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  • Rule 33 (1) (b) of the Bombay Civil Service Rules, 1959 ('the BCSR' for short).
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • Rule 33 (1) (b) of the said Rules.
  • Rule 33 (1) (b)
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Citation Codes
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  • Rule 33 (1) (b) of the Bombay Civil Service Rules, 1959 ('the BCSR' for short).
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • Rule 33 (1) (b) of the said Rules.
  • Rule 33 (1) (b)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a workman, filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking direction to regularise his service as a clerk in Danta Taluka Panchayat with consequential benefits and, by amendment, to set aside an alleged oral order of termination said to have been made on 30.11.1988.

According to the petition, the petitioner was first appointed from 3.3.1983 as a work-charge clerk for 29 days and was thereafter repeatedly employed on successive short-term orders (typically for 29 days) with an admitted break of seven months between May and December 1983. The last appointment order dated 1.11.1985 described him as a mistry on daily wage with a stipulation that he could be relieved at any time without notice. By order dated 11.2.1987 he and others were appointed as work-charge clerks on "scarcity relief work" to end with the closing of relief works. An order on 30.7.1988 relieved him with effect from 31.7.1988 on termination of the scarcity relief work.

The petitioner alleges that he continued to work from 1.8.1988 and was orally discharged on 30.11.1988. The Taluka Development Officer denies any service after 30.7.1988 and states the petitioner had joined a separate Special Civil Application No.1577 of 1988 (which the petitioner admitted). Thus, continuity of service after 30.7.1988 and the alleged oral termination on 30.11.1988 are disputed questions of fact.

Because the facts about continuation of service and the legality of the alleged oral termination involve disputed factual questions, the Court identified limitations on what could be decided in these Article 226 proceedings and framed the central legal issue as whether, disregarding artificial breaks, the petitioner had acquired status entitling him to protection under Rule 33(1)(b) of the Bombay Civil Service Rules (BCSR).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner, by disregarding artificial breaks caused by successive short-term appointment orders, had acquired continuous service such that he should be regularised in service.
  2. Whether the alleged oral termination on 30.11.1988 amounted to "retrenchment" and, if so, whether mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (including Section 25F) were violated.
  3. Whether Rule 33(1)(b) of the Bombay Civil Service Rules applied to the petitioner and, if so, whether termination without notice or notice pay violated Rule 33(1)(b).
  4. Whether the last appointment (for scarcity relief work) terminated by efflux of time, and if so, whether that precludes application of Rule 33(1)(b) or claims of wrongful termination or entitlement to regularisation.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The repeated issuance of 29-day appointment orders and interposed breaks were artificial, unfair and arbitrary, intended to prevent acquisition of rights.
  • He had put in continuous service amounting to three years and had completed 240 days of work in the year preceding termination, invoking protection under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act and entitling him to regularisation.
  • Alternatively, termination without notice or notice pay violated Rule 33(1)(b) of the Bombay Civil Service Rules and entitled him to relief.
  • Relied on several judgments (including Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation) to argue that ignoring artificial breaks and demonstrating continuous service supports confirmation, equal pay, and reinstatement in some cases.

