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  • Section 212(3) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, read with Section 179(a) of that Act,
  • provisions of Section 43 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947,
  • Section 212(3) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913).3.
  • Section 10 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947,
  • Section 212(3) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913,
  • Section 212(3) of the Companies Act, 1913,
  • O. 6, R. 17 and Section 151 of the CPC
  • Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947,
  • Indian Companies Act, 1956,
  • PUNJAB MUNICIPAL ACT
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • Section 212(3) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, read with Section 179(a) of that Act,
  • provisions of Section 43 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947,
  • Section 212(3) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913).3.
  • Section 10 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947,
  • Section 212(3) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913,
  • Section 212(3) of the Companies Act, 1913,
  • O. 6, R. 17 and Section 151 of the CPC
  • Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947,
  • Indian Companies Act, 1956,
  • PUNJAB MUNICIPAL ACT
Smart Summary

Analytical Summary of the Opinion — Plaintiffs' Appeal in Civil Suit No. 1 of 1952 (Mandi Transport Company Ltd.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs are Mandi Transport Company Limited, incorporated in the erstwhile Mandi State in 1939, which owned 27 motor vehicles and operated passenger and goods services on various routes in Mandi State. On 1-7-1949, after Mandi State's merger into Himachal Pradesh, the District Magistrate of Mandi issued an order requisitioning 20 of the vehicles under Section 10 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947 (as applied to Himachal Pradesh), placing them at the disposal of the General Manager, Himachal Government Transport, and fixing Rs. 10 per vehicle per day as hire charges.

From 2-7-1949 the Himachal Pradesh Government ran transport services on the plaintiffs' former routes using the requisitioned vehicles. The requisition was periodically extended; 16 vehicles were returned on 10-11-1949 and the remaining 4 on 10-12-1949.

The plaintiffs sued claiming (a) the requisition orders were illegal and ultra vires, (b) the hire rate of Rs. 10 per day was unduly low (they claimed at least Rs. 20 per day), (c) compensation for cancellation of route permits and resulting business stoppage, and (d) compensation for damage to vehicles while requisitioned. The total claimed amounted to Rs. 87,589/7/-.

The defendants pleaded, inter alia, that the suit was barred by Section 43 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947 (as applied to Himachal), that the suit was instituted by only one of several liquidators (hence incompetent), that it was time barred, and that the requisition orders were legal and intra vires; they denied liability for route permit cancellation and denied negligence causing damage to vehicles.

Eleven issues were framed at trial. The District Judge concluded, among other things, that (A) the suit was not barred by Section 43 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, (B) the suit was incompetent because it had been instituted by only one liquidator (Shri Mahendra Singh) though there were several liquidators, (C) the suit was within time, (D) the requisition orders were legal and intra vires but the District Magistrate had no power to fix the daily-hire rate, (E) plaintiffs were entitled to Rs. 29,400 as compensation for cancellation of route permits, and (F) plaintiffs failed to prove vehicle damage due to defendants' negligence.

