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Case Summary — Criminal Revision under Section 397 CrPC (Harsukhbhai Lakshmanbhai)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision arises from Criminal Case Nos. 392 of 1995, 428 of 1995 and 43 of 1996 filed by Gandalal Revabhai Chowdhary (respondent/complainant) against M/s. Bhagyoday Industries (accused No.3) and its partners (accused Nos.1 and 2). The complaint alleged sale and purchase transactions between the complainant and the firm amounting to Rs. 16,88,153/-, of which Rs. 10,95,000/- was paid and approximately Rs. 6,02,852/- remained unpaid. Three cheques were presented by the firm; one cheque for Rs. 4,00,000/- dated 30-6-1995 was dishonoured. Notices dated 10-7-1995 and 25-7-1995 were sent; the second notice was served. The complaint was filed on 2-9-1995 and, together with an affidavit, led to the learned Magistrate issuing summons under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Accused No.2 (petitioner) filed an application dated 14-8-2000 seeking discharge on the ground that he was not the drawer of the cheques and therefore should be acquitted. The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Mansa rejected that application by order dated 19-12-2000. The petitioner then preferred this Criminal Revision under Section 397 CrPC, filed about 10-1-2001; the High Court admitted the revision on 23-1-2001 and made it returnable for hearing. After final hearing, the High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision, upheld the Magistrate's order dated 19-12-2000, discharged the rule and vacated any earlier stay.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Magistrate erred in issuing summons on 2-9-1995 without conducting the examination of the complainant or applying Section 200 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure (as contended by the petitioner).
  2. Whether accused No.2 (a partner who did not personally sign/draw the cheque) can be held liable under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by reason of his status and participation in the partnership's business (i.e., whether he was "in-charge of" and "responsible to" the firm for the conduct of its business).
  3. Whether the petitioner's challenge to the issue of process can be entertained despite being raised at a late stage (delay/fag end pleading).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. Kakkad, Advocate)

  • The learned Magistrate ought not to have issued summons on 2-9-1995 because that order was inconsistent with the procedure in the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 200 — examination of complainant; Section 201 — procedure by Magistrate not competent to take cognizance; Section 202 — postponement of issue of process).
  • The petitioner asserted he was not the drawer of the cheque and therefore not liable under Section 138; he sought discharge on that basis (application dated 14-8-2000).
  • Relied upon K. M. Mathew (AIR 1992 SC 2206) to submit that a Magistrate may rescind process if complaint on its face does not disclose any offence and that the accused can plead that process ought not to have been issued.
  • Relied on Sushil Kumar Sen (AIR 1975 SC 1185) to argue that delay in raising the contention should not defeat substantive rights — procedural delay cannot override substantial justice.
  • Relied on multiple judgments (including Sham Sundar v. State of Haryana; State of Haryana v. Brij Lal Mittal; K.P.G. Nair; Mafatlal Swarupchand Thakkar; various High Court decisions and an unreported judgment of the High Court) to support the proposition that mere partnership or title alone does not fasten criminal liability on partners who were not in charge of or responsible for the firm's conduct; sleeping partners or directors not involved in day-to-day affairs should not be prosecuted merely by being named.

Respondent's Arguments (Shri A. J. Desai, A.P.P.)