Respondents' / Taluka Development Officer's Arguments

  • Denied that the petitioner worked after 30.7.1988; asserted that the petition suppressed the fact of the petitioner's participation in Special Civil Application No.1577 of 1988.
  • Contended that the petitioner's appointments were not against a permanent vacancy, were for specific short-term jobs or works under different heads and different employers, and the last appointment expressly provided termination on completion of scarcity relief work.
  • Relied on an earlier order of this Court dismissing a petition with similar facts (Special Civil Application No.3548 of 1997) and submitted the petitioner should be relegated to alternative remedies, including making representations.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mariamben Amirbhai v. State of Gujarat [1985 (2) GLR 946] Denouncing use of repeated short-term (29-day) employments as subterfuge to circumvent rules. Cited to show such practice is unfair; Court noted factual differences in that case (employed against a permanent post or interim relief was in operation).
Dineshkumar Himatlal Nimavat v. State of Gujarat [1987 (2) GLR 1146] Similar principle against circumventing rules by short fixed-term appointments. Referred to for the proposition that resorting to 29-day engagements to avoid rules must be condemned; factual distinctions noted.
Ghanshyam M. Pandya v. State of Gujarat [1985 GLH (UJ) 51] Repeated multiple appointment orders can indicate a substantive vacancy and/or that the person acquired status of temporary government servant; oral termination may be arbitrary. Cited to demonstrate circumstances where multiple renewals supported temporary government status and made oral termination arbitrary; used for comparison on facts.
Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation [(1990) 1 SCC 361] Three years' continuous service (ignoring artificial breaks) may be sufficient for confirmation; findings of tribunal on duties and pretense for non-regularisation; equal pay and reinstatement remedies where dismissal is arbitrary. Relied on to support petitioner's contention in principle but Court noted that in that case the Tribunal was directed to take evidence and factual questions were resolved by the Tribunal, unlike the present proceeding.
Sub-Divisional Soil Conservation Officer, Idar v. M.M. Saiyed [1990 (1) GLR 495] Rule 33(1)(b) of BCSR applies to termination of temporary government servants and absence of requisite notice voids termination; but efflux of time under last appointment may lead to different conclusion. Used to show that Rule 33(1)(b) can apply in some temporary appointment cases, but that if the last appointment terminates by efflux of time, Rule 33(1)(b) may not be attracted.
C.D. Chauhan v. Reserve Bank of India [1991 (2) GLR 1192] Emphasises \"right to work\" and right to livelihood; courts can act where similarly situated persons are preferred over incumbent workers; factual background included selection and wait-listing. Cited for the broader principle that courts can protect livelihood rights where facts show unfair practices; Court observed the factual distinctness (selection and wait-list existed in that case).
Gujarat Agricultural University v. Rathod Labhu Bechar [AIR 2001 SC 706] Scheme for regularisation/absorption of daily wage workers after ten years' service (example of approved phased regularisation scheme). Referred to as an example where a regularisation scheme was framed and approved; Court noted differences in present facts.
State of Gujarat v. P.J. Kampavat [34 (1) GLR 848] (Supreme Court) Rule 33(1)(b) not applicable where Rule 2 non obstante clause and appointment terms expressly provide termination without notice; such appointments are contractual and outside BCSR. Strongly relied upon: Court applied this principle to hold that appointments clearly contractual/co-terminous with a specific term may be outside BCSR and not attract Rule 33(1)(b).
Savitaben M. Patel v. State of Gujarat [38 (2) GLR 1567] 29-day appointments are fixed-term; services liable to be terminated without notice; Rule 33(1)(b) not attracted. Used to support view that short fixed-term appointments may not attract Rule 33(1)(b).
Nilesh Bhatt v. Administrative Officer, Nagar Pradhamik Shikshan Samiti [1996 (1) GLH 108] Ad-hoc, temporary, fixed-term appointments liable to be brought to an end earlier without notice; principles of natural justice need not apply; prolonged ad-hoc service does not necessarily ripen into regular service. Cited to support that temporary/ad-hoc appointments do not create substantive rights to permanent posts merely by prolonged service.
Vithalbhai Babaldas Patel v. Chairman, Oil & Natural Gas Commission, Dehradun [28 (2) GLR 1308] Work-charge employees engaged for short periods contingent on work cannot claim permanent appointment; regularisation must follow settled rules and selection procedures; regularisation may infringe Articles 14 and 16. Applied to caution that regularisation absent proper procedure risks violating equality and opportunity in public employment; used to deny automatic conversion of contingent appointments into permanent posts.
State of U.P. v. Ajay Kumar [1997 (4) SCC 88] Regularisation requires existence of a post and administrative/statutory instruments to fill it; daily-wage appointments relate to contingent establishments where no post exists; regularisation of such daily wagers can be set aside. Relied upon to show that daily wage appointments in contingent establishments do not create posts that can be regularised.
Ashwanikumar v. State of Bihar [1997 (2) SCC 1] If initial entry was unauthorised and not against a sanctioned vacancy (without budgetary backing), the question of regularisation does not survive. Applied to support the proposition that appointments de hors budgetary sanction or sanctioned vacancies confer no right to regularisation.
Special Civil Application Nos.708 of 1989 and 5315 of 1992 (this Court) Previous applications with similar facts were rejected by this Court. Cited as internal precedent indicating consistent rejection of similar claims in like circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by identifying both factual disputes and the legal question that could be determined on the record. The Court emphasized that whether the petitioner continued to work after 31.7.1988 and whether an oral termination occurred on 30.11.1988 were disputed questions of fact not amenable to resolution in these Article 226 proceedings without evidence.

