Bhat, J.:— The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has refused to grant compensation to the claimant who had preferred a claim before it for compensation in respect of damage to his property. Relying on S. Iqbal Singh v. Jagan Nath reported in 1980 Acc CJ 220 (J&K) the Tribunal held that the relief claimed by the petitioner before him could not be granted under the provisions of Motor Vehicle Act. Therefore the petition was dismissed. On facts it was found that the petitioner was entitled to get an amount of Rs. 1,461/- as compensation for damages, but the relief was refused because there was an authority of this Court on which reliance was placed by the Tribunal.

2. In this Civil Misc. Appeal which came before a learned single Judge of this Court, a reference is made to the larger Bench to consider the scope and jurisdiction of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal regarding the maintainability of the petition filed with respect to the damage caused in an accident to the property only. The learned single Judge had doubted the correctness of the authority reported in 1980 Acc CJ 220 (J&K) (supra) and has opined that on going through some authorities of various High Courts of the country, he was prima facie of the opinion that such a petition was maintainable. This is how this Civil Misc. Appeal is placed before us.

3. The short point therefore for consideration in this appeal is as to whether claim petition is maintainable in respect of claim of compensation on account of damage caused in an accident to the property only. The learned single Judge in Iqbal Singh's case (supra) has observed:

“That an owner who has not sustained any bodily injury cannot take recourse to S. 110

110-A for recovering compensation in respect of his property damaged in the accident. The object of the Act as already observed, is to provide relief to only those who either die or receive bodily injuries due to the accident, and not to others. He cannot be considered injured within the meaning of S. 110(A)(1) with the aid of dictionary meaning of the word ‘injury’. The word ‘injury’ occurring in S. 110(1) distinctly refers to a bodily injury and has been used in sub-s. (1) in contradistinction to the word ‘damages’ occurring in it, which pointedly refers to property. Furthermore, the word ‘the’ preceding the word ‘injury’ occurring in Cl. (a) of sub-s. (1) of S. 110-A qualifies its meaning and clearly signifies that it refers to ‘bodily injury’ mentioned in sub-s. (1) of S. 110, and not to any other injury. To determine precisely its ambit and scope, S. 110-A(1) has to be read along with S. 110. Had the intention of the legislature been to enlarge the scope of Cl. (a) of sub-s. (1) immediately preceding the word ‘injury’ would not have been there.”

Learned single Judge has disagreed with the view expressed by Punjab and Haryana High Court. In the opinion of the learned single Judge damages can be claimed in respect of the property of a third party even only by a person who had sustained bodily injuries in a vehicular accident. So bodily injury is the sine quo non for claiming compensation and if a person has sustained damage to property whether owned by him or not, he can claim such damages only if he proves that bodily injury was suffered by him. Without there being bodily injury, compensation for damages in respect of property alone cannot be claimed.

4. This necessarily would take us to the provisions of law which have bearing on this matter.

5. Section 110(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act came to be amended vide Act No. 56 of 1969. It reads as under:

“110(1) A State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereinafter referred to as Claims Tribunals) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising or both:

Provided that where such claim includes a claim for compensation in respect of damage to property exceeding rupees two thousand, the claimant may, at his option, refer the claim to a Civil Court for adjudication, and where a reference is so made, the Claims Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to such claim.”

The following words occurring in the said section seem to have been added: “or damages to any property of a third party so arising or both”.

6. From the reading of this section it appears that the State Government is competent to constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals for such areas as may be specified in the notification for purposes of adjudicating upon claims of compensation in respect of accidents which involve:

(a) the death of or bodily injury to a person arising out of the use of motor vehicle;

(b) damage to any property of a third party arising out of the use of motor vehicle;

(c) death of or bodily injury and damage to any property of a third party.

7. Provided if the compensation in respect of damage to the property exceeds Rs. 2,000/- the claimant at his option may refer the claim to a Civil Court for adjudication or reference may be made by the Tribunal in such cases to Civil Court, then the Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to such claim. In any case claim for compensation for damage to property not exceeding Rs. 2,000/- is cognizable by the Claims Tribunal.

