1. In this group of 14 petitions which demonstrate common questions of law and facts, not much but every thing would depend upon the say of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha (1969) X GLR 992.

2. The question which was presented before the Supreme Court for consideration and decision was in respect of the time lag, during which the powers under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 could be exercised. The pronouncement takes into consideration the date of granting of the orders for the non-agricultural use, namely July 02, 1960, along with the date of the setting aside of the orders of the Collector, namely, 12th October, 1961. The pronouncement also takes into consideration the fact that, there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211 of the Code. After pointing out this Statutory position, the pronouncement goes further to say that this power must be exercised within a reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and nature of the order which is being revised. Any how the Apex Court also further says that section 65 of the code indicates the length of the reasonable time within which the revisional powers under Section 211 of the Code could be exercised. Ultimately, the pronouncement rendered by the Apex Court rules that, reading sections 211 and 65 of the code, it seems very clear that these powers must be exercised within a few months of the passing of the orders sought to be revised. I would prefer to under-line the words exercise because as it would become evident, a little bit later, the learned Government Counsel Ms. Mandavia would like to urge that, even the initiation of the action under Section 211 of the Code or some preparatory work being done by the State Government, there before, would also be able to save the situation and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Raghav Natha (supra) would not be attracted.

3. The broad facts which would form the background for all these petitions are not in dispute. It appears that on December 22, 1977 the State Government had adopted a Resolution for introducing a suitable package of incentive, for the encouragement of the industries in the State after having undertaken a detailed study of various aspects, including the scope and the nature of the incentives. The basic idea of the State Government in adopting this Resolution was to formulate a policy for achieving the wider object of the development of small, medium and large scale industries in the rural areas of the State. This could have been done by affording an opportunity to the industries to grow. This could further only be done after giving certain incentive. The Resolution dated December 22, 1977 shows Annexure-I and carves out certain areas to which the incentives package formula would be applicable. Zone-I, Zone-II and Zone-Ill has been provided in the schedule. District of Vadodara with five Talukas thereunder, including the Taluka of Waghodia has also been shown under Zone-Ill. By a later Notification it was thought fit to establish the growth centres. Without going into much details in this respect, it must be said that Waghodia falling under the Vadodara District was also accepted as one of such growth centres.

4. The Government was aware that for the purpose of establishing industries as envisaged under the new policy, the prime requirement would be to make available the suitable lands within the areas, which were included in the zone and to which certain advantages and incentives were to be given. According to the formula, as Waghodia Taluka was declared as the growth centre, falling under Grade-C if the industries were to be set up in this growth centre, a cash subsidy at the rate of 15% of the fixed asset or Rs. 25,00,000/- whichever would be less would be available to the industries under different modes under the scheme. It is not in dispute that the lands concerning these petitions would fall within the Waghodia Takuka of the Vadodara District to which all these incentives would be available. By a Resolution dated March 31, 1981, the Government had also decided that those lands which would be situated within the limits of 24 kilometres from the Municipal limits of Ahmedabad and Vadodara but were out side the limits of Urban Development Area would also get the benefit of the scheme as already referred to above.

5. Looking to this incentives, it appears that a number of land occupants in villages under the Waghodia taluka had submitted necessary application for obtaining N.A. permission under section 65 of the code. It shall have to be emphasised that these applications were submitted by the original occupants or the landlords and not by the purchasers or some profit hunters popularly known as "middle men" with a view to earn from the policy of the Government. This aspect requires a special mention because as it would be evident from the orders of revision a view possibly had impressed the authority, that all these permissions might have been acquired by me transferees or the vendees or some "middlemen".

6. The following Table would show the number of petitions, name of the respective petitioner, survey number and the name of the village, and the date of the grant of the N.A. permission. It would also show the date on whcih the respective sale deeds came to be executed by the original owner after obtaining the necessary permission of non-agricultural use under section 65 of the code. The Table would also indicate the date of the notice under which the powers under Section 211 of the Code were sought to be exercised. The last column of the Table would show the date of the orders which are impugned in the present proceedings.

