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citation codes
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  • Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act
  • Kerala Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1960.
  • Sections 409 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code.
  • SECTION 43 EVIDENCE ACT
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • SEA CUSTOMS ACT
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act
  • Kerala Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1960.
  • Sections 409 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code.
  • SECTION 43 EVIDENCE ACT
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • SEA CUSTOMS ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by K.K. Mathew, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was a lower-division clerk in the Land Revenue Department and worked as head clerk in the Wynad Land Colonization Scheme office between 1946 and 1953. In 1955 the police prosecuted him for alleged irregularities in his official duties under Sections 409 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code. He was convicted by the Magistrate, Kalpetta, but acquitted on appeal. Because of the criminal prosecution he had been suspended by the Collector of Malabar by Ex. P.I order; although acquitted in appeal, no reinstatement order was initially passed.

Subsequently, multiple criminal cases were instituted against him in respect of alleged irregularities in maintaining office accounts (periods and specific years given in the opinion). He was acquitted in those criminal cases (acquittals in and around 1960–1962). On October 5, 1963 disciplinary proceedings were initiated and conducted under the Kerala Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1960. The Tribunal found him guilty; Government agreed and issued a show-cause notice followed by Ex. P. 7 (order dated June 23, 1967) dismissing the petitioner from service with effect from February 8, 1966 (the date of suspension).

The petitioner challenged Ex. P. 7 (the dismissal order) on three primary grounds and sought relief by way of petition in the court whose opinion is summarized here. The court addressed the contentions and dismissed the petition. The court also expressly ordered that there be no costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Government of Kerala had jurisdiction to take disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner on the ground that he was not finally allotted to the State under the States Reorganisation Act (i.e., whether he was a servant of the Kerala State at the material time).
  2. Whether the disciplinary authority failed to consider the supplementary representation (Ex. P.6) filed by the petitioner on April 15, 1967, before passing Ex. P.7 (the dismissal order).
  3. Whether the acquittal(s) of the petitioner by criminal Courts on substantially the same charges operated as a bar to disciplinary proceedings — in particular, whether the doctrine of issue estoppel or res judicata (or similar principles) prevented the departmental inquiry or the acceptance of evidence in the disciplinary proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • The petitioner was not a servant of the Kerala State because he was not finally allotted to Kerala in accordance with the States Reorganisation Act; therefore, Kerala had no jurisdiction to hold disciplinary proceedings against him.
  • The disciplinary authority did not consider the petitioner's supplementary representation filed on April 15, 1967 (Ex. P.6) before passing the dismissal order Ex. P.7.
  • Disciplinary proceedings were barred because the petitioner had been acquitted by criminal Courts on substantially the same charges; counsel advanced the doctrine of issue estoppel and argued that an acquittal in criminal proceedings should operate to preclude the later reception of evidence or the recording of a contrary finding in the disciplinary forum.