  • From the averments of the complaint and the supporting affidavit filed on 2-9-1995, the complaint prima facie disclosed an offence against all accused, including accused No.2; thus, the learned Magistrate rightly issued summons under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  • The petitioner did not raise the present challenge earlier; the discharge application was filed only on 14-8-2000 and the revision only challenged the Magistrate's order dated 19-12-2000 — not the earlier order of issue of summons dated 2-9-1995 — and such late contentions cannot be entertained at the fag end of the hearing.
  • Supported the Magistrate's reasoning in the impugned order dated 19-12-2000 and contended the record supports issuance of summons and continuation of proceedings against accused No.2.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K. M. Mathew v. State of Kerala, AIR 1992 SC 2206 Magistrate may rescind or vary the interim order issuing process if, on reconsideration, the complaint on its face does not disclose any offence; accused may plead that process ought not to have been issued. The petitioner relied on this authority to challenge issuance of summons; the court considered the principle but found no merit in the petitioner's contention given the affidavit and facts before the Magistrate in 1995 and upheld the issuance of summons.
Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar, AIR 1975 SC 1185 Delay in raising a procedural contention should not automatically defeat substantive rights; procedural delay does not bar consideration of real justice (as relied on by petitioner). Petitioner cited this case to counter the objection of delay. The court considered delay but rejected the substantive contention on merits, not on procedural delay alone.
Sham Sundar & Ors. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1989 SC 1982 Partners who are sleeping partners or not in actual management should not be prosecuted merely by virtue of partnership; prosecution must establish that the partner was in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of business. Petitioner relied on this authority; the court distinguished it on the facts, finding accused No.2 was actively participating and not a sleeping partner, so the principle did not lead to discharge.
State of Haryana v. Brij Lal Mittal & Ors., 1998 (4) Supreme Today 364 Vicarious liability under provisions analogous to Section 141 arises only if a person was in-charge of and responsible to the company/firm for conduct of business; mere titular position is insufficient. Petitioner relied on this authority; the court found the complaint here contained specific allegations that accused No.2 was responsible and actively involved, and therefore Brij Lal Mittal did not mandate discharge.
K. P. G Nair v. M/s. Jindal Menthol India Ltd., 2000 (6) Scale 578 Complaint must, even at prima facie stage, indicate that the accused was in-charge of and responsible for the company's business to attract liability under provisions like Section 141. Relied upon by petitioner; court accepted the legal proposition but held that, on the facts before it, there were specific averments against accused No.2 establishing his role and responsibility, so the case for discharge did not succeed.
Mafatlal Swarupchand Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, 2000 (1) GLH (UJ-2) 1 Section 138 targets the person who drew the cheque (i.e., who maintained the account and signed the cheque); liability under Section 138 is to be strictly construed; mere presence/association does not attract liability. Petitioner cited the case to argue accused No.2 was not drawer and thus not liable. The court noted the proposition but concluded the facts here showed accused No.2 had participated in business dealings and given assurances, making Section 141 applicable.
Unreported High Court judgment (Misc. Cr. Appln. No. 3748 of 1996, Coram: S. D. Pandit, J., 18-10-1996) The complainant must aver that the accused was in actual management or in-charge of the business; mere allegation of directorship/partnership is insufficient to sustain proceedings against such person. Petitioner relied on the unreported judgment; the court observed the judgment's principle but held that the complaint in the present matter did contain specific allegations of active participation by accused No.2.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 67 (Cited in the unreported judgment) Principle that mere status (director/partner) without averments of actual control/management is insufficient to attract criminal liability. Cited in support of petitioner's reliance on the unreported decision; the High Court treated it as a background authority but distinguished the present facts.
B. Lakshmi v. M/s. Trishul Coal Services & Transporters & Ors., 1997 Cri. LJ 3616 (AP High Court) This High Court decision was relied upon by petitioner; the precise rule cited in the opinion is not reproduced in the provided text. The petitioner relied on it; the provided opinion does not state the Court's detailed application of that authority beyond noting it was cited.
Secundembad Health Care Ltd. & Ors. v. Secunderabad Hospitals Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 1998 (4) Crimes 74 This High Court decision was relied upon by petitioner; the precise rule cited in the opinion is not reproduced in the provided text. The petitioner relied on it; the provided opinion does not state the Court's detailed application of that authority beyond noting it was cited.
Sml. Sharda Agarwal & Ors. v. Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate II, Kanpur & Anr., 1992 Cri.LJ 1442 (Allahabad High Court) This High Court decision was relied upon by petitioner; the precise rule cited in the opinion is not reproduced in the provided text. The petitioner relied on it; the provided opinion does not state the Court's detailed application of that authority beyond noting it was cited.
Rajan Kinnerkar v. Eric Cordeiro & Anr., 1994 (2) Crimes 259 (Bombay High Court) Relied upon by petitioner; the precise rule cited in the opinion is not reproduced in the provided text. Cited by petitioner; the opinion does not elaborate how the court applied this specific precedent.
Mahendra Pratap Singh Ratra & Anr. v. M/s. N. K. Metals & Anr., 1998 Cri.LJ 4383 (Delhi High Court) Relied upon by petitioner; the precise rule cited in the opinion is not reproduced in the provided text. Cited by petitioner; the opinion does not elaborate how the court applied this specific precedent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two main stages: (1) consideration of the procedural challenge to the issuance of summons and (2) merits under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act with reference to partnership law.