7. Even a causal look at the above said Table would show that in all the petitions, except Special Civil Applicatiohe original owners have approached this Court in the capacity of the petitioners. The petitioner M/s. Jailaxmi Estate happen to be the purchaser and the petitioner in the said petition No. 5298 of 1983. The Table would also go to show very clearly that in all the petitions before transferring the land under the duly registered sale deeds, the origianl occupants had obtained the necessary N.A. permissions. This fact requires to be re-emphasised once again with a view to meet with the case of the revisional authority that, possibly such transfers would have been made for the purpose of profiteering from the rural agricultural lands. The Table would also go to show that in all the cases the sale deeds came to be executed in year 1981, while the notice under Section 211 of the Code came to be issued in the month of April 1983. The question, therefore, which arises for the consideration, while deciding this group of petitions, is as to whether this can be said to be the exercise of the revisional powers under Section 211 of the Code within a reasonable time.

8. As indicated earlier, the Supreme Court was precisely concerned with the case falling under sections 65 and 211 of the code. The permission for the non-agricultural use was granted on a remand by the Collector of Rajkot and the lands were put to the non-agricultural use. The Commissioner who at that time would be the revisional authority under Section 211 of the Code had issued the necessary notices and ultimately the orders granting the N.A. permissions came to be set aside vide the orders dated 12th October 1961. The principle adopted by the Supreme Court is that this revisional powers must be exercised within a reasonable time. It is also pointed out by the Supreme Court that the question of reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised. Ultimately, the Supreme Court has taken into consideration the provisions contained under section 65 of the code and has opined that, "a reasonable time limit" one gets in the provisions contained under section 65 of the code itself. When that reference is made to the text of the said provision, it appears very clearly that an occupant of a land which is being assessed and held for the purpose of agriculture, is entitled to put the land on the non-agricultural use. Under the procedure provided by this section itself, the occupant has to obtain the permission of the Collector and that the Collector has to process the application on the receipt of it. Section 65(1)(b) makes it abundantly clear that if the Collector fails to inform the applicant, of his decision on the application, within a period of three months, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. Therefore, reading these provisions along with the provisions contained under Section 211 of the Code, a view has been taken by the Supreme Court that in such a case when the orders under section 65 of the code are involved, the revisional authority acting under Section 211 of the Code must exercise the revisional powers within a few months. Undoubtedly, in the instant petitions such powers have not been exercised within a few months of the order granting permission for putting the land to the N.A. permission.

9. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Patel Raghav Natha (supra), a Bench decision of this Court has, also said, that, though no period of limitation is prescribed under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, this power of revision must be exercised in a reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the. nature of the order which is being revised. This is the say of the Bench of this Court in case of Bhagwanji Bawanji Patel v. State of Gujarat and Anr. (1971) XII GLR 156. Though the Supreme Court in case of Raghav Natha (supra) has said that this exercise must be within a period of few months, this Bench decision says that the maximum period cannot be more than a year from the date of the orders, which are to be revised under Section 211.

