Whether
Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
To
be referred to the Reporter or not ?
Whether
their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?
Whether
this case involves a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 or any order
made thereunder ?
Whether
it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
================================================================
SATISH BABUBHAI
PATEL....Petitioner(s)
Versus
UNION OF INDIA &
3....Respondent(s)
================================================================
Appearance:
MR
MASOOM K SHAH, ADVOCATE for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MS.
VACHA DESAI, ASSTT. GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the Respondent(s) No. 2
================================================================
CORAM:
HONOURABLE THE
CHIEF JUSTICE MR. BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA
and
HONOURABLE
MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
Date :30/11/2013
CAV JUDGEMNT
(PER : HONOURABLE
MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA)
By
this writ application under Article-226 of the Constitution of India,
the petitioner, a consumer of electricity supplied by the respondent
no.4 company, has prayed for the following reliefs :
"(a) Be
pleased to quash and set aside Section 126 and Section 127 of The
Electricity Act, 2003 ( Act no.26 of 2003) as ultra vires the
Constitution of India.
(b) Be
pleased to quash and set aside the Section 145 of the The Electricity
Act, 2003 (Act no.36 of 2003) as ultra vires the Constitution
of India.
(c) Be
pleased to quash and set aside the GSR 265(E) dated 16th
April 2004, The Appeal to the Appellate Authority Rules, 2004 as
ultra vires the constitution of india and the parent act i.e
The Electricity Act, 2003 ( Act no.36 of 2003).
(d) Be
pleased to quash and set aside Notification styled as
GU-2007-133-ELA-1103-9539-k dated September 1, 2007, issued by
Energy and Petrochemicals Department, Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar as
ultra vires the Constitution of India, 1950 and Parent Act i.e The
Electricity Act, 2003 (Act no.36 of 2003).
(e) Be
pleased quash and set aside Notification styled GSR 481(E) dated 17th
August 2006 the Qualifications Powers and Functions of Chief
Electrical Inspectors and Electrical Inspectors Rules, 2006 the
constitution of india and the parent act ie The Electricity Act, 2003
(Act no.36 of 2003).
(f) Be
pleased to quash and set aside final Assessment Order dated 22nd
February 2010 issued under S. 126 of The Electricity Act, 2003 (Act
no.36 of 2003).
(g) Pending
Admission, Hearing and Final disposal of this Petition, Be pleased to
grant electrical connection to the petitioner.
(h) Pending
Admission, Hearing and Final disposal of this Petition, Be pleased to
stay the recovery proceedings against the petitioner pursuant to the
final Assessment Order dated 22.02.2010.
(i) Costs
of this Petition be awarded.
(j) Such
further and other relief, order or direction which may be just, fit,
proper and equitable in the facts and circumstances of the Petition.
2. Facts
of the Case :
2.1 The
petitioner is a consumer of electricity supplied by the respondent
no.4 company, namely, Dakshin Gujarat Vij Company Ltd., Bambhroli Sub
Division, Surat. The Electricity Company has provided a single phase
meter to the petitioner bearing No.2188376 with a Customer No.18204/
11957/7. The respondent no.4 company has also provided a three phase
meter No.4946873 bearing Customer No.17294.11957/7 with a sanctioned
load of 27 HP.
2.2 It
appears that on 22/12/2009, an inspection was carried-out by the
Vigilance Officers of the Electricity Company at the premises of the
petitioner and during the inspection it was found that the
consumption of the electricity by the petitioner was more than the
sanctioned load of 29 HP. Such excess consumption of electricity by
the petitioner was found to be unauthorized by the Vigilance
Officers.
2.3 It
also appears from the materials on record that pursuant to the
inspection which was carried-out at the premises of the petitioner, a
provisional assessment bill was raised by the electricity company for
the unauthorized use of the excess load.
2.4 It
is the case of the petitioner that in the provisional assessment bill
there were blanks and the same was a cyclostyled final assessment
order without any reference of any of the objections which were
raised by the petitioner at the relevant point of time.
2.5 The
petitioner, being dissatisfied with such a provisional assessment
bill issued by the Electricity Company, instead of challenging the
same before the Appellate Authority U/s.127 of the Electricity Act,
2003, thought fit to challenge the same before the District Consumer
Forum, Surat by filing a Complaint Case No.97/2000.
2.6 It
appears that the District Consumer Forum, Surat refused to entertain
such complaint of illegal issuance of a provisional assessment Bill
relying on a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of U.P.
Power Corporation Ltd., and Others Vs. Anish Ahmed reported in
2013(9) SCALE -334 wherein the Supreme Court held that the Consumer
Forum has no jurisdiction to entertain a complaint filed by a
consumer or any person against assessment made U/s.126 of the
Electricity Act. In such circumstances, the District Consumer Forum,
Surat rejected the complaint filed by the petitioner.
2.7 It
appears that thereafter the petitioner thought fit to file the
present writ application raising manifold grounds as regards the
provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 and the Rules framed
thereunder.
2.8 The
petitioner has raised the following questions of law in this petition
:
3.1 Whether
Sections 126 and 127 of The Electricity Act, 2003 are
unconstitutional ?
3.2 Whether
the GSR 265 (E) dated 16th April, 2004, The Appeal to the
Appellate Autohrity Rules, 2004 is ultra vires the
constitution of india and the parent act ie The Electricity Act, 2003
( Act no.36 of 2003)
3.3 Whether
the Notification styled as GU-2007-133-ELA-1103-9539-k dated
September 1, 2007, issued by the Energy and Petrochemicals
Department, Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar is ultra vires the
constitution of india and the parent act i.e The Electricity Act,
2003 (Act no.36 of 2003)
3.4 Whether
the Notification styled as GSR 481 (E) dated 17th August
2006, prescribing the Qualifications, Powers and Functions of the
Chief Electrical Inspectors and Electrical Inspectors Rules, 2006 is
ultra vires the constitution of india and the parent act ie
The Electricity Act, 2003 (Act no.36 of 2003).
3.5 Whether
fill in the blank, cyclostyle orders can be passed under Sec. 126?
3.6 Whether
the Provisional Assessment Order and final Assessment Order is legal,
when the Assessing Officer himself carried out the inspection?
3.7 Whether
the Appellate Authority constituted under the Act, 2003 is violative
of the Constitutional Principles as he has no knowledge of law?
3.8 Whether
the Appellate authority i.e the Chief Electrical Inspector and other
Electrical Inspectors are biased as they are appointed by the State
Government and also the Appellate Authority under the Scheme of the
Act?
3.9 Whether
a reasoned order is required to be passed in the final Assessment
Order ?
3.10
Whether the period of 12 months for extending the unauthorized used
by a guess work when the perfect estimate is not possible as provided
in Sec. 126 is arbitrary and unreasonable?
3.11 Whether
the disconnection of the petitioner s electricity supply without
any notice in writing is permissible in law?
3.12 Whether
the Assessing Officers can appoint Officers of the licensee?
3. Submissions
on behalf of the petitioner:
3.1 Mr.
Masoom K. Shah, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner,
vehemently submitted that Sec. 126 and 127 of the Electricity Act,
2003 deserves to be struck-down as unconstitutional because the
scheme of Sec. 126 and 127 is unworkable since there is no judicial
scrutiny envisaged. Mr. Shah submitted that not only there is no
judicial scrutiny envisaged so far as the scheme of Sec. 126 and 127
of the Act, 2003 is concerned, but the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court has also been barred by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 145 of
the Act, 2003.
