The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

1. Petitioner is aggrieved since he is denied the disability pension. Disability to the extent of 60 per cent is admitted. The petitioner also has been included in the medical category EEE and he is thus unfit for service under the respondents. Pension is refused on the ground that the disease suffered by the petitioner is not a scheduled one under the Schedule to the Central Civil Services (Extraordinary Pension) Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). That the personnel under the respondents are governed by the above mentioned Rules, is not disputed.

2. Petitioner entered service of the Border Security Force as constable (OPR) and joined duty on 26 April 1973. He was thereafter promoted as Naik (OPR), head constable (Cipher) and assistant sub-inspector (Cipher). While the petitioner was serving in Assam/West Bengal in 1984, he developed dandruff slowly and then some skin lesions causing itching which spread all over the body. He came to Delhi for Cipher Grade II Course. He was referred to Skin OPD Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi and they referred him to AIIMS. He took treatment for about four months. He returned to Siliguri. His disease aggravated and he took treatment in SSKM Hospital, Calcutta. He was not cured. He was transferred to 25 Bn BSF, Delhi on medical grounds in January 1988. He was placed in low medical category (CEE (T) for one year from 11 June 1990 to 10 September 1991. He was produced before a Medical Board on 20 January 1992. The Medical Board held on 20 January 1992 included him in medical category EEE with 60 per cent disability and declared him to be completely and permanently incapacitated for further service of any kind in the department to which he belongs, due to “PSORIASIS VULGARIS.” Accordingly the petitioner was invalidated out from service with effect from 30 September 1992.

3. Though the petitioner claimed disability pension, the stand taken by the respondents is that “as per Medical Board proceedings, the disease is not attributable to service. The contention that the disease has aggravated as a result of posting in various places is therefore not tenable”. Yet another main contention taken by the respondents is that the disease is not covered by Sch. 1A of the Rules. In view of the contentions taken as above the crucial question to be tackled is whether the disability suffered by the petitioner is covered by the Rules.

4. Rule 3 provides for the definitions. To the extent relevant it reads as follows:

“3. For the purpose of these rules unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context-

(4) ‘disease’ means a disease as is mentioned in Sch. 1A hereto annexed.”

There is no dispute that Psoriasis Vulgaris is not a disease included in the schedule. Rule 3A provides for the eligibility. To the extent relevant R. 3A reads as follows:

“3A(1)(a). Disablement shall be accepted as due to Government service provided that it is certified that it is due to wound, injury or disease which

(i) is attributable to Government service, or

(ii) existed before or arose during Government service and has been and remains aggravated thereby

(2) There shall be a casual connection between—

(a) disablement and Government service; and

(b) death and Government service, for attributability or aggravation to be conceded.

Guidelines in this regard are given in the appendix which shall be treated as part and parcel of these Rules.”

Rule 8(2) reads as follows:

“8(2) The percentage of disability due to a disease or diseases specified in Sch.1A, hereto annexed, shall be as certified by the Medical Authority.”

Rule 9 provides that when disablement of a Government servant is conceded as due to Government service in terms of R. 3A, he shall be awarded disability pension. It is provided in sub-rule (2) as follows:

“9(2). If the Government servant is boarded out of Government service on account of his disablement, the quantum of disability pension for cent per cent disability shall be specified in Sch. II here to annexed.”

Paragraph 2 of the guidelines for conceding attributability of disablement or death to Government service provides as follows:

“2. In deciding on the issue of entitlement, all the evidence (both direct and circumstantial) will be taken into account and the benefit of reasonable doubt will be given to the claimant. This benefit will be given more liberally to the claimant in field service cases.”

Paragraph 5 of the guidelines deal with the procedure to be followed in the case of diseases, provides as follows:—

“5. In respect of diseases, the following rules will be observed:—

(a) Cases, in which it is established that conditions of Government service did not determine or contribute to the onset of the disease but influenced the subsequent course of the disease, will fall for acceptance on the basis of aggravation.

