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  • Section 239 of the Code.8.
  • Section 251 of Cr.P.C
  • Section 305 of Cr.P.C
  • Section 91 of Cr.P.C
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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  • Section 239 of the Code.8.
  • Section 251 of Cr.P.C
  • Section 305 of Cr.P.C
  • Section 91 of Cr.P.C
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns a criminal complaint No. 1015/2010 filed by Make My Trip (India) Private Ltd. against Ezeego One Travel & Tours Ltd. and others, involving an offence of defamation. The petitioner, a Director of the respondent-accused companies, was summoned by an order dated 5th May 2011. The petitioner seeks quashing of both the complaint and the summoning order on merits. The trial court had summoned the petitioner despite no specific role or overt act attributed to her, raising questions about vicarious liability and procedural correctness under relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner, as a Director of the accused companies, can be summoned and prosecuted for defamation without specific allegations against her or nomination under Section 305 of the Cr.P.C.
  2. Whether the trial court erred in summoning the petitioner without applying its mind and whether such summoning constitutes abuse of process of court.
  3. The scope and application of Section 305 and Section 251 of the Cr.P.C. in relation to prosecution of corporate entities and their officers.
  4. Whether the summoning order can be quashed at this stage or should the matter be considered at the framing of Notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • No specific role or overt act attributed to the petitioner in the alleged defamatory publications; the petitioner was summoned solely due to her position as Director.
  • Vicarious liability cannot be imposed merely by virtue of being a Director of the accused companies.
  • The petitioner has not been nominated under Section 305 of the Cr.P.C., which is a prerequisite for prosecution of a company’s officer.
  • Summoning without proper application of mind is an abuse of the court’s process and the complaint and order deserve to be quashed.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Cognizance is taken of the offence and not the offender; thus, summoning the petitioner is permissible.
  • Section 305 Cr.P.C. allows a company to be represented by a nominee but does not bar summoning of a principal officer of the accused company.
  • An application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. to admit evidence against the petitioner is pending, and no reply has been filed by petitioner.
  • The impugned order reflects due application of mind and is a reasoned order; hence, no grounds exist to invoke the Court's inherent jurisdiction to quash the complaint or order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Anil D. Ambani v. State of Bihar, 2006 (4) PLJR 571 General principles on summoning and prosecution in criminal complaints. Relied upon by petitioner to argue absence of specific role and vicarious liability.
S.A Khan v. Union of India, Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 5 SCC 668 Legal standards for summoning and prosecution of accused persons. Invoked by petitioner to contend no offence made out against her.
Vineet Jain v. NCT of Delhi & Ors., Crl. M.C 2704/07 (2011) Consideration of prima facie case at summoning stage. Used to support petitioner's plea for quashing.
Bhushan Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2012 SC 1747 Trial court's duty to apply mind at framing of Notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. Key authority emphasizing that summoning is not final and trial court must assess prima facie case.
Krishna Kumar Variar v. Share Shoppe, (2010) 12 SCC 485 Jurisdictional objections should be raised before trial court with evidence. Supports approach that trial court decides jurisdiction before proceeding with trial.
Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal, (2004) 7 SCC 338 Prohibition on recalling summoning orders. Court clarifies that this does not preclude dropping proceedings at framing of Notice stage.
Swil Ltd. v. State of Delhi, (2001) 6 SCC 670 Cognizance is taken of offence, not offender; scope of Section 305 Cr.P.C. Respondent relied on this to justify summoning petitioner as principal officer.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the complaint and the impugned summoning order along with the cited precedents and legal provisions. It emphasized that at the stage of framing Notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C., the trial court must determine whether a prima facie case exists against the accused. The Court noted that the complaint prosecuted the accused companies as corporate bodies through a principal officer or a nominated person under Section 305 Cr.P.C., but the petitioner had not been nominated by the companies.

The Court held that the option to nominate a person under Section 305 Cr.P.C. lies with the accused companies, and in the absence of such nomination, prosecution through the petitioner as principal officer cannot be faulted at this stage. It was underscored that cognizance is taken of the offence, not the offender, and the trial court must apply its mind carefully rather than mechanically summoning accused persons.

The Court relied on the Apex Court's decisions in Bhushan Kumar and Krishna Kumar Variar, which mandate that jurisdictional and other objections should be addressed before the trial court with evidence, allowing it to decide on such issues before proceeding. The Court clarified that the decision in Adalat Prasad prohibiting recall of summoning orders does not prevent the trial court from dropping proceedings at the framing of Notice stage if no prima facie case is found.

