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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • rule of limitation in Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act,
  • Rule 17, Part II, Chapter VIII of the Rules
  • Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act,
  • Rule 9(2) of the Rangoon High Court Rules,
  • Order XLI, Rule 19 of the Code
  • SECTION 5 INTEREST ACT
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • rule of limitation in Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act,
  • Rule 17, Part II, Chapter VIII of the Rules
  • Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act,
  • Rule 9(2) of the Rangoon High Court Rules,
  • Order XLI, Rule 19 of the Code
  • SECTION 5 INTEREST ACT
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns a rule for restoration of an appeal that was dismissed on or about June 2, 1960, due to nonpayment of paper book costs. The present rule was obtained on March 23, 1961, seeking to restore the dismissed appeal. The appellant petitioner showed sufficient cause for excusing the default and delay in filing the restoration application, which the Court found not unreasonable under the circumstances.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the application for restoration of the appeal is barred by limitation under Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act.
  2. Whether Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act applies to enable the Court to condone the delay in filing the restoration application.
  3. The applicability of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) and the relevant limitation period for such restoration applications.
  4. The interpretation and scope of Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act vis-à-vis restoration applications dismissed for default under the Code of Civil Procedure.

Arguments of the Parties

Contestant Opposite Parties' Arguments

  • The application for restoration is time barred under Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act.
  • Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act has no application in this case to condone the delay.

Appellant Petitioner's Arguments

  • Sufficient cause was shown to excuse the default and delay in filing the restoration application.
  • The delay is not unreasonable under the circumstances.
  • The restoration application falls under the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 of the CPC, where Article 168 does not apply.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mrs. Minne Lal v. Mahadeo Lal, AIR 1949 Pat 112 Application of Section 151 CPC and limitation principles for restoration applications Supported the view that Article 168 does not apply to restoration under Section 151 CPC; limitation period is at least three years under Article 181.
Ramkhelawan Singh v. Monilal Sahu, AIR 1939 Pat 678 (FB) Interpretation of limitation and restoration under CPC Relied upon to explain the scope of Article 168 and Section 151 CPC in restoration cases.
Sm. Hari Dassi Debi v. Sajani Mohan, AIR 1932 Cal 770 Placement of restoration applications under Section 151 CPC Supported the classification of such restoration applications as governed by Section 151 CPC rather than Article 168.
Annada Prasad Mitra v. Sushil Kumar, AIR 1942 Cal 390 Limitation periods and restoration applications Referenced for the limitation period applicable to restoration applications under Section 151 CPC.
Sonubai Baburao v. Shivajirao Krishnarao, AIR 1921 Bom 20 Scope of Article 168 and limitation for restoration applications Confirmed that Article 168 is limited to applications under Order XLI, Rules 17 and 18 CPC.
Asmatali Shario v. Mujaharali Sardar, AIR 1948 Cal 48 (SB) Application of Article 181 as nearest limitation period for restoration under Section 151 CPC Used to support that Article 168 does not apply and Article 181 is the relevant limitation article.
Ramhari Sahu v. Madan Mohan, ILR 23 Cal 339 Interpretation of limitation and procedural rules for restoration Plea of limitation under Article 168 was rejected as the application was treated under Rule 17, Part II, Chapter VIII of the Court Rules.
Fatimunnissa v. Deoki Pershad, ILR 24 Cal 350 (Full Bench) Availability of remedy by way of review and distinctions between old and new Code Clarified that dismissal for default under the old Code was a decree, unlike under the new Code.
Abdul Ganny v. Mrs. I.M Russell, AIR 1930 Rang 228 (Full Bench) Application of Article 168 to applications under the Civil Procedure Code and ejusdem generis principle Held Article 168 applies only to applications under the Code; extension to other applications was obiter dictum.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the applicability of Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act, which is limited to applications for restoration of appeals dismissed due to defaults under Rules 17 and 18 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure. The present case, involving dismissal for nonpayment of paper book costs, does not fall within this category and instead comes under the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 of the CPC. The Court relied on multiple precedents, including Mrs. Minne Lal v. Mahadeo Lal and Sm. Hari Dassi Debi v. Sajani Mohan, to hold that Article 168 does not apply and that the limitation period, if any, would be governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act or possibly no fixed period at all. The Court rejected the plea that Section 5 of the Limitation Act could not be invoked, emphasizing that the delay was not unreasonable and sufficient cause was shown. The Court also distinguished the present case from older precedents and noted that the current Section 151 was not part of the earlier Code, further supporting its conclusion. The obiter dictum in Abdul Ganny v. Mrs. I.M Russell was noted but not followed. Ultimately, the Court found the application for restoration to be maintainable and not barred by limitation.

Holding and Implications

The Court overruled the plea of limitation raised by the contesting parties and made the rule for restoration absolute. It set aside the dismissal of the appeal and restored it to the file. There was no order as to costs.

The direct effect of this decision is the restoration of the appellant’s dismissed appeal. The Court clarified the legal position regarding the limitation applicable to restoration applications under Section 151 CPC, emphasizing that Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act does not apply in such cases. No new precedent was established beyond the reaffirmation and application of existing principles and authorities.

    Biswanath Banerjee And Others, v. Amar Nath Mukherjee And Others, Opposite Parties.