(b) A disease which has led to an individual's discharge or death will ordinarily be deemed to have arisen in service if no note of it was made at the time of the individual's acceptance for Government service. However, if medical opinion holds, for reasons to be stated, that the disease could not have been detected on medical examination prior to acceptance for service, the disease will not be deemed to have arisen during service.

(c) If a disease is accepted as having arisen in service, it must also be established that the conditions of Government service determined or contributed to the onset of the disease and that the conditions were due to the circumstances on duty in Government service.

(d) In considering whether a particular disease is due to Government service it is necessary to relate the established facts, in the aetiology of the disease and of its normal development, to the effect that conditions of service, e.g, exposure, stress, climate, etc., may have had on its manifestation. Regard must also be had to the time factor.”

Paragraph 7 deals with assessment which reads as follows:—

“7. Assessment—

(a) The assessment of a disability is the estimate of the degree of disablement it causes, which can properly be ascribed to service as defined below.

(b) The disablement properly referable to service will be assessed as under.

(i) At the time of discharge from the Government service.

Normally the whole of the disablement then caused by the disability. This rule will apply irrespective of whether the disability is actually attributable to service, or is merely aggravated thereby. In the latter event, part of the disablement on discharge may have been present before service and/or may have been brought about by the natural progress of the disability during service. But as it is impossible, for so long as the strain and stress of service continues, to apportion quantitatively the effects of service and non-service factors, the entire disablement at the time of discharge will be taken into account.”

At sub-para. (c) it is provided as follows:

“(c) In cases accepted as aggravated by service, although a percentage of disablement, equal to more than 20 percent, may be assessed on medical resurvey, after discharge from service, in accordance with Para. (b)(ii)(2) above, disability pension will cease to be payable as soon as the effects of the aggravation by service have passed away, e.g, where a person with disease, e.g, fibrositis bronchitis, eczema, etc, held to be aggravated by service, is invalided, out and on resurvey as found by the Medical Board to have been resorted

(a) to his pre-service condition or

(b) the condition in which he may have been normally at that time even if he had not joined Government service, aggravation by service will be deemed to have passed away.”

5. The main contention of the petitioner is that the schedule is not exhaustive. The Rule has to be given a purposive interpretation: Thrust is not on the disease but on the disability due to a disease. If there is a disability which stands in the way of a BSF employee continuing in service, despite the fact that the disease which caused the disability is not scheduled, such personnel shall be entitled for disability pension. Yet another contention is that the definition of disease is not exhaustive. The 3rd contention is that if the Rules are read in its totality, it would be fairly clear that the disability need not necessarily be arising out of the disease covered only by the schedule.

6. The guidelines as extracted above regarding the attributability of disablement to Government service would show the object behind the scheme for disability pension. It is clearly stated therein that the benefit of reasonable doubt shall always be given to the claimant and the benefit has to be given more liberally to a claimant in field service cases. True, if a literal interpretation is given to the Rules, the disability should be in respect of a disease included in the schedule only. The question is, does it serve the purpose of the Rules. The Court has to administer justice, of course, justice according to law. But the Court has a duty also to see whether the law is according to justice. Lex injusta non est lex is a celebrated Latin maxim which means that an unjust law is not law. In other words, laws should be just and they should serve the cause of justice. In interpreting laws the Court should find out the soul and spirit of law and not mechanically apply the letter of law. After all, law is for man and that the man in need should be the subject and object of the law. Just to recollect the factual background of this case, the petitioner joined service under the BSF in 1973. He worked in various places including field service in Jammu and Kashmir, Meghalaya, Assam, West Bengal, Hariyana, Madhya Pradesh and Delhi. While working in Assam/West Bengal in 1984 he developed dandruff. Skin lesions developed causing itching and it spread all over the body. Still he continued in service. Only in 1992, he was invalidated out from service, since the skin disease developed into an unbearable form as Psoriasis Vulgaris with 60 per cent disability whereby he was included in the medical category EEE. Thus it is a case where for 11 years petitioner did not have any problem. Only while working in particular regions of the country, he developed dandruff initially and then lesions causing itching and finally Psoriasis Vulgaris. There is no case for the Medical Board that it is genetic as far as the petitioner is concerned. It will be profitable to refer to the proceedings of the Medical Board. The opinion of the specialist is available in Exhibit R1(a) produced along with the counter-affidavit which reads as follows:

“As per the opinion of Dermatologist Dr. Sunil Dayal, Safdar Jang Hospital, New Delhi, dated 20 January 1992, he is suffering from ‘PSORIASIS VULGARIS.’ This disease is inherited but has an unpredictable course. He is suffering from PSORIASIS for the last 7 years. His disease gets aggravated in winter and remission generally occurs during summer months.”

The unit medical officer hence made the following recommendation:—

“In view of the above, the individual is ‘unfit’ to continue in service in BSF. I recommend him to remain in medical category EEE.”

The Medical Board proceedings are also produced. The Medical Board proceeding, to the extent relevant, reads as follows:

“The Board having examined Mo. 737550315 ASVCIPH, K.A VIJOY of 25 BN BSF are of the opinion that he is suffering from PSORIASIS VULGARIS and considered unfit for further service in BSF.

1. Was the disability contracted in service: Yes 2. Was it contracted in circumstances over which he had no control: Yes 3. It is directly attributable to the conditions of service: No 4. If so, by what specific conditions: N.A 5. If not directly attributable to service was it aggravated thereby and if so, by what specific condition: Yes due to service conditions 6. Medical category recommended: EEE 7. Period of which the above medical category is recommended: Permanent 8. Percentage of disability: 60%”

Regarding pension claim the certificate given by the Medical Board reads as follows:

“Certified that we have carefully examined No. 737550315 Rank ASI/CIPH NAME Sri K.A VIJOY, S/o. LATE SRI K.M ABRAHAM OF 25 BN BSF. His age by his own statement is 41 years and by appearance is 41 years. We consider him to be completely and permanently incapacitated for further service of any kind in the department to which he belongs in consequence to ‘PSORIASIS VULGARIS’.”

7. The medical reports thus show that the petitioner has contracted the disease during service only. It is significant to note that the Medical Board has not given an opinion that the disease is genetic or it is owing to contributing factors on the part of the petitioner. As per the guidelines the disease contracted in service shall ordinarily be deemed to have arisen in service, if it was not noted at a time of individual's acceptance of Government service, otherwise the Medical Board should give a definite opinion to the contrary. It is also clearly provided that if the conditions of service influenced the subsequent course of the disease, it will fall for acceptance on the basis of aggravation. In this case admittedly the symptoms appeared in 1984. The same aggravated and developed to Psoriasis Vulgaris only slowly, obviously due to the influence of service conditions. But the crucial question again is whether such disability can be accepted since Psoriasis Vulgaris is not covered by the schedule. For the only reason that the disease is defined under the Rules by using the expression ‘means’ does it mean that it is an exhaustive definition.

8. It is significant to note that Rule 3 has guardedly uses the expression “unless if there is anything repugnant in the subject or context”. Extreme rigour need not be attached to the definition in the Rules. It is now a well-settled principle of interpretation that definition of a word or phrase is to be construed in the light of the context, scheme and object of the Act instead of ascribing the meaning as literally set out in the definition. In one of the early decisions in Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Company, Ltd., Madras v. Fraser and Ross, [A.I.R 1960 S.C 971], it was held that for the only reason that a word is defined to mean a certain thing it does not necessarily indicate that the expression has the only meaning as provided. It all depends on the context, collocation and object of the expression used in relation to the object of the statute. To quote:

“It is well settled that all statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or the context. That is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words namely, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. In view of this qualification, the Court has not only to look at the words but also to look at the context, the collocation and the object of such words relating to such matter and interpret the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the words under the circumstances.”