1. Procedural challenge to issuance of summons (Sections 200/201/202 CrPC)

  • The court observed that the complaint was filed on 2-9-1995 and was accompanied by an affidavit. On that basis the learned Magistrate examined the record and was satisfied to issue summons under Sections 138 and 141. The High Court found no illegality in the magistrate's exercise of jurisdiction in issuing summons.
  • The court considered the petitioner's reliance on authorities that permit the Magistrate to rescind process if the complaint on its face discloses no offence, but concluded that the facts and record before the Magistrate in 1995 justified issuance of process; therefore the challenge to the 2-9-1995 issuing order lacked substance on merits.
  • The court also noted the chronology: the petitioner did not raise the present contention until 14-8-2000 and the revision challenged only the order dated 19-12-2000. The A.P.P. argued, and the court observed, that the delay in raising such a procedural challenge at the fag end weakens the petitioner's case; however, the court disposed the contention primarily on its merits.

2. Merits under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Partnership law

  • The court set out Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and relevant provisions of the Partnership Act (Sections 18, 19(1), 22 and 25) concerning agency, implied authority, manner of binding the firm and joint and several liability of partners.
  • On the facts, the court noted: accused Nos.1 and 2 were partners of M/s. Bhagyoday Industries; both had jointly carried on business with the complainant; both attended to the account-related matters; accused No.1 signed the cheques as partner and accused No.2 had assured the complainant that the cheques would be honoured.
  • Applying Section 141, the court concluded that where a partner was actively participating in the firm's business and was responsible to the firm for its conduct, that partner can be deemed guilty if an offence under Section 138 is established. The court held that the complaint contained clear and specific allegations against accused No.2 that he was responsible and participated in the business; hence he was in-charge of and responsible to the firm for the conduct of its business during the relevant period.
  • The court expressly distinguished the authorities cited by the petitioner (which mainly concern sleeping partners, directors not in actual management, or cases where the complaint lacked averments of in-charge/responsibility). The High Court observed that those authorities do not apply to the present factual matrix because here accused No.2 was not a passive partner but actively involved and had given assurances to the complainant.
  • The court also addressed the specific argument that Section 138 is strictly construed and targets the drawer. While recognizing the strict approach of Section 138, the court relied on Section 141 and partnership law to hold that, in these circumstances, accused No.2's conduct and participation made the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act applicable to him.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court's final decision was to dismiss the revision and to uphold the Magistrate's order.

Core Ruling: Criminal Revision Application dismissed; the order dated 19-12-2000 of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Mansa (dismissing the discharge application / refusing to discharge accused No.2) is upheld.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner (original accused No.2) remains an accused in the Criminal Cases and is not discharged at this stage; proceedings against him will continue in the trial court under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The rule is discharged and any earlier interim stay granted by the High Court is vacated.
  • Broader legal implications: The opinion applies established legal principles (including the requirement that a person must be shown to be in-charge of and responsible for the firm’s business to attract vicarious liability) to the specific facts and distinguishes precedents concerning sleeping partners or directors not involved in management. The court did not purport to lay down a new legal principle; rather, it applied existing authorities to the factual record and concluded that the present facts justified continuation of prosecution against accused No.2.