The District Judge non-suited the plaintiffs because the suit was incompetent for being instituted by only one of several liquidators. The plaintiffs appealed but confined their claim in the appeal to Rs. 20,000. Arguments in the appeal were heard (noted as heard on the 23rd and 24th instant). The appellate court ultimately dismissed the appeal except to reduce the cost liability of the plaintiffs (directing plaintiffs to pay only one half of the defendants' costs in the trial Court and one half of the respondents' costs in the appeal).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Shri Mahendra Singh, a single liquidator, was properly authorized and competent to institute this suit on behalf of the plaintiff company (Issue No. 3).
  2. Whether the requisition orders issued under Section 10 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947 (as applied to Himachal Pradesh) were legal and intra vires.
  3. Whether the District Magistrate had power to fix the daily hire rate for requisitioned vehicles and whether the fixed rate of Rs. 10/- per vehicle per day was adequate.
  4. Whether plaintiffs were entitled to compensation for cancellation of route permits and for loss of business.
  5. Whether plaintiffs proved that vehicles were damaged due to negligence of the defendants and their servants.
  6. Whether the suit was barred by Section 43 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947 (as applied), or was otherwise time-barred.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • Contended that the District Judge's finding on Issue No. 3 (competency of Shri Mahendra Singh to file the suit) was erroneous.
  • Argued Shri Mahendra Singh was authorized by the remaining liquidators: relied on Ext. P‑C, a copy of a resolution of the Board of Liquidators (dated 13-1-1952) authorizing Shri Mahendra Singh to file suit.
  • Pointed to the plaint having been signed by Shri Besar Ram (a pleader and another liquidator) and requested the court to treat the suit as filed by two liquidators.
  • Submitted that the act of filing the suit had been ratified by other liquidators and any defect thereby cured; cited authorities supporting amendment/ratification in analogous contexts.
  • Filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 and Section 151 CPC seeking permission to permit another liquidator to sign the plaint (i.e., to amend the plaint to cure the defect).
  • Argued the requisition orders were illegal and inoperative on the ground that the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947 had expired in Punjab on 20-3-1949 (implying it could not support requisition thereafter).
  • Relied on Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah (Supreme Court) to urge that procedural rules should be interpreted flexibly to facilitate justice and not to penalize parties on technical grounds.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • Asserted that the suit was barred by Section 43 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947 (as applied to Himachal Pradesh).
  • Maintained the suit was incompetent because it had been instituted by only one liquidator; a suit of this kind must be instituted by at least two liquidators under Section 212(3) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (read with Section 179(a)), and the later statutory scheme (Indian Companies Act, 1956) preserves this requirement.
  • Contended that Ext. P‑C (Board of Liquidators' resolution) could not authorize an act that the statute forbids; thus the resolution could not validate a suit instituted by only one liquidator.
  • Argued that the mere fact that Shri Besar Ram (a pleader) signed the plaint did not convert the suit into one instituted by two liquidators; paragraph 1 of the plaint and paragraph 1 of the written statement show Mahendra Singh was the liquidator authorized to file, and the defendants disputed his sole authority.
  • Opposed the amendment application under O.6 R.17 and Section 151 CPC, arguing the defect was not merely procedural but statutory and mandatory, and could not be cured by amendment; emphasized delay and potential prejudice.
  • Contended that the expiration of the Act in the Punjab did not necessarily abate its application in Himachal Pradesh; therefore the appellants' contention on that point need not be adjudicated because the appeal failed on competency grounds.
  • Denied liability for cancellation of route permits and for vehicle damage; maintained the District Magistrate's fixation of Rs. 10 per day was reasonable (the District Judge had found the orders intra vires but without power to fix hire).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dahyabhai Girdhardas v. Bobaji Dahyaji, AIR 1953 Bom 28 (A) Held that a plaint signed by an unauthorized person (e.g., a son described as kulmukhtyar) can be amended later; defect regarded as merely formal and amendable even beyond limitation in appropriate circumstances. The court held this authority inapplicable: here the suit was ab initio bad (filed by a single liquidator where statute required at least two), not a mere formal omission amendable thereafter.
Kirpal Chand v. Traders Bank Ltd., AIR 1954 J. & K. 45 (B) Where a manager was authorized under Articles (subject to prior sanction) to institute suits and subsequently the Bank ratified the manager's act, the subsequent ratification cured the original defect. Held inapplicable: factual and statutory context different; in that case there was no statutory bar like Section 212(3) of the Companies Act; here Section 212(3) imposes a mandatory requirement preventing such cure by ratification.
Fuli Bibi Mt v. Khokai Mondal, AIR 1928 Cal 537 (C) Proceedings instituted by a minor without a next friend are not void; Order 32 intends protection of defendants but normally allows an opportunity to regularize; defendants who knew and took the trial may be estopped from raising the defect later. Court found no analogy: the policy and protection under Order 32 for minors do not apply to the statutory rule requiring two liquidators; thus the case does not assist the plaintiffs.
Wali Mahomed Khan v. Ishak Ali Khan, AIR 1931 All 507 (D) Defect in form due to bona fide mistake (plaintiff wrongly described as minor) should be cured rather than have the suit thrown out on a technical ground. Deemed inapplicable: the facts here differ and the defect arises from a mandatory statutory requirement, not a bona fide mistake in description.
Notified Area Committee, Okara v. Kidar Nath, AIR 1935 Lah 345 (E) Where a statutory body cannot by general resolution delegate to its Secretary the power to institute suits, such delegation is ultra vires and cannot be validated by ratification; an illegal act cannot be legalized. The court treated this decision as analogous: filing a suit by one liquidator where Section 212(3) mandates at least two is similarly ultra vires and cannot be validated by subsequent ratification.
Sangram Singh v. 1. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 (F) Procedural provisions should be interpreted to facilitate justice and not to operate as traps; courts should avoid overly technical constructions and allow reasonable elasticity, provided justice is done to both sides. Appellants relied on it to seek an amendment under procedural provisions; the court held it inapplicable because the issue here was statutory and mandatory (Section 212(3)) rather than merely procedural.
Vedakannu Nadar v. Nanguneri Taluk Singikulam Annadana Chatram, AIR 1938 Mad 982 (G) Refused prayer to implead absent necessary parties and remand for fresh trial where impleading would prejudice the other side, raise limitation issues, and where plaintiffs had been negligent in delay. The court cited this authority to support refusal of the amendment application: delay, potential prejudice, and negligence weighed against permitting cure of the statutory defect.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The following summarizes the court's step-by-step legal analysis strictly as stated in the opinion.

