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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This Rule challenges an order of the Third Industrial Tribunal refusing to accord approval to an order of dismissal by the petitioner company of its workman, Sukumar Chowdhury, for alleged misconduct.

Sukumar Chowdhury, a fitter in the petitioner company's fitting and assembly department, was charged with disorderly behaviour on 23-11-1960 for allegedly abusing and threatening the Machine Shop Foreman in relation to job rates. He was directed to submit a written explanation and was suspended pending enquiry. By letter dated 25-11-1960 he denied the charges and stated a detailed explanation would follow, but no further explanation appears to have been submitted.

The Managing Director, Mr. Dennison, directed the Labour Officer, K.D. Banerjee, to hold a managerial (departmental) enquiry. The enquiry proceeded with notice to Sukumar Chowdhury; witnesses were examined and the workman participated. The enquiring officer reported that the charges were established. On that report Mr. Dennison dismissed Sukumar Chowdhury by order communicated on 6-12-1960 and informed him that an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act would be made to the Industrial Tribunal for approval. The application was filed before the Tribunal on 6-12-1960.

The Industrial Tribunal refused approval to the dismissal for reasons set out in its order (summarised below), and the petitioner company impugns that refusal by the present Rule.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Industrial Tribunal was correct in treating Sukumar Chowdhury as a "protected workman" so that the dismissal required the Tribunal's prior "express permission in writing" under section 33(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act and thus rendering the employer's application under section 33(2)(b) not maintainable.
  2. Whether the departmental/managerial enquiry that led to the dismissal complied with principles of natural justice and was conducted by an impartial tribunal (i.e., whether the presence and participation of the Works Manager, and other procedural aspects, vitiated the enquiry).
  3. Whether the Industrial Tribunal was justified in refusing to accord approval to the dismissal on the grounds stated in its order (victimisation/unfair labour practice, procedural defects in enquiry including non-supply of proceedings and alleged bias).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner Company's Arguments

  • The Tribunal was wrong to presume that Sukumar Chowdhury was a "protected workman" entitled to the protection under section 33(3) — therefore the application under section 33(2)(b) was maintainable.
  • The departmental enquiry was properly conducted by the Labour Officer (K.D. Banerjee) and was not vitiated by bias or by the physical presence/evidence of the Works Manager; procedural criticisms did not render the enquiry unfair.
  • Nothing established mala fides or victimisation by the managerial enquiry; the charges were established on materials before the enquiry and the Tribunal should have granted approval.

Respondent's Arguments (as recorded)

  • The respondent (workman and union) asserted that Sukumar Chowdhury was a permanent workman and an office-bearer of the registered union; therefore he was a "protected workman" and the employer could not dismiss him without the Tribunal's express permission in writing — the company's action was motivated and constituted victimisation/unfair labour practice.
  • Counsel for the respondents (Mr. Pritimoy Dutt) argued that a letter (Annexure "I") forwarding names of office-bearers constituted an expression by the union that all office-bearers should be recognised as "protected workmen"; and that because the number of office-bearers did not exceed one per cent of total employees, all were necessarily intended for recognition.
  • The Tribunal also relied on criticisms that the Works Manager initiated and was present during the enquiry and gave evidence, and that a copy of the proceedings was not provided to the trade union — raising issues of bias and procedural unfairness.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal and factual analyses strictly based on the materials before it:

  1. Statutory framework: The judge examined sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act (text reproduced in the opinion) defining "protected workman" and the conditions under which an employer is barred from altering conditions of service or dismissing such a protected workman without the express permission in writing of the authority before which proceedings are pending. The Court also considered the rules framed under section 33 read with section 38, in particular Rule 71, which prescribes the procedure for a union to communicate names of officers it considers should be recognised as protected workmen, the employer's duty to recognise and communicate that recognition within 15 days, and related mechanics (copies to Labour Commissioner, distribution where numbers exceed maximum, and reference to Labour Commissioner in disputes).
  2. Whether Sukumar was a "protected workman": The Court observed (and accepted) that Sukumar was Vice-President of the union and that the union had forwarded names of office-bearers to the employer (letter dated 5-4-1960). Crucially, however, the union never expressed the specific opinion that all office-bearers elected at the annual meeting should be recognised as protected workmen. The Court rejected the respondents' counsel's attempt to read such an expression into Annexure "I".
  3. Evaluation of the affidavit evidence: The Court found the affidavit statement that the number of office-bearers was less than or equal to one per cent to be devoid of particulars (it did not disclose the total number of workmen employed). The Court would not rely on that bald assertion. Even assuming numerically the office-bearers were below the one per cent threshold, the Court held that would not automatically establish that the union had expressed the opinion that all such office-bearers were to be recognised as protected workmen.
  4. Natural justice and impartiality: The Court distilled the principle of natural justice into four recognised components: (1) opportunity for both parties to be heard, (2) hearing before an impartial tribunal so no one is a judge of his own cause, (3) decision made in good faith, and (4) an orderly course of procedure. The Tribunal's criticisms were examined under the impartiality limb.
  5. Impartiality of the enquiring officer: The Labour Officer, K.D. Banerjee, acted as the enquiring officer under the direct direction of the Managing Director (Dennison). The Court found no material showing that the Works Manager, B.K. Bhattacharjee, was superior in rank to the Labour Officer. The mere physical presence of Bhattacharjee at the enquiry and his giving evidence did not, on the material before the Court, affect the impartiality of the enquiring officer. The Tribunal had presumed too much in concluding the enquiry was conducted by an officer subordinate to Bhattacharjee and that Bhattacharjee's presence affected it.
  6. Failure to supply copy of proceedings: The Court noted that neither Sukumar nor the union asked for any document or copy of the proceedings before the enquiry was completed. The request for copy came only after punishment was issued; allegations of earlier verbal requests were denied and not relied upon by the Court. On the facts, the failure to supply a copy after the order of punishment did not vitiate the enquiry. The Court suggested the union may have sought the copy to facilitate converting the individual dismissal into an industrial dispute, but found this irrelevant to the fairness of the managerial enquiry.
  7. Alleged admission of partiality by the enquiring officer: The Court examined the evidence of K.D. Banerjee and found no admission that union representatives questioned his fairness in a manner that established bias. Even if fairness were questioned during the enquiry, that alone would not prove partiality. The Court concluded the charge of partiality had not been established.
  8. Overall conclusion on Tribunal's refusal: Having rejected the Tribunal's foundational finding that Sukumar was a protected workman and having found no established mala fides, victimisation, or procedural infirmity that vitiated the enquiry, the Court held the Tribunal was wrong in refusing approval to the dismissal. The Court noted that the managerial enquiry had found the charges established and the Tribunal did not find the finding perverse. Given that approval under section 33(2)(b) does not require proving charges "to the hilt", the Tribunal should have accorded approval on the materials before it.

Holding and Implications

The award of the Third Industrial Tribunal refusing approval to the dismissal of Sukumar Chowdhury is quashed and a writ of certiorari is ordered to issue.

Direct consequences: The Tribunal's refusal to accord approval to the employer's dismissal order was set aside by the Court. The Court specifically concluded (on the facts and law before it) that Sukumar Chowdhury was not shown to be a "protected workman" within the meaning of section 33(3) and that the managerial enquiry was not shown to be vitiated by bias or procedural unfairness sufficient to deny approval. The Court further directed that there would be no order as to costs.

Broader implications: The opinion does not discuss or announce any novel legal principle beyond the application of existing statutory provisions (section 33 and Rule 71) and established notions of natural justice; it does not state that a new precedent is being laid down.

    Saxby & Farmer (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. The Third Industrial Tribunal And Others

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Banerjee, J.:— This Rule is directed against an order, made by the Third Industrial Tribunal, refusing to accord approval to an order of dismissal by the petitioner company of its workman, Sukumar Chowdhury, for misconduct.

    2. The following facts are not disputed. The respondent No. 2, Sukumar Chowdhury was a fitter employed in the fitting and assembly department of the petitioner company. He was charged with misconduct by the Works Manager of the petitioner company to the following effect:—

    “It has been reported that about 10.45 A.M on 23-11-1960 you went to the office of the Machine Shop Foreman and started an altercation in a very insolent manner with the Foreman Mr. N. Chatterjee over job rates of V.B 7, in course of which you also abused him and threatened him. Your alleged actions as referred to above amounted to disorderly behaviour which is a major misdemeanour according to the Certified Standing Orders of the Company.”

