legal character of such an order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order rejecting the memorandum of appeal following the rejection of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal is a decree.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sudhansu Bhusan Pandey v. Majhe Bibi (1938) 42 Cal WN 72 Order rejecting memorandum of appeal is a decree (tentative view) Noted as a conflicting decision; tentative view that order rejecting memorandum is a decree
Rakhal Chandra Ghosh v. Ashutosh Ghosh (1913) 17 Cal WN 807 Order rejecting appeal presented out of time is a decree under Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the CPC Recognized as holding that such an order is a decree
Jnanadasundari Shaha v. Madhabchandra Mala (ILR 59 Cal 388 = AIR 1932 Cal 482) Order rejecting memorandum of appeal on insufficient court-fee is not a decree under Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the CPC Held contrary to above precedents; order rejecting memorandum is not a decree
Charusila Dasi v. Abhilas Bauri 40 Cal WN 1149 = AIR 1936 Cal 804 Order rejecting memorandum of appeal is not a decree Followed the judgment in Jnanadasundari Shaha; held order rejecting memorandum is not a decree

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the conflicting precedents regarding whether an order rejecting a memorandum of appeal is a decree. It emphasized that when an appeal is barred by limitation, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay must be allowed before the appeal can be filed or admitted. Until such application is allowed, the appeal is considered non est (does not exist). Therefore, the rejection of the memorandum of appeal following the rejection of the Section 5 application is merely incidental and not a decree. The Court concluded that the order rejecting the application under Section 5 and the subsequent order rejecting the memorandum of appeal do not amount to a decree. Instead, such an order is appealable only by way of revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not by appeal under Order 43, Rule 1.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

The Court held that an order rejecting the memorandum of appeal following the rejection of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is not a decree. Consequently, no appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code can be preferred against such an order; however, an application in revision under Section 115 of the Code may lie. The direct effect of this decision is the dismissal of the appeal before the Court, with liberty granted to the appellants to proceed with any application under Section 115 of the Code read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The opinion does not establish any new precedent beyond clarifying the nature of the order in question.

    Mamuda Khateen & Ors. v. Beniyan Bibi & Ors.

    1. This matter has been referred under Chapter VII, Rule 2 of the Appellate Side Rules to a larger Bench by a Division Bench consisting of Mr. Justice A, C. Gupta and Mr. Justice S. C. Deb for a decision on the following question:

    Is an order rejecting the memorandum of appeal following the rejection of application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal a decree ?

    2. In the instant case, the proposed appeal to the first appellate Court, namely, the Court of the District Judge, was barred by limitation. An application was made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay and the memorandum of appeal was sought to be filed along with the application. The application under Section 5 was rejected. It also appears that an order was made rejecting the memorandum of appeal. The question is whether the order rejecting the memorandum following the rejection of the application under Section 5 is a decree.

    3. The referring Bench has noted a few conflicting decisions of this Court. In Sudhansu Bhusan Pandey v. Majhe Bibi, reported in (1938) 42 Cal WN 72 Mr. Justice Biswas expressed a tentative view that an order rejecting the memorandum of appeal would be a decree.

    4. In Rakhal Chandra Ghosh v. Ashutosh Ghosh, (1913) 17 Cal WN 807 a Division Bench of this Court held that an order by an appellate Court rejecting an appeal before it has been admitted, on the ground that it was presented out of time, is a decree within the meaning of the definition of Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    5. A contrary view was taken by another Division Bench. In Jnanadasundari Shaha v. Madhabchandra Mala, (ILR 59 Cal 388 = (AIR 1932 Cal 482). It was held that an order rejecting a memorandum of appeal, written on paper insufficiently stamped, for non-payment of the deficit court-fee within the time allowed by the Court, was not a decree within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Code.

    6. This judgment in ILR 59 Cal 388 = (AIR 1932 Cal 482) was followed by a Division Bench of Mr. Justice Nasim AH and Mr. Justice Henderson in Charusila Dasi v. Abhilas Bauri. 40 Cal WN 1149 = (AIR 1936 Cal 804). This Division Bench also held that an order rejecting the memorandum of appeal was not a decree.

    7. It seems to us that when an appeal is barred by limitation and an application is made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay along with the memorandum of appeal, until the application under Section 5 is allowed the appeal cannot be filed or admitted at all. In other words, till a favourable order is made on the application under Section 5 the appeal is non est. In that event, the question of rejecting a memorandum of appeal does not arise at all at this stage.

    8. If the application under Section 5 be rejected the order rejecting the application cannot be a decree. And the order rejecting the memoraundum of appeal is merely an incidental order.

    9. Our answer therefore to the question referred to us is that an order rejecting the memorandum of appeal following the rejection of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal is not a decree but an order against which an application in revision under Section 115 of the Code may lie but no appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code can be preferred.

    10. In the premises aforesaid, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

    11. We are told that the appellants have also made an application under Section 115 of the Code read with Section 5. They would be at liberty to proceed with the said application if so advised.

    Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.

    12. I agree.

    Salil Kumar Datta, J.

    13. I agree.

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    Comments

    Mamuda Khateen & Ors. v. Beniyan Bibi & Ors.
    (Aug 12, 1976)