Final Disposition: Application dismissed; the Magistrate's order dated 19-12-2000 is upheld; the previously granted stay is vacated.

    Harsukhbhai Lakshmanbhai v. State Of Gujarat .

    1. Harsukhbhai Lakshmanbhai, petitioner-original accused No. 2 has filed this Criminal Revision Application under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'). The petitioner has challenged the order dated 19th December, 2000, passed by the learned J.M.F.C., Mansa, wherein the learned Magistrate was pleased to reject the application Exh. 97 in Criminal Case No. 392 of 1995, 428 of 1995 and 43 of 1996. The learned Magistrate rejected the said application of the accused wherein the accused has stated that he is not the drawer of the cheque as per the averments of the complaints and he may kindly be ordered to be acquitted of the charge of the offence alleged in the complaint.

    2. The facts giving rise to this application are as under :

    2.1 That one Gandalal Revabhai Chowdhary-respondent No. 2 filed a Criminal Case Nos. 392 of 1995, 428 of 1995 and 43 of 1996 against petitioner accused before the Court of learned J.M.F.C., Mansa. In that case, offences punishable under Sees. 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') were alleged against the petitioner-accused. In that case, as the facts set out in the complaint by the complainant, it has been stated that the respondent No. 2-complainant is carrying on business of commission. The complainant is a partner of the firm-Dhanlaxmi Corporation. In the complaint, it has been stated that there is a firm M/s. Bhagyoday Industries who is accused No. 3 and firm is having a Oil Mill. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 are partners of the said firm.

    2.2 It has been alleged that the business of sale and purchase between complainant and accused No. 3 were going on. In that business, accused No. 3 has to pay Rs. 16,88,153/- against the goods purchased by firm from the complainant. Out of that amount accused No. 3 has paid Rs. 10,95,000/-. Thereafter, accused No. 3 had presented following three cheques :

    Date Cheque Bank Name Amount

    1. 15-6-1995 858683 State Bank of India Rs.

    l,00,000/-

    2. 30-6-1995 858684 " "

    Rs.

    4,00,000/-

    3. 15-7-1995 858685 " "

    Rs. 1,02,855/-

    2.3 When the said cheques were issued in the name of partnership firm accused No. 1 has signed on behalf of accused No. 3 and accused No. 2 assured that the said amount will be paid by the firm in this behalf.

    2.4 From the record and the complaint it appears that on 30th June, 1995, when the cheques were presented of Rs. 4.00 lakhs the same was dishonoured. Thereafter, a notice was addressed on 10th July, 1995, as well as 25th July, 1995, to the accused though earlier notice was not served, but the second notice dated 25th July, 1995, was served to the accused. As about Rs. 6,02,852/-amounts due and payable were not paid, the complainant has filed present complaint on 2-9-1995 before the learned Magistrate, Mansa, being Criminal Case No. 428 of 1995. In that case also, the complainant has filed affidavit and the learned Magistrate passed the order on 2-9-1995 of issuing summons.

    2.5 In that case, original accused No. 2 has filed application dated 14th August, 2000, and prayed that as accused No. 2 who is admittedly not drawer of the cheque and as per the averments of the complaints may kindly be ordered to be acquitted of the charge of the offence alleged in the interest of justice. That matter was heard by learned Magistrate, Mansa. The learned Magistrate after considering the provisions of Sees. 138 and 141 of the Act, copy of the complaint and also considered some of the judgments cited by the petitioner accused had rejected the said application on 19-12-2000.

    2.6 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid order of the learned Magistrate, the petitioner-original accused No. 2 has filed this revision application before this Court somewhere on 10th January, 2001. On 23rd January, 2001, this Court has admitted the matter and made returnable on 6-2-2001.