9. In K.V Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal, [(1997) 2 S.C.C 53], also the situation was considered by the Supreme Court. It has been held that while interpreting a definition it has to be borne in mind that the interpretation placed on it should not only be not repugnant to the context, it should also be such as would aid the achievement of the purpose which is sought to be served by the Act. A construction which would defeat or was likely to defeat the purpose of the Act has to be ignored. It will be profitable to extract the relevant paragraphs:

“10. Apparently, it appears that the definition is conclusive as the word “means” has been used to specify the members, namely, spouse, son, daughter, grandchild or dependant parent, who would constitute the family. Section 2 of the Act in which various terms have been defined, opens with the words ‘in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires’ which indicates that the definitions, as for example, that of ‘family,’ which are indicated to be conclusive may not bet treated to be conclusive if it was otherwise required by the context. This implies that a definition, like any other word in a statute, has to be read in the light of the context and scheme of the Act as also the object for which the Act was made by the Legislature.

11. While interpreting a definition, it has to be borne in mind that the interpretation placed on it should not only be not repugnant to the context, it should also be such as would aid the achievement of the purpose which is sought to be served by the Act. A construction which would defeat or was likely to defeat the purpose of the Act has to be ignored and not accepted”.

10. Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Company case (vide supra), was relied on by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, [(1998) 8 S.C.C 1]. It has been held that the Court has not only to look at the words but also to look at the context namely the circumstances in the expression “powers” and the purpose for which a particular statute is enacted. That aspect is dealt with at Para. 28 of the judgment which reads as follows:

“The principle is that all statutory definitions have to be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or context. That is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words, similar to the words used in the present case, namely ‘unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.’ Thus there may be sections in the Act where the meaning may have to be departed from on account of the subject or context in which the word had been used and that will be giving effect to the opening sentence in the definition section, namely ‘unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.’ In view of this qualification, the Court has not only to look at the words but also to look at the context, the collocation and the object of such words relating to such matter and interpret the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the words ‘under those circumstances.’ ”

11. The emerging inference is that a rigorous, literal and pedantic interpretation is not to be attributed to the definition of disease as appearing under the Rules. For the only reason that a particular disease is not included in the schedule and if the disease has caused disability to a serving personnel to continue in service, the law is not helpless in the matter of disability pension. It will not also be altogether out of context to note that some of the diseases noted in the guidelines which are given as examples, pibrositis, bronchitis, eczema, etc., are not included in the Schedule and yet it is provided that in such cases the resurvey Medical Board should assess the disability. The crucial consideration should be whether a serving personnel is disabled to continue in service owing to any disease. It is in that context the opinion of the Medical Board becomes crucially relevant. According to the Medical Board the petitioner who is suffering from Psoriasis Vulgaris is “unfit for further service in BSF”. The Medical Board also has opined that the disease is aggravated by service conditions. There is also no dispute that the disease is contracted in circumstances over which the petitioner had no control. It is also not in dispute that the disability was contracted while the petitioner was in service. It is also a fact that even after the initial symptoms the petitioner continued for about 8 years and only when it was certified that the petitioner was unfit to continue in the service of BSF he was invalidated from service declaring him to be unfit to continue in the service of the BSF. According to the Medical Board the petitioner is “completely and permanently incapacitated for further service of any kind in the Department to which he belongs”. In such circumstances it will be highly unjust and unreasonable to deny the petitioner the benefit of disability pension for the only reason of specific non-inclusion of the disease causing the disability, in the schedule. Such under inclusion does not matter since the Rules provide for a purposive interpretation as required in the given circumstances so as to achieve the object of the Rules, the object being the grant of disability pension to a serving personnel invalidated from service owing to disability for the reason that he is unfit to continue in BSF. It is declared that the petitioner is entitled to disability pension under the Rules. The needful in the light of the declaration shall be done by the respondents within a period of three months from the date” of production/receipt of a copy of the judgment. The eligible arrears shall also be disbursed within the said period.

The writ petition is disposed of as above.