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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant is the original plaintiff in Civil Suit No. 214 of 1979 seeking a declaration that he is the absolute owner of survey Nos. 54/1 and 54/2, village Mahobatpara, Taluka Vanthali, District Junagadh. He says the land originally belonged to Noormohmed Nagori who mortgaged it in 1951; after Noormohmed's death in 1960 his heirs Sonbai (mother) and Valbai (daughter) became tenants in common. The applicant purchased the lands from Sonbai and Valbai under a registered sale deed dated 28th August, 1968 and was put in possession; the opinion also contains a later reference to a registered sale deed dated 28th June, 1968 in the narrative concerning the suit (both dates appear in the text).

In 1969 proceedings under the Evacuee Property Act, 1950 were initiated and the lands were declared evacuee properties. They were dealt with under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 and the present opponent No. 4 (Mulchand Khatumal Khimani) was allotted the lands and was ordered to be put in possession.

The plaintiff filed Civil Suit No. 214 of 1979 challenging the evacuee declaration and seeking a declaration of ownership and protection of possession. The suit was brought against the Collector of Junagadh, Mamlatdar of Vanthali and the Union of India (opponents Nos. 1–3). Opponent No. 4 moved under Order I, Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC to be impleaded as a co-defendant, alleging he was the successor of the original allottee and claiming a Sanad and entitlement to possession. The learned Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Junagadh allowed that application on 30th June, 1979, holding that opponent No. 4 was a necessary party whose rights were likely to be settled in the suit. The original plaintiff challenged that order by way of revision to the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned trial Judge correctly exercised the discretionary power under Order I, Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Code to implead opponent No. 4 as a co-defendant notwithstanding the plaintiff's opposition.
  2. Whether opponent No. 4 (the allottee) was a necessary or proper party to the suit such that his presence before the court was required to enable the court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant / Original Plaintiff

  • Alleged title to the lands by registered sale deed (dated in the opinion as 28th August, 1968) purchased from the heirs of Noormohmed Nagori and asserted continuous actual possession.
  • Opposed the application to implead the allottee as a co-defendant; the opinion records "stiff opposition" from the plaintiff to the addition of defendant No. 4.

Opponent No. 4 (Applicant to be Impleaded)

  • Claimed to be successor of the original allottee (Verumal Tekumal) and alleged entitlement to the subject lands by virtue of allotment under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954.
  • Alleged that the plaintiff's challenge to the evacuee proceedings and subsequent allotment was mala fide and that he was vitally interested in the outcome; therefore he sought to be added as a co-defendant to contest the suit on merits.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Razia Begum v. Saheb zadi Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886 That addition of parties under Order I, Rule 10 is a matter of judicial discretion; in property suits a person to be added should have a direct (not merely commercial) interest in the subject-matter. The Court relied on this authority to underscore that the power to add parties is discretionary and must be exercised with regard to the nature of the interest of the proposed party; it supports scrutiny of whether the allottee had a direct interest necessitating impleadment.
Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786 Definition of necessary and proper parties: a necessary party is one without whom no effective order can be made; a proper party is one whose absence does not prevent an effective order but whose presence is necessary for a complete decision. The Court applied this principle to conclude that the allottee (defendant No. 4) was neither a necessary nor a proper party for adjudication of the question whether the land was evacuee property; an effective decision could be made without him.
Muslim Wakf Board, Bhopal v. Municipal Board, Bhopal, AIR 1960 Madh Pra 249 That a plaintiff cannot be compelled against his wishes to implead a person as defendant; the plaintiff is free to frame his suit and the court should not force impleadment over his objection. The Court invoked this authority to support the proposition that ordinarily the court should not add a co-defendant against the plaintiff's wishes unless absolutely necessary to adjudicate the controversy.
Ambalal Maganial Rawal v. Vaghari Bababhai Shivabhai, (1974) 11 Guj LT 215 That Rule 10(2)'s discretionary "may" requires the court normally to ascertain the plaintiff's wishes and that addition should not be ordered when the plaintiff is opposed unless addition is absolutely necessary to adjudicate effectively. The Court relied on this case to emphasize that the discretion to add a party should not be exercised lightly and that the plaintiff's status as dominus litis is a strong factor against forcible impleadment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by setting out the text and scope of Order I, Rule 10(2) CPC: the provision invests the court with discretion to add any party at any stage if the party ought to have been joined or its presence is necessary to enable the court to effectually and completely adjudicate all questions in the suit; if a defendant is added, the pleadings and service must be amended as appropriate.