Government / Disciplinary Authority — Position as reflected in the opinion

  • A Tribunal was appointed under the Kerala Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1960; an enquiry was conducted which found the petitioner guilty of the charges.
  • Government accepted the Tribunal's findings, issued a show-cause notice, considered the petitioner's explanation, and passed Ex. P.7 dismissing the petitioner from service with effect from the date of suspension (February 8, 1966).
  • The opinion records actions and conclusions of the Tribunal and Government rather than an extended adversarial argument by the Government; the court examined the legal implications of those actions in light of authority and legal principles.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Manipur Administration v. Thokchom Bira Singh Explanation of the doctrine of issue estoppel in criminal trials (res judicata/estoppel as to facts found in prior criminal trial). The court quoted the decision to state the conventional scope of issue estoppel in criminal trials, then held that the doctrine did not apply to departmental disciplinary enquiries.
State of Kerala v. Varghese Observation on issue estoppel precluding evidence to prove an issue already tried and decided in favour of accused at an earlier criminal trial. The court relied on the passage to explain the doctrine, but rejected its application to disciplinary tribunals.
D'Silva v. Road Transport Authority Held that discharge or acquittal by Magistrate may be conclusive against a quasi-judicial body (e.g., Transport Authority) acting on identical facts and that criminal Courts primarily are entrusted with inquiry into offences. The court discussed and distinguished this decision, noting that proceedings like those of the Road Transport Authority were predominantly civil in character and that the decision supported waiting for criminal verdicts in some contexts, but it did not lead the court to hold that departmental enquiries are always barred by acquittals.
Shaik Kasim v. Superintendent of Post Offices, Chingleput Division Followed D'Silva: administrative authority not bound to await a criminal verdict but an acquittal on merits makes subsequent contradictory disciplinary action improper. Referenced to show that some authorities hold an acquittal on merits should preclude later contradictory disciplinary findings; court considered it but ultimately emphasized difference in standards and admissibility between criminal and disciplinary proceedings.
Bater v. Bater Denning L.J. on "degrees of proof" within criminal standard and relation between gravity and degree of probability in civil matters. Quoted to illustrate that standards of proof vary in practice and severity of allegation affects the degree of proof required in civil contexts; used to support distinction between criminal and disciplinary standards.
Hornal v. Neuberger Products Ltd. Observation that gravity of issues affects the degree of probability required in civil finding. Used to support the proposition that civil or disciplinary tribunals may require different degrees of probability depending on gravity, distinct from criminal beyond-reasonable-doubt standard.
Hoking v. Bell Dixon, J.: Against importing criminal standard of persuasion into civil causes. Cited to support the position that civil or quasi-civil proceedings use a different standard of proof than criminal proceedings.
Narayanan Chettiyar v. Official Assignee (Allahabad reference) Mentioned in context of Lord Atkin's unconsidered statement; referenced in the discussion of standards of proof. Mentioned as part of authorities discussing standards; court relied on broader authorities rather than adopting that particular statement.
Reifek v. McElroy Australian High Court: distinction between criminal and civil standards of proof is substantive. Quoted to emphasize the substantive difference between the standards of proof applicable in criminal and civil (or disciplinary) proceedings.
Helton v. Allen Authority cited on evidentiary consequences of acquittal in civil proceedings (Australian context). Used in discussing the limited evidentiary value (or inadmissibility) of a criminal acquittal in civil or quasi-civil proceedings.
Blyth v. Blyth Lord Denning on degree of probability in proof of grave civil allegations (e.g., adultery in divorce). Quoted to illustrate that the civil standard (preponderance) admits degrees according to gravity — supporting the court's analysis of differing standards in disciplinary enquiries.
Kesava Bhatta v. Venkitaramana Bhatta Mathew J.'s prior observations on inadmissibility of an acquittal as evidence in subsequent civil proceedings. Relied upon for the view that an acquittal is not admissible in evidence in a subsequent civil or quasi-civil proceeding to prove non-guilt, subject to limited statutory exceptions.
Packer v. Clayton Observations suggesting limited weight of criminal acquittal in subsequent civil contexts (affiliation proceedings). Discussed as part of a cluster of authorities addressing admissibility and weight of previous criminal conclusions in civil matters.
Hollington v. Hawthorn Company Ltd. Held that previous convictions are not admissible as evidence of facts in subsequent civil proceedings where those facts are directly in issue. Used to note the general rule about inadmissibility of criminal convictions in later civil proceedings and as part of contrast with how disciplinary tribunals operate.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sri Rama Rao (S.) Supreme Court: criminal standard (beyond reasonable doubt) has no application in disciplinary enquiries against public officers. Adopted as authoritative support for the proposition that disciplinary proceedings do not require criminal proof standards.
Regina v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner, Ex Parte Moore Diplock L.J.: technical rules of evidence are not part of natural justice; quasi-judicial tribunals may rely on material having logical probative value. Quoted to justify the admissibility of a broader range of materials in disciplinary tribunals and the tribunal's duty to base decisions on material with logical probative value rather than strict evidentiary forms.
Mahin v. Collector of Customs Mathew J.'s prior discussion on evidence admissible before a tribunal in disciplinary/administrative enquiries (Sea Customs Act context). Referred to as precedent for the proposition that disciplinary tribunals are not bound by strict rules of evidence and may admit logically probative material.
Motising Chhagasingh Vaghela v. S.D. Mehta Held departmental enquiry is not barred by acquittal in criminal court; departmental enquiry and criminal trial are different in nature and have different objectives. Relied upon to reinforce the view that departmental enquiries serve administrative ends and are not supplanted merely by criminal acquittal.
State of Orissa v. Sailabehari Where criminal Court acquits "honourably" further departmental enquiry may offend natural justice; but acquittal by benefit of doubt does not preclude further departmental enquiry. The court discussed this distinction and noted that benefit-of-doubt acquittals do not necessarily bar disciplinary enquiries; the opinion referred to it in examining the consequence of criminal acquittals.
J.L. Toppo v. Tata Locomotive and Engineering Company Ltd. Held that acquittal giving benefit of doubt is no ground for holding disciplinary proceedings barred. Used to support the proposition that acquittals based on benefit of doubt do not prevent disciplinary action on the same facts.
Proddman v. Davman Described statutes such as the Motor Vehicles Act as dealing with "social and industrial regulations" — helps distinguish civil/regulatory sanctions from criminal punishment. Referenced in the discussion distinguishing regulatory/civil sanctions from criminal punitive aims; used in the analysis of D'Silva and similar cases.
Brown v. Green Referred to statutes dealing with "economic and social regulations". Also cited in the court's discussion contrasting civil/regulatory proceedings and criminal punishment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a structured legal analysis focused primarily on the effect of prior criminal acquittals on subsequent disciplinary proceedings taken by the State. The reasoning can be summarized in the following steps, each reflecting propositions expressly stated in the opinion:

  1. Scope of Issue Estoppel: The court explained the doctrine of issue estoppel (as articulated in cited authorities) is principally concerned with the admissibility of evidence in a subsequent criminal trial where a previous competent criminal Court has recorded a finding in favour of the accused. It observed that the doctrine has been applied to preclude reception of evidence designed to upset a prior criminal finding in a later criminal prosecution, but it has not been applied to disciplinary enquiries conducted by tribunals under disciplinary rules.
  2. Distinction between criminal trials and disciplinary enquiries: The court emphasized important differences in purpose, standard of proof and admissibility of evidence:
    • Criminal law and criminal trials are directed primarily to punishment and require proof beyond reasonable doubt.
    • Disciplinary proceedings are intended to maintain efficiency and purity of public service and operate with different objectives.
    • Tribunals conducting disciplinary enquiries are not strictly bound by the Evidence Act and may admit any material having logical probative value; technical rules of evidence do not form part of natural justice in such enquiries.
    The court relied on multiple authorities, including domestic and foreign decisions, to support the view that the standard and rules applicable in disciplinary proceedings differ from those in criminal trials.
  3. Effect of criminal acquittal on disciplinary proceedings: The court held that an acquittal in a criminal Court on the merits does not as a rule operate as an absolute bar to disciplinary proceedings based on the same facts. The reasons given include:
    • An acquittal indicates the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt — it does not necessarily establish the absence of misconduct on the civil or disciplinary standard of proof (preponderance of probabilities).
    • The disciplinary standard is lower (preponderance of probability), and tribunals have the duty and power to examine facts independently and decide whether misconduct is proved to that civil standard.
    • Disciplinary tribunals may admit and rely upon materials which would be inadmissible in criminal trials but still have probative value for administrative fact-finding.
    The court considered authorities (e.g., D'Silva and Shaik Kasim) that suggested acquittals might in certain contexts be conclusive but distinguished them on the basis that those authorities related to predominantly civil/regulatory proceedings (such as suspension of vehicle permits) and emphasized that differing proceedings may call for different approaches.
  4. Limitations and caveats: The court acknowledged certain nuances in the authorities:
    • Some decisions suggest that where a criminal Court has "honourably" acquitted a public servant, a subsequent departmental enquiry might offend natural justice; conversely, an acquittal by way of benefit of doubt does not bar departmental enquiry.
    • The court did not definitively rule on whether a judgment of conviction should be treated differently in disciplinary proceedings in the light of constitutional or statutory provisions (it expressly declined to express an opinion on one theoretical point concerning Article 311(2) proviso (a)).
  5. Other contentions: On the two other principal contentions — (a) whether the petitioner was a servant of Kerala at the material time, and (b) whether the supplementary representation Ex. P.6 was not considered — the court found no substance in those contentions. The opinion notes that the Tribunal and disciplinary authority had found the petitioner was a Kerala servant and that the petitioner admitted being reinstated on September 2, 1985 (as recorded in the opinion), which the court treated as indicating service with the State on the relevant date. The court also rejected the complaint about non-consideration of the supplementary representation.
  6. Conclusion: On the combined appraisal of the law and facts, the court concluded that the petitioner's challenge to the disciplinary order could not be sustained on the grounds advanced, and it dismissed the petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court DISMISSED the petition challenging Ex. P.7 (the Government order dated June 23, 1967 dismissing the petitioner from service with effect from February 8, 1966). The court ordered that there be no costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the disciplinary order of dismissal (Ex. P.7) was upheld and the petition seeking to set it aside failed.
  • The court's reasoning affirms the proposition that prior criminal acquittal does not automatically bar or conclusively preclude a separate disciplinary enquiry or a contrary disciplinary finding, because disciplinary proceedings differ in purpose, standard of proof and admissibility of material from criminal trials. The opinion draws upon and synthesizes a number of authorities to explain those differences.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down an absolute rule that applies in every factual setting (for example, it acknowledges authorities that would require different treatment where a criminal acquittal is an "honourable" acquittal), and the court expressly refrained from deciding certain theoretical questions (for instance, in relation to Article 311(2) proviso (a)). Consequently, the decision should be read as applying the law to the facts before the court rather than as an attempt to pronounce an exhaustive rule on all possible permutations of criminal acquittal and disciplinary proceedings.
  • No separate costs were awarded; the immediate practical consequence for the parties is that the dismissal remains effective as upheld by the court.