    3. Sukumar Chowdhury was directed to submit his written explanation to the charge. He was also suspended pending enquiry into the charge. By a letter, dated 25th November, 1960, (Enclosure “D” to the petition), Sukumar Chowdhury denied the charges levelled against him and characterised them as baseless and malafide. In the aforesaid letter, he stated that his detailed explanation to the charges would follow. It does not, however, appear that any other explanation was submitted by him.

    4. One Mr. Dennison is the Managing Director of the petitioner company. He directed the Labour Officer of the company, K.D Banerjee, to hold the managerial enquiry into the charges. Pursuant to that direction, the said Labour Officer held a departmental enquiry, with notice to Sukumar Chowdhury. Witnesses were examined in the said enquiry, and it appears from the materials before me, that the said Sukumar Chowdhury fully participated in the enquiry. The enquiring officer reported to Mr. Dennison that the charges were established against the delinquent workman, Sukumar Chowdhury. On the report, Mr., Dennison passed an order of dismissal of Sukumar Chowdhury from service. The order of dismissal was communicated to the workman abovenamed, by a letter, dated the 6th December, 1960. By the said letter the workman was further informed that, in view of the pendency of an industrial dispute at that time, an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act would be made before the Industrial Tribunal for approval of the order of dismissal.

    5. The application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act was filed before the Industrial Tribunal on the very same date, namely, the 6th December, 1960.

    6. The reasons which weighed with the Tribunal in refusing approval to the order of the dismissal are hereinbelow set out:—

    (a) “The concerned workman, Shri Sukumar Chowdhury, has stated in his written statement that he is a permanent workman of the company and has been, an office bearer of the Saxby & Fanner Mazdur Union and the company was duly furnished with a list of office bearers of the Union. So, he being a protected workman, the company cannot dismiss or otherwise punish hirn without express permission in writing of this Tribunal. The company's action against him is a motivated one and is an act of victimisation and unfair labour practice.

    (b) “I find that there is substance in the contention of the workman and that the present proceeding is not maintainable because the employer's action against the concerned workman, who was the Vice-President of the registered trade union, without obtaining ‘express permission in writing’ of this Tribunal. Admittedly, the company did not obtain permission of this tribunal as required by section 33(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act before taking action by way of dismissal of Shri Sukumar Chowdhury who has been admittedly an officer of the registered trade union connected with the establishment. Therefore the present application is not maintainable in law.

    (c) “It transpires in evidence that the Works Manager of the company (Shri B.K Bhattacharji) who initiated the proceeding against the workman by drawing up a charge-sheet (Ex. 1) on 24-11-60 placed the workman under suspension by a letter dated 24th November, 1960 (Ex. 2) and by another letter dated 28th November, 1960 (Ex. 4-a), fixed the time and place of holding the departmental enquiry against the said workman. His direction was that the departmental enquiry into the charges against the workman will be held in his office. It is also in evidence that he remained all along present during the departmental enquiry held by his subordinate officer and in which his subordinate staffs gave evidence. He himself also gave evidence in support of the charges levelled against the workman as per chargesheet Ex. 1 drawn by him. So not only he initiated the departmental proceedings and conducted the same, but also watched the proceedings till the last moment and he himself gave evidence in support of the charge. This conduct of the Works Manager who was, so to say, the prosecutor has been seriously commented upon in my view not without justification.

    (d) “* * * P.W 1 Shri K.D Banerjee who was the Enquiring Officer admits that the concerned workman asked for a copy of the proceedings but it was not furnished to him and no reason has been assigned to him for the non-compliance. * * * P.W 1 has also admitted that at the time of the enquiry some representatives of the Union questioned his fairness and impartiality in conducting the enquiry.”

    7. For the reasons quoted above, the Industrial Tribunal refused to accord approval to the order of dismissal.

    8. The propriety of the order is being disputed in this Rule at the instance of the petitioner company.

    9. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner company that the Tribunal was wholly wrong in presuming that Sukumar Chowdhury was a protected workman and as such could not be dismissed from service save with the express permission in writing of the Industrial Tribunal. This contention, I find, is a correct contention. Sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act deal with “protected workman”, which I set out below:

    “(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), no employer shall, during the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, take any action against any protected workman concerned in such dispute—

    (a) by altering, to the prejudice of such protected workman, the conditions of service applicable to him immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; or

    (b) by discharging or punishing, whether by dismissal or otherwise, such protected workman, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending.

    Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, a ‘protected workman’, in relation to an establishment, means a workman who, being an officer of a registered trade union connected with the establishment, is recognised as such in accordance with rules made in this beha If.

    (4) In every establishment, the number of workmen to be recognised as protected workmen for the purposes of sub-section (3) shall be one per cent, of the total number of workmen employed therein subject to a minimum number of five protected workmen and a maximum number of one hundred protected workmen and for the aforesaid purpose, the appropriate Government may make rules providing for the distribution of such protected workmen among various trade unions, if any, connected with the establishment and the manner in which the workmen may be chosen and recognised as protected workmen.”

    10. Under the powers conferred in the Explanation to sub-section (3) of section 33 read with section 38 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, certain rules have been framed regarding the protected workmen and rule 71 of the Rules is material for the present purpose. Rule 71 is set out below:

    “71. Protected workmen.—(1) Every registered trade union connected with an industrial establishment to which the Act applies, shall communicate to the employer, before the 30th September every year, the names and addresses of such of the officers of the union who are employed in that establishment and who, in the opinion of the union, should be recognised as ‘protected workmen’. Any change in the incumbency of any such officer shall be communicated to the employer by the union within 15 days of such change.

    (2) The employer shall, subject to section 33, sub-section (4), recognise such workmen to be ‘protected workmen’ for the purposes of sub-section (3) of the said section and communicate to the union in writing within fifteen days of the receipt of the names and addresses under sub-rule (1), the list of workmen recognised as ‘protected workmen’.

    (3) Copies of communications under sub-rules (1) and (2) shall also be sent to the Labour Commissioner and the Conciliation Officer concerned.

    (4) Where the total number of names received by the employer under sub-rule (1) exceeds the maximum number of the protected workmen, admissible for the establishment, under section 33, sub-section (4), the employer shall recognise as protected workmen only such maximum number of workmen:

    Provided that where there is more than one registered trade union in the establishment, the maximum number shall be so distributed by the employer among the unions that the numbers of recognised protected workmen in individual unions bear roughly the same proportion to one another as the membership figures of the unions. The employer shall in that case intimate in writing to the President or the Secretary of the union the number of protected workmen allotted to it. A copy of this letter shall also be sent to the Labour Commissioner:

    Provided further that where the number of protected workmen allotted to a union under this sub-rule, falls short of the number of officers of the union seeking protection, the union shall be entitled to select the officers to be recognised as, protected workmen. Such selection shall be made by the union and communicated to the employer within 5 days of the receipt of the employer's letter.

    (5) When a (dispute arises between an employer and any registered trade union whether a particular workman should be recognised as a ‘protected workman’ or not, the dispute shall be referred to the Labour Commissioner whose decision thereon shall be final.”

    11. The law relating to protected workmen being as stated above, I have to see whether Sukumar Chowdhury, the dismissed workman, was at all a protected workman. It is not disputed that he is the Vice-President of the trade union of the workmen of the petitioner eompany. It further appears from a letter, dated April 5, 1960 (Annexure “I” to the petition), that the names of the officebearers elected at the Annual Genera Meeting of the Union, held on April 2, 1960, were forwarded to the petitioner company. But although that is so, the Union never expressed the opinion that all the office bearers, elected at the Annual General Meeting, should be recognised as protected workmen.

    12. Mr. Pritimoy Dutt, learned Advocate for the respondents, made somewhat desperate effort to read in the letter, Annexure “I”, an expression of an opinion that all the office-bearers should be recognised as protected workmen. He further contended that because the number of the officebearers did not exceed one per cent of the total number of workmen employed in the petitioner company, the conclusion was inevitable that all the office-bearers were intended for recognition as protected workmen. Mr. Dutt is wholly in error in this connection. The letter, Annexure “I”, does not imply the expression of any opinion that all the office-bearers were to be treated or recognised as protected workmen. In paragraph 6 of the affidavit-in-opposition, filed by the respondent Sukumar Chowdhury, there is no doubt a bold statement to the following effect:

    “I have further to add that the total number of office-bearers including the President and Vice-President of the said union constituting its Executive aggregated to less than and or not more than one per cent, of the said total number of workmen working in the establishment and or factory and or company of the petitioners situate at 17, Convent Road, Entally.”