8. In the unamended S. 110(1), Claims Tribunal had no authority to entertain claims with respect to grant of compensation for damages to any property of a third party. The clause in this regard was added in 1969. So the law as it stood before 1969 would not confer jurisdiction on the Claims Tribunal to grant compensation on account of damages to property of a third party suffered in a Motor accident because power in this regard did not exist and therefore it could not be used by the Claims Tribunal. But the amending Act No. 56 of 1969 enlarged the scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the Tribunal could deal with claims for award of compensation for damage to the property.

9. In Haryana State v. Pusa Ram, reported in 1979 Acc CJ 12 : (AIR 1978 Punj and Har 171), the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was of the view that a claims tribunal has jurisdiction to award compensation for damages to the property because the person whose property has been damaged in an accident would be the person who has sustained the injury within the meaning of S. 110(A)(1) of the Act. It seems that Haryana State had claimed compensation of Rs. 3,000/- on the ground that five buffaloes of the progeny testing farm, Hissar, owned by the State, were killed by rash and negligent driving of truck involved in the said accident. A preliminary objection was raised before the Tribunal that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Relying on Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Ratti Ram reported in 1971 Acc CJ 31 (Punj and Har), the Tribunal upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the petition. On appeal the correctness of this judgment was also challenged along with the findings of the Tribunal. Relying on various authorities, it was held that wider meaning to the word ‘injury’ occurring in Cl. (1)(A) of S. 110 should be given so as to include injury to the property also. Reliance was placed on Ratan Singh Karsambhai Nakum v. Isadkhan reported in 1975 Acc CJ 455 and it was held that claim for compensation with respect to damage of property can be preferred before Claims Tribunal and such a claim would be covered by the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.

10. A similar question arose in the Motor Owner's Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hrishikesh Das, reported in 1975 Acc CJ 295 : (AIR 1975 Cal 218.) The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court was of the opinion that Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act has jurisdiction to pass an award in respect of damages to property of a third party. Such a power could not be denied to the Tribunal on the plain reading of the provisions of law and on the basis of the amendment which was effected in S. 110(1) by Act No. 56 of 1969.

11. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Banwari Lal v. Vishnunarayan, reported in 1975 Acc CJ 40 has also held that jurisdiction of Claims Tribunal would extend to the matters relating to the grant of compensation for damage of property also. It is not, in such claim necessary to claim compensation for bodily injury also. It was pointed out by the learned Judges in this authority that power of Tribunal constituted by a notification is not confined only to those matters which were specified in unamended sub-s. (1) of S. 110 which existed at the date of the notification.

12. In Ratan Singh's case 1975 Acc CJ 455 (Guj) (supra) it was held that the Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction to award compensation for loss of or damage to property even if no compensation is claimed for bodily injury.

13. A Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the Deputy General Manager and Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Jyoti Constructions, Mangalore reported in 1979 Acc CJ 426 : (AIR 1979 Kant 79) had the occasion to consider the ambit and scope of S. 110(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act and on consideration it found that Claims Tribunal can grant compensation in respect of damages of property alone and it also gave wide meaning to the word ‘injury’ which in its opinion would include wrong or damage to a man's person or goods. This definition of injury was borrowed by the learned Judges from Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edition, page 1372.

14. Section 110(A) of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that an application may be made for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-s. (1) of S. 110 of the Act. So S. 110 and S. 110(A) of the Motor Vehicles Act are to be read together in order to ascertain the ambit and scope of the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal with respect to the matters where compensation for property alone is claimed. It says that in the following cases application can be made for compensation:

(a) By the person who has sustained the injury;

(b) Where the death has resulted from the accident by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased;

(c) By an agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased as the case may be.