Given that limitation, the Court focused on whether, disregarding the alleged artificial breaks, the petitioner had acquired the status of a temporary government servant such that Rule 33(1)(b) of the BCSR would apply and entitle him to notice or notice pay.

The Court observed that the petitioner had not shown how the BCSR applied to his case; crucially, he was never appointed against a sanctioned vacant post after any process of selection or regular recruitment. The appointment orders reflected different jobs, different accounting heads for wages, and, at least in one relevant instance, a different employer (Executive Engineer, Roads & Buildings).

The Court examined the nature of the last appointment (11.2.1987) as one made expressly for scarcity relief work and terminable with the closing of that relief work. Applying precedents (including the Supreme Court decision in State of Gujarat v. P.J. Kampavat and related Gujarat and other decisions), the Court noted that fixed-term or contractual appointments expressly terminable by efflux of the specific work or term may fall outside the ambit of Rule 33(1)(b).

The Court balanced authorities supporting regularisation where facts showed workmen performed the same duties as regular incumbents or where administrative schemes provided for regularisation, against authorities holding that contingent, ad-hoc or fixed-term appointments not made against sanctioned vacancies do not give rise to a right to regularisation. The Court found the present facts closer to the latter line of authorities.

Concluding its analysis, the Court held that the employment throughout remained outside the regular establishment, was for particular jobs or works (not against vacancies), and the employment was terminated in accordance with the last appointment order for scarcity relief work. On these bases and following the cited precedents, the Court found the petitioner had not acquired the status of a temporary government servant entitled to Rule 33(1)(b) protection.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is rejected. The Rule is discharged and there is no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The petitioner is not entitled to reinstatement or regularisation of service on the facts before the Court.
  • The Court held that the petitioner failed to establish acquisition of status as a temporary government servant entitled to the protection of Rule 33(1)(b) of the BCSR.
  • The decision follows existing precedents cited and does not purport to create a new legal principle; it applies established ratios concerning contractual/fixed-term and contingent appointments versus appointments against sanctioned vacancies.

    Anvarkhan R. Makarani v. State Of Gujarat & Ors.

    1. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner-workman has prayed for a direction to regularise his service on the post of a clerk in Danta Taluka Panchayat with all consequential and incidental benefits. As the service of the petitioner was alleged to have been terminated on the day the petition was filed, i.e. 30.11.1988, a further prayer by an amendment is made to set aside the alleged oral order of termination.

