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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

In the Kerala Assembly general election held on 23 March 1987 for the No. 30 Sultan's Battery seat, ten candidates contested, the main contest being between the first respondent (the returned candidate) and Mr. Cyriac John. The first respondent won by a margin of over 4,000 votes. The petitioner, an elector and the election agent of Mr. Cyriac John, filed an election petition seeking to declare the election of the first respondent void on various grounds (alleging corrupt practices under Sections 123(1)(a), 123(2), 123(7) and some allegations under Section 100(1)(d)(iv)).

Trial commenced and the petitioner had been partly examined as P.W.1 when the first respondent sought a preliminary hearing on the maintainability of the petition for want of cause of action. With the petitioner's earlier agreement, examination of P.W.1 was suspended and the preliminary point was heard. At argument the learned counsel for the petitioner objected to the hearing of the preliminary point, citing Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain (AIR 1960 SC 770) and arguing that after issues are settled and trial has started, preliminary points cannot be decided. The court considered this objection and proceeded to examine the sufficiency of the petition's allegations, particulars, and verification, and the applicability of procedural powers to strike out pleadings or reject the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a preliminary objection on maintainability (for want of cause of action) can be heard after trial has started and issues have been settled, particularly in light of Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain (AIR 1960 SC 770).
  2. Whether allegations of corrupt practices in the petition (under Sections 123(1)(a), 123(2) and 123(7) and some under Section 100(1)(d)(iv)) disclose sufficient material facts and particulars to constitute a cause of action.
  3. Whether omissions of material facts or insufficient particulars in an election petition can be cured by amendment or whether they are fatal, permitting striking out under Order VI, Rule 16 and rejection under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C.
  4. Whether the petition's verification and supporting affidavit comply with Section 83(1)(c) and the proviso requiring Form No. 25 (R.94A) for corrupt practice allegations.
  5. Whether acts of third parties (including government officers) amount to corrupt practice attributable to the candidate absent consent by the candidate or his election agent.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Counsel

  • Objected to hearing the preliminary point after trial had started, relying on Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain (AIR 1960 SC 770), and contended that once issues are settled and trial has started there cannot be a question of deciding any preliminary point.
  • Alleged a range of corrupt practices and other malpractices against the first respondent, including persuasion to induce other candidates to stand so as to divide votes, obtaining government assistance (electric connection and other benefits) by influence, misuse of official position by ministers canvassing, improper inclusions in electoral rolls (dead persons and minors), malpractices in counting, and various instances of assistance or canvassing by government officers or organisations.

First Respondent (as reflected in the record)