    13. The above-quoted statement in the affidavit-in-opposition of Sukumar Chowdhury is so devoid of particulars that I am not inclined to place any reliance on the same and this is particularly so because the affidavit does not disclose the total number of workmen employed by the petitioner company. Assuming for the sake of argument that the number of office-bearers elected accidentally happened to be less than one per cent, of the total number of workmen employed by the petitioner company, that would not automatically follow that all of them, in the opinion of the Union, were intended for recognition as “protected workmen.” I, therefore, hold that the Tribunal was wholly wrong in thinking that the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act was not maintainable because of the reason that Sukumar Chowdhury was a “protected workman”.

    14. Then, again, the Tribunal appears to have made a much too free invocation to the principles of natural justice. The principle of natural justice, in its journey through the centuries, has shed much of its glories and is now crystallised into four principles of justice, namely, (1) opportunity for both the contesting parties to be heard, (2) hearing before an impartial tribunal so that no man can be a judge of his own cause, (3) decision made in good faith, and (4) an orderly course of procedure. Apart from this, no other principle of natural justice is known in modern jurisprudence. The criticisms made by the learned Judge of the Industrial Tribunal, if they can be fitted in with any of the aforemenioned principles of natural justice may come under the heading ‘impartial tribunal’. I have, therefore, to examine whether the person who enquired into the charge of misconduct against Sukumar Chowdhury was or remained an impartial tribunal throughout.

    15. It appears from the affidavit of Mr. Dennison, the Managing Director of the petitioner company, that the Labour Officer, K.D Banerjee, acted as the Enquiring Officer under his direct direction. There is nothing to show that the Works Manager, B.K Bhattacharjee, was an officer superior in rank to the Labour Officer. The physical presence of B.K Bhattacharjee at the enquiry and the fact that he also gave evidence before the Labour Officer do not appear to have, in any way, affected the impartiality of the Enquiring Officer and do not also appear to have embarrassed him. The Industrial Tribunal presumed too much in coming to the conclusion that the enquiry was conducted by an officer subordinate to E.K Bhattacharjee and that the physical presence of Mr. Bhattacharjee affected the enquiry.

    16. I further find that the criticism that the enquiry was vitiated because a copy of the proceedings was not supplied to the trade union, is wholly misconceived. Sukumar Chowdhury or the trade union, of which he was a member, did not ask for any document or copy of the proceedings at any time before the enquiry was completed. It was only after the order of punishment was] issued that the union asked for a copy of the proceedings at the enquiry. There is, of course, an allegation to the effect that even prior to that verbal requests had been made for supply of such a copy. The allegation, however, is denied and I am not inclined to place any reliance on the story of verbal demand for copy. In my opinion, the request for a copy of the proceedings after the order of punishment had been issued and the failure of the petitioner company to supply the copy did not affect the enquiry. The Trade Union was possibly asking for such a copy so as to collect materials for the conversion of the individual dispute concerning the dismissal of Sukumar Chowdhury into an industrial dispute. The criticism based on the failure on the part of the petitioner company to supply a copy of the proceedings to the trade union is, in the circumstances aforesaid, irrelevant and I attach no importance to it.

    17. The last criticism made by the Industrial Tribunal that K.D Banerjee had himself admitted that during the enquiry some representatives of the union questioned his fairness and impartiality in conducting the enquiry is factually wrong and inconsequential in effect. I have been taken through the evidence of K.D Banerjee and I do not find any admission to the above effect. Then, again, even if anybody had questioned his impartiality during the enquiry, that would not ipso facto prove partiality on his part. In my opinion, the charge of partiality has not been established in this case. For the reasons aforesaid, I hold that the Tribunal was wrong in refusing approval to the order of dismissal of the workman Sukumar Chowdhury. Nothing has been shown or proved that in dismissing the workman the managerial enquiry acted in a mala fide manner or attempted to victimise the workman. On the evidence recorded before the managerial enquiry, the charge appears to have been established. At least that was the view of the managerial enquiry. The Tribunal does not find that on the evidence the charge was not established or that the finding was perverse on the materials. Since it is not necessary for the purpose of obtaining approval to prove the charges “to the hilt”, the Tribunal should have, on the materials before it, accorded the approval asked for.

    18. In the view I take, I quash the award of the Tribunal. Let a writ of certiorari accordingly issue. There will be no order as to costs.

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    Saxby & Farmer (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. The Third Industrial Tribunal And Others
    (Feb 15, 1962)