In the present case we are concerned only with the first category, i.e by the person who has sustained the injury. Whether the injury would be injury to person alone or it would include injury to property also. The learned single Judge of this Court has opined that injury occurring in this clause is injury to person only and not injury to property. Some High Courts of the country have held that it includes within its fold injury to property also and some of the authorities have been mentioned hereinabove. Now with reference to the two relevant provisions one has to determine the correctness or otherwise of the pronouncement made by Kotwal, J. in 1980 Acc CJ 220 (J&K) (supra).

15. Kotwal, J. seems to have been influenced by the word ‘the’ preceding the word ‘injury’ occurring in Cl. (a) of sub-s. (1) of S. 110-A, which according to him qualifies the meaning of injury and restricts the injury only to bodily injury and not to any other injury. With respects we are not inclined to subscribe to this view.

16. A plain reading of S. 110 would make it manifestly clear that bodily injury or damage to property arising out of a motor accident or both could be made subject-matter of claim before the Claims Tribunal. That would mean that in respect of both injuries whether it be to property or to person claim can be preferred under the provisions of S. 110, Motor Vehicles Act. The word ‘or both’ occurring in S. 110 is of a great significance. It would conversely mean that compensation can be claimed for one of the injuries in the section. The section takes care of injuries to person arising out of the use of motor vehicle or to any property of a third party or both. After the word Motor Vehicle, the amendment has used damage to any property of a third person, dis jointly and one can prefer claim in respect of injury to property notwithstanding the fact that bodily injury was not sustained by the said person. It is not necessary that one must sustain bodily injury, then alone he can apply to the Tribunal and in the said application he can then claim damages to any property of a third party. Such a meaning would make the intent and purpose of the section absurd.

17. Section 110(A) only says that claim can be made by the person who has sustained the injury. The injury would not mean that it would be the bodily injury alone and not injury to the property. The word ‘the’ preceding the injury has reference to the injury of a kind mentioned in S. 110, which has not reference to the bodily injury as observed by the learned single Judge. The word ‘the’ certainly qualifies injury but it does not qualify it in the manner in which the learned single Judge has construed the qualification. The qualification to the injury is that it must fall within the ambit and scope of the injury which is mentioned in S. 110 and no other injury. Section 110 therefore is to be read co-jointly with S. 110(A) for purposes of understanding the meaning and import of the word ‘injury’. Injury of the kind which is referable to S. 110 can be brought before the Tribunal for determination. The injury mentioned in S. 110 is in relation to bodily injury or injury to the property of a third party arising from use of motor vehicle. A composite application also can be made by a person who has suffered bodily injury as also injury to property. But it does not preclude a man from claiming compensation on account of damage to property without sustaining bodily injury. As has already been observed that ‘or both’ occurring at the close of the sub-s. (1) of S. 110 is to be given its meaning and its import cannot be restricted or confined to bodily injury only. It has relation with both the injuries.

18. Use of word ‘injury’ in sub-s. (1) of S. 110 is to be understood in the context in which it is used. If it is held to be used in a qualified manner as observed by a learned single Judge then the legislative intent seems to be defeated and the object underlying S. 110(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act as also S. 110(A) cannot be fully achieved. The Legislature in its wisdom seems to have been of the view that the Claims Tribunal be given power to entertain claims which cause damage to property also out of the use of motor vehicle. There is no ambiguity in the language in which S. 110(1) is couched. Learned single Judge has qualified the word injury and that qualification runs counter to the intention expressed by the Legislature and S. 110(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act and its plain meaning.

19. According to the Dictionary meaning of the word ‘injury’ it means damage or hurt done or suffered by a person or thing. The word injury is of large import. It cannot be restricted to mean bodily injury, but may include injury by which damage or loss has been caused to property. Webester's 3rd New International Dictionary has given a wide meaning to the word ‘injury’. It is defined as an actionable wrong distinguished from harm, an unjust or undeserved infliction of suffering. It is accompanied by loss, damage and hurt. Injury is said to be, according to Webester, an act or result involving an impairment or destruction of right, health, freedom, soundness or loss of something of value………. inflicting on a person a positive hurt either in the form of direct suffering or of the privation of some good which he had reasonable ground either of a physical or social kind for counting upon. It is also held to be violation of another right for which the law allows an action to recover the damages or specific property or both and in that sense it is said to be an actionable wrong.