The Court then reviewed binding and persuasive authorities. Razia Begum was cited to show that addition under Order I, Rule 10 is a judicial discretion and that in property matters the added person should have a direct interest. Udit Narain was relied upon for the working distinction between "necessary" and "proper" parties (a necessary party being one without whom no effective order can be made). Muslim Wakf Board and Ambalal supported the proposition that the plaintiff, as dominus litis, should not be compelled to litigate against a person he does not wish to join unless their addition is indispensable.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court identified the real dispute as the legality of the officers' decision declaring the property to be evacuee property—this is the decision challenged by the plaintiff. The Court reasoned that if the declaration by Union officers is upheld, the allotment to defendant No. 4 stands; if the declaration is set aside, the allotment automatically collapses. Hence the "real contesting parties" are the plaintiff versus the government officers (defendants Nos. 1–3). The allottee's claim is contingent on the evacuee declaration and is therefore a post-declaration matter.

The Court concluded that the presence of defendant No. 4 was not necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate the key questions concerning the legality of the evacuee declaration and incidental matters: those questions could be decided without impleading the allottee. The Court further observed that adding the allottee would confer procedural rights (such as a right to appeal) and impose consequential burdens on the plaintiff, which it is not appropriate to do where the addition is not indispensable.

In short, the Court found that the trial Court's exercise of discretion to implead the allottee was not judicious in the circumstances and amounted to an improper exercise of the discretionary power under Order I, Rule 10(2).

Holding and Implications

Disposition: The Revision Application succeeds. The High Court set aside the order of the learned trial Judge directing the plaintiff to implead the allottee (defendant No. 4) as a co-defendant. The Rule is made absolute and there is no order as to costs. The final line records: "Revision allowed."

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that defendant No. 4 shall not be impleaded as a co-defendant in Civil Suit No. 214 of 1979; the contest over the legality of the evacuee declaration remains between the plaintiff and the Union officers (defendants Nos. 1–3). The opinion applies settled principles concerning the exercise of discretion under Order I, Rule 10(2) CPC and does not purport to lay down any new legal precedent beyond applying those principles to the present facts.

    Noormahmad Hajishama v. Anand Mohan Bhardwai And Others Opponents.

    1. The applicant is the original plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 214 of 1979 filed against the present opponents Nos. 1, 2 & 3 for a declaration that he, the applicant, is the absolute owner of survey Nos. 54/1 and 54/2 of village Mahobatpara, Taluka Vanthali, District Junagadh. He contends that the said land originally belonged to one Noormohmed Nagori and he mortgaged the land for Rs. 1,000/- on 24th April, 1951 with Patel Trikam Arjan for a period of 10 years. The said Noormohmed Nagori expired in Junagadh on 5th June, 1960. His heirs Sonbai (mother) and Valbai (daughter) thereupon became the tenants in common, in respect of the said lands: The present applicant plaintiff purchased the lands from Sonbai and Valbai under registered sale deed dated 28th August, 1968 for a valuable consideration without notice of claim of any third party. Under the said document he was put in possession of the lands and it is his contention that even today, he is in actual possession thereof.

    2. It appears that in the year 1969, proceedings under the Evacuee Property Act, 1950 were commenced and the aforesaid lands were declared to be the evacuee properties in the said proceedings. These lands were thereafter dealt with under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1954 and the present opponent No. 4 was allotted the lands in question. Thereafter orders were passed in favour of the allottee to put him in actual possession of the lands in question. Thereupon the present applicant filed the suit in question for a declaration that the lands were not evacuee properties and that he was the absolute owner of the said lands under the registered sale deed dated 28th June, 1968 and his possession could not be disturbed in pursuance of any order passed under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954.