  1. Statutory Requirement Governing Who May Institute the Suit:

    The court identified Section 212(3) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (read with Section 179(a) of that Act) as mandating that a suit of this kind must be instituted by at least two liquidators. The court also noted the corresponding provisions in the later Companies Act, 1956 (S. 512(4) read with S. 457(a)), confirming the statutory requirement.

  2. Effect of Board Resolution (Ext. P‑C):

    The Board of Liquidators' resolution (Ext. P‑C) authorizing Shri Mahendra Singh to file suit was examined. The court reasoned that a resolution of the Board of Liquidators is not equivalent to a shareholders' resolution, and importantly, the Board cannot, by resolution, do what the law forbids. Because the statute requires at least two liquidators, the Board's resolution could not legalize a suit filed by only one liquidator.

  3. Signature by a Pleader (Shri Besar Ram) on the Plaint:

    The court analyzed the effect of the plaint being signed by Besar Ram (a pleader who was also a liquidator). It concluded that the plaint's signature, and the plaint's own averments (para 1 stating Shri Mahendra Singh was authorized), together with the defendants' written statement disputing Mahendra Singh's sole authority, meant that mere signing by a pleader did not convert the filing into one by two liquidators.

  4. Authorities on Amendment and Ratification Considered:

    The court reviewed several precedents relied on by the appellants that permitted amendment or ratification in different factual contexts. In each instance the court distinguished those authorities on the basis that where a statutory mandatory bar exists (Section 212(3)), the defect is not a mere procedural omission capable of being cured by later ratification or amendment.

  5. Application to the Present Case — Incompetency:

    Given the statutory bar and the fact that the suit was instituted by only one liquidator, the court concurred with the trial judge that the suit was incompetent ab initio. Consequently, the suit could be dismissed notwithstanding that the plaintiffs had succeeded on several substantive issues at trial.

  6. Application to the Amendment Application (O.6 R.17 & Section 151 CPC):

    The court rejected the plaintiffs' application to permit another liquidator to sign the plaint. It reasoned that (a) the defect was statutory and mandatory, not merely procedural; (b) there had been long delay (suit instituted 18-1-1952, written-statement 16-1-1953, issues framed 25-2-1953, amendment sought in 1957 during appeal proceedings), and (c) allowing the amendment would cause prejudice and potentially raise limitation issues. The court therefore refused to exercise discretion to permit amendment.

  7. Other Issues Not Determined:

    The court expressly declined to decide whether the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947 had abated in Himachal because that question was unnecessary to decide once the suit was held incompetent.

  8. Costs Consideration:

    Although the trial judge had dismissed the suit with full costs (directing plaintiffs to pay Rs. 1,035 to defendants), the appellate court found it equitable to reduce the plaintiffs' cost liability to one half because the plaintiffs had prevailed on several issues at trial. Accordingly, the court ordered the plaintiffs to pay only one half of the defendants' costs at trial and one half of the respondents' costs in the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is dismissed except insofar as it reduces the plaintiffs' cost liability; the trial Court's dismissal of the suit for incompetency is upheld.

Direct consequences and implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • The appellate court concurred with the trial court that the suit was incompetent because it had been instituted by only one liquidator contrary to the mandatory requirement of Section 212(3) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913; therefore the trial court's dismissal of the suit stands.
  • The appeal was allowed only to the limited extent of reducing the plaintiffs' liability for the defendants' costs: the plaintiffs are to pay one half of the defendants' costs in the trial Court (where the District Judge had originally ordered plaintiffs to pay Rs. 1,035) and the plaintiffs must also pay one half of the respondents' costs of the appeal.
  • The court did not set any broader precedent beyond application of the existing statutory rule; no new legal principle was laid down beyond the application of Section 212(3) and existing authorities distinguishing when defects are merely formal and when statutory requirements are mandatory.

Order: The appeal is dismissed except insofar as it directs that the plaintiffs pay only one half of the respondents' costs in the trial Court and one half of the respondents' costs in this appeal. The trial Court's order dismissing the suit remains in force.

M.K.S

    Mandi Transport Co. Ltd. v. Himachal Pradesh Administration

    1. This is a plaintiffs' appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge of Mandi in Civil Suit No. 1 of 1952. It arises under the following circumstances: The plaintiffs, the Mandi Transport Company Limited, were incorporated in the erstwhile Mandi State, in 1939. It possessed 27 motor vehicles and it was running passenger and goods services on different routes in Mandi State. On 1-7-1949, i.e subsequent to the merger of Mandi State in Himachal Pradesh, the District Magistrate of Mandi, by means of an order under Section 10 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947, as applied to Himachal Pradesh, requisitioned 20 of the above vehicles for a period of six weeks and placed them at the disposal of the General Manager, Himachal Government Transport. By means of the same order, the District Magistrate fixed a sum of Rs. 10/- as daily hire charges for each vehicle.

    2. From 2-7-1949, the Himachal Pradesh Government started running its own transport services on the routes formerly used by the plaintiff-Company, and for that purpose, made use of the requisitioned vehicles. The period of requisition was extended by the District Magistrate, from time to time. Eventually, on 10-11-1949, sixteen, out of the twenty vehicles, were returned to the plaintiffs and the remaining four on 10-12-1949.

    3. The plaintiffs' case was that the requisition orders were illegal and ultra vires and the daily hire of Rs. 10/- per vehicle was unduly low. According to them, the daily hire should have been, at least, Rs. 20/- per vehicle. The plaintiffs also claimed compensation, because, as a result of the requisitioning order, their route permits were cancelled and their business came to a standstill.

    4. Another claim, put forward by the plaintiffs, was that their vehicles were seriously damaged during the time they remained under requisition. Consequently, they claimed compensation on that score also.

    5. In all, the plaintiffs claimed a total sum of Rs. 87,589/7/- from the defendants.

    6. The suit was resisted by the defendants, inter alia, on the following grounds: (a) The suit was barred by the provisions of Section 43 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947, as applied to Himachal Pradesh. (b) The suit was bad because it had been instituted by only one out of several liquidators of the plaintiffs. (c) The suit was time barred. (d) The requisition orders were perfectly legal and intra vires and were binding on the plaintiffs. The daily hire of Rs. 10/- per vehicle fixed by the District Magistrate was quite reasonable. (e) The plaintiffs were not entitled to any compensation on account of the cancellation of route permits. (f) No damage was caused to the plaintiffs' vehicles, as a result of negligence on the part of the defendants and their servants.

    7. Out of these pleadings, as many as 11 issues were framed by the learned trial Judge. After going into the evidence of the parties and hearing the arguments of their counsel, the learned District Judge has come to the following conclusions: (A) The suit was not barred under the provisions of Section 43 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947, as applied to Himachal Pradesh. (B) The suit was incompetent, because it had been instituted by only one liquidator, Shri Mahendra Singh, although there were several liquidators. (C) The suit was within time. (D) The orders of requisition were legal and intra vires, but the District Magistrate had no power to fix the rate of daily hire. (E) The plaintiffs were entitled to a sum of Rs. 29,400/- as compensation for the cancellation of the route permits. (F) the plaintiffs failed to prove that the vehicles were damaged on account of negligence of the defendants and their servants.

    8. The learned District Judge non-suited the plaintiffs in view of his finding that the suit was incompetent, because it had been instituted by only one, out of several liquidators.

    9. Hence, this appeal by the plaintiffs. I may point out that in the appeal, the plaintiffs have confined their claim to a sum of Rs. 20,000/- and abandoned the rest of their claim.

    10. Arguments of the learned counsel for the parties were heard on 23rd and 24th instant. For reasons to be stated shortly, the appeal fails, except in the matter of a part of the costs of the suit.

    11. Learned counsel for the appellants, argued, vehemently, that the finding of the learned District Judge on issue No. 3 is erroneous and cannot be maintained. This issue runs as follows:

    “Whether Shri Mahendra Singh has been properly authorized and is competent to file this suit on behalf of the plaintiffs? O.P plaintiff”.

    12. Shri D.R Chaudhary, Advocate, for the appellants, urged that although the suit was instituted by Shri Mahendra Singh, liquidator, nevertheless, he was authorized to do so by the remaining liquidators and, consequently, the Court should hold that the suit had been filed by more than one liquidator. My attention was also invited to the fact that the plaint had been signed by Shri Besar Ram, Pleader another liquidator. I was, therefore, requested to hold that the suit had been filed by two liquidators.

    13. Neither of these pleas can, however, be accepted. As the learned counsel for the respondents rightly pointed out, Ext. P-C, which is a copy of the resolution, passed by the Board of Liquidators of the plaintiff-Company on 13-1-1952, merely shows that Shri Mahendra Singh, liquidator, was authorized to file a suit on behalf of the Company. It goes without saying that a resolution passed by the Board of Liquidators, is not the same thing as a resolution passed at a meeting of the shareholders.

    14. Moreover, under Section 212(3) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, read with Section 179(a) of that Act, a suit of the present kind must be I instituted by, at least, two liquidators. That is the position under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, also, vide S. 512(4), read with S. 457(a) thereof. The learned District Judge has rightly pointed out that the Board of Liquidators could not authorize Shri Mahendra Singh to do a thing which the law forbids, i.e they could not legalise the filing of a suit by a single liquidator, where the law requires that the suit should be filed, at least, by two liquidators. Consequently, the resolution, Ext. P-C, will not help the appellants.

    15. We now come to the other argument, namely, that since Shri Besar Ram had signed the plaint, as a pleader, the suit should be deemed to have been filed by two liquidators. Learned counsel for the respondents invited my attention to the contents of para 1 of the plaint as well as to paragraph 1 of the written-statement. Paragraph 1 of the plaint is to the effect that the plaintiff-Company had gone into voluntary liquidation and Shri Mahendra Singh, one of the liquidators, being conversant with the facts of the case, had been authorized to file the suit.

    16. Paragraph 1 of the written-statement is to the effect that Shri Mahendra Singh was not the sole liquidator and the defendants did not know whether he was duly authorized to file the suit. Under these circumstances, the mere fact that Shri Besar Ram had signed the plaint, as a pleader, along with Sarvashri Kedar Ishwar and T.P Vaidya, Advocates, would not change the situation.

    17. Shri Chaudhary, for the appellants, then submitted that the act of Shri Mahendra Singh in filing the suit had been ratified by the other liquidators and, therefore, the defect, if any, has been cured. He cited the following authorities: 1. Dahyabhai Girdhardas v. Bobaji Dahyaji, AIR 1953 Bom 28 (A). There, the facts were that the plaint was signed by the plaintiffs son, who was described therein as kulmukhtyar. Later on, it turned out that the son had no proper authority to sign the plaint. The plaintiff applied for permission to sign the plaint. Under those circumstances, Chagla, C.J, held that:

    “A plaint signed by the son of the plaintiff, who had no proper authority to sign it on behalf of the plaintiff, can be allowed to be amended at a later stage by allowing the plaintiff to sign irrespective of the bar of limitation, inasmuch as the defect is merely formal.”

    18. Learned counsel for the respondents rightly pointed out that this ruling has no application to the facts of the present case. It is not as though the suit was validly instituted by two liquidators and one of them forgot or omitted to sign the plaint. The suit, in the present J form, was ab initio bad, and, consequently, the defect cannot be cured by permitting any liquidator to sign the plaint.

    2. Kirpal Chand v. Traders Bank Ltd., Jammu, AIR 1954 J. & K. 45 (B). There, the facts were:

    “A plaint, in a suit filed on behalf of a Bank, was signed and verified by its manager who, under the Articles of Association of the Bank, was authorized, with the previous sanction of the directors, to take legal proceedings to recover the dues of the Bank. He did not hold any power of attorney on the date of the suit. On an objection by the defendant, an amended plaint was filed by the Bank stating that the Bank had, by its resolution, confirmed and ratified the Manager's action. The Court allowed the amended plaint.”

    19. On revision being taken to the High Court, Shahmiri, J., held that:

    “As the initiative to institute the suit could be properly transferred to the Manager under the Articles of Association, the subsequent ratification of the act of the agent by the principal could cure the original defect.”

    20. This ruling, again, has no application to the facts of the present case. In the Kashmir case under the Articles of Association of the Bank, the Manager was authorized to take legal proceedings with the previous sanction of the directors. He did not, however, hold any power of attorney on the date of the suit. The Bank, by a resolution, ratified the Manager's action. Therefore, there was no statutory bar as operates in the present case (the bar contained in Section 212(3) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913).

    3. Fuli Bibi Mt v. Khokai Mondal, AIR 1928 Cal 537 (C). There, with reference to a suit filed by a minor without a next friend, a Division Bench of that High Court observed that:

    “Proceedings in a suit instituted by a minor, and not by the minor's next friend in his name, are not void. The policy of the legislature in enacting O. 32 was that where a minor has instituted a suit in his own name the proceedings, in normal cases, should not be treated as abortive, but that an opportunity should be given to constitute the suit in the regular manner. Order 32, R. 1, is intended for the protection and benefit of the defendant.

    But the ground upon which the protection is afforded to the defendant in a suit instituted by a minor is removed, when the defendant at all material times is aware or has received notice, of the minority of the plaintiff and yet elects to proceed to trial and take his chance of obtaining a decree in his favour on the merits without raising any objection to, or issue upon, the maintainability of the suit and prefers the objection for the first time, on appeal, when the trial has gone against him.”

    21. Learned counsel for the respondents rightly pointed out that no analogy can be drawn between a suit instituted by a minor without a next friend and the present suit. I agree that no such analogy can be drawn.

    4. Wali Mahomed Khan v. Ishak Ali Khan, AIR 1931 All 507 (D). There, the facts were that a suit was filed in the name of a supposed minor through his mother, acting as his guardian, and describing him as a minor. In fact, the plaintiff was a major. Under those circumstances, a Special Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that:

    “The suit cannot be thrown out, on the technical ground that the plaint, as originally filed, described him as a minor under the guardianship of his mother. Defect in its form should be cured if it is due to a bona fide mistake.”

    22. Here, again, I agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the facts of the present case, being altogether different, this ruling will not help the plaintiffs.

    23. Learned counsel for the respondents rightly urged that no question of ratification arises here, because the original act, i.e, the filing of the suit by one liquidator was ab initio illegal. He cited Notified Area Committee, Okara v. Kidar Nath, AIR 1935 Lah 345 (E), referred to by the Court below, wherein Addison and Din Mohammad, JJ., with reference to a case arising out of the Punjab Municipal Act, held that:

    “The Notified Area Committee cannot delegate its powers to its Secretary by a general resolution without reference to any particular case to institute civil suit on its behalf. The action of the Committee in so doing is ultra vires and cannot be validated by ratification as an illegal act cannot be legalised.”

    24. On the same analogy, it can very well be said here, that the filing of the present suit by one liquidator, out of several, cannot be legalised, because Section 212(3) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 expressly lays down that such a suit should be instituted by, at least, two of the liquidators.

    25. During the course of arguments, an application purporting to be under O. 6, R. 17 and Section 151 of the CPC was put in by learned counsel for the appellants, wherein I was requested to permit another liquidator to sign the plaint. This petition was vigorously opposed by the learned counsel for the respondents. Mr. Chaudhary submitted that the defect, if any, in the plaint was one of procedure and justice should not be denied to his clients on that account. He cited Sangram Singh v. 1. Election Tribunal, Kotah, (S) AIR 1955 SC 425 (F), wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that:

    “A Code of Procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.”

    26. Mr. Vaidya, for the respondents, rightly pointed out that this is not a question of procedure. The law lays down that the suit of the present kind should be instituted by, at least, two liquidators. Section 212(3) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, would have been enacted in vain, if its mandatory provisions can be ignored on the ground of hardship, or as merely procedural. Mr. Vaidyacited Vedakannu Nadar v. Nanguneri Taluk Singikulam Annadana Chatram, AIR 1938 Mad 982 (G).

    27. There, Abdur Rahman, J., held that the plaintiffs could not continue the suits in the absence of the heirs of one Alagappa. A prayer was then made on behalf of the plaintiffs that Alagappa's heirs be impleaded and the case remanded for fresh trial. The prayer was refused by Abdur Rahman, J., since, in his opinion, prejudice would be caused to other side and the question of limitation would arise and further the plaintiffs had been negligent. In the same way, I may point out that the suit, out of which this appeal has arisen, was instituted on 18-1-1952. Written-statement was filed on 16-1-1953.

    28. Issues were framed on 25-2-1953. Issue No. 3 distinctly refers to the question as to whether Shri Mahendra Singh was competent to file the suit. It apparently never occurred to the plaintiffs to ask for amendment of the plaint till 24-5-1957 i.e during arguments in this Court. During the course of this judgment, I have pointed out that it is not a question of one of the liquidators having forgotten or omitted to sign the plaint.

    29. If the suit had been validly instituted by two liquidators and one of them had forgotten to sign the plaint, then, the Court might have well exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiffs and permitted the other liquidator to sign the plaint. But that is not the case here. The suit was filed on behalf of the Company by one liquidator and that fact cannot be altered by means of an application, purporting to be under O. 6, R. 17. Under these circumstances, the application is rejected.

    30. In view of all that has been said above, I concur with the view of the Court below that the suit was incompetent and, accordingly, hold that it was rightly dismissed.

    31. It was further argued by Shri Chaudhary, for the appellants, that the requisition orders were illegal and inoperative as the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947, expired in the Punjab on 20-3-1949. Shri Vaidya, for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that the mere fact that the Act had ceased to be in force in the Punjab would not automatically have the effect of abating it in Himachal Pradesh also. I do not, however consider it necessary to go into this question, because I have already held that the suit was incompetent.

    32. There remains the question of costs. The learned District Judge has dismissed the suit with full costs (the plaintiffs have been directed to pay a sum of Rs. 1,035/- as costs to the defendants). Considering (as already shown) that, on several issues, the District Judge found in favour of the plaintiffs and the suit failed on account of the bar contained in Section 212(3) of the Companies Act, 1913, I am of the opinion that it would be equitable to saddle the plaintiffs with only one half of the defendants' costs. Similarly, in this appeal, the plaintiffs have confined their claim to a sum of Rs. 20,000/-. Arguments here were directed mainly on Issue No. 3. The plaintiffs have spent considerable sums by way of court-fees etc. Therefore, in dismissing the appeal, I would direct the appellants to bear only one half of the respondents' costs.

    33. The appeal is allowed to this limited extent that the plaintiffs-appellants will be liable to pay only one half of the costs of the defendants-respondents in the trial Court. In other respects, the appeal is rejected. The order, dismissing the suit, will stand. As regards the costs of appeal, my order is that the appellants will pay one half of the respondents' costs here.

    M.K.S

    34. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Mandi Transport Co. Ltd. v. Himachal Pradesh Administration
    (May 29, 1957)