    P.N Mookerjee, J.:— This Rule raises an important question, concerning the law of limitation. On or about June 2, 1960, the connected appeal was dismissed for nonpayment of paper book costs. On March 23, 1961, the present rule was obtained for restoration of the said appeal. On the merits, we are satisfied that it is a lit case for restoration, as aforesaid, as sufficient cause has been shown by the appellant petitioner for excusing the default in Question and the delay, if any, in the making of the present application is not, in the circumstances of this case, unreasonable. The point, however, has been raised by Mr. Bhattacharya, who appears for the contesting opposite parties, that the instant application is time barred under Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act and, as a matter of law, Section 5 of that Act has no application here to enable or entitle the Court to condone the delay in the matter.

    2. On the second question, aforesaid, no decision is necessary as, in our view, the above Article (Article 168) does not apply to cases like the present, which really come under Section 151 of the CPC (vide Mrs. Minne Lal v. Mahadeo Lal, AIR 1949 Pat 112, citing inter alia and relying upon Ramkhelawan Singh v. Monilal Sahu, AIR 1939 Pat 678 (FB); see also Sm. Hari Dassi Debi v. Sajani Mohan, 36 Cal WN 564: (AIR 1932 Cal 770), as explained hereinafter), for which and for the exercise of the inherent powers where under, there cannot be any period of limitation less, at I any rate, than three years from the date of the impugned order, Article 181 being the nearest Article, if any, of the Indian Limitation Act, applicable to the case. Indeed, it may well be contended that there is no period of limitation, prescribed for such applications, and the question of limitation, apart from unreasonable delay, would not arise or would not be relevant in such cases (Vide AIR 1949 Pat 112, supra, the latest Patna case on the point, in which all the relevant earlier authorities have been discussed; see also Annada Prasad Mitra v. Sushil Kumar, 46 Cal WN 326 at p. 332: (AIR 1942 Cal 390 at p. 393) and Sonubai Baburao v. Shivajirao Krishnarao, AIR 1921 Bom 20 but, even taking the ether view, the nearest,—and, indeed the only,—Article applicable would be Article 181 (Vide in this connection, Asmatali Shario v. Mujaharali Sardar, 52 Cal WN 64: (AIR 1948 Cal 48) (SB), Article 168 being, upon a true view of the said Article (Vide AIR 1921 Bom 20: ILR 45 Bom 648) limited to applications for restoration of appeals, dismissed on account of defaults under the Code, that is, under Rules 17 and 18 of Order XLI, thereof, or, in other words, to application for restoration under Order XLI, Rule 19 of the Code, which in our opinion, cannot and would not comprehend the instant case, the said Rule being expressly, on its terms, limited to cases of default under Rules 17 and 18 of the said Order.

    3. We do not think that the above view is opposed to Ramhari Sahu v. Madan Mohan, ILR 23 Cal 339, where, notwithstanding reference to the old S. 568, corresponding to the present Order XLI, Rule 19 of the Code, at p. 344 of the report, which was really for the purpose of citing an analogous provision of similar principle and procedure, the application in question was dealt with really as an application under Rule 17, Part II, Chapter VIII of the Rules of this Court and the plea of limitation,—particularly under Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act, — was rejected on that ground.

    4. It is to be remembered, further, in the above connection that the present Section 151 was not there in the aforesaid old Code of Civil Procedure.

    5. We do not think also that the subsequent Full Bench decision of this Court (Vide Fatimunnissa v. Deoki Pershad, ILR 24 Cal 350, overruling the above case of ILR 23 Cal 339), in so far as it held that the remedy by way of review was not available in such cases, and holding that, that, indeed was the only remedy available for the purpose, presents any difficulty as, under the old Code, a dismissal for default was a decree, which it is not under the new.

    6. One word, now, as to the Full Bench decision of the Rangoon High Court, in Abdul Ganny v. Mrs. I.M Russell, AIR 1930 Rang 228 (F.B). That decision appears to have accepted the position that Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act applies only to applications under the Civil Procedure Code, though purporting to extend it to applications ejusdem generis and seeking to include therein also applications for restoration of appeals dismissed for default for non-payment of paper book costs. It is to be noted, however, that the actual decision in the above Rangoon case appears to have been given upon the footing that the application before their Lordships, though under Rule 9(2) of the Rangoon High Court Rules, was really one under the Code the basis and the substantive rule (R. 9(1)) under which the appeal in, question was dismissed, being of a nature, similar to other provisions of the Code, and having been expressly placed by the Rangoon High Court in Order LII of the Code (vide P. 234). In that view, the proposed extension — at least, beyond the strict ejusdem generis principle, if not, on the same principle also—must be held to be merely an obiter dictum.

    7. Lastly, we would like to add here that the decision of this Court in 36 Cal WN 564: (AIR 1932 Cal 770) supra, has placed cases like the present really under Section 151 of the CPC and the reference in that decision to Order XLI, Rule 19 of the Code was only the citation of an analogous provision of similar underlying principle or procedure (vide, in this connection, Ramkhelawan Singh's case, AIR 1939 Pat 678 (FB), already cited), never meant to apply by analogy,—and that, indeed, is not permissible, the rule of limitation in Article 168 of the Indian Limitation Act, no such question of limitation being or having arisen there before their Lordships for decision.

    8. We, accordingly, overrule Mr. Bhattacharya's plea of limitation and make this Rule absolute, set aside the dismissal of the above appeal and restore it to file.

    9. There will be no order for costs in this Rule.

    Bhattacharya, J.:— I agree.

    JE/I.

    10. Rule made absolute.

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    Comments

    Biswanath Banerjee And Others, v. Amar Nath Mukherjee And Others, Opposite Parties.
    (May 30, 1961)