  • Sought a preliminary hearing on maintainability of the petition for want of cause of action. The record shows the first respondent took the point that the petition did not disclose a cause of action and urged that this be examined before proceeding further.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain, AIR 1960 SC 770 Held in context of corrupt practice under S.123(5) (hiring/procuring vehicles): if material facts regarding corrupt practice are alleged but particulars under S.83(1)(b) are deficient, petition should not be dismissed in limine if parties go to trial and evidence is led; opportunity to amend should be given; insistence on full particulars is important. The court held that the petitioner's counsel had misunderstood the scope of this decision. The court explained that Balwan Singh did not bar striking out pleadings or rejecting petitions at any stage where cause of action is absent; rather it addressed situations where parties had gone to trial despite defective particulars and evidence had been led.
Razik Ram v. J.S Chouhan, AIR 1975 SC 667 Cited as one of later decisions which considered AIR 1960 SC 770. Used to show subsequent consideration of Balwan Singh and to support proposition that courts have power to strike out pleadings under O.6 R.16 and reject petitions under O.7 R.11 when no cause of action remains.
Balwant Singh v. Prakash Chand, AIR 1976 SC 1187 Cited as another later decision considering Balwan Singh. Referred to in support of the court's view on the court's power to strike pleadings and reject petitions when defects persist.
Dhartipakar v. Rajiv Gandhi, AIR 1987 SC 1577 Reiterated that Balwan Singh related to S.123(5) and that full statement of hiring/procuring must be given; affirmed power and duty of court to strike out pleadings under O.6 R.16 and reject petitions under O.7 R.11 when no cause of action remains. The court relied on this decision to support the proposition that an election petition can be summarily rejected at the threshold or at any subsequent stage if the basic defect persists, and that the starting of the trial or settlement of issues is no bar to such action.
(Unspecified citation) AIR 1987 SC 1926 Referred to for the proposition that O.7 R.11 does not place restriction as to the stage when a petition may be rejected. Used to reinforce that the Court's power to reject a petition under O.7 R.11 is available at any stage.
Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1191 Principle that bribery under S.123(1) and undue influence under S.123(2) require consensus of mind; gift, offer or promise must be made to candidate or elector with requisite intention. Applied to hold that the petition's bare allegation of "persuasion" without details or evidence of promises/offers/consensus is insufficient to make out an offence under S.123(1)(a).
AIR 1986 SC 1253 (reported also as 1986 Supp SCC 315) Cited in relation to S.123(7) and the requirement of specific particulars as to how influence was exerted and assistance procured from government officers. Invoked to emphasise that material particulars (who, how, where, when, nature of assistance) are required to complete cause of action under S.123(7); mere general expressions are inadequate.
AIR 1972 SC 515 Cited regarding insufficiency of vague expressions like "approached the minor irrigation officer", "influence and repeated pressure", etc., without specific particulars. Used to support the court's view that such vague expressions do not constitute a cause of action for corrupt practice.
AIR 1969 SC 1201 Authority for the proposition that the election agent is the alter ego of the candidate and his acts bind the candidate; an election agent can act on behalf of the candidate and bind him without separate consent. Applied to explain that acts of the election agent are treated as acts of the candidate, and that acts by third parties without the candidate's or his agent's consent will not affect the candidate's election.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise legal analysis, grounded in the statutory scheme and precedents referenced in the petition:

  1. On the preliminary objection that a point of maintainability could not be heard after trial commenced: the court concluded that the petitioner’s reliance on Balwan Singh (AIR 1960 SC 770) misread that decision. Balwan Singh addressed a narrow situation concerning particulars of corrupt practice under S.123(5) and did not immunize a defective pleading from being struck out or the petition rejected at any stage. The court emphasized that Order VI, Rule 16 uses the phrase "at any stage of the proceedings" and that Order VII, Rule 11 must also be effective at any stage; therefore, striking out pleadings or rejecting petitions when no triable cause of action remains is permissible even after trial has started.
  2. On amendment and particulars: the court acknowledged the general power to allow amendments or amplifications of particulars of corrupt practice where necessary for a fair trial, and noted the earlier dictum that parties who go to trial despite defective particulars should not have the petition dismissed without an opportunity to amend. However, the court also stressed statutory constraints: Section 86(5) bars introduction by amendment of particulars of corrupt practice not previously alleged, and the law requires exactitude in alleging material facts under S.83(1)(a). Omission of material facts is fatal and cannot be cured by amendment in appropriate cases.
  3. On sufficiency of the petition's allegations: the court examined the charges classified broadly under Sections 123(1)(a), 123(2), and 123(7) (with some under S.100(1)(d)(iv)). For S.123(1)(a) the petition offered only a "bald and general allegation of 'persuasion'" that respondents 2 and 3 were induced to stand to divide the votes; the court held that the core elements of bribery—gift, offer or promise with intent, and consensus of mind—were not alleged. The court relied on Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh for the principle that bribery/undue influence require consensus of mind and intention.
  4. For S.123(7) allegations (influence on officers to procure funds for electric connection etc.), the court emphasized missing particulars: who the officers were, how influence was exerted, from where assistance was procured, the nature of assistance, and the nexus between the assistance and the candidate. The court referenced earlier authorities to show that vague allegations such as "approached the minor irrigation officer", "influence and repeated pressure", or "solicited assistance" are inadequate.
  5. The court observed that activities such as arranging expenditure on the eve of election for general good or compliance/non-compliance with Election Commission Handbook instructions are not, by themselves, corrupt practices under the Representation of the People Act. The court held that violation of Election Commission instructions does not, independent of the Act and Rules, provide a ground to set aside an election unless it brings the case within the statute (e.g., S.100(1)).
  6. The court reiterated the principle that a corrupt practice or malpractice by a third party affects a candidate only if the candidate or his election agent consents. The election agent is the candidate's alter ego and can bind the candidate; conversely, acts done without such consent do not implicate the candidate's election.
  7. Regarding verification and supporting affidavit, the court found the petition's verification deficient. The petition's verification was only "on information which I believe to be true" and the affidavit was not in Form No. 25 as required by Rule 94A and Section 83(1)(c) proviso; thus the verification and affidavit could not be accepted.
  8. Synthesizing these points, the court found that many of the petition's grounds consisted of vague, irrelevant, or insufficient allegations lacking the necessary material facts or particulars demanded by precedent and statute; consequently, the court exercised its power to strike and to reject where no cause of action remained.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court struck out Grounds A to K under Order VI, Rule 16, C.P.C., and rejected the petition itself under Order VII, Rule 11(a), C.P.C. The petition was dismissed. The petitioner was directed to pay costs to the first respondent quantified at Rs. 1,500. The opinion concludes with the order:

Petition dismissed.

Implications:

  • The direct consequences are the dismissal of the petition, striking out of specified grounds, and payment of costs by the petitioner (Rs. 1,500).
  • The court reaffirmed that courts have the power and, in appropriate cases, the duty to strike out pleadings under O.6 R.16 and to reject an election petition under O.7 R.11 at any stage if no triable cause of action remains; the mere fact that trial has begun or issues have been settled does not preclude this exercise of power.
  • The opinion does not state that it establishes a new precedent; rather, it applies and synthesizes existing statutory provisions and case law to the facts of this petition and emphasizes strict compliance with requirements as to material facts, particulars and verification in election petitions.

All content in this summary is based exclusively on information contained in the provided opinion and does not add, infer, or invent facts beyond that text.

    K.K Somanathan v. K.K Ramachandran Master And Others

    1. In the general election to the Kerala assembly held on 23-3-1987 ten candidates including one Mr. Cyriac John and respondents 1 to 3 contested for the No. 30 Sultan's Battery seat. Real contest was between first respondent and Mr. Cyriac John. First respondent won by a margin of over 4,000 votes. Petitioner, an elector and the election agent of Mr. Cyriac John, seeks to declare the election of the first respondent void on various grounds. After the trial of the case started, at a time when the petitioner was partly examined as P.W 1, first respondent wanted maintainability of the petition for want of cause of action to be heard preliminary and as agreed to on behalf of the petitioner also, the examination of P.W 1 was suspended and the matterheard.

    2. But at the time of argument the learned counsel for the petitioner took objection to the preliminary point being heard, seeking authority from the decision in Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain, AIR 1960 SC 770. The argument was that after issues are settled and trial started there cannot be any question of deciding any preliminary point. I think the counsel has misunderstood the scope of that decision. That was a case dealing with corrupt practices, particularly those coming under S. 123(5) involving hiring or procuring of vehicles for the free conveyance of electors. It was held that the corrupt practices being hiring or procuring of vehicle for the conveyance of electors, if the full particulars of conveying by a vehicle of electors to or from any polling station are given, S. 83 is duly complied with, even if particulars of the contract of hiring, an distinguished from the fact of hiring, are not given. It was in that context that their Lordships said that normally the argument for hiring or procuring of a vehicle is within the special knowledge of the parties to that agreement and it is difficult to assume that it was intended to require the petitioner in an election petition to set out the particulars of such facts within the special knowledge of the other party, and expose the petitioner to a penalty of dismissal if those particulars could not be given. At the same time that decision itself said that insistence upon full particulars of corrupt practice is undoubtedly of paramount importance and if the petition is found to be defective in that respect an opportunity should be given to the petitioner to amend or amplify the particulars without dismissing the petition in limine and in the event of non-compliance alone, charges which are vague may be struck out. It was in such a situation that their Lordships said that if the parties go for trial, despite the absence of full particulars of the corrupt practices alleged, and the evidence of the contested parties is led on the plea raised by the petitioner, the petition cannot thereafter be dismissed for want of particulars without giving an opportunity for amendment, because the defect is one of procedure and not one of jurisdiction to adjudicate the plea in the absence of particulars. After that decision was rendered S. 123(5) has undergone radical amendments. Anyhow that decision only said that when material facts regarding corrupt practices are alleged and the only defect is absence of sufficient particulars under S. 83(1)(b), the petition cannot be dismissed in limine, after the parties went for trial and evidence of the contesting parties is led, without giving an opportunity to amend or amplify the particulars. The limitations in the granting of such an amendment are also not for my consideration now.