Accordingly, the Court declined to quash the complaint or summoning order at this stage, granting liberty to the petitioner to raise the same pleas before the trial court during the framing of Notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. The Court also dispensed with the personal appearance of the petitioner until the framing of Notice is concluded, provided she is represented by counsel who does not seek adjournment.

Holding and Implications

The petition for quashing the complaint and summoning order is disposed of without expressing any opinion on the merits.

The petitioner is granted liberty to raise all pleas, including the absence of nomination under Section 305 Cr.P.C., before the trial court at the framing of Notice stage under Section 251 Cr.P.C. The trial court is directed to pass a reasoned order on these pleas. Until then, the petitioner’s personal appearance is dispensed with if represented by counsel who does not seek adjournment.

This decision does not set any new precedent but clarifies the procedural pathway and safeguards in summons complaint cases involving corporate entities and their officers, emphasizing the trial court’s role in applying its mind at the framing of Notice stage.

    Urrshila Kerkar Petitioner v. Make My Trip (India) Private Ltd.

    JUDGMENT

    1. In criminal complaint No. 1015/2010 titled Make My Trip (India) Private Ltd. v. Ezeego One Travel & Tours Ltd. (Annexure P-1 Colly.), petitioner has been summoned vide impugned order of 5th May, 2011 (Annexure P-2) for the offence of defamation in the capacity of her being the Director of both the respondent-accused companies. Quashing of aforesaid complaint (Annexure P-1 colly.) and impugned order (Annexure P-2) is sought on merits in this petition.

    2. At the hearing, learned counsel for petitioner had placed reliance upon decisions in Anil D. Ambani v. State of Bihar2006 (4) PLJR 571., S.A Khan v. Union of India., Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat(2008) 5 SCC 668., R.C Gupta v. State., Ashok Sikka v. State., 147 (2008) DLT 552., Vineet Jain v. Nct Of Delhi & Ors…. S in Crl. M.C 2704/07 rendered on 10 October, 2011., Dr. P. Sharma v. P.S Popli 94 (20001) DLT 913., Savera Sidhu v. Harleen Sidhu, 2010 Law Suit (P&H) 4442., Ghcl Employees Stock Option Trust v. India Infoline Limited(2013) 4 SCC 505 and Raymond Ltd. v. Rameshwar Das Dwarkadas P. Ltd.2013 2 JCC 1227 to contend that it is not the case of respondent that alleged defamatory articles were got published by petitioner nor had contained any statement made by petitioner and so, no offence is made out against petitioner. It was vehemently urged that vicarious liability cannot be fastened upon petitioner as no specific role or overt act has been attributed to petitioner and so, petitioner cannot be prosecuted by virtue of being Director of accused companies.

    3. It was pointed out by learned counsel for petitioner that petitioner has not been nominated in terms of Section 305 of Cr.P.C and a person so nominated can alone be prosecuted and trial court has gravely erred in not taking notice of this vital aspect. Lastly, it was submitted that summoning of an accused for a criminal offence is a serious matter and trial court without applying its mind has summoned petitioner, which is an abuse of process of the court, and so, impugned order as well as the complaint in question deserves to be quashed.

    4. To the contrary is the submission of learned counsel for respondent, who had relied upon Apex Court decision in Swil Ltd. v. State of Delhi(2001) 6 SCC 670 to contend that cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the offender. It was asserted by learned counsel for respondent that Section 305 of Cr.P.C merely enables a company to be represented by a nominee and it does not bar summoning of a principal officer of accused company. It was pointed out that respondent's application under Section 91 of Cr.P.C to admit evidence against petitioner is pending and no reply to it has been filed by petitioner and that impugned order discloses due application of mind and is a reasoned order. Thus, it was submitted that no case is made out by petitioner for invoking inherent jurisdiction of this Court and so, this petition deserves rejection.