3.2 Mr.
Shah submitted that there is only one layer of adjudication so far as
the Assessment Order is concerned and the same is treated to be
final. According to him such being the position, the pre-requisite
of depositing 50% of the bill amount of the provisional assessment
before the Appellate Authority is arbitrary and unreasonable. Mr.Shah
submitted that the same is ultra vires Articles-14, 19 and 21
of the Constitution of India.
3.3 Mr.
Shah also submitted that the Assessing Officers are appointed by the
State Government and on their final assessment, the Consumer is made
to deposit 50% of the disputed amount before the consumer is heard by
the Appellate Authority. According to Mr. Shah such a scheme could
be termed as arbitrary and unreasonable. He
would submit that the Assessing Officers who work for the
company itself would definitely act in a bias manner so as to benefit
the electricity company.
3.4 Mr.
Shah has challenged the validity of Sec. 126 of the Act, 2003 on the
ground that the concept of period of 12 months immediately preceding
the date of inspection for the purpose of assessment once the
Assessing Officer reaches to the conclusion that unauthorized use of
electricity has taken place is more a guesswork rather than a legal
and reasonable approach.
3.5 Mr.
Shah submitted that the provisions of Sec. 126(5) of the Act, 2003
defies all logic because every month the inspector would come and
record the reading of the meter on the basis of which the bill is
being prepared and if that is so and nothing is found to be wrong,
then suddenly one fine morning the consumer cannot be asked to pay
an amount upto the extent of 12 months. This, according to Mr. Shah,
could be termed as arbitrary and against the Wednesbury principle of
reasonableness.
3.6 Mr.
Shah submitted that the Central Government, in exercise of the powers
conferred by Clause-4(2) of Sec. 176 of the Electricity Act, 2003,
issued a Notification dated 16/4/2004 by which the State Government
has been authorized for the purpose of appeal U/s.127 of the Act to
constitute an Appellate Authority consisting of one or more persons,
such that one of the persons shall have knowledge of matter related
to assessment of electricity charges and none of them should be
directly related to the affairs of the territorial jurisdiction of
the Licensee or supplier of the electricity. According to Mr. Shah,
this could not have been done because the Parliament has delegated
the said power to the Central Government. Once such power has been
delegated to the Central Government, then the Central Government has
no power to sub-delegate the same in favour of the State Government
for the purpose of constituting an appellate authority.
3.7 Mr.
Shah submitted that in the aforesaid context the legislature in its
wisdom was aware that in most of the States the Electricity Companies
are owned by the State and with a view to providing a fair hearing
with due compliance of the principles of natural justice, the said
power for appointment of an Appellate Authority was, therefore,
delegated to the Central Government. Mr.Shah relied on the legal
maxim Delegatus non potest delegare , meaning that no
delegated powers can be further delegated .
3.8 Mr.
Shah, in the aforesaid context, further submitted that such
sub-delegation is not permissible because the State Government has
been conferred with the responsibility to appoint the Assessing
Officer and therefore, the legislature in its wisdom conferred the
power of appointment of the appellate authority to the Central
Government and with a view to strike the balance, the legislature,
therefore, thought fit to confer the power upon the Central
Government to appoint the Appellate Authority. Therefore, according
to Mr. Shah, the Notification dated 16/4/2004 is an example of
excessive delegation.
3.9 Mr.
Shah submitted that the State Government, on the strength of the
Notification dated 16/4/2004 issued by the Central Government has
appointed Chief Electric Inspector and other Electric Inspectors as
the Appellate Authorities and such persons have no knowledge of law
because they are neither lawyers nor retired Judges. According to
Mr. Shah they have no judicial mind and, therefore, it is difficult
for them to understand the legal concept of fair hearing.
3.10 Mr.
Shah challenging the Final Assessment Order dated 22/2/2010 submitted
that the same is nothing but a proforma order with blanks all over
the place.
3.11 Mr.
Shah also submitted that the decision of the Assessing Officer could
be termed as a quasi judicial decision and therefore, it should
contain reasons while over-ruling the objections raised by the
Consumer. No reasons are recorded for reaching to a particular
conclusion and nothing is being discussed so far as the objections
which are raised by the consumer are concerned.
3.12 Mr.
Shah last submitted that Sec. 145 of the Act, 2003 which bars the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court so far as any matter which an
Assessing Officer referred to in Sec. 126 or an Appellate Authority
referred to in Sec. 127 of the Act or the Adjudicating Officer
appointed under the Act is empowered to determine is concerned, the
same is arbitrary and unreasonable. According to him, having regard
to the scheme of the Act, the Civil Court s jurisdiction could not
have been barred and the legislature ought to have kept the option
open for the consumer to challenge such arbitrary or illegal
assessment before the competent Civil Court where the consumer would
get the opportunity to lead necessary evidence and the authority
would also be a legal mind.
4. Having
heard the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and having
gone through the materials on record, including the provisions of the
Electricity Act, 2003 and the Rules framed thereunder, the only
question that falls for our consideration in this petition is,
whether the petitioner is entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for
in this petition.
5. Before,
we proceed to consider the submissions on merit, it will be expedient
for the better adjudication of the issues, to look into the
Electricity Act, 2003, more particularly the statement of objects and
reasons.
5.1 The
Electricity Act, 2003 is an Act to consolidate the laws relating to
generation, transmission, distribution, trading, use of electricity
and for development of electricity industry promoting competition
even while ensuring supply of electricity to all areas duly
protecting the interests of the consumer. It also is a law to ensure
transparent policies and for providing two tire redressal mechanism
at the Central as well as the State levels. The statement of objects
and reasons for the Act would show that the radical reforms in
generation and transmission of electricity are sought to be ushered
in by the new legislation on the principles of de-licensing and open
access in transmission. It also provides for the State Regulatory
Commission, Central Regulatory Commission and an Appellate Tribunal
to review the decisions of Regulatory Commissions.
5.2 The
Act is divided into XVIII parts. Part-III deals with generation of
Electricity, part IV with licensing method and Part-(V) deals with
transmission of electricity. The fixation and administration of
tariff is contained in Part-VII. Part X, which contains Sections-76
to 109 provides for Constitution, powers and functions of the Central
Commission and State Commission. An overall view of the Act
especially the parts referred to herein would show that the Act
brought in structural changes in generation, distribution and
transmission of electrical energy. There is a distinct trichotomy
among these three aspects of Electricity. The Act also broadly deals
with generation separately and transmission separately. Except in
the matter of levying the surcharge for crop subsidy, the Act does
not make any distinction between a generating company and captive
generating company.
6. We
shall now consider Sec.126 of the Act which falls within Part-XII
Investigation and Enforcement , more particularly the scope of
the Section.
6.1 Section
126 of the Electricity Act, 2003 provides that if it is found by the
Officer that a consumer is indulging in unauthorized use of
electricity, he will make provisional assessment and thereafter a
demand has to be made. Unauthorized use of electricity has
been defined in Sec. 126(6), Explanation- Clause (b) and the
definition for all practical purposes includes theft of electricity
as is understood.
6.2 Sub-Sec.(1)
of Sec. 126 authorizes the Assessing Officer to inspect any place or
premises, gadgets, machines, devices and may come to a conclusion
that a consumer is indulging in unauthorized use of electricity. In
such a case, the Assessing Officer has to provisionally assess to the
best of his judgment, the electricity charges payable by such a
person. After so doing, such provisional assessment order has to be
served on the person who, under sub-section (3) is entitled to file
objections against the provisional Assessment Order before the
Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer may then afford an
opportunity and pass a Final Order of Assessment of the electricity
charges payable by such person. Sub-Sec.1 to 4 do not compel the
person to pay any amount, if he wants to file objection and invite
final assessment order.
