K. Narayana Kurup, J.:— Petitioner(s) in all these Original Petitions are the Insurance Company who figure as third respondent in O.P (MV) No. 804 of 1992 and connected cases which were disposed of by the first respondent, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thalassery as per Ext. P1 common award dated 28.11.1995 in favor of the respective claimants (who figure as second respondent in all these original petitions) to realise from respondents 1 to 3 therein-owner, driver and insurance company respectively-jointly and severely payable by the petitioner/insurance company the various sums mentioned therein with interest at 12% per annum from the date of petition till realisation and with proportionate costs. Petitioner-insurance company was directed to make payment by way of crossed D.D or account payee cheque in the name of the second respondent claimants) and on such deposit the claimants were permitted to withdraw the same. Though Ext. P1 common award deals with 10 petitions, the present original petitions deal with the award in 7 petitions only, since in the rest of the cases the impugned award being more than Rs. 10,000/-, the insurance company has right of appeals to this Court under S. 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short the Act). Since the impugned award in favor of the 2nd respondent-claimants in all these original petitions is less than Rs. 10,000/-, no appeal is maintainable under S. 173 of the Act and hence the insurance company has filed these original petitions invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
2. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner in extenso, I am not satisfied that the petitioners) are entitled to succeed in these original petitions. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is the only remedy available to the insurance company in view of the express bar of an appeal created by S. 173(2) of the Act which says that “no appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees”. Admittedly in the award which is the subject matter of challenge in these original petitions award amount is less than Rs. 10,000/- in which case going by the mandate of S. 173(2) of the Act, no appeal wilt lie. According to the learned counsel when an appeal is barred, a petition under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable to quash the award. I cannot agree. Once the Legislature in its wisdom has thought it fit that no appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than Rs. 10,000/- this Court cannot lend its aid to the petitioner to circumvent the statutory bar by enabling it to question the award collaterally by filing a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. This Court cannot sit in judgment over the legislative wisdom and policy in regard to filing of appeals, more so when it is remembered that right of appeal is not a vested right or a constitutional right but a creature of the statute.
3. There is no inherent right of appeal from the original forum unless such a right is created by the statute which creates the forum. In other words, right of appeal is a creature of statute and it is for the Legislature to provide or not to provide appeal. The Legislature can also impose conditions for the maintainability of an appeal. Similarly the Legislature can create a total bar of appeal under certain circumstances as in the instant case. Since right of appeal inheres in no one an appeal for its maintainability requires clear authority of law. In the face of the express statutory bar against an appeal as contained in S. 173(2) of the Act, I do not think that this Court will be justified in interfering with the award in this proceedings under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. No doubt, this Court can and will interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India provided the findings of the Tribunal are utterly perverse or the Tribunal has misdirected itself on points of law or when the Statute simply says that the decision of the authority or Tribunal is final. That is not the case here. As already noticed, here is a total bar of appeal against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than Rs. 10,000/-. In such a case the defeated party cannot be permitted to up-set the decision of the Tribunal by resort to proceedings under Arts. 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. The position will be different once the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is barred by the Legislative device of a ‘finality’ clause as already noted. In such a case, this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction will certainly interfere with the impugned award, provided sufficient grounds are made out not withstanding the finality clause. The grounds usually urged in support of such interference are illegality and irregularity in the proceedings of the Tribunal, jurisdictional error or defect or the order being not in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure resulting in miscarriage of justice. No such ground has been made out in these Original Petitions.
4. In the result, the Original Petitions are dismissed.