    3. In view of the aforesaid proceedings the matter has been taken up for final hearing.

    The petitioner's Counsel contention challenging order of learned Magistrate dated 2-9-1995 issuing summons.

    4. Mr. Kakkad, learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that, in this case, originally complaint was filed on 2nd September, 1995. Along with the complain! an affidavit was also filed and ultimately on 2nd September, 1995, the learned Magistrate has issued summons in view of Sees. 138 and 141 of the Act. He submitted that the learned Magistrate ought not to have issued summons in this behalf, and that the order of the learned Magistrate issuing summons is contrary to and inconsistent with the provisions of the Code particularly Section 200 of the Code which provides examination of complainant along with section 201 of the code which provides for procedure by Magistrate not competent to take cognizance of the case and section 202 of the code which provides for postponement of issue of process.

    4.1 In support of his contention, he has relied upon judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of K. M. Mathew v. State of Kerala & Anr., reponed in AIR 1992 SC 2206. In para 8 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :

    "It is open to the accused to plead before the Magistrate that the process against him ought not to have been issued. The Magistrate may drop the proceedings if he is satisfied on reconsideration of the complaint that there is no offence for which Ihe accused could be tried. It is his judicial discretion. No specific provision is required for the Magistrate to drop the proceedings or rescind the process. The order issuing the process is an interim order and not a judgment. It can be varied or recalled. The fact that the process has already been issued is no bar to drop the proceedings if the complaint on the very face of it does not disclose any offence against the accused."

    4.2 Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sushil Kumar Sen v. State Of Bihar, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1185. Relying upon para 6 of the said judgment, he submitted that merely because the accused has not raised this contention at the earlier stage and also at the subsequent stage and only raised at the fag end, it cannot be defeated only on the ground of delay because according to him, the processual law should not dominates and should not defeat substantive rights and substantial justice in this behalf.

    4.3 On the other hand, Shri A. J. Desai, learned A.P.P., for the respondent has taken me to the entire complaint. From the averments of the complaint he submitted that the complaint prima facie discloses the offence against all the accused including accused No. 2. The learned A.P.P., has tried to support the reasonings of the learned Magistrate in his order dated 19-12-2000. The learned A.P.P., further submitted that, in this case, the complaint was filed on 2nd September, 1995, and in support of the complaint, an affidavit was also filed, and thereafter, the learned Magistrate was satisfied and ultimately issued summons by his order dated 2-9-1995 as per Sees. 138 and 141 of the Act. He has further submitted that after the issuance of the said summons, petitioner-accused No. 2 has filed application for acquitting him only on 14th August, 2000, before that the accused has not raised any contention in this behalf. He has also further submitted that when the learned Magistrate passed impugned order dated 19-12-2000 also the accused has not raised the contention in this behalf. He has further submitted that even the revision application filed on 10-1-2001 in para 6(a) the petitioner-accused No. 2 has challenged the only order dated 19-12-2000 passed below at Exh. 97 and he has not challenged the earlier order dated 22-9-1995. In view of the same, he submitted that in any view of the matter, the learned Advocate for the petitioner cannot challenge the order dated 2-9-1995, in view of this facts and circumstances of the case, only at the fag end of final hearing, the learned Advocate for the petitioner-accused No. 2 cannot raise such contention in this behalf.

    4.3(A) In my view, there is no substance in the contention of the petitioner. In this case, complaint was filed in 1995, affidavit was also filed in 1995, the learned Magistrate after satisfying himself and after going through record of the case issued summons under the provisions of the Code in 1995. In my view, the learned Magistrate has rightly exercised jurisdiction of issuing summons after going through the record of the case. So even on merits also order of the learned Magistrate is legal and valid. In view of the same, the first contention raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioner is rejected.