    3. The aforesaid suit was filed against the Collector of Junagadh, Mamlatdar of Vanthali and the Union of India. In the said suit the present opponent No. 4 Mulchand Khatumal Khimani filed an application under Order 1, Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code read with Section 151 of the said Code to be impleaded as a co-defendant. He alleged that he was the successor of Verumal Tekumal the original allottee in respect of the suit lands. According to him, the appeal filed by the applicant plaintiff challenging the proceedings commenced under the Evacuee Property Act, 1950 as well as the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, was dismissed by the Authorised Chief Settlement Commissioner on 7th June, 1978 and a Sanad was issued in favour of the allottee on 15-2-79. Accordingly, he alleged that he had become the owner of the aforesaid two survey numbers and was entitled to be put in actual possession thereof. He, therefore, applied to the court, alleging that he was vitally interested in the outcome of the suit and as the suit was filed mala fide with a view to keeping him out of possession, to be joined as co-defendant in the suit to enable him to contest the same on merits.

    4. The aforesaid application Exh. 9 was heard and disposed of by the learned Jt. Civil Judge, Senior Division, Junagadh on 30th June, 1979. The learned Judge took the view that the said opponent No. 4 was a necessary party to the suit as his rights, in the lands allotted to him were likely to be settled in the said suit. On this, line of reasoning the learned Trial Judge granted the application and directed that he be impleaded as defendant No. 4 in the suit. It is against this order passed by the learned Trial Judge, that the original plaintiff has approached this Court.

    5. The relevant part of Order 1, Rule 10 (2), provides that the Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either Party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party which ought lo have been joined whether as plaintiff or as a defendant or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. It further provides that where a defendant is added, the plaint shall unless the Court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as may be necessary, and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and, if the Court thinks fit, on the original defendant. Thus, under sub-rule (2) of R. 10 of order I. The Court is invested with the discretion to add a party as co defendant at any stage of the trial on such terms and conditions as it may think fit to impose if it is of the opinion that the party ought to have been joined at the initial stage or that the presence of the party before the Court is necessary in order to enable the Court effectively and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. In Razia Begum v. Saheb zadi Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886 the Supreme Court pointed out that the question of addition of parties under Order I Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code is generally not one of initial jurisdiction of the court, but of a judicial discretion which may be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case. It further pointed out that in a suit relating to property, in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. That was a case in which a suit was filed for a declaration that the plaintiff-appellant was a legally wedded wife of respondent No. 3 and that she was also entitled to receive from him 'Kharch-e-pandan' at a certain rate. Respondent No. 3 filed his written statement admitting the fact that the appellant was married to him and that she was entitled to maintenance as claimed in the suit. He also admitted that the appellant bore him three issues of the marriage. At that stage, respondent No. 1 claiming to be the lawful and legally wedded wife of respondent No. 3, and respondent No. 2, the son of respondent No. 3 by the first respondent, filed an application under Order I, Rule 10 (2) as being interested in denying the marriage of the appellant and her rights and status. The Trial Court allowed the application and directed the respondents Nos. 1 & 2 to be added as defendants. The High Court in revision refused to interfere with the discretion of the trial court. The Supreme Court, applying the proposition set out above, held that the discretion was rightly exercised on sound judicial consideration and it was not necessary to interfere with the order passed by the trial court.

    6. In Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786, the Supreme Court pointed out who are the necessary parties to the petition answered the question judgment in para 7 of the following words:

    "The law on the subject enough if we state the principle. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively: a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding."

    7. In Muslim Wakf Board, Bhopal v. Municipal Board, Bhopal, AIR 1960 Madh Pra 249, Shrivastava. J. while interpreting order I, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code held that a plaintiff cannot be compelled against his wishes to implead anyone as a defendant. He is perfectly at liberty to frame his suit in any way. If the third party defendant, then the suit would be dismissed; otherwise the case would be decided on the merits so far as the Parties before the Court are concerned. At best, the only order that can be Passed by the court would be to allow the plaintiffs time to decide whether they would like to implead the third party as a co-defendant and if they decided against it, the court has no power to compel them.

    8. A similar view was taken by J. M. Sheth, J. in Ambalal Maganial Rawal v. Vaghari Bababhai Shivabhai, (1974) 11 Guj LT 215. It was pointed out that as a rule the Court should not add a person as a defendant in a suit when the plaintiff is opposed to such addition. The reason is that the plaintiff is the dominus litis. He is the master of the suit. He cannot be compelled to fight against a person against whom he does not wish to fight and against whom he does not claim any relief. It was pointed out that the word "may" in sub-rule (2) of Rule 10, of Order I of the C. P. C. clearly imports a discretion that the Court will, while exercising the same discretion, invariably ascertain the wishes of the plaintiff before directing a third party to be added as a co-defendant to his suit. In exceptional cases only where the Court finds that the addition of the new defendant is absolutely necessary to enable it to adjudicate and effectively and completely decide the controversy, it may add the said party as a co-defendant: the objection of the plaintiff notwithstanding.