Note: This summary is confined to and based exclusively upon the content of the provided opinion. No facts, authorities, or procedural details have been added beyond what appears in the opinion itself.

    Spadigam (J.) v. State Of Kerala

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    K.K Mathew, J.:— The petitioner was a lower division clerk in the Land Revenue Department. From 1946 to 1953 he was working as head clerk in the office of the Administrative Officer, Wynad Land Colonization Scheme, Ambalavayal. In 1955 the police took up a case against him for certain irregularities alleged to have been committed by him in the discharge of his official duties. He was charged with offences punishable under Sections 409 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code. He was convicted of the offences by the Magistrate, Kalpetta; but was acquitted in appeal. In view of the pendency of the criminal case, the petitioner was suspended by the Collector of Malabar by Ex. P.I order. Although the petitioner was acquitted in appeal, no order was passed reinstating him in service. Thereafter, for irregularities alleged to have been committed by him in keeping the accounts of the office from March 21, 1950 to March 21, 1951, four criminal cases were filed against him by the police before the Munsif-Magistrate, Kalpetta. On January 14, 1960 he was again acquitted of the charges. Yet again, on February 26, 1961 he was charged by the police before the Magistrate in three cases in connection with irregularities in maintaining the accounts but in these cases also he was acquitted in 1962. On October 5, 1963 disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him in respect of the subject-matter of the police charges and the charges were directed to be enquired into under Kerala Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1960. An enquiry was conducted by the tribunal and the report of the enquiry finding the petitioner guilty of the charges was sent to Government. The Government agreed with the findings of the tribunal in the report, and issued a show-cause notice why the punishment of dismissal should not be imposed on him. The petitioner submitted his explanation, and thereafter, Government passed Ex. P. 7 order on June 23, 1967 dismissing the petitioner from service with effect from February 8, 1966, the date on which he was suspended.

    2. Exhibit P. 7 order was impeached on three grounds: Counsel said that the petitioner was not a servant of the Kerala State as he was not finally allotted to the Kerala State in accordance with the provisions of the States Reorganization Act, and therefore, the Kerala State had no jurisdiction to take disciplinary proceedings against him, that the supplementary representation filed by the petitioner on Aprirl 15, 1967 (Ex. P. 6) before the disciplinary authority was not considered by the authority in Ex. P. 7 order, and the disciplinary proceedings were barred in view of the orders of acquittal passed by the criminal Court on substantially the same charges.