    3. Undoubtedly it is within the powers of the Court to allow the particulars of any corrupt practice alleged in the petition to be amended or amplified in such manner as may be, in the opinion of the Court, necessary for securing a fair and effective trial of the petition. Whether such a relief can be granted after the expiry of limitation is not a matter that comes up for decision. Anyhow S. 86(5) itself prohibits introduction by amendment of the particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged. Now the law is well settled and decisions are unanimous that allmaterial facts coming under S. 83(1)(a) will have to be alleged with exactitude and even the omission of a single material fact will render the cause of action incomplete, entailing that charge being struck out under O. 6, R. 16 and if no further triable issue remains, the petition itself is liable to be rejected under O. 7, R. 11, C.P.C as not disclosing any cause of action. So also the decisions are unanimous that while particulars under S. 83(1)(b) could, in appropriate cases, be allowed to be supplied by amendment, omission of a material fact is fatal and cannot be so cured.

    4. The real scope of the objection of the counsel arises at this stage. We will take the case of an election petition which does not disclose any cause of action in the sense that no cause of action with complete material facts is alleged. That defect cannot be supplied by amendment. That means the petition continues to be defective and it could only be rejected because the defect cannot be supplied. If the argument of the counsel on the basis of his interpretation of AIR 1960 SC 770 is accepted the only course open to the Court will be to undergo the full ordeal of the trial by the unnecessary examination of the parties and witnesses at the risk of wastage of the precious time of the Court which could be utilised for other useful purposes. I do not think that this is what the decision meant. It cannot mean so because the words used in Order 6, R. 16 are “at any stage of the proceedings”. Though O. 7, R. 11 does not contain such words the absence is immaterial. If pleadings could be struck out at any stage the applicability of O. 7, R. 11 must also be there at all stages. When no triable cause of action remains after striking out the pleadings it will be an abuse of the process of Court to keep the proceedings still pending without being rejected under O. 7, R. 11.

    5. AIR 1960 SC 770 (Balwant Singh v. Lakshmi Narain) was considered in several later decisions including AIR 1975 SC 667 (Razik Ram v. J.S Chouhan), AIR 1976 SC 1187 (Balwant Singh v. Prakash Chand) and AIR 1987 SC 1577 (Dhartipakar v. Rajiv Gandhi). In AIR 1987 SC 1577 the Supreme Court said that though AIR 1960 SC 770, related to corrupt practice under S. 123(5) and though it was decided prior to the amendment of that sub-section, even then it was observed in that decision that corrupt practice under S. 123(5) being the hiring or procuring of a vehicle for the conveyance of electors, full statement of the hiring of procuring must be given in the election petition. Now it is well established that the Court has not only the power but the imperative duty also to strike out pleadings in appropriate cases under O. 6, R. 16, at any stage and to reject the petition itself under O. 7, R. 11 if no cause of action remains. An election petition can be summarily rejected at the threshold of the proceeding and equally so at any subsequent stage if the basic defect persists even at that stage. The starting of the trial or settlement of issues is no bar to such an action. O. 7, R. 11 does not place any restriction in that respect (see AIR 1987 SC 1926). O. 7, R. 1 does not restrict the power of the Court or say that it could be only at any particular stage. Especially in an election petition this power has to be freely exercised. An election petition which does not disclose any cause of action and which is likely to prove abortive should not be allowed to engage the time of the Court or act as the Sword of Democles hanging over the head of the returned candidate deterring him from discharging his duties to the nation. I, therefore, reject the contention of the petitioner's counsel in this respect outright.