20. Therefore it will be doing violence to the language of S. 110(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act if the injury which is an actionable wrong is related only to the bodily injury and any claim for damage to property is made unactionable, if the two claims do not co-exist. Claim for damage to property cannot be made dependent on the claim for bodily injury. The two claims are independent and the two can be independently claimed or jointly claimed, as the case may be. If in an accident damage is caused only to the property without causing bodily injury such claim will be injury to the property and the Tribunal will have the jurisdiction to determine the same. If bodily injury is also caused, Tribunal will have jurisdiction to entertain claim in respect of both and composite application can be made. This is the express intention of the provisions relating to the claim of compensation on account of bodily injury or damage to property caused by use of motor vehicle.

21. It is important to note that a notification was issued by the State Govt. on 28-8-1971 which is SRO 383 strictly in accordance with and in conformity with the provisions of S. 110(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The power of the tribunal therefore to determine the compensation on account of the bodily injury or injury to property is to be exercised by such tribunal if there is a notification in this behalf. The said notification was issued and the Tribunal was entitled to determine the claim of a person who had sought compensation for damage to property only without claiming any damage on account of bodily injury.

22. Section 110(F) of the Motor Vehicles Act places a total bar on the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts for claiming compensation or entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which is to be adjudicated upon by the Tribunal. So any damage caused by use of motor vehicle whether it will be bodily injury, death or damage to property, that is to be brought before the Tribunal unless it is covered by the proviso added to S. 110(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act.

23. Section 110(A) of the Motor Vehicles Act has categorised the person who can make an application for grant of compensation. Category (a) refers to persons who have sustained the injury. By correlating it to S. 110(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act it becomes manifestly clear that the persons mentioned in sub-s. (a) of S. 110(A) of the Motor Vehicles Act are those who have suffered either bodily injury or damage to property. It cannot be restricted only to those persons who have suffered bodily injury alone. Those who suffer damage to property have an independent right and it is not necessary that they must also have suffered bodily injury for enforcing their claim under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act.

24. Therefore we are of the opinion that the single Bench authority of this Court reported in 1980 Acc CJ 220 does not lay down the correct law in so far as it excludes from the purview of the Ss. 110(1) and 110(A) those persons who have suffered damage to property only and in so far as it lays down that any claim on account of damage to property can be enforced by such person who has suffered bodily injury also. This apparently is contrary to the provisions of Ss. 110(1) and 110(A) of the Motor Vehicles Act and is against the very purpose for which these two provisions have been framed. We accordingly overrule the said authority. We are guided by some authorities mention whereof has been made and we feel that the law laid down in those authorities is sound and reflects the legislative intention underlying the two provisions i.e S. 110(1) and S. 110(A) of the Motor Vehicles Act. As a result of our discussion we accordingly hold that claim for compensation on account of damage to property which is caused out of the use of a motor vehicle is entertainable by a Tribunal and the tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate and decide such a claim and it is not necessary that while preferring the claim as regards damage to property, the Claimant must have suffered bodily injury also. The claim petition for damage to property can be filed independently without there being any claim for bodily injury. The tribunal in the present case has decided all the issues, but it has refused the relief because of the authority reported in 1980 Acc CJ 220 (supra) and had taken a view against the grant of compensation. The amount of compensation was also determined by the tribunal. Now that the said authority is overruled by us, and we have taken a contrary view, therefore the finding of the tribunal dt. 15-4-1980 whereby petitioner's claim was refused is set aside and it is directed that the petitioner shall be entitled to the amount determined by the Tribunal in its order dt. 15-4-1980. In that view of the matter the appeal is accordingly allowed. But there will be no order as to costs.

Appeal allowed.