    3. It is the last contention which was pressed most strenuously by counsel and I would deal with it in the first instance. The argument of counsel was that the doctrine of issue estoppel was attracted to the case and that since the petitioner was acquitted by the criminal Court on identical charges, the findings in the criminal cases would operate as res judicata against Government and would preclude evidence being led to prove the facts in issue in the disciplinary proceedings as regards which evidence has already been led and findings entered by the criminal Court. Counsel said that there is no reason why the doctrine of issue estoppel should be confined to the trial of an issue in a subsequent criminal case. In Manipur Administration, Manipur v. . Thokchom Bira Singh (1), the Supreme Court explained the doctrine as follows:

    “The rule of issue estoppel in a criminal trial is that where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent Court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such a finding would constitute as estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for the different or distinct offence, but as precluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms of Section 403(2). The rule is not the same as the plea of double jeopardy or autrefois acquit…………”

    4. In State of Kerala v. Varghese (2), Sadasivan, J. observed:

    “The rule of issue estoppel precludes evidence being let to prove a fact in issue as regards which evidence has already been led and a specific finding recorded at an earlier criminal trial, where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent Court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence; but as precluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence. The rule relates only to the admissibility of evidence which is designed to upset a finding of fact recorded by a competent Court at a previous trial.

    5. I do not think that the doctrine of issue estoppel has any application here. The doctrine is only concerned with the admissibility of evidence designed to upset a finding recorded by a competent Court in a previous trial in a subsequent criminal trial. It has never been applied in the case of an enquiry before a tribunal conducting a disciplinary proceeding, although the proceeding might be quasi-criminal in character.

    6. It was then contended that because of the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal cases, the disciplinary proceedings were barred. Counsel referred me to the judgment of Rajamannar, C.J, and Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in D'Silva v. Road Transport Authority (3) to support the contention. In that case, the question was whether the discharge of the cleaner of the lorry in question there by the Magistrate of an offence under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act would preclude the Road Transport Authority from suspending the permit on the ground that the lorry was used to carry smuggled articles. The learned Judges held that the discharge order by the Magistrate was conclusive, and that no further enquiry can be had into the offence by the Road Transport Authority for suspending the permit of the vehicle. The Court said that primarily the crminal Courts of the land are entrusted with enquiry into offence, and it is desirable that the findings and orders of the criminal Courts should be treated as conclusive in proceedings before quasi-judicial tribunals like Transport Authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Court also said that if there is conviction by a competent criminal Court, that would furnrish conclusive ground for any penal action by the transport authorities and that equally, if the criminal prosecution ended in a discharge or acquittal of the accused, and that event happened before the order of any Road Transport Tribunal, then, the tribunal would not have the power to go behind the final order of a competent criminal Court. According to the learned Judges, if at the time the Road Transport Tribunal disposes of any application or before such tribunal passes an order no prosecution has been launched, then, of course, it is not incumbent on the tribunal to await the criminal prosecution. But if a prosecution has actually commenced and that prosecution is in respect of the same offence by reason of which the transport authority proposes to take dractic action against the accused in the criminal case, then, it is desirable that the transport authority should await the decision of the criminal Court. The Court considered that this procedure would avoid the spectacle of two departments of the Government proceeding on contradictory lines to the annoyance and hardship of the citizens. This decision was followed in Shaik Kasim v. Superintendent of Post Offices, Chingleput Division, (4). In that case Ananthanarayanan, officiating Chief Justice, said that an administrative authority in initiating disciplinary proceedings is not bound to wait for the verdict of a criminal Court. But where the criminal Court has tried a person and acquitted him, it would be improper, and that such a proceeding is liable to be quashed as not in consonance with the principles of natural justice, if the administrative authority later initiates disciplinary proceedings on the identical facts and identical charges and records a contrary conclusion. The learned Judge said that the acquittal should have been substantially on the merits; and that technical acquittals on grounds like want of sanction or jurisdiction may not inhibit departmental disciplinary proceedings. He further said that there is no inflexible rule that the finding of a criminal Court is conclusive, in every sense, upon administrative authority, and that if the finding is based purely on technical grounds; the administrative authority may conceivably punish, on the same facts. It could also punish, he said, on the same facts, for some lesser charges, which may not amount to a criminal offence, but may well amount to grave dereliction of duty, entitling disciplinary action. He was of opinion that where the acquittal is substantially on merits, it will not be proper for a disciplinary tribunal to record a finding of guilt on substantially same facts, and to punish thereon and that there is no difference whether the departmental authority acts before the criminal proceedings or after it.