10. A similar view has been taken by learned single Judge of this Court in Bipinchandra G. Dalai and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Anr. [1987(2)] XXVIII (2) GLR 971. In that decision also this Court was concerned with the exercise of the revisional powers under Section 211 of the Code while reviewing the orders made under section 65 of the code. This decision makes it clear that the revisional jurisdiction must be exercised within a reasonable time especially with respect to the orders under Section 65. Even incurring the distaste of repetition it shall have to be emphasised that, what this Court has said in this decision is also in respect of the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction and not of the initiation of any such proceeding or only the moving of the Government machinery as being urged by the learned Government Counsel Ms. Mandavia. In Govindbhai Somabhai Nai and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. [(1987 (2)] XXVIII (2) GLR 760 it has been said that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Raghav Natha (supra) would not be applicable in the said case. The reasons for coming to this conclusions are not far away to seek. As it is evident from the above said decision, after the enactment of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961 the authority to grant the N.A. permission came to be delegated to the District Panchayat under Section 157 of the Act. There was a further scope for a redelegation of the powers to the Taluka Panchayat. The Government had passed two orders under which such powers were delegated to the District Panchayats and there was a direction to District Panchayat that this powers can be redelegated to the Taluka Panchayat. It was found, as a fact, in the said case that, though the powers were delegated to the District Panchayat Mehsana, there was not a redelegation of the powers in favour of the Taluka Development Officer, Kalol. It was, therefore, further held and ruled that the orders passed by the Taluka Development Officer, granting permission to the petitioners, for making use of their lands was without authority and wholly void. After pointing out this nature of the orders in question, the learned single Judge has said that, as the Taluka Development Officer, Kalol had no right or authority to grant such permission, his orders were ab initio void and therefore, a nullity. This decision, therefore, would also go to show that ordinarily the exercise of the powers under Section 211 of the Code must be within a reasonable time when the orders under section 65 of the code are sought to be revised. Nonethless this principle would not be attracted in cases in which the orders sought to be revised could be branded as nullity. A similar view has been taken by the learned single Judge of this Court in Koli Nagjibhai Varjan v. State of Gujarat [1992(1)] XXXIII (1) GLR 14. This decision also after making a reference to Supreme Court decision in case of Raghav Natha (supra) says that, normally the powers of revision could be exercised within a reasonable time where by law no period is prescribed. However, when the transaction is non-est, the Court cannot validate that transaction by invoking this principle laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Raghav Natha. The learned single Judge was undoubtedly concerned with the provisions contained in the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation And Consolidation & Holdings Act, 1947 and especially with Section 9 thereof. It was found as a fact that the transaction was running counter to the provisions of the said Act and therefore, the very transaction was non-est or void ab-initio. This decision, therefore, shall have to be taken as saying that if the transaction is non-est or void ab-initio, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Raghav Natha shall not be attracted. In Mavji Dhorji and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Anr. [1994(1)] 14(1) GLH 20 a similar view has been taken. While considering the provisions contained under section 84c of the bombay tenancy & agricultural lands act 1948, it has been said that, if the transaction or the order is void the period of limitation for exercise of the revisional powers as ruled by the Supreme Court in case of Patel Raghav Natha (supra) would not be attracted. It shall have to be appreciated that, in this case also the learned single Judge was concerned with the proceedings under Section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act.

11. Thus, on a compactus of decisions which have been cited at the Bar, the unequivocal principle laid down by the Supreme Court appears to have been followed by saying that, if the order granting the permission for non-agricultural use under Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code are to be revised under Section 211 of the Code, it must be done within a reasonable time and that looking to the special provisions embodied in section 65 of the code a few months can be said to be a reasonable time during which the powers shall have to be exercised.

12. It is settled that, there is a fine distinction between the orders which can be said to be illegal or invalid orders on one hand and the orders which can be said to be ab-initio void or orders in nullity. A mere error of law or a mere non-performance of a duty by an officer acting under a particular Statute would not render his orders void ab-initio. The orders under challenge do demonstrate that the authority passing the orders was of course enlightened on this aspect. The revisional authority, namely, Special Secretary (Appeals, Revenue Department, Ahmedabad, was aware of a hurdle or a predicament in his way being created by the Supreme Court decision, in case of Raghav Natha (supra). The authority knew well that the hurdle can be crossed only if the orders granting the N.A. permission could be characterised or branded as the orders void ab-initio. The Special Secretary (Appeals), in the course of his orders, has tried to distinguish, define and distribute the orders in two groups, illegal and invalid orders on one hand and orders which would be orders void ab-initio. The enlistment made by the revisional authority does not appear to be complete. Apart from those orders enlisted by the revisional authority there could be still some orders which could be said to be orders void ab-initio. Anyhow, one thing which must be taken as a settled legal position that a mere faulteries here and there by an authority acting under a statute while passing certain orders would not drag the orders in the arena of orders ab-initio void was present to the mind of the authority also. But this all is for a mere academic purpose because the study of the orders passed by the Special Secretary would go to show that there was not even a single irregularity or non-compliance with the provisions of the Statute. The Supreme Court had an occasion to make more clear the distinction between the orders which can be regarded as legal orders on one hand and the orders void ab-initio on the other. The Supreme Court pronouncement in case of Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey and Anr. thus:

But it is well settled that a Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit and over the parties thereto, though bound to decide right may decide wrong; and that eventhough it decided wrong, it would not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. It had the jurisdiction over the subject-matter and it had the jurisdiction over the party, and, therefore, merely because it made an error in deciding a vital issue in the suit, it cannot be said that it has acted beyond its jurisdiction. As has often been said, Courts have jurisdiction to decide right or to decide wrong and eventhough they decide wrong, the decrees rendered by them cannot be treated as nullities.

13. This decision, rendered by the Supreme Court way back in year 1964, makes it abundantly clear that if the authority had jurisdiction over the subject-matter and over the parties also, merely because the authority had made an error in deciding a vital issue in the matter it cannot be said that the orders would result into nullity. The Supreme Court probably was on a recognised principle that when the authority has the jurisdiction to decide a thing the same should stand decided in a right manner. But occasions do arise when the matter may get decided in a wrong manner too. But this would not render the order pronounced by the authority void ab-initio. Therefore, even if it is to be accepted that the orders sought to be revised by the revisional authority, were in contravention of certain provision of law or certain directions issued by the Government they cannot be termed as orders void ab-initio. This again is for the academic purpose, because in my view no irregularity whatsoever appears to have been committed by the authority granting the permission for non-agricultural use, under the orders which came to be revised after a pretty long time, after bearing a bad name of orders void ab-initio.

14. A large area admeasuring more than 350 Acres of land situated under Waghodia Taluka had the benefit of obtaining the non-agricultural use permission. This was done by the original landlords or occupants. In no case the non-agricultural use permission has been obtained by a transferee or a vendee after the execution of the sale deed. The petitioners in each of the petitions have attributed mala fide on the part of the Government. I do not propose to decide these matters even on remote concern with the mala fide alleged to the State Government. In my view, therefore, a detailed reference to the allegations of the mala fides in the petitions should not find their place in the present orders. It would suffice to note that, according to the petitioners, following a Government policy large areas of lands were permitted to be converted to the non-agricultural lands use. But later on an Intra-Cabinet dispute had resulted into the revision of the orders. I may not go to that aspect as, already indicated by me the fate of the petitions do not depend upon the allegations or the proof of the mala fides on the part of the State Government. The question is as to whether any of the infirmities pointed out by the revisional authority can be said to be even an illegality or an irregularity. While considering this question, one will have to forget everything regarding the orders which could be said to be orders in nullity or orders void ab-initio. On reading of the orders under challenge it becomes clear that they do not even breach of any provision or rule and that the orders granting the permission at any rate, even cannot be characterised, as illegal or invalid, justifying the exercise of the revisional powers under Section 211 of the Code.

15. The revisional authority, as pointed out earlier, was conscious that he would not be able to revise the orders after such a pretty long time because that exercise would run counter or diametrical to the rule of the Supreme Court in case of Patel Raghav Hatha (supra). The authority, therefore, was conscious that this could be done by characterising the orders granting N.A. permission as orders in nullity. While doing this exercise the revisional authority has accepted that the authority who had given the permission for the N.A. use was competent to do so and that, the said authority never lacked the necessary jurisdiction. This much has been made abundantly clear in the revisional orders.