6.3 In
assessing the value of the energy provisionally, as seen from
Sub-Sec.(1) of Sec. 126, the Assessing Officer has to do it to the
best of his judgment. The power of Assessing Officer is not
controlled or circumscribed by sub-sec.5. Sub-sec.5 of the Sec.126
takes care of altogether a different situation. It contains the
deeming provision; a presumption. If the Assessing Officer has no
proper material or mechanism used or pilferage of energy is of such a
nature that the Assessing Officer cannot reasonably fix the period
during which there has been unauthorized use of electricity, in such
cases, he can presume that there has been a continuous unauthorized
use of energy for a period of three months or six months, as the case
may be. The presumption contained in Sub-sec.5 does not in any
manner prevent or prohibit the Assessing Officer while provisionally
assessing the electricity charges payable by such person under
Sub-sec.1 of Sec. 126 after determining actual energy pilfered.
6.4 Sub-sec.6
of Section 126 stipulates that the assessment of value of the energy
pilfered should be made at the rate equal to one times the tariff
applicable to the relevant category of services.
6.5 The
Explanation to Sec.126 of the Act defines the Expression
Unauthorized use of electricity and the definition includes
four categories as specified in Sub-para-B to the Explanation. It
has been defined to mean the usage of electricity (i) by any
artificial means, (ii) by means not authorized by the concerned
person or authority of licensee, (iii) through a tampered meter and
(iv) for the purpose other than for which the usage of electricity
was authorized.
7. We
are not impressed by the submission of Mr. Shah that Section 126 of
the Act deserves to be declared as ultra vires
as the legislature has conferred unbridled and uncontrolled power on
the Assessing Officers, and the assessment is always bias because the
Assessing Officers are appointed by the Government.
8. It
is now well settled that a power which is discretionary is not
necessarily discriminatory and abuse of power should not be easily
assumed where the discretion is vested in the public officials.
There is a presumption that public officials will discharge their
duties honestly and in accordance with the rules of law, that unless
the contrary were shown, the administration of a particular law would
be done "not with an evil eye and unequal hand". There
might be cases where improper execution of power will result in
discriminatory treatment and injustice to the consumers, but, the
possibility of such a discriminatory treatment cannot necessarily
invalidate the legislation and where there is an abuse of such power,
the parties aggrieved are not without ample remedies under the law,
and what will be struck down in such cases will not be the provision
which invests the authorities with such power, but the abuse of the
power itself. [See Pannalal Binjraj Vs. Union of India,
1957 SC 397].
9. A
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in the case of State
of Punjab Vs. Khan Chand,
reported in AIR 1974 SC 543, made the following observations in
context with abuse of power
by the public officials.
37.
Dealing with the Equality Clause in the Constitution of the U.S.A.
Professor Willis has said (Willis, "Constitutional Law",
pp. 536-7) :
Perhaps
the best view on the subject is that 'due process' and 'equality' are
not violated by the mere conference of unguided power, but only by
its arbitrary exercise by those upon whom it is conferred (see
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania (1914) 232 U.S. 531
).
The
theory behind this proposition is that although the conferment of
discretionary power without guideline might result in its being
exercised in a discriminatory manner, no one will presume that it
will be so exercised. On the other hand, the presumption is that
public functionaries will administer the law properly. Courts do not
strike down a provision in a statute on the assumption that the
person invested with power under it would exercise it "with an
evil eye and unequal hand". The heart of the matter is that in
such a case the law itself is not bad, because it is capable of being
administered in an impartial and reasonable manner as this case
illustrates. So long as courts are open in this country and the
doctrine of abuse of power is there, there need be no apprehension
that any power will be exercised arbitrarily or in a discriminatory
manner merely because the power is apparently capable of being so
exercised. It is perfectly open to the State Government or an honest
officer to whom the power is delegated to exercise it in a reasonable
and non-discriminatory manner. Why then should the Court be anxious
to strike down the law? The Court's power is properly invoked if a
person is actually aggrieved by the exercise of the power under the
law. We should not exercise our power to strike down a law on
hypothetical considerations of what a bad officer might do. In
determining the constitutionality of an Act, we would construe it in
such a manner as to sustain it and every possible presumption will be
indulged in for that purpose. Our attempt must be to preserve and not
destroy. Respect for a coordinate branch of the Government as
well as the presumption of constitutionality demands it. Before a
duly enacted law can be judicially nullified, it must be forbidden by
some explicit restriction in the Constitution. Our duty of deference
to those who have the responsibility for making the laws has great
relevance in this context. The attitude of judicial humility which
this consideration enjoins is not an abdication of the judicial
function. It is a due observance of its limits. As Marshall said: "No
questions can be brought before a judicial tribunal of greater
delicacy than those which involve the constitutionality of
legislative acts". And, as I said, a just respect for the
legislature requires that the obligation of its laws should not be
unnecessarily and wantonly assailed."
10. In
Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(1997 [5] SCC 536), a Bench of 9 Judges observed that mere
possibility of abuse of a provision by those in charge of
administering it cannot be a ground for holding a provision
procedurally or substantively unreasonable.
11. In
Collector of Customs v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty (1962 (3) SCR
786) the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:
"The
possibility of abuse of a statute otherwise valid does not impart to
it any element of invalidity." It was said in State of Rajasthan
v. Union of India (1977 (3) SCC 592) "it must be remembered that
merely because power may sometimes be abused, it is no ground for
denying the existence of power. The wisdom of man has not yet been
able to conceive of a Government with power sufficient to answer all
its legitimate needs and at the same time incapable of mischief."
(Also
see: Commissioner, H.R.E. v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri
Shirur Meth (1954 SCR 1005).
12. As
observed in Maulavi Hussien Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of
Gujarat (2004 (6) SCC 672), Unique Butle Tube Industries (P)
Ltd. v. U.P. Financial Corporation and Ors. 2003 (2) SCC 455 and
Padma Sundara Rago (dead) and Ors. v. State of T.N. and Ors.
(2002 (3) SCC 533), while interpreting a provision, the Court only
interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is
misused and subjected to the abuse of the process of law, it is for
the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary.
13. Thus,
the afore-noted decisions make it plain and clear that the mere
possibility or likelihood of abuse of power does not make the
provision ultra vires or bad
in law. There is a distinction between existence of power and
exercise thereof. The legality or otherwise of the power must be
decided by considering the nature of power, the extent thereof, the
body or authority on whom it has been conferred, the circumstances
under which it can be exercised and all other considerations which
are relevant and germane to the exercise of such power.
14. At
this stage, it may not be out of place to mention that in the past,
the Constitutional validity of Section 126 of the Act, 2003 was a
subject matter of challenge before a Division Bench of this Court in
Ranchhodbhai Haribhai
Sutariya Vs. Union of India
(Special Civil Application No. 13931 of 2009 and allied matters)
decided on 26th April, 2011.
15. The
main contention before the Division Bench in the said case was that
the electricity companies, which make the allegations, and their
officers having been appointed as Assessing Officers, the electricity
companies prove their own allegations by themselves. It was also
contended before the Division Bench that there is no chance even to
say that the bill is incorrect
or the charge is incorrect. There is little chance being given to
explain the matter. In many cases, the electricity company would
remove the meters even without sealing, and if they were sealed, the
witnesses were the employees of the company and no independent
evidence would be taken. It was argued that therefore, the
electricity company plays the role of a complainant, investigator,
prosecutor and the judge for determination as provided under Section
126 of the Act.