    7. I do not think that judgment of a criminal Court acquitting an accused on the merits of a case would bar disciplinary proceeding against him on the basis of the same facts, or that the judgment would operate as conclusive evidence in the disciplinary proceedings. The reason for it is not far to seek. A criminal Court requires a high standard of proof for convicting an accused. The case must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The acquittal of an accused by a criminal Court only means that the case has not been proved against him beyond reasonable doubt. Such a standard of proof is not required for finding a person guilty in a disciplinary proceeding. It would be enough if there is a preponderance of probability of his guilt. Normally, in a civil case, account must be taken of a doubt only if it results in a rational opinion that a fact in issue is less likely than not, whereas in a criminal case account must be taken of a doubt if it results in rational opinion that the contradictory of the issue is more than a remote possibility. (See the observations of Professor Cootes quoted in Cross on Evidence, p. 117.) Denning, L.J (as he then was), said:

    “In criminal cases the charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but there may be degrees of proof within that standard”. See Bater v. Bater (5).

    8. From the theoretical point of view the standard is always the same proof beyond reasonable, doubt, but what is a reasonable doubt …….varies in practice according to the nature of the case and the punishment which may be awarded. The standard of proof on the normal issues in a civil suit is likewise always the same in theory proof of a preponderance of probability, but in practice,

    “there may be degrees of probability within that standard. The degree depends on the subject-matter. A civil Court, when considering a charge of fraud will naturally require for itself a higher degree or probability than that which it would require when asking if negligence is established (see Bater v. Bater (6)).”

    “Though no Court and no jury would give less careful attention to issues lacking gravity than to those marked by it, the very elements of gravity become a part of the whole range of circumstances which have to be weighed in the scale when deciding as to the balance of probabilities Hornal v. Neuberger Products Ltd. (7).”

    9. I do not think that even if the misconduct charged in a disciplinary proceeding has all the ingredients of a criminal offence, the standard of proof would vary.

    10. As regards the standard of proof required for criminal acts in civil proceedings, Dixon, J. (as he then was), said in Hoking v. Bell (8):

    “The solid body of authority against introducing the criminal standard of persuation into civil causes cannot be shaken by the unconsidered statement of Lord Atkin in the case from Allahabad —Narayanan Chettiyar v. Official Assignee of the High Court, Rangoon (9).”

    11. In Reifek v. McElory (10), the Australian High Court said:

    “The difference between the criminal standard of proof and the civil standard of proof is no more matter of words: it is a matter of critical substance. No matter how grave the fact which is to be found in a civil case, the mind has only to be reasonably satisfied and has not with respect to any matter in issue in such a proceeding to attain that degree of certainty which is indispensable to the support of a conviction upon a criminal charge—see Helton v. Allen (11), per Dixon, Evott and Mactiernan, JJ.”

    12. In Blyth v. Blyth (12), Lord Denning speaking about the standard of proof required for commission of adultery as a ground of divorce said:

    “So far as the standard of proof is concerned, I would follow the words of Dixon, J., which I have quoted and which I elaborated in Bater v. Bater (13) with the approval of the court of Appeal in Hornal v. Meuberger Products Ltd. (14). In short, it comes to this: so far as the grounds for divorce are concerned, the case, like any civil case may be proved by a preponderance of probability, but the degree or probability depends on the subject-matter. In proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear.”

    13. I had occasion to consider this aspect of the question in Kesava Bhatta v. Venkitaramana Bhatta (15) were I said:

    “Accordingly, in Helton v. Allen (16) where the claimant under a will had been tried and acquitted of the murder of the testatrix the High Court of Australia was inclined to the view that she could not rely on this as an evidentary fact in her favour when her rights under the will were contented by the next of kin. In Packer v. Clayton (17) there are some observations of Avory, J., in a Divisional Court to the effect that in affiliation proceedings, the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of sexual offence against the complainant was something that could have been taken into account by the justices as showing that the girl's evidence did not convince the jury, but it is doubtful whether this could be said to be so after Hollington v. Hawthorn Company Ltd. (18). That case lays down in the clearest possible terms that a previous convictions is not even admissible as evidence of the facts upon which it was founded, at any rate when these facts are directly in issue in subsequent civil proceedings. In that case, the conviction of one of the defendants for careless driving was held to be inadmissible as evidence of his negligence in proceedings for damages on that ground against him and his employer. The main reason for the decision was that the conviction merely proved that another Court, acting on evidence which was unknown to the tribunal trying the civil proceedings was of opinion that the defendant was guilty of careless driving. This case has been criticized by textbook writers. For instance, see Rupert Cross on Evidence, 1958 Edn., p. 344. Whatever might be the rule as regards an order of conviction, we do not think that an order of acquittal is admissible in evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding or in a proceeding having a predominantly civil character as here, to prove that the party is not guilty of the act charged in the previous criminal case.”