16. The first ground on which the orders are sought to be characterised as nullity is the say that, in all these matters the permissions were obtained not by the occupants but by some other persons whose names had never appeared in the Revenue record. This finding in a vague and round about fashion recorded by the revisional authority probably wanted to say that, there was a large scale purchase of the lands by industrialists and even before their names could be entered in the Revenue record, the N.A. use permissions were granted to them. If this is the meaning which the revisional authority wanted to give to its order, it shall have to be said, of course with anxiety and concern, that there appears to be a total non-application of mind on the part of the revisional authority, as the table shows, in all the cases the N.A. permissions was asked for and obtained not by the transferees or the vendees but the original landlords or occupants, whose names stood in the Revenue records since long. There was not a single case in which the N.A. permission was applied for or was obtained by the transferee or the vendee after obtaining the transfer in his name. Thus, the very first ground under which the orders granting the N.A. permission are sought to be characterised as orders void ab-initio or orders in nullity vanishes. On the contrary, this demonstrates a total non-application of mind on the part of the authority exercising the revisional jurisdiction. It may also be indicative of a manner or a fashion in which the revisional powers were being exercised, which in any case and in any view of the matter, appears to be cavalier.

17. The second ground on which the orders granting the N.A. use permission are sought to be branded as the orders in nullity or orders void ab-initio is the ground that the use to which the lands were to be put were open N.A. use. The revisional authority says that in all the cases such a permission has been granted and later on the factories could not have come up on this lands. This is nothing but putting a cart before the horse. When the N.A. permissions were obtained there was no factory and there was no construction. The lands were agricultural lands in respect of which the permissions were sought for and were given. If after the granting of the permission and after the transfer of me land to certain other people, the buildings and factories have come up, can it be said for a moment that the authority granting the permission had passed such orders which could be characterised as orders in nullity or orders void ab-initio. Moreover, a reference to the provisions contained under section 65 of the code does not invite such a distinction. Section 65 speaks of the conversion of the use of the land from agriculture to non-agriculture. The amended provisions under section 65a of the code prescribe the procedure if the occupant wishes to put to and use for his land to a different form of Non-Agricultural use not envisaged under the original orders. This amendment is the Statutory recognition of a prevalent practice to obtain me permission on the change of the purpose. Merely because after obtaining me N.A. permission, after the sale of me lands to the third parties and after construction of me factory buildings, the Government was of the opinion mat mis could not have been done, the orders granting the N.A. permission can never be said to be orders in nullity or orders void ab-initio. The reasoning adopted by the revisional authority for coming to mis conclusion appears to be so amusing mat it deserves an outright straight rejection.

18. These are the grounds on which the revisional authority has said mat the orders would be orders in nullity or orders ab-initio void. On examination of the reasoning adopted by the revisional authority, it becomes clear mat not only me orders cannot be said to be orders in nullity or orders void ab-initio but even they cannot be said to be the orders falling within the category of invalid or illegal orders.

19. The learned Government Counsel Ms. Mandavia wanted to urge with great emphasis that, even if the principle is to be accepted that the revisional powers must be exercised under Section 211 of the Code within a reasonable time, the reasonableness of the time should be decided qua the date of the commencement of the proceedings. Ms. Mandavia, placing reliance upon the observations of the revisional authority wanted to urge further that, this all was brought to the notice of the Government, some officer was appointed to make necessary inquiries and ultimately the notices were issued and the powers were exercised. The learned Counsel Mr. Patel for the petitioners while replying this contention wanted to urge that, there is absolutely no mention in the show cause notice saying that the Government would like to treat the orders as orders in nullity. The learned Counsel further urges that, what the Government had done as a spade work, preparatory to the exercise of the powers under Section 211, was never brought to the notice of the petitioners and that this becomes evident for the first time, when one reads the orders of the revisional authority. The question appears to have been decided in case of Patel Raghav Natha (supra). The Supreme Court does not speak of the initiation of the proceedings under Section 211 of the Code. This decision of the Supreme Court and the decisions referred to above, would speak not of initiation of the proceedings but the exercise of the revisional powers under Section 211. The whole exercise of revision must be done within the time frame as provided by the Supreme Court in case of Raghav Natha (supra). If the Supreme Court wanted to rule that even an initiation of the proceedings by way of notice within a reasonable time would salvage the situation, it would have so befallen from the Supreme Court, which has not happened. Moreover, no decision says that some preliminary exercise to be done by the Government popularly known as 'Spade Work' would amount to the exercise of the powers within the meaning of Section 211 of the Code. Moreover, if initiation is to be taken into consideration, then also, as seen from the Table, it is definitely not within the time frame. The spade work or the inquiry by some Government officer would not tantamount to exercise of the powers under Section 211 of the Code.