    2. According to the petition, the petitioner, being qualified and registered with the employment exchange, was appointed from 3.3.1983 as a work charge clerk for a period of 29 days in the respondent No.2 - Danta Taluka Panchayat. Subsequently, he continued to be employed as a clerk or mistry on similar appointment orders employing him for a fixed period of 29 days with a clear break of seven months from May 1983 to December, 1983. The successive orders of appointment on or for specific job and for specific periods are placed on record. The last such order dated 1.11.1985 appointed the petitioner as a mistry on daily wage basis with the stipulation that he could be relieved at any time without notice. Thereafter, by an order dated 11.2.1987 of the Executive Engineer, Roads & Buildings, Panchayat Department No.1, Palanpur, the petitioner along with 117 other persons was appointed as work-charge clerk on purely temporary basis and with the express condition that the appointment was on `scarcity relief work' and would automatically come to an end with the closing of the relief works. It appears that by an order dated 30.7.1988 of the Taluka Development Officer, the petitioner was relieved with effect from 31.7.1988 on termination of the scarcity relief work. Immediately after that, on 1.8.1988, the petitioner made a fresh application for appointment which was considered by the Taluka Panchayat in its meeting dated 14.10.1988 and it was resolved to appoint the petitioner after obtaining prior permission of the District Panchayat. However, the District Panchayat having not approved the appointment, the petitioner was no more employed by any of the respondents. The allegation of the petitioner that he continued to work in the same office under the same employer from 1.8.1988 till he was orally discharged on 30.11.1988, is denied in the affidavit of the Taluka Development Officer, according to which, after the termination of the petitioner's service from 30.7.1988, the petitioner had never worked. It is also stated by the Taluka Development Officer that the petitioner had along with other employees filed Special Civil Application No.1577 of 1988 through their Union and the fact of its disposal by this Court was suppressed in the petition. It is admitted by the petitioner in his rejoinder that he had joined in the Special Civil Application No.1577 of 1988 as a petitioner and as one of the persons who were working in the scarcity relief work. Thus, the service of the petitioner or continuation thereof after 30.7.1988 till the alleged oral termination is in dispute. And the alleged oral termination on 30.11.1988, the legality and validity thereof as also whether such alleged oral termination amounted to "retrenchment" and whether any of the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were violated, involve disputed questions of fact which cannot be resolved in this proceedings.

    3. On the basis of the above facts, it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the breaks brought about in the continuity of his service by issuance of orders of appointment for 29 days were artificial, that such practice was unfair and arbitrary, that the petitioner had put in continuous service of three years and also completed 240 days of work in the year preceding his termination and, therefore, the termination of his service was void ab initio for being in violation of the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act and that the petitioner was also entitled to regularization in service. It was also argued in the alternative that the termination of service of the petitioner being admittedly without notice or notice pay, the same also violated Rule 33 (1) (b) of the Bombay Civil Service Rules, 1959 ('the BCSR' for short). However, as seen earlier, the petitioner's case has to be considered on the basis that his service had been terminated on completion of the scarcity relief work and the factum of his alleged subsequent service as also the legality and validity of its termination having fallen in the area of disputed questions of fact cannot be decided. Therefore, the issue that falls for consideration is whether, disregarding the artificial breaks brought about by the successive orders of appointment for 29 days, the petitioner had acquired the status of a temporary employee entitled to notice and protection of Rule 33 (1) (b) of the BCSR. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, despite a specific query in that regard, failed to point out as to how the BCSR were applicable in the facts of this case. And, the fact which has to be borne in mind is that the petitioner was never appointed on or against a vacant post after undergoing any process of selection or regular recruitment.

    4. Relying upon a judgment of this Court in MARIAMBEN AMIRBHAI V. STATE OF GUJARAT [1985 (2) GLR 946] and in DINESHKUMAR HIMATLAL NIMAVAT v. STATE OF GUJARAT [1987 (2) GLR 1146], it was submitted that by resorting to the subterfuge of employing for 29 days at a stretch, an attempt was made to circumvent the provisions of the Rules and resort to such kind of unfair tactic by the State must be denounced. In the facts of those cases, the petitioners were either employed against a permanent post or continuation of interim relief against termination of such employees was in operation. In GHANSHYAM M. PANDYA v. STATE OF GUJARAT [1985 GLH (UJ) 51], the factum of 42 appointment orders during a period of little more than four years was taken to indicate that there was vacancy and the petitioner was appointed on such vacancy. It also appeared that appointments for only 29 days were given so that the employee would not acquire any right over the post to which he was appointed. The action of giving such appointments appeared to be arbitrary and the petitioner was held to have acquired the status of a temporary government servant. The oral order terminating the service of such employee was, therefore, also held to be arbitrary.