    14. A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sri Rama Rao (S.) (19), the Supreme Court observed that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him in disciplinary proceeding, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court has no application.

    15. The object of criminal law and its enforcement through criminal proceeding is different from that of disciplinary proceeding. A criminal proceeding is mainly intended to punish persons who have bro ken ‘the King's peace’, and thus to show the indignation of the community to criminals whereas disciplinary proceeding is intended to main tain the purity and efficiency of public service. Then again, in a criminal trial, the only evidence admissible is that which is made admissible under the provisions of the Evidence Act. A tribunal conducting an enquiry in a disciplinary proceeding is not bound by the strict rules of evidence. Any material which has a logically probative value to prove or disprove the facts in issue is relevant and admissible. I had occasion to consider the nature of the evidence admissible before a tribunal conducting an enquiry in respect of a charge under the Sea Customs Act in Mahin v. Collector of Customs (20). There, I quoted the following observations of Diplock, L.J (as he then was), in Regina v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner, Ex Parte: Moore (21):

    “These technical rules of evidence, however, form no part of the rules of natural justice. The requirement that a person exercising quasi-judicial functions must base his decision on evidence means no more than it must be based upon material which tends logically to show the existence or non-existence of facts relevant to the issue to be determined, or to show the likelihood or unlikelihood of the occurrence of some future event the occurrence of which would be relevant. It means that he must not spin a coin or consult an astrologer but he may take into account any material which as a matter of reason, has some probative value in the sense mentioned above.”

    16. and also I said:

    “A law suit in Court is not entirely an enquiry into truth. The rules of contest often make the result hinge not on the truth, but on the astuteness of counsel………. But in a non-adversary proceeding in which the tribunal is under an affirmative duty to find out the truth, and in cases in which parties are unrepresented by counsel and are unable to help themselves, the requirements must be different. Although evidence rules of some kind are needed for all fact-finding proceedings, those rules which rest heavily up on the adversary system of Courts are ill-adapted for some types of quasi-judicial proceedings. The rules of evidence in such proceedings must take into account the affirmative obligation resting upon the administrative agencies in some proceedings in aggressively finding out the truth………The rules of evidence to be applied in any proceeding before an administrative authority must be selected in part with regard to the degree of precision needed in the particular fact-finding. Some enquiries require maximum precision, others only a rough approximation. Where precision is needed rules of evidence must be more exacting. Where approximation suffices, less reliable information may be admitted.”

    17. Therefore, in a disciplinary proceeding, a person can be found guilty of a charge on materials which are inadmissible in evidence in a criminal trial. A judgment of acquittal by a criminal Court is inadmissible in a civil suit based on the same cause of action, except for the very limited purpose mentioned in Section 43 of the Evidence Act. Just as a civil Court must independently of the decision of the criminal Court investigate facts and come to its own finding, so also, I think, a tribunal conducting a disciplinary proceeding must investigate the facts and come to its own finding and that without being hampered by the strict rules of evidence. Whether or not it is theoretically right to accord a different treatment to a judgment of conviction in a disciplinary proceeding involving the same issue in the light the proviso (a) to Art. 311(2), is a matter of which I do not wish to express an opinion now. Even as regards a judgment of acquittal as the strict rules of Evidence Act are not applicable to a disciplinary proceeding, the judgment might be a relevant piece of evidence, not because the judgment has got any peculiary value but because a tribunal conducting a disciplinary proceeding can take into account any material provided it is logically of the facts in issue.

    18. The principles governing criminal justice that the State would allow a score of real offenders to escape rather than see a single innocent man convicted, can hardly find an echo in disciplinary proceeding.

    19. As regards the observations of the learned Judges in J. D'Silva v. Road Transport Authority (22) (vide supra) that when a criminal Court and a disciplinary authority come to different conclusions on identical charges, the spectacle is rather unedifying, I need only say that it is inherent in our system. We see much the same thing when a civil court arrives at a finding different from that of a criminal Court in respect of the same matter.