16. It
was also argued that the provisions of Section 126 of the Act were
ultra vires
Article 14 of the Constitution of India, since unbridled and
uncontrolled power has been vested with the electricity supply
company. It was also submitted that no person can be a judge of his
own cause. There was also a submission of likelihood of bias, and in
accordance with the principles of natural justice, if there was a
likelihood of bias, such
person should be incapacitated from adjudicating this issue.
17. The
Division Bench of this Court while answering the submissions which
were canvassed on behalf of the petitioners first took note of
Section 126 of the Act, along with Section 127 (appeal to Appellate
Authority), Section 135 (theft of electricity), Section 143, which
prescribes power to adjudicate under which appropriate Commission can
appoint any of its member to be an adjudicating officer for holding
an enquiry for the purpose of imposing any penalty, Section 145 which
bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in any matter which an
Assessing Officer referred to in Section 126 or an Appellate
Authority referred to in Section 127 or the adjudicating officer
appointed under the Act is empowered
by to determine and The Electricity Rules, 2005, various other
Notifications issued under the Act, and held as under:-
28.
The Parliament u/Sec.126 (Part-XII - Investigation and Enforcement')
has not delegated any power to the State to make inspection of any
place or premises to take inspection of equipments, gadgets,
machines, devices, etc. On the other hand, such power has been
delegated by the Parliament to the assessing officer, who on such
inspection may come to the conclusion that such person is indulging
in unauthorised use of electricity. The assessing officer has to make
a provisional assessment u/sub-Sec.(2), and then, after service of
notice upon the person, and hearing the objections, if any, filed and
after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to such person,
he is required to pass final order of assessment u/sub-Sec.(3) of
Sec.126. The aggrieved person has a right to prefer appeal to the
Appellate Authority u/Sec.127 against the final order, as may be
passed u/Sec.126.
29.
From the Explanation below Sec.126, it will be evident for the
purpose of said Section that `assessing officer' means an officer of
State Government or Board or licensee, as the case may be, designated
as such by the State Government. The meaning of `unauthorised use of
electricity' has also been defined in the said Explanation.
Assessment of electricity charges in case a person indulges in
unauthorised use of electricity is not a duty of the Legislatures.
Therefore, in normal course, it cannot be stated that there is an
`abdication' of power or `assessment' in conferring the power to the
delegatee. The question is whether the power of assessment has been
delegated by the Legislature in favour of the licensee, including any
officer of the licensee, i.e., respondent companies herein. This will
be evident from the Explanation below Sec.126, quoted and discussed
above, wherein `assessing officer' has been defined to be an officer
of the State Government or Board or Licensee, who is to be designated
by the State Government.
30.
It is a settled law that the Legislature, as a part of its
legislative function, can confer powers to make rules and regulations
for carrying the enactment into operation and effect. While
Legislature exercises such power, it also lays down the policy and
principles providing the rule of conduct, and while it may further
provide that on certain data or facts being found and ascertained by
the Executive or authority, the operation of the Act can be brought
into force.
31.
In the present case, in exercise of powers conferred u/Sec.126 and in
light of Explanation below Sec.126, the Government of Gujarat has
designated the officers as assessing officers by order dated 5th June
2004. Such power of assessment being not the power of the
Legislature, and as such power can be delegated under the Act, it has
been delegated in favour of the assessing officer, but it cannot be
alleged that the Legislature has abdicated its power. The question of
abdication arises only if the Legislature or a particular authority
who is delegated with such power, instead of exercising the same, has
sub-delegated such power without any such authority. That question
does not arise in the present case.
32.
We have already noticed that the question of assessment of
electricity charges payable by a person indulging in unauthorised use
of electricity cannot be made by the Legislature (Parliament in the
present case). It will have to utilise any outside agency to the
extent it finds it necessary for doing things, which the Legislature
is unable to do itself or finds it inconvenient to do. Legislature is
supposed to do everything which is ancillary and necessary to the
full exercise of its power of legislation. To that extent it cannot
abdicate its legislative function. However, while entrusting such
power to an outside agency, it has only to see that it acts as a
subordinate authority and is guided by norms and rules. In the
present case, the manner in which the provisional assessment is to be
made has been prescribed in Gujarat Electricity (Manner of Service of
Provisional Assessment Order) Rules, 2004 by notification dated 5th
June 2004. For service of the final order prescription has also been
made under the Gujarat Electricity (Manner of service of notice,
order or document) Rules, 2004, and therefore, it cannot be stated
that the authorities have been provided with unbridled power, as
inspection is made u/Sec.126 in presence of the user of unauthorised
electricity and in presence of other witnesses. Before the final
assessment, a provisional assessment order is to be made, opportunity
of objection and hearing is to be given to the person, and then only,
the final order is passed, the legality and propriety of which can be
challenged in an appeal u/Sec.127. Foolproof procedure having been
laid down under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, as referred
to above, the delegation of such power cannot be held to be
arbitrary.
33.
So far as Sec.135 is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioners
assail the same mainly on the ground that a private person cannot be
allowed to take into administration of criminal justice in its hands.
In the case of Union
Carbide (supra),
Supreme Court observed the essence of doctrine of stifling
prosecution, i.e. no private person should be allowed to take the
administration of criminal justice out of the hands of the judges and
place it in his own hands. The judgment was based on a Calcutta High
Court decision in
Rameshwar
Marwari v. Upendranath Das Sarkar reported
in AIR
1926 CAL 455 and
Supreme Court decision in V.
Narasimha Raju v. V. Gurumurthy Raju reported
in AIR
1963 SC 107 and
Ouseph
Poulo v. Catholic Union Bank Ltd. reported
in AIR
1965 SC 166.
34.
We have noticed that in the case of Ouseph
Poulo (supra)
Supreme Court observed that no Court of law can allow a private party
to take administration of law in its own hands and settle the
question as to whether a particular offence has been committed or not
for itself.
35. Sec.135
deals with theft of electricity. Thereunder no power has been vested
with any individual to take the administration of criminal justice
into his own hands. Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec.135 is a penal provision,
which prescribe punishment, as may be imposed, if theft of
electricity is detected and proved. The licensee or supplier has been
empowered to disconnect the supply of electricity u/Sec.1A. For
detection of theft of electricity officers of the licensee or
supplier has been empowered u/sub-Sec.(2) to enter, inspect, break
open and search any place or premises in which he has reason to
believe that electricity has been used or being used unauthorisedly
and to search, seize and remove all such devices, instruments, etc.,
and to examine or seize any books of account or documents, etc. Under
sub-Sec.(3) the occupant of the place of search is required to be
present during the search and a list of all things so seized in the
search be prepared and the occupant's signature is obtained on the
list.
36.
The officer of the licensee or supplier, whoever may be authorised,
has not been empowered to take administration of criminal justice in
his hands. For trial of such offence u/Sec.135, the State Government
has been empowered to constitute Special Courts u/Sec.153 of the Act.