    9. From the above case Law, it becomes clear that sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order I of the Civil Procedure Code invests the Court with discretion to add a party as co-defendant to the suit. Ordinarily, the discretion will not be exercised in the face of opposition from the plaintiff. In the instant case, there was stiff opposition from the plaintiff and yet, the Court exercised its discretion in overruling that opposition and in directing the co-defendant to be added as a party to the suit. The Court can, in a fit case, overrule the objection of the plaintiff if it finds it necessary to implead the third party as a co-defendant to enable it to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit. The question then is, was it necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit, to add defendant No. 4 as co-defendant to the suit? In other words, could it be said, in the facts and circumstances of the present case that the presence of defendant No. 4 was necessary to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon all questions involved in the suit? Putting it differently, could the questions involved in the suit not disposed of, effectually and completely in the absence of defendant No. 4 as co-defendant? What is the real dispute involved in the suit? The property which the plaintiff claims to be of his ownership, has been declared to be evacuee property and has been allotted to defendant No. 4, a displaced person. The plaintiff challenges the order where under the property was declared to be evacuee property. It is a different matter whether or not the Court will have jurisdiction to decide such a suit because that question does not arise at the present stage. It is the decision of the officers of the Union of India declaring the property in question to be evacuee property which is the subject matter of challenge in the suit. If the property s not evacuee property, then, there would be no question of allotting the said property to displaced person under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1954. On the question whether the property is evacuee property or otherwise the real contesting parties are the plaintiff on the one side and the officers of the Union of India on the other side. If the order or decision of the Union of India declaring the property in question to be evacuee property is upheld, then the order of allotment in favour of defendant No. 4 will stand. If on the other hand, it is found that the property was wrongly declared to be evacuee property and that, in fact, it was never evacuee property, the order of allotment in favour of defendant No. 4 will automatically collapse. Therefore, the real contesting parties are the plaintiff on the one hand, and defendants Nos. 1, 2 & 3 on the other Defendant No. 4 has, no doubt been allotted the property in question, but that allotment is on the basis that the property is evacuee property. If that basis disappears, the order of allotment cannot stand. What has been challenged in the suit is the order declaring the property to be evacuee property. The defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 have to meet that challenge to their order. Till that stage the allottee does not enter the field. The state of allotment is a post declaration stage. The presence of the allottee is not at all necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle the question regarding the legality of the declaration and question incidental thereto. Even without his presence all those questions can be effectually and completely adjudicated upon and settled in the suit. If in such circumstances the plaintiff objects to the addition of the allottee as a party to the suit, it cannot be said that the objection is unreasonable or wholly unsustainable. The addition of a party confers certain rights on the added party, such as a right to appeal, etc., and it would not be proper, in a case where the presence of the party is not absolutely necessary to lightly implead him and thereby impose consequential obligations on the plaintiff. Therefore in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Udit Narain's case (AIR 1963 SC 786) (supra), it is clear that the allottee is neither a necessary nor a proper party to the suit. The discretion should not be exercised lightly as it confers certain rights on the added party and entails certain consequences which the plaintiff would be justified in avoiding, because he cannot be expected to litigate with a party with whom it is unnecessary to litigate. Supposing in the instant case the plaintiff successfully proves that the order declaring his property to be evacuee property is illegal and the defendants Nos. 1. 2 and 3 are also satisfied that the view of the trial Court is unassailable and decide not to appeal yet the plaintiff will have to fight further legal battles if the allottee decides to challange the view in the higher forums. If it is found that discretion is not exercised on sound judicial considerations this Court would be justified in interfering with the lower Courts order in the interest of justice. In the facts and circumstances of this case I am satisfied that the lower Court's exercise of discretion is not judicious. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the trial Court was not right in directing the allottee to be impleaded as a co-defendant in the suit.

    10. In the result, therefore, this Revision Application succeeds, and the order passed by the learned trial Judge directing the plaintiff to implead the allottee-defendant No. 4 as a party to the suit, is set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.

    11. Revision allowed.

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    Comments

    Noormahmad Hajishama v. Anand Mohan Bhardwai And Others Opponents.
    (Mar 12, 1980)