20. In view of this position even if it is accepted, disregarding the contention of the learned Counsel Mr. Patel that nothing was brought to the petitioners even during the course of the hearing, then also, all what is done by the revisional authority cannot be said to be the exercise within the time frame provided by the Supreme Court in case of Raghav Natha (supra).

21. In the four petitions at Sr. No. 11 to 14, in addition, the notices under Section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 came to be issued on September 15, 1983, the further implementation of the same have been stayed, while granting Rule in these matters. These notices shall have to be quashed for the apparent reason that before the transfer of the lands involved in the said petitions, the provisions for conversion to Non-Agricultural use were already obtained. Thus, these lands, before the sale had, ceased to be the Agricultural lands to which the provisions of Section 84C of the Act of 1948 could be made applicable. The provision contained under Section 84C of the Act of 1948 can be invoked only in respect of a transfer or acquisition of any land, which is or becomes invalid under the provisions of the Act of 1948. The lands involved in these petitions had come out of the purview of the Act of 1948, and therefore, the proceedings under Section 84C of the Act of 1948 could not have been initiated. Such notices, therefore, shall have to be quashed.

22. Three conclusions, therefore, would follow; firstly the revisional authority was not justified in taking up the exercise of revision after such a pretty long time as evidenced by the Table above referred, in view of the Supreme Court pronouncement in case of Raghav Natha (supra). Secondly & alternatively even if it is to be accepted that the revisional authority could do so after such a pretty long time, then also, the orders granting the N.A. use permission can never be said to be orders in nullity or void ab-initio. Going a step further, I shall have to say that, a close scrutiny of the reasons assigned by the revisional authority demonstrates that these orders even cannot be said to be illegal, invalid of unlawful orders. Thirdly, and lastly, the notices under Section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1948 shall have to be quashed.

23. Therefore, the impugned orders/notices shall have to be quashed and set aside by allowing the present petitions. This group of petitions, therefore, shall stand allowed. The impugned order/notices are hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly.

24. The learned Government Counsel Ms. Mandavia at this juncture points out a Bench decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 2000 of 1971, decided on 21/22-11-1974 and urges that, there could not be any estoppel against the Statute and that, though the proceedings are initiated after a pretty long time, it cannot be said that the authorities are estopped from exercising the powers. This decision has no application in the facts of the present case, because therein certain transactions were entered into by the petitioner which were clearly against the provisions of the saurashtra ghar khed tenancy settlement & agricultural lands ordinance, 1949, sections 54 & 75 of the Ordinance had provided for the restrictions of the transfer of agricultural lands in certain cases and summary eviction of the persons unauthorisedly occupying or wrongly possessing of any such land. Here, once again the question was in respect of a transaction which was violative of a special enactment brought by way of an Ordinance with a view to prevent the transfer of certain agricultural lands in favour of non-agriculturist. The action might be regarded as non-est or void ab-initio. In such a case, definitely as held by me, the principles under the principle laid down by Supreme Court in case of Raghav Natha (supra) might not be attracted. This decision, therefore, hardly renders any assistance to learned Government Counsel Ms. Mandavia. The conclusion, therefore, remains unchanged.