The procedure which is to be adopted by the Special Court has also
been prescribed u/Sec.154, which has also been empowered with the
power of court of sessions u/Sec.155. Against this decision, appeal
and revision is maintainable before High Court u/Sec.156. If the
aforesaid provision is read with Rule 12 of the Electricity Rules,
2005, as noticed and quoted in the earlier paragraphs, it will be
evident that police is to take cognizance of the offence. The power
of investigation is also vested with the police; an officer of the
licensee or supplier is merely an informant in the matter of theft of
electricity. In view of such specific provisions enacted under the
law, the allegation as being made by the petitioners that a private
party has been allowed to take administration of criminal justice in
his hands cannot be accepted. We find no abdication of power by the
Legislature in enacting Sec.126 of the Electricity Act, 2003, nor the
allegation that u/Sec.135, a private person has been delegated power
to administer criminal justice, can be sustained. Consequential
notifications, rules issued there under, for the very same reason,
cannot be held to be illegal. We uphold Sections 126 and 135 of the
Electricity Act, 2003 and the Gujarat Electricity (Manner of Service
of Provisional Assessment Order) Rules, 2004 and the Gujarat
Electricity (Manner of service of notice, order or document) Rules,
2004 issued by different notifications all dated 5th June 2004. In
absence of any merit, all the writ petitions are dismissed, but there
shall be no order as to costs. Notice is discharged."
18. In
view of the afore-noted decision of the Division Bench of this Court,
the challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 126 of the
Act should necessarily fail.
19. We
are also not impressed by the submission of Mr. Shah, the learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner with regard to the
Notification dated 16th April, 2004, issued by the Central
Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (v) of
sub-section (2) of Section 176 of the Act, framing Rules called
"Appeal to the Appellate Authority Rules, 2004" for
appointment of the Appellate Authority under Section 127 of the Act,
is concerned.
20. The
sum and substance of the contention of Mr. Shah is that under Section
176 of the Act, the Central Government may, by Notification, make
Rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act, and Section 176,
clause (2) sub-clause (u) empowers the Central Government to appoint
an authority to whom the appeal shall be filed under sub-section (1)
of Section 127 of the Act. Thus, according to Mr. Shah, the Central
Government has been delegated with the power under Section 176 clause
(2) sub-clause (u) to appoint the Appellate Authority under
sub-section (1) of Section 127 of the Act, but by virtue of the
Notification dated 16th April, 2004, the Central Government has
sub-delegated the power in favour of the State Government for the
purpose of appointing the Appellate Authority under Section 127 of
the Act.
21. According
to Mr. Shah, if a power has been delegated, then there cannot be any
further sub-delegation. According to Mr. Shah, the legal maxim
"delegatus non potest delegare , means sub-delegation
of the delegated power is not permissible unless the person on whom
the power conferred is permitted to delegate expressly or by
necessary intendment.
22. To
appreciate the aforesaid submission in this regard, it would be
profitable for us to look into the provisions of Section 176(1) and
(2) (u) of the Act, 2003 and the Notification itself. We quote
Section 176 (1) (2)(u) of the Act, and the the entire Notification as
under:-
"Sec.
176. Power of Central Government to make rules.--
(1) The Central Government may, by notification, make rules for
carrying out the provisions of this Act.
(2) In
particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing
power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following
matters, namely:--
(a)
to (t) ....... ......
(u) the
authority to whom the appeal shall be filed under sub-section (1) of
Section 127;"
"(Contains
amendment vide Notification No.GSR 537(E)
dated
7th September, 2006)
Government
of India
Ministry
of Power
New
Delhi, the 16th April, 2004.
Notification
G.S.R.
265(E). In exercise of powers conferred by clause (u) of
sub-section (2) of section 176 of the Electricity Act,2003, (36 of
2003) the Central Government hereby makes the following rules
prescribing the appellate authority for preferring appeal against the
orders of the assessing officer, namely:-
1. Short
title and commencement,- (1) These rules may be called Appeal to the
Appellate Authority Rules, 2004.
(2) They
shall come into force on the date of their publication in the
Official Gazette.
2. Definitions.-
(1) In these rules unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) Act
means the Electricity Act, 2003;
(b) section
means a section of the Act.
(2) Words
and expression used and not defined in these rules but defined in the
Act, 2003 shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in
Act.
3. Appellate
Authority.- For the purpose of appeal under section 127, the
State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
constitute an Appellate Authority consisting of one or more persons
such that one of the persons shall have knowledge of matters related
to assessment of electricity charges and none of them shall be
directly related to the affairs of the territorial jurisdiction of
the licensee or supplier of the electricity .
Sd/-
(Ajay
Shankar)
Additional
Secretary to the Government of India
F.No.23/63/2003-R&R"
23. So
far as the principle of the maxim "delegatus non potest
delegare , is concerned, the same rests on the principle that a
person who wishes to act through another confers a power on that
other person, who otherwise would have to do himself. This does not
however, imply that a person who delegates parts with his power or
his authority to another so as to denude himself of his rights, or to
totally abdicate that power in favour of the other. Delegation of
power, in other words, could always be abrogated by the grantor at
any time, or he could, if he so chooses act himself to the exclusion
of the agent or the person to whom he has delegated.
24. We
are of the opinion that there is no sub-delegation by virtue of the
Notification dated 16th April, 2004. By Notification dated 16th
April, 2004, the Central Government, in exercise of the delegated
power has merely asked the State Government to constitute an
Appellate Authority consisting of one or more persons, such with one
of the persons shall have knowledge of matters related to assessment
of electricity charges and none of them shall be directly related to
the affairs of the territorial jurisdiction of the licensee or
supplier of the electricity. Therefore, it could be said that the
Central Government has asked the State Government to appoint such
persons as the Appellate Authority, who are well versed with the
matters related to the assessment of electricity charges. The State
Government would merely act according to the Rules and would appoint
an appropriate person who is well versed with the matters of
assessment of electricity charges.
25. In
the present case, the rule making authority has not effaced itself
and there is in fact no delegation of any essential legislative
function. The rule making authority by framing rules, which is to
the effect that the State Government may, by notification in the
official gazette, constitute an appellate authority consisting of one
or more persons such with one of the persons shall have knowledge of
matters related to assessment of electricity charges and none of them
shall be directly related to the affairs of the territorial
jurisdiction of the licensee or supplier of the electricity,
exercised the real legislative function and laid down a clear policy.
All that was left to the State Government to do by Notification was
to appoint the appellate authority as suggested by the Central
Government.
26. The
Supreme Court in re Art. 143, Constitution of India and Delhi Laws
Act (1912) etc. in a Special Reference, reported in AIR 1951 SC 332,
has laid down the extent to which it is permissible to a legislative
or a rule making authority to leave to the executive to frame
provisions in order to implement the Act passed by the Legislature or
the Rules framed by the rule making authority. In our opinion, in
the present case, the Central Government has not gone beyond what was
held permissible by the Supreme Court in the case mentioned above.
It is well known that considering the necessities of modern life the
Legislature or the rule making authority cannot contemplate all the
future contingencies and it has been held permissible to allow
provisions being made in order to implement an Act of the Legislature
or a rule framed by a rule making authority. Thus, in our opinion,
therefore, there is no substance in the submission of the learned
counsel appearing for the petitioner.
27. We
are also not impressed by the submission of Mr. Shah that the
Notification dated 1st September, 2007, issued by the Energy and
Petrochemicals Department of the State Government, appointing the
Appellate Authority for the purpose of appeal under Section 127 of
the Act is concerned. We quote below the Notification:-
"ENERGY
AND PETROCHEMICALS DEPARTMENT
Notification
Sachivalaya,
Gandhinagar, 1st September, 2007.
ELECTRICITY
ACT, 2003.
No.
GU-2007-133-ELA-1103-9539-K :- WHEREAS, by virtue of powers conferred
by clause (u) of sub-section (2) of section 176 of the Electricity
Act, 2003 ( 36 of 2003 ), the Central Government has framed the
Appeal to the Appellate Authority Rules, 2004 and subsequently
amended the said Rules by the Appeal to the Appellate Authority
(Amendment) Rules, 2006.
AND
WHEREAS, under rule 3 of the said rules, it has been provided that
the State Government may, for the purpose for appeal under section
127, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute an Appellate
Authority consisting of one or more persons such that one of the
persons shall have knowledge of matters related to assessment of
electricity charges and none of them shall be directly related to the
affairs of the territorial jurisdiction of the licensee or supplier
of the electricity.
NOW,
THEREFORE, in pursuance of the provisions of the Appeal to the
Appellate Authority (Amendment) Rules, 2006 and the provisions of
sub-section (1) of Section 127 of the Electricity Act, 2003, and in
supersession of Govt. Notification, Energy & Petrochemicals
Department No. GU-2005-4-ELA-1103-9539-K, dated the 10th
January, 2005, the Government of Gujarat hereby designates the
Gazetted Officer specified in column 2 of the Schedule appended
hereto to be an Appellate Authority, to exercise the powers within
the jurisdiction specified against them in column 3 of the Schedule,
for the purpose of appeal under section 127 of the said Act.
Amongst
the Appellate Authority specified in column 2 of the Schedule, the
Chief Electrical Inspector shall be the Appellate Authority for the
amount above Rs.10 lacs, the Deputy Chief Electrical Inspectors shall
be the Appellate Authorities for the amount above Rs.5 lacs and up to
10 lacs, the Electrical Inspectors shall be the Appellate Authorities
for the amount above Rs.1 lac and up to 5 lacs and the Assistant
Electrical Inspectors shall be the Appellate Authorities for the
amount up to Rs.1 lac of final assessment made under section 126 of
the Electricity Act, 2003."
28. It
appears that by virtue of the afore-noted Notification dated 1st
September, 2007, the State Government has appointed the Chief
Electrical Inspector for the whole of the State of Gujarat as the
Appellate Authority and, thereafter, Deputy Chief Electrical
Inspector, Electrical Inspector and Assistant Electrical Inspector as
the Appellate Authority in the various Districts of the State. This
contention should fail only on the ground that the same has been done
by virtue of the Notification dated 16th April, 2004 referred to
above, the validity of which has been upheld by us.
29. The
above takes us to deal with the contention canvassed on behalf of the
petitioner that Section 127 of the Act, 2003 should be struck down as
ultra vires, as it imposes an
onerous condition of a pre-deposit of 50% of the assessment amount
before the appeal could be entertained by the Appellate Authority.
The submission is that such stringent conditions would defeat the
very purpose of the appeal and hence, invites the frown of Article 14
of the Constitution of India. It is also asserted that the
Parliament should have conferred the appellate authority with the
power to waive the full amount depending upon the nature of the case,
and the same not having been provided, the provision is ultra
vires Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. It is also submitted that the concept of
undue hardship has not been kept in view and further, the various
circumstances are not being taken into consideration, which
makes the legislation unconstitutional. It was also argued that
there is a possibility of abuse of power and unworkability of the
provision.
30. We
are not impressed by the above referred submission canvassed on
behalf of the petitioner because it is now well settled that the
right of appeal is the creature of the statute. Without a statutory
provision creating such a right, the person aggrieved is not entitled
to file an appeal. Had it been a case where the legislature would
have imposed such a condition before the final assessment is carried
out under Section 126 of the Act, then perhaps there could have been
some scope to argue that such a condition could not be imposed in the
very first round of adjudication. It is not so so far as the present
case is concerned. It is only after the Assessing Officer
adjudicates and passes the
final assessment order holding the consumer guilty of unauthorized
use of electricity and if the consumer is dissatisfied, or aggrieved
by such assessment intends to file an appeal, then such a condition
of pre-deposit of 50% of the assessment amount could not be termed as
onerous so as to declare it as ultra vires.
31. In
the aforesaid context, we may refer with profit to certain citations
in the field, which pertain to the conditions imposed while providing
for appeal as a statutory remedy.
32. In
Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v.
State of Gujarat, (1975)
2 SCC 175 : (AIR 1975 SC 1234), the Apex Court has opined thus:
The
right of appeal is the creature of a statute. Without a statutory
provision creating such a right the person aggrieved is not entitled
to file an appeal. We fail to understand as to why the legislature
while granting the right of appeal cannot impose conditions for the
exercise of such right. In the absence of any special reasons there
appears to be no legal or Constitutional impediment to the imposition
of such conditions. It is permissible, for example, to prescribe a
condition in criminal cases that unless a convicted person is
released on bail, he must surrender to custody before his appeal
against the sentence of imprisonment would be entertained. Likewise,
it is permissible to enact a law that no appeal shall lie against an
order relating to an assessment of tax unless the tax had been paid.
33. The
Constitution Bench in Nand
Lal and another v. State of Haryana and others,
AIR 1980 SC 2097, while dealing with the conditions imposed in
preferring an appeal or revision, has ruled thus:
It
is well settled by several decisions of this Court that the right of
appeal is a creature of a statute and there is no reason why the
legislature while granting the right cannot impose conditions for the
exercise of such right so long as the conditions are not so onerous
as to amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering the right almost
illusory(vide the latest decision in Anant Mills Ltd. v. State of
Gujarat,
AIR 1975 SC 1234). Counsel for the appellants, however, urged that
the conditions imposed should be regarded as unreasonably onerous
especially when no discretion has been left with the appellate or
revisional authority to relax or waive the condition or grant
exemption in respect thereof in fit and proper cases and, therefore,
the fetter imposed must be regarded as unconstitutional and struck
down. It is not possible to accept this contention for more than one
reason. In the first place, the object of imposing the condition is
obviously to prevent frivolous appeals and revision that impede the
implementation of the ceiling policy; secondly, having regard to
sub-sections (8) and (9) it is clear that the cash deposit or bank
guarantee is not by way of any exaction but in the nature of securing
mesne profits from the person who is ultimately found to be in
unlawful possession of the land; thirdly, the deposit or the
guarantee is correlated to the land holdings tax (30 times the tax)
which, we are informed, varies in the State of Haryana around a
paltry amount of Rs. 8 per acre annually; fourthly, the deposit to be
made or bank guarantee to be furnished is confined to the land
holdings tax payable in respect of the disputed area i.e. the area or
part thereof which is declared surplus after leaving the permissible
area to the appellant or petitioner. Having regard to those aspects,
particularly the meagre rate of the annual land tax payable, the
fetter imposed on the right of appeal/revision, even in the absence
of a provision conferring discretion on the appellate/revisional
authority to relax or waive the condition, cannot be regarded as
onerous or unreasonable. The challenge to S. 18(7) must, therefore,
fail.
[Emphasis supplied]
34. In
Vijay Prakash D. Mehta and
another v. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Bombay,
AIR 1988 SC 2010, the Apex Court was dealing with the provisions
contained in Section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962 wherein the said
provision provided that a person desirous of preferring an appeal was
required to deposit, with the proper officer, the duty demanded or
the penalty levied. There was also a stipulation that in any
particular case, if the Collector (Appeals) or the appellate tribunal
is of the opinion that the deposit of the duty demanded or the
penalty levied would cause undue hardship to such person, the
appellate authority may dispense with such deposit, subject to such
conditions as he or it may deem fit to impose so as to safeguard the
interests of the revenue. While dealing with the said provision,
their Lordships have opined thus:
The
aforesaid Section provides a conditional right of appeal in respect
of an appeal against the duty demanded or penalty levied. Although
the Section does not expressly provide for rejection of the appeal
for non-deposit of duty or penalty, yet it makes it obligatory on the
appellant to deposit the duty or penalty, pending the appeal, failing
which the Appellate Tribunal is fully competent to reject the appeal.
See, in this connection, the observations of this Court in respect of
Section 129 prior to substitution of Chapter XV by the Finance Act,
1980 in Navin Chandra Chhotelal v. Central Board of Excise and
Customs and Ors., 1981 (8) ELT 679 (SC). The proviso, however, gives
power to the Appellate Authority to dispense with such deposit
unconditionally or subject to such conditions in cases of undue
hardships. It is a matter of judicial discretion of the Appellate
Authority.
Thereafter,
their Lordships, while dealing with the right of appeal, have opined
thus:
Right
to appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural
justice the principles of which must be followed in all judicial and
quasi-judicial adjudications. The right to appeal is a statutory
right and it can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant.
35. In
view of the above, the contention as regards declaring Section 127 of
the Act as ultra vires also
fails.
36. We
are also not impressed by the submission of Mr. Shah that Section 145
of the Act, which bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in any
matter falling within the ambit of Section 126 or Section 127 of the
Act is concerned, deserves to be declared as ultra vires
the constitution of India, as the same could be termed as arbitrary
and unreasonable.
37. It
is now well settled that the question as regards ouster of a
jurisdiction of the Civil Court must be construed having regard to
the scheme of the Act, as also the object and purport it seeks to
achieve.
38. In
Dhulabhai and ors. Vs.
State of M.P and anr.
reported in (1968) 3 SCR 662, the Supreme Court summarised the
following
principles relating to the exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil
Court.
(a)
Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special
tribunals, the civil court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded
if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would
normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude
those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been
complied with or the statutory tribunals has not acted in conformity
with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
(b)
Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an
examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy
or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is
not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
Where
there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and
the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes
necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the
latter case, it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special
right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right
or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said
right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so
constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in
Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.
(c)
Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires
cannot be brought before tribunals constituted under that Act. Even
the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or
reference from the decision of the tribunals.
(d)
When the provision is already declared unconstitutional or the
constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is
open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the
claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but
it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit.
(e)
Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax
collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected,
a suit lies.
(f)
Questions of the correctness of the assessment, apart from its
constitutionality, are for the decision of the authorities and a
civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared
to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act.
In either case, the scheme of the particular Act must be examined
because it is a relevant enquiry.
(g)
An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to
be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.
[See
also Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and another v.
Krishna Kant and others (1995) 5 SCC 75; Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v.
Ramesh Chand Agarwal, (2003) 6 SCC 220; Sahebgouda v. Ogeppa (2003) 6
SCC 151; Dhruv Green Field Ltd. v. Hukam Singh (2002) 6 SCC 416 and
Swamy Atmananda and Ors. v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam and Ors., [2005
(4) SCALE 116]].
39. Taking
into consideration the peculiar features of the Electricity Act, and
more particularly the technical aspects involved so far as the
assessment under Section 126 of the Act, is concerned, in our view,
the legislature thought fit to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court so far as matters falling within Section 126 and Section 127 of
the Act is concerned, and it could not be said that on such ground
alone Section 145 of the Act should be struck down as ultra
vires
the Constitution.
40. Section
145 of the Electricity Act, 2003 would read as under:-
"145.
Civil Court not to have jurisdiction :-
No
Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or
proceeding in respect of any matter which an assessing officer
referred to in Section 126 or an appellate authority referred to in
Section 127 or the adjudicating officer appointed under this Act is
empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall
be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action
taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under
this Act".
41. Section
126 of the said Act would deal with the determination of the loss.
Section 127 of the Act deals with the appellate forum under which
the aggrieved party can file an appeal. A reading of Section 145 of
the Act would clearly indicate that no Civil Court shall have the
jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any
other matter, which the Assessing Officer referred to in Section 126
or an appellate authority referred to in Section 127 is empowered to
determine or act, only on such conditions being satisfied the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court as well as any other forum is ousted.
42.
This question regarding the civil courts or any other forums having
jurisdiction to deal with the situation on hand fell for
consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Punjab State
Electricity Board v. Ashwani Kumar, 1997 (5) JT (SC) 182. The
Apex Court while interpreting the scope of Section 9 of the Code of
Civil Procedure was of the opinion that by necessary implication the
cognizance of the civil Court as contemplated in the present set of
circumstances is ousted. As a consequence, the Apex Court held that
the civil Court in the circumstances will not be justified in
entertaining the complaint or giving a declaration when an adequate
remedy is provided under the Act for the redressal of the grievances.
The relevant discussion is to be found at para 10 which reads as
hereunder :
"10.
The question then arises : whether the Civil Court would be justified
in entertaining the suit and issue injunction as prayed for? It is
true, as contended by Shri Goyal, learned senior counsel, that the
objections were raised in the written statement as to the
maintainability of the suit but the same given up. Section 9 of
C.P.C. provides that Civil Court shall try all suits of civil nature,
subject to pecuniary jurisdiction, unless their cognizance is
expressly or by necessary implication is barred. Such suit would not
be maintainable. It is true that ordinarily, the Civil Court has
jurisdiction to go into and try the disputed questions of civil
nature, where the fundamental fairness of procedure has been
violated. The statutory circulars adumbrated above do indicate that a
fundamental fairness of the procedure has been prescribed in the
rules and is being followed. By necessary implications, the
cognizance of the civil cause has been excluded. As a consequence,
the Civil Court shall not be justified in entertaining this suit and
giving the declaration without directing the party to avail of the
remedy provided under the Indian Electricity Act and the Indian
Electricity (Supply) Act and the instructions issued by the Board in
that behalf from time to time as stated above."
43. In
the aforesaid context, we may also refer to a decision of this Court
in the case of Plasto
Processors and anr. Vs. Gujarat Electricity Board and ors.
2005 (2) GLR 993. A learned Single Judge of this Court made the
following observations:-
The
jurisdiction of the Civil Court is expressly excluded in respect of
the matters to be decided by the assessing officer under Section 126
or the appellate authority under Section 127 or the adjudicating
officer under Sec. 143, but it cannot be held that even if the action
is ultra vires the powers under Sec. 126 or 127 or if the action is
in breach of the statutory provisions
of the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court shall stand excluded.
In any event, it is apparent that until the decision
is rendered by the assessing officer or by the appellate authority or
the adjudicating officer under this Act, the jurisdiction of the
civil Court stands expressly excluded. However, if the decision is
taken by the appellate authority finally upon the assessment made and
if as per the consumer exercise of power is ultra vires the
provisions of the Act or in breach of the statutory provisions of the
Act, at that stage, but after final decision under Sec. 127 of the
new Act the jurisdiction cannot be said to be as excluded.
Jurisdiction of the Civil Court will normally stand excluded in
respect of matters which the assessing officer has to decide under
Sec. 126 or the appellate authority has to decide under Sec. 127 of
the new Act, but after the decision, if the provisions of the new Act
have not been complied with and/or the statutory Tribunal has not
acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial
procedure, the Civil Court will have jurisdiction, but only to that
extent and it will in any case not grant injunction against any
authority exercising power under the Act. In view of Sec. 145 of the
new Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded for matters
where the assessing officer has to decide under Sec. 126 or the
appellate authority has to decide under Sec. 127 of the Act or the
adjudicating officer has to decide under Sec. 143
of the new Act, but, after the decision is rendered by the assessing
officer or the appellate authority or the adjudicating officer, as
the case may be, the Civil Court will have
the jurisdiction only in those cases where the provisions of the new
Act have not been complied with or the assessing officer or the
appellate authority have not acted in conformity with the fundamental
principles of judicial procedure. In any case, in all cases, the
Civil Court shall not grant injunction in respect of any action taken
or to be taken in pursuance of the powers conferred by or under the
new Act.
44. We
are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned Single
Judge of this Court, quoted above. Therefore, the challenge to the
constitutional validity of Section 145 of the Act should also
necessarily fail.
45.
It is a well settled position of law that a statute can be
invalidated or held unconstitutional -
(i)
if it is ultra vires the Parent Act;
(ii)
if it is contrary to the statutory provisions other than those
contained in the Parent Act;
(iii)
if law making power has been exercised in bad faith;
(iv)
if it is not reasonable and it goes against the legislative policy;
and
(v) if
it does not fulfill the object and purpose of the enabling Act.
46.
The Constitution Bench of this Court in Mohd.
Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar [AIR 1958 SC 731]
while dealing with the meaning, scope and effect of Article 14,
reiterated what was already explained in earlier decisions that to
pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be
fulfilled, namely,
(i).
the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia
which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from
others left out of the group, and
(ii).
such differentia must have rational relation to the object sought to
be achieved by the statute in question. The Court further stated that
classification might be founded on different basis, namely,
geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like and
what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of
classification and the object of the Act under consideration.
47.
In Mohd. Hanif Quareshi [AIR 1958 SC 731], the Constitution
Bench further observed that there was always a presumption in favour
of constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him, who
attacks it, to show that there has been a clear violation of the
constitutional principles. It stated in para 15 of the Report as
under: (AIR pp. 740-41)
15.
& The courts, it is accepted, must presume that the legislature
understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people,
that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience
and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. It must
be borne in mind that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of
harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need
is deemed to be the clearest and finally that in order to sustain the
presumption of constitutionality the court may take into
consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report,
the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which
can be conceived existing at the time of legislation.
48.
The above legal position has been reiterated by a Constitution Bench
in Mahant Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi [AIR 1959 SC 942]
49.
In Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India [AIR 1960 SC 554],
inter alia, while referring to the earlier two decisions, namely,
Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. [AIR 1955 SC 661] and Mahant Moti Das [AIR
1959 SC 942], it was observed in para 8 of the Report as follows:
(Hamdard Dawakhana case [AIR 1960 SC 554], AIR p. 559)
8.
Therefore, when the constitutionality of an enactment is challenged
on the ground of violation of any of the articles in Part III of the
Constitution, the ascertainment of its true nature and character
becomes necessary i.e. its subject-matter, the area in which it is
intended to operate, its purport and intent have to be determined. In
order to do so it is legitimate to take into consideration all the
factors such as history of the legislation, the purpose thereof, the
surrounding circumstances and conditions, the mischief which it
intended to suppress, the remedy for the disease which the
legislature resolved to cure and the true reason for
the
remedy&.
In
Hamdard Dawakhana, the Court also followed the statement of law in
Mahant Moti Das and the two earlier decisions, namely, Charanjit Lal
Chowdhury v. Union of India [AIR 1951 SC 318] and State of Bombay v.
F.N. Balsara [AIR 1951 SC 318] and reiterated the principle that
presumption was always in favour of constitutionality of an
enactment.
50.
In one of the recent cases in Karnataka Bank Ltd., [(2008) 2 SCC
254] while referring to some of the above decisions, in para 19 of
the Report, this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 262-63)
19. The
rules that guide the constitutional courts in discharging their
solemn duty to declare laws passed by a legislature unconstitutional
are well known. There is always a presumption in favour of
constitutionality, and a law will not be declared unconstitutional
unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt; to doubt the
constitutionality of a law is to resolve it in favour of its
validity . Where the validity of a statute is questioned and there
are two interpretations, one of which would make the law valid and
the other void, the former must be preferred and the validity of law
upheld. In pronouncing on the constitutional validity of a statute,
the court is not concerned with the wisdom or unwisdom, the justice
or injustice of the law. If that which is passed into law is within
the scope of the power conferred on a legislature and violates no
restrictions on that power, the law must be upheld whatever a court
may think of it. (See State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara. [AIR 1951 SC
318])
51. We
are also not impressed by the submission of Mr. Shah that the
Appellate Authority, namely the Chief Electrical Inspector and other
Electrical Inspectors are always bias towards the consumers, as they
are appointed by the State Government. According to Mr. Shah, the
appeal, which is provided under the provisions of Section 127 of the
Act against the final assessment order passed under Section 126 of
the Act could not be termed as an efficacious remedy, and more
particularly, when Section 127 of the Act mandates deposit of 50% of
the amount assessed by the assessing officer in exercise of his power
under Section 126 of the Act.
52. The
rule against the bias is an offshoot of the principle of natural
justice. Bias by interest, which disqualifies an authority, falls
into two broad classes:
(a) where
the authority has a pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the
litigation;
(b) where
from kindred or other cause, the authority may have a bias in favour
of one of the parties.
53. In
cases of the present nature, we are concerned with that kind of bias
which falls category (b). This rule is based on the maxim "nemo
judex in causa sua",
which means that no man can be
a judge in his own cause. Only by virtue of the fact that the
appellate authority, namely the Chief Electrical Inspector and other
Electrical Inspectors are officers appointed by the State Government,
there cannot be a presumption that in all cases they would act in a
bias manner trying to favour the Electricity company. It would
depend from cases to cases and in a particular case, if there is
material to establish bias, then it could always be corrected by a
superior Court.
54. It
follows that in determining the question of personal bias, the Court
should see whether there is undisputed material which is likely to
give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of the
person complaining of bias taking care that the apprehension is not
vague, whimsical or capricious. The Court will have to satisfy of
three things before recording a finding of bias against an authority,
namely,
(i) there
is uncontroverted and undisputed material;
(ii) the
material is such as is likely to give rise to a reasonable
apprehension in the mind of the person complaining of bias; and
(iii) the
apprehension is not a vague, whimsical or capricious suspicion.
Thus,
we reject such contention of Mr. Shah so far as the appellate
authority being bias is concerned.
55. It
appears that the petitioner has also challenged the legality and
validity of the final assessment order dated 22nd February, 2010,
issued under Section 126 of the Act, 2003. It also appears that on
conclusion of the arguments on 11th September, 2013, and while making
the judgment CAV, we had made it clear in our order dated 11th
September, 2013, that we have not taken into consideration the remedy
pleaded in paragraph 10 Clause (f) and other consequential reliefs
and the pendency of this application would not stand in the way of
the petitioner in separately challenging the assessment order dated
22nd February, 2010, passed under Section 126 of the Electricity Act,
2013, before the appropriate forum, in accordance with law. We also
clarified that we had not gone into the merit of the order dated 22nd
February, 2010.
In
such circumstances, we have not touched the challenge to the legality
and validity of the order dated 22nd February, 2010.
56. In
the overall view of the matter, we are of the opinion that there is
no merit in any of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner
and the petition should fail.
57. In
the result, this petition fails and is hereby rejected. However, in
the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as
to costs.
(BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA,
C.J.)
(J.B.PARDIWALA, J.)
Mohandas
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