    4.1 Relying upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation . CORPORATION [(1990) 1 SCC 361], it was urged that three years of experience and continuous service, ignoring artificial breaks created by the respondent, would be sufficient for confirmation of the petitioner. It was also pointed out from the said judgment that the petitioners were held to be entitled to equal pay at par with the persons appointed on regular basis on similar post and the petitioners who were ousted from service pending the petition were also ordered to be reinstated. It must be noted that, in the facts of that case, daily rated workmen of the respondent-corporation had approached the Court and the respondent had raised several questions of fact. The Court had directed the Industrial Tribunal to examine the contentions of the petitioners after taking evidence and the Tribunal had found that the petitioners were performing same or similar duties as were performed by the regular incumbents. The reason for non -regularisation was found to be a pretense and dismissal of certain workmen was also found to be arbitrary, discriminatory, illegal and by way of unfair labour practice. Accordingly, framing of a scheme for regularization of the service of the petitioners was directed.

    4.2 Relying upon a judgment of this Court in SUB-DIVISIONAL SOIL CONSERVATION OFFICER, IDAR v. M.M.SAIYED [1990 (1) GLR 495], it was submitted that Rule 33 (1) (b) of the BCSR was attracted in case of termination of a temporary government servant and in absence of the requisite notice, the order would get voided. It is, however, clearly observed in the judgment that if the service had come to be terminated by efflux of time under the last appointment order of 29 days, the situation would have been different. And, on facts, the government servant was found to have acquired the status of a temporary government servant.

    4.3 The judgment of this Court in C.D. CHAUHAN v. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [1991 (2) GLR 1192 ] was relied upon to submit that "right to work" was the most precious liberty and the right to livelihood was a part of `right to life'. If the State or its instrumentality cannot be compelled to provide adequate means, but when persons equally situated are sought to be offered the right to work in preference to those who have been working in the State or in its instrumentality, the Court can definitely jump into action and can perform the role expected of it. In fact, the important and distinct background in that case of regularisation of mazdoors in the Reserve Bank was that the workmen had been, after being qualified, selected and wait-listed for appointment, made to work as daily wage mazdoors even when vacancy had occurred or sanctioned posts were available. In GUJARAT AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY v. RATHOD LABHU BECHAR [AIR 2001 SC 706] relied upon by the petitioner, a scheme for regularisation was made and approved for absorption in a phased manner of daily wage workers who had completed ten years of service.

    5. The first hurdle in consideration of the petitioner's case for regularisation on the basis of his alleged continuous service under the Taluka Development Officer for about two years is that not only the continuity is broken by the so-called artificial breaks but his posting and jobs as also the works on which he was employed are different. Each of the relevant appointment orders indicate separate heads under which the wages paid to the petitioner were to be accounted. Besides that, the petitioner appears to have submitted fresh applications for each of the appointments and his last appointment under the Executive Engineer, Roads and Buildings clearly appears to be altogether under a different employer on a clear condition and stipulation of termination at the end of the relief works. In such circumstances, a case for regularisation under the Taluka Development Officer on the basis of two years of alleged continuous service is not made out.

    6. As against the facts and submissions as above, the learned counsel for respondent No.3 only relied upon order of this Court in Special Civil Application No.3548 of 1997 by which the petition was dismissed in similar set of facts and the petitioner was relegated to alternative remedies including making of a representation.