    6. The grounds alleged in the petition broadly fall under three categories under Ss. 123(1)(a), 123(2) and 123(7). True that there are some allegations coming under S. 100(1)(d)(iv) also. The allegations coming under S. 123(1) are that the first respondent persuaded respondents 2 and 3 to stand and continue as candidates with the object of dividing the votes likely to go in favour of Mr. Cyriac John and he also succeeded in that attempt. Apart from the absence of material facts and full particulars in support of that charge, the basic ingredients of the charge are not there in the petition. The only averment is a bald and general allegation of ‘persuasion’ without any further details. Details of the persuasion are not there. Even taking for granted that it is sufficient to establish persuasion, that is absolutely insufficient to bring home the charge under S. 123(1). What is involved in the charge is bribery in one form. Any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his election agent or by another person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing a person to stand or not to stand as, or to withdraw or not to withdraw from being a candidate at an election is necessary to constitute such a charge. As held in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1191 bribery under S. 123(1) and undue influence under S. 123(2) require consensus of mind. A promise of a gift or an offer is equally a corrupt practice, but the gift, offer or promise must be made in the case of S. 123(1)(a) to the candidate or an elector and in the case of S. 123(2) to an elector with the requisite intention. Undue influence and obtaining or procuring services of a Government servant coming under S. 123(7) also must be with that intention. Offer, acceptance, influencing and submitting are the essential factors. These corrupt practices cannot be unilateral or onesided. In the absence of any such allegations there is absolutely no cause of action for a charge under S. 123(1)(a).

    7. One of the corrupt practices coming under S. 123(7) is that for the purpose of winning over the electors first respondent influenced the concerned officers and the Government itself to provide funds against the financial rules for getting electric connection for a lift irrigation scheme. What was the influence exerted, how the assistance was obtained or procured, who are the officers or persons, from where assistance was obtained or procured and what was the nature-of the assistance are facts not alleged (see 1986 Supp SCC 315 : (AIR 1986 SC 1253)). These are material particulars without which the cause of action is not complete. There must also be nexus between the assistance and procurement by or with the consent of the candidate. Material facts and necessary particulars as to the time and place where the assistance was sought from each of the persons will have to be alleged with exactitude and how it was in furtherance of the election prospects is also an essential ingredient. Mere expressions like “approached the minor irrigation officer”, “influence and repeated pressure”, “solicited assistance”, “securing help” etc. without specific particulars will not constitute cause of action (see AIR 1972 SC 515).

    8. What could be gathered from the petition is a general allegations without any details that the petitioner, using his influence with the Government and its officers, some hire or other managed to make available the requisite funds for being deposited to secure power connection for the project. The main prohibited or offensive portion of S. 123(7) is the obtaining or procuring of the prohibited assistance of Government officers for the furtherance of the prospects of the candidate's election. This charge is not all established by the allegations.

    9. It is true that election is something which must be conducted fairly. Arranging to spend money on the eve of the election in difficult circumstances, although for the general good, is when all is said and done, an evil practice which the Election Commission has prohibited in its instructions in the Handbook. But it is not a corrupt practice as defined under the Act though the dividing line between them is very thin. Whatever is said by the Election Commission, its violation will not be a ground for interference with the election unless that violation comes within the ambit of S. 100(1). Even if the allegation is construed as one coming within the mischief of S. 123(1)(a) or S. 123(2) the ingredients are not attracted. If a Minister or an influential politician redresses the grievances of a class of the public or people of a locality or renders them any help or does some developmental activity in the constituency on the eve of the election, it is not a corrupt practice unless there is an element of bargaining by which in turn for the services he obtains some promises for his help. If it is under S. 123(2) the allegations must show that what was done amounts to undue influence which is a tyranny over the mind leaving the elector no choice in the matter of franchise. None of these requirements are satisfied and necessary material facts or particulars constituting the corrupt charges are not there. The over emphasis given in the petition to the instructions given by the Election Commission in the Handbook indicates that the petitioner has gone under the wrong impression that independent of the Representation of the People Act and Rules, violation of those instructions are grounds for setting aside an election. Such instructions cannot override the provisions of the Act and Rules and they cannot enlarge the scope of the provisions for setting aside an election.

