Vikramajit Sen, J. (Oral)— The prayers in this suit are as follows:
(a) grant a decree for declaration in favour of the Plaintiff Company and against Defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 to the effect that the Agreement to Sell dated 19.11.2003 entered into by Defendant No. 3, is illegal, null and void and is non-est is of no effect and is not binding on the Plaintiff Company;
(b) a decree of permanent injunction may also be granted in favour of the Plaintiff Company and against the Defendants No. 1 and 2 and not to disturb the peaceful possession of the Plaintiff Company of plot No. 47, Block No. 9