    7. In STATE OF GUJARAT v. P.J.KAMPAVAT [34 (1) GLR 848], a decision of the Supreme Court, it was held that Rule 33 (1) (b) of the BCSR was not applicable in such cases in view of the opening words of Rule 2 of the BCSR, which contained the non obstante clause ("except where it is otherwise expressed or implied"), and because the order appointing the respondents expressly stated not only that the service shall be terminated at any time without giving any notice and without assigning any reasons, but also that the appointment was for a limited period co-terminous with the concerned Minister's tenure. It was held that the terms of appointment and undertaking executed in those terms were clearly inconsistent with Rule 33 (1) (b) of the said Rules. The Supreme Court held that the appointment of the respondents was a pure and simple contractual appointment and that such appointment did not attract and was outside the purview of the BCSR, and no order of termination as such was necessary for putting an end to the service, much less a prior notice.

    In SAVITABEN M. PATEL v. STATE OF GUJARAT [38 (2) GLR 1567], the appointment of the petitioners for 29 days was held to be a fixed term appointment and it was held that as per the terms and conditions of appointment, their services were liable to be terminated without any notice and Rule 33 (1) (b) of the BCSR was not attracted.

    In NILESH BHATT v. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, NAGAR PRADHAMIK SHIKSHAN SAMITI [1996 (1) GLH 108], where the appointment was itself ad-hoc, temporary and for a fixed term and subject to further stipulation that it was liable to be brought to an end earlier without notice, it was held that the principles of natural justice did not have to be followed while terminating the services of such employees. It was held that a person who was appointed on temporary basis did not acquire any substantive right to the post and that mere prolonged continuous ad-hoc service did not ripen into a regular service to claim permanent or substantive status.

    In VITHALBHAI BABALDAS PATEL v. CHAIRMAN, OIL & NATURAL GAS COMMISSION, DEHRADUN [28 (2) GLR 1308], work-charge employees appointed for short periods according to contingencies could not claim that their appointments should be made permanent. It was held that regular appointments under such authorities were required to be made in accordance with settled law or rules or regulations governing such appointments and the prescribed procedure. It was further held that if employment or appointment of temporary or ad-hoc appointee is regularised, guarantee of equality and equality of opportunity in matters of public employment enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution would be infringed, and such regularisation would encourage back-door appointments denying equality of opportunity to those who were eligible for the post.

    In STATE OF U.P. v. AJAY KUMAR [1997 (4) SCC 88], the Supreme Court while considering the question of regularising the daily wagers, held that there must exist a post and either administrative instruments or statutory rules must be in operation to appoint a person to the post, and that daily wage appointment will obviously be in relation to contingent establishment in which there cannot exist any post and it continues so long as the work exists. The orders regularising the services of the daily wagers were, therefore, set aside.

    In ASHWANIKUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR [1997 (2) SCC 1], the Supreme Court held that where the initial entry itself was unauthorised and not against any sanctioned vacancy, the question of regularising the incumbent would never survive for consideration. It was held that the posts or vacancies must be backed up by budgetary provisions so as to be included within the permissible infrastructure of the scheme, and that any posting which is de hors the budgetary grant and on a non-existing vacancy, would be outside the sanctioned scheme and would remain totally unauthorised. No right would accrue to the incumbent of such an imaginary or shadow vacancy.

    Relying on the above judgments, this Court (Coram: R.K. Abichandani, J.) has, in Special Civil Application No.708 of 1989 and Special Civil Application No.5315 of 1992, rejected similar claims in similar set of facts.

    8. Respectfully following the ratio of the judgments referred to hereinabove and in view of the fact that the employment of the petitioner under the respondent all throughout remained outside the regular set up and on a particular job or work as distinguished from being against any vacancy and the employment having been terminated in terms of the last appointment order appointing him on scarcity relief work, the petitioner is neither entitled to reinstatement nor regularisation. It has also to be clarified and held that the petitioner has failed to establish that he had in any way acquired the status of a temporary government servant.

    9. Under the circumstances and for the reasons discussed hereinabove, there is no substance in the contentions raised and the claims made in the petition and, therefore, the petition is rejected. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.

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    Anvarkhan R. Makarani v. State Of Gujarat & Ors.
    (Sep 28, 2001)