    20. In Motising Chhagasingh Vaghela v. S.D Mehta (23) the Court held that there is no basis for the view that a departmental enquiry is barred on the same facts on which an order of acquittal has been recorded by a criminal Court. The Court said that when an officer decided to hold a departmental enquiry all that he does is to start the proceedings for the purpose of satisfying himself as to whether, in fact, the delinquent is guilty of any misconduct or delinquency which requires to be dealt with in the interests of public administration and that when he is holding such an enquiry he is not at all concerned nor is it his object to undertake the decision of the question as to whether the findings recorded by the criminal Court were right or wrong. The Court added that the two proceedings, the departmental enquiry and the criminal trial, are entirely different in nature, that they operate in different fields, and that they have different objections. The Court said:

    “In a criminal trial, an incriminating statement made by an accused, in certain circumstances or before certain individuals, is totally inadmissible in evidenve in a departmental proceeding, the enquiry officer is not bound by any such technical rule. The degree of proof which is necessary to record an order of conviction is different from the degree of proof which is necessary to record the commission of a delinquency.”

    21. In State of Orissa v. Sailabehari (24), the Court held that where a criminal Court has acquitted a public servant honourably, a subsequent enquiry in respect of the same allegation may offend the rules of natural justice and may have to be quashed, but where a criminal Court did not acquit him honourably but gave him benefit of doubt stating that though there was strong suspicious evidence against him, the prosecution evidence did not completely exclude the other possibility, further department enquiry in respect of the same subject-matter is not excluded, especially as the standard of proof required in such an enquiry against a delinquent public servant is not the same as that required against an accused in a criminal case. I am not sure whether in principle any distinction can be made because the judgment of the criminal Court gives the benefit of doubt to the accused. That only means that the evidence in the case has not reached the standard required for the proof of the offence. In J.L Toppo v. Tata Locomotive and Engineering Company Ltd. (25) (vide supra), it was held that the acquittal of a person giving him the benefit of doubt is no ground for holding that a disciplinary proceeding in respect of the identical facts would be barred.

    22. The proceedings before the Road Transport Authority for suspending the permit was assumed to be of a penal nature in J. D'Silva v. Road Transport Authority (supra), I think, the proceedings there were predominantly civil in character. The offence was merely a ‘violation’ to use an American expression, and carried none of the incidents of criminal conviction except the civil penalty of suspension or cancellation of the permit of the vehicle. Some American writers would call an offence of this type as a ‘civil offence,’ and they have the support of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code. In Proddman v. Davman (26), Dixon, J., referred to statutes like the Motor Vehicles Act as statutes dealing with ‘social and industrial regulations.’ In Brown v. Green (27), the Court referred to such statutes as dealing with ‘economic and social regulations.’ The proceeding before the Road Transport Authority in question in J. D'Silva v. Road Transport Authority (supra) was a proceeding affecting only civil rights. The proceeding for suspension or cancellation of a permit is not intended to punish in the sense in which punishment is understood in criminal law:

    “What distinguishes a criminal from civil sanction…….….is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition. As Professor Gardner wrote not long ago, in a distinct but cognate connexion:

    ‘The essence of punishment for moral delinquency lies in the criminal conviction itself. One may lose more money on the stock market than in a court-room; a prisoner of war camp may well provide a harsher environment than a State prison: death on the field of battle has the same physical characteristics as death by sentence of law. It is the expression of the community's hatred, fear, contempt for the convict which alone characterizes physical hardship as punishment.’

    [See the Aims of the Criminal Law by Henry Hart—23 Law and Contemporary Problems, 1958, pp. 404-406.]”

    23. I do not think that there is any substance in the contention that the petitioner was not a servant of the Government of Kerala at the material time. The finding of the tribunal and the disciplinary authority is that he was. The petitioner admits that he was reinstated in service on September 2, 1985 after he was suspended. This would indicate that he was in the service of the Kerala State on the relavant date. There is also no substance in the contention of the petitioner that the supplementary representation filed by him was not considered before passing Ex. P. 7.

    24. I dismiss the petition. No costs.

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    Spadigam (J.) v. State Of Kerala
    (Aug 21, 1969)