    Contention regarding Section 138 and Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act :

    5. Before I consider the rival submission on merits of the matter, let me refer the statutory provisions. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account is falling under Chapter 17 of the Act. The title of the said Chapter is as follows:

    Chapter 17 :- Of penalties in case of dishonour of certain cheques for insufficiency in the accounts."

    Section 138 of the Act reads as under "Section 138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account :- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the Bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that Bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence, and shall without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both :

    Provided that nothing contained in this Section shall apply unless -

    "Offences by companies :- (1) If the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly :

    Provided that nothing contained in this sub-sec138tion shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

    (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section(1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly."

    6. The learned A.P.P., has also relied upon Chapter 3 of the Partnership Act which provides relations of partners to third parties. He has also relied upon Section 18 of the Partnership Act which provides partner to be agent of the firm subject to the provisions of this Act, a partner is the agent of the firm for the purposes of the business of the firm.

    Section 19(1) which defines implied authority, is subject to the provisions of Section 22.

    Section 22 which provides mode of doing act to bind firm :-

    In order to bind a firm's, an act or instrument done or executed by a partner or other person on behalf of the firm shall be done or executed in the firm name, or in any other manner expressing or implying an intention to bind the firm."

    Section 25 which provides for liability of a partner for acts of the firm :-

    Every partner is liable, jointly with all the other partners and also severally, for all acts of the firm done while he is a partner.

    7. The learned Counsel for petitioner has submitted on merits of the matter, that in any view of the matter, the impugned order of the learned Magistrate dated 19th December, 2000, is illegal and bad in taw. He has submitted that the learned Magistrate has erred in holding that the complaint is against the firm and all the partners of the firm, and therefore, if any of the accused intends to take benefits of the settled legal position they should allow to complete the Court proceedings otherwise this application is not liable to be granted.

    7.1 Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment in the case of Sham Sundar & Ors. v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1982. In para 9 after considering Section10 of the Haryana Rice Procurement (Levy) Order 1979, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :

    "It is, therefore, necessary to add an emphatic note of caution in this regard. More often, it is common that some of the partners of a firm may not even be knowing of what is going on day to day in the firm. There may be partners, better known as sleeping partners who are not required to take part in the business of the firm. There may be ladies and minors who were admitted for the benefit of partnership. They may not know anything about the business of the firm. It would be a travesty of justice to prosecute all partners and ask them to prove under the proviso to sub-section(1) that the offence was committed without their knowledge. It is significant to note that the obligation for the accused to prove under the proviso that the offence took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such offence arises only when the prosecution establishes that the requisite condition mentioned in sub-section(1) is established. The requisite condition is that the partner was responsible for carrying on the business and was during the relevant time in charge of the business. In the absence of any such proof, no partner could be convicted. We, therefore, reject the contention urged by Counsel for the State."

    7.1(A) He has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Brij Lal Mittal & Ors., reported in 1998 (4) Supreme Today 364. After referring to Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, though Section is pan materia of Section 141 of the Act the Hon'ble Apex Court on page 369 observed as under :

    It is thus seen that the vicarious liability of a person for being prosecuted for an offence committed under the Act by a company arises if at the material time he was in-charge of and was also responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. Simply because a person is a director of the Company it does not necessarily mean that he fulfills both the above requirements so as to make him liable. Conversely, without being a director a person can be in-charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. From the complaint in question we, however, find that except a bald statement that the respondents were directors of the manufacturers, there is no other allegation to indicate, even prima facie, that they were in-charge of the Company and also responsible to the company for the conduct of its business.

    7.2 He has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K. P. G Nair v. M/s. Jindal Menthol India Ltd., reported in 2000 (6) Scale 578. In para 7 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :

    "From a perusal of the excerpts complaint it is seen that nowhere it is stated that on the date when the offence is alleged to have been committed, the appellant was in-charge of or was responsible to the accused company for the conduct of its business."