    5. After having heard both the sides and on perusal of the criminal complaint (Annexure P-1 colly) and the impugned order (Annexure P-2), the material on record and the decisions cited, it becomes evident that upon bare reading of complaint (Annexure P-1 colly), it cannot be said that no case for summoning respondent-accused companies is made out and at the stage of framing of Notice under Section 251 of Cr.P.C only, it is required to be seen as to whether a prima facie case to continue the proceedings is made out or not. The relevant averment in paragraph No. 2 of the complaint (Annexure P-1 colly) qua petitioner deserves to be taken note of and it reads as under:-

    “The companies which are accused nos 1 & 2 are prosecuted as body corporate and are prosecuted through a common principal officer accused no. 3 responsible for the conduct of its affairs and/or any person nominated by them for the purposes of Section 305 CrPC.”

    6. Upon being summoned as an accused in this complaint case, whom to nominate for the purpose of Section 305 of Cr.P.C is an option which has to be exercised by respondent-accused companies and so, on this ground, complaint in question and the impugned summoning order cannot be quashed as cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the offender. In the absence of respondent accused companies not exercising their option under Section 305 of Cr.P.C, their prosecution through petitioner cannot be faulted with. In any case, the appropriate stage at which these aspects are required to be considered is the stage of framing of Notice under Section 251 of Cr.P.C Such a view is taken as trial court is not expected to mechanically frame Notice under Section 251 of Cr.P.C and has to apply its mind to find out as to whether a prima facie case is made out or not and in the event of finding that no case is made out for proceeding against a particular accused, trial court would be well within its right to drop the proceedings qua such an accused.

    7. On this aspect, pertinent observations of Apex Court in Bhushan Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi)AIR 2012 SC 1747 are as under:-

    “17. It is inherent in section 251 of the code that when an accused appears before the trial Court pursuant to summons issued under section 204 of the code in a summons trial case, it is the bounden duty of the trial Court to carefully go through the allegations made in the charge-sheet or complaint and consider the evidence to come to a conclusion whether or not, commission of any offence is disclosed and if the answer is in the affirmative, the Magistrate shall explain the substance of the accusation to the accusation to the accused and ask him whether he pleads guilty otherwise, he is bound to discharge the accused as per Section 239 of the Code.”

    8. Further, on this aspect, the dictum of the Apex Court in Krishna Kumar Variar v. Share Shoppe(2010) 12 SCC 485 is as under:-

    “4. In our opinion, in such cases where the accused or any other person raises an objection that the trial court has no jurisdiction in the matter, the said person should file an application before the trial court making this averment and giving the relevant facts. Whether a court has jurisdiction to try/entertain a case will, at least in part, depend upon the facts of the case. Hence, instead of rushing to the higher court against the summoning order, the person concerned should approach the trial court with a suitable application for this purpose and the trial court should after hearing both the sides and recording evidence, if necessary, decide the question of jurisdiction before proceeding further with the case.

    5. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the impugned judgment and order is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The appellant, if so advised, may approach the trial court with a suitable application in this connection and, if such an application is filed, the trial court shall after hearing both the sides and after recording evidence on the question on jurisdiction, shall decide the question of jurisdiction before further proceeding with the trial.”

    9. It is no doubt true that Apex Court in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal(2004) 7 SCC 338 has ruled that there cannot be recalling of summoning order, but seen in the backdrop of decisions of Apex Court in Bhushan Kumar and Krishan Kumar (supra), aforesaid decision cannot be misconstrued to mean that once summoning order has been issued, then trial must follow. If it was to be so, then what is the purpose of hearing accused at the stage of framing Notice under Section 251 of Cr.P.C In the considered opinion of this Court, Apex Court's decision in Adalat Prasad (supra) cannot possibly be misread to mean that proceedings in a summons complaint case cannot be dropped against an accused at the stage of framing of Notice under Section 251 of Cr.P.C even if a prima facie case is not made out.

    10. In the aforesaid view, this petition and the application are disposed of without commenting upon the merits of this case and with liberty to petitioner to urge the pleas taken herein before the trial court. Needless to say, the pleas raised by petitioner at the hearing on the point of Notice under Section 251 of Cr.P.C shall be dealt with by the trial court by passing a reasoned order so that petitioner may avail of the remedies available in law, if need be. Since the plea pertaining to Section 305 of Cr.P.C goes to the root of this matter, therefore, till the hearing on the point of Notice under Section 251 of Cr.P.C is concluded by the trial court, personal appearance of petitioner before the trial court is dispensed with provided petitioner is duly represented by counsel, who does not seek adjournment.

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    Urrshila Kerkar Petitioner v. Make My Trip (India) Private Ltd.
    (Nov 18, 2013)