    10. Any corrupt practice or malpractice done by anybody other than the candidate or his election agent will operate against the candidate only if himself or his election agent consents to it. Election agent is the alter ego of the candidate in the scheme of the Act and his acts are acts of the candidate, consent or no consent on the part of the candidate. He alone can act on behalf of the candidate without his consent to bind him. He is the same as the candidate himself having been appointed under S. 40 (see AIR 1969 SC 1201). If somebody else, whether it be a Government servant coming within the prohibited class in S. 123(7) or not, does something for the candidate illegally in the election, without the consent of the candidate, that cannot affect his election even if the wrong doer may be otherwise liable. Canvassing for a candidate is the right of anybody and it is as important as the right to vote.

    11. Two other allegations are that first respondent secured electric connection to one K.J Devassia who is not even alleged to be a voter and that he gave instructions for digging tube-well in the constituency. Without any other allegation I fail to understand how these allegations, even if taken as true, could constitute corrupt practices. The same is the case of the allegation that “at the instance of the first respondent” drinking water was supplied in lorries with his symbols displayed. Then there is the allegation that some Government officers' organisations rendered or offered assistance. Yet another set of allegations is that some officers of the revenue, excise, agricultural income-tax or sales tax department either threatened or influenced electors to vote for the first respondent. Apart from the absence of any material fact or particulars, the only allegation indicating consent of first respondent is the expression “at the instance of the first respondent”. It is really unfortunate that the petitioner, himself an Advocate, approached the Court with vague allegations, many of which are irrelevant and some of which are insufficient, and all of which are without the requisite material facts of full particulars. The petition seems to have been filed in the most irresponsible way without looking into the requirements of the provisions of the Act and the Rules as interpreted by the Supreme Court and various High Courts in ever so many decisions.

    12. The irresponsible way in which the petition was filed is further clear from the other allegations. One ground alleged for declaring the election void is that Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and Central Minister Mr. M.M Jacob canvassed for the first respondent by their speech in election meetings. Petitioner ought to have realised that in a democratic set up where Governments are headed by political parties, even Ministers who are representing political parties are entitled to canvass for their candidates and it will not amount to corrupt practice unless the requirements for that purpose in the Act are satisfied. Probably it was to overcome this situation that the petition made a vain attempt to make an empty allegation, “the Prime Minister apparently used his official position to compel the voters to vote for his party”. The only allegation of use of official position is “the Prime Minister exorted the voters present to raise their palm if they are inclined to vote for the first respondent and actively instigated many voters present in the meeting to raise their hands so as to resemble the election symbol of the first respondent”. I do not think that any misuse of official position is disclosed.

    13. The other allegations are “the petitioner understands that on the closing date for the preparation of electoral rolls, at the instance of the first respondent and his active supporters caused the inclusion of many names in the electoral roll which could not have been legally included since the concerned persons were not qualified to be included in the electoral rolls.” It is said that names of dead persons and minors were included. Apart from the question of omission of material facts in the forms of instances and their details, the petitioner ought to have realised that the electoral rolls and the eligibility of person included in the rolls to vote are not matters that could be challenged in a Court. The allegation regarding counting is “several malpractices were detected”. It is sufficient to say that the petition is lacking immaterial facts and particulars and as such incapable of bringing about any cause of action and the allegations are mere irresponsible and careless statements.

    14. Under S. 83(1)(c) the petition shall be signed and verified in the manner laid down in the C.P.C for verification of pleadings. Proviso to that sub-section says that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice it shall be accompanied by an affidavit in Form No. 25 in support of the allegation of corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. The only verification in the petition is “on information which I believe to be true”. This is no verification at all when the object and purpose of verification is considered. The affidavit do not support any material facts or particulars and it is not in Form 25 as required by R. 94A. The verification is only “on information which I believe to be true”. The affidavit and the verification in the petition, therefore, cannot be accepted at all.

    Grounds A to K in the petition are therefore struck out under 6, 6, R. 16, C.P.C The other allegations do not disclose any cause of action and hence the petition itself is rejected under O. 7, R. 11(a), C.P.C Petitioner will pay the costs of the first respondent which is quantified at Rs. 1,500/-.

    Petition dismissed.

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    Comments

    K.K Somanathan v. K.K Ramachandran Master And Others
    (Oct 24, 1987)