    Thereafter, in para 8 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under :

    "From a perusal of Section 141 it is evident that in a case where a company committed offence under Section 138 then not only the company, but also every person who at the time when the offence was committed, was incharge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. It follows that a person other than the company can be proceeded against under those provisions only if that person was in-charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business."

    7.3 He has also relied upon the judgment in the case of Mafatlal Swarupchand Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2000 (1) GLH (UJ-2) 1. In that case, from the facts it appears that the complainant was doing the money lending business and only allegation against accused No. 2 that he was accompanied with the accused No. 1 and there was no allegation against accused No. 2. In that case after quoting Section 138 in para 8 the Court has held as under :

    Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, therefore, has taken due care to fasten criminal liability on a party, who squarely fall within the first phrase, i.e., first opening part of section 138. under section 138 only that person can be prosecuted who has drawn cheque on an account maintained by him with the banker for the payment. If this test is applied in the present case it clearly appears that the accused No. 2 i.e., present petitioner is not a person, who has drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him with the banker. No liability, therefore, would arise so far the present petitioner, i.e., accused No. 2 is concerned. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as aforesaid has been enacted for special purposes, and therefore, it must be strictly interpreted and strictly applied. There is no scope of application of Section 114 of the I.P.C., in prosecution taken in Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This is so because for the special purpose as aforesaid a criminal liability is fastened by this piece of Legislation to an exclusively civil transactions, and therefore, the same is required to be interpreted and applied strictly. So far as accused No. 1 is concerned, he might be squarely falling within the mischief of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act because he has signed the cheque and he maintains the account at Bank for which the cheque is drawn. It is immaterial that who wrote in the body of cheque, and for that the accused No. 2, cannot be made responsible under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Likewise, merely accompanying with the accused No. 1 to the complainant or even requesting the complainant for the advances of money, would not render accused No. 2 liable for prosecution under Section 138, which only recognises the person who has drawn the cheque, and person who has drawn the cheque is a person who has signed the cheque and who is maintaining account in his name with the banker. In these circumstances, the accused No. 2 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is improperly involved in this prosecution.

    7.3(A) The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon Unreported Judgment of this Court in Misc. Criminal Application No. 3748 of 1996 decided by this Court (Coram : S. D. Pandit, J.), on 18th October,. 1996. This matter was also arose out of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In that case, complaint was filed against the Company and other accused on the ground that other accused were the manager of the Company, chairman and managing director of the company and other directors of the Company. On page 3 of the said judgment, the Court has observed as under :

    "It is very pertinent to note that the complainant has no where alleged in his complaint that the accused No. 7 - the petitioner before me is in actual management of the business of the accused No. 1-Company. It is not the claim of the complainant that petitioner-accused No. 7 was conducting the business of the company. When the complainant does not allege in his complaint that the accused-petitioner was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business or that he was in-charge of the business of the Company or that he was looking after the day to day affairs of the Company, merely because the accused petitioner being the director of the Company the complainant would not be justified in naming him as an accused in the case."

    Thereafter, after considering the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi & Ors., reported in AIR 1983 SC 67, on Page 4 and 5 the learned single Judge has held as under :

    "In the present case, there is not a single averments made by the complainant respondent No. 1 in the complaint to hold that in view of the said averments the petitioner-accused will have to go before the trial Court. Merely because the petitioner-accused happens to be the director, even taking into consideration of the provisions of Section 141 of the said Act, the prosecution launched against the petitioner-accused will have to be quashed. The view taken by me is aiso taken by this Court (B. C. Patel, J.), in the earlier decision in Misc. Cri. Appln. No. 601 of 1991 to 603 of 1991 and 606 of 1991 and 705 of 1991 and 706 of 1991 on 27-12-1993. Thus, I hold that in view of the averments made in the complaint itself, the order of issue of process against the petitioner-original accused No. 7 is not justified, and therefore, the petitions will have to be allowed and the order of issue of process against the petitioner in Cri. Case Nos. 244 of 1991 to 247 of 1991 and 285 of 1991, 316 of 1991 and 317 of 1991 will have to be quashed."

    7.4 Learned Counsel for the petitioner has similarly relied upon the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of B. Lakshmi v. Mis. Trishul Coal Services & Transporters & Ors., reported in 1997 Cri. LJ 3616 and in the case of Secundembad Health Care Ltd. & Ors. v. Secunaerabaa Hospitals Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., reported in 1998 (4) Crimes 74. Similarly, he has relied upon the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Sml. Sharda Agarwal & Ors. v. Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate II, Kanpur & Anr., reported in 1992 Cri.LJ 1442. He has also relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Rajan Kinnerkar v. Eric Cordeiro & Anr., reported in 1994 (2) Crimes 259 and also the judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Mahendra Pratap Singh Ratra & Anr. v. M/s. N. K. Metals & Anr., reported in 1998 Cri.LJ 4383.

    7.5 Relying upon the aforesaid judgments, he submitted that accused No. 2 was not in charge of the firm and was not responsible to the firm for the conduct of his business, and therefore, in any view of the matter he should be discharge at this stage.

    8. I have considered the provisions of Section 138 and Section 141 of the Act and also the relevant provisions of partnership act which has been relied upon by the learned A.P.P., in this behalf. I have already set out the facts in this case in which applicant-original accused is a partner in the firm which has carried out on business with the complainant in fact total business of sale and purchase between complainant and accused to the extent Rs. 16,88,153/- and about Rs. 10,95,000/- has been paid and only about Rs. 6 lacs were to be paid by the accused. The complainant has averred in his complaint that accused No. 1 and 2 were the partners of M/s. Bhagyodaya Industries, partnership firm which is of accused No. 3 and this business was carried out since 1995 and both the accused have jointly carried out business as a partners in the said firm. In fact, when the account was opened, both the accused No. 1 and 2 went to complainant in connection with sale and purchase of the business. The cheques have been drawn by accused No. 1 in his capacity as a partner of the partnership firm and accused No. 2 has assured the complainant that as and when the cheques were presented in the Bank the same may be honoured in due course. In view of this facts and circumstances of the case, the provisions of Section 138 and Section 141 of the Act are clearly applicable to this case. In my view, in this case when accused No. 2 applicant herein is a partner of the firm and when he has actually actively take part in carrying on business as a partner of partnership firm is concerned, the accused No. 2 is responsible to the firm for the carrying on the business of the firm and during relevant time he was in charge of the business of the firm. He shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be punished for the offence accordingly. There is clear and specific allegation against accused No. 2 that the business has been carried out with his knowledge and he was responsible to the firm in connection with carrying on business. In my view, the offence have been committed with consent or connivance of accused No. 2 applicant herein and commission of offence can also be attributable to the conduct of the accused No. 2. The provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act clearly applies to this case and provisions of the partnership act also support my conclusion. All other cases which have been relied upon by the petitioner are cases of firm or companies of in relation to partners or directors where there are some partners/directors who are actually associated with the carrying on business whereas there are some partners/directors who are partners/directors who are actually not concern with the day-to-day working of the Company, but they enjoyed certain position or social status, and they become directors and in that context the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the other judgments of High Courts have held that such directors/partners are not responsible for carrying on business of the Company/firm and to that extent they may be discharged. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court are binding on me, however these principles are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. The case of respondent No. 2 is not that he is sleeping partner or he is not required to take part in the day-to-day business of the firm. In this case, offence has taken place within knowledge of the accused No. 2 and he has not exercised due diligence to prevent such offence may not take place.

    9. In view of the same, the Criminal Revision Application is dismissed.

    The order dated 19-12-2000 of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Mansa, dismissing the discharge application is legal and valid and the same is upheld. Rule is discharged. The stay granted earlier by this Court shall stand vacated.

    10. Application dismissed.

    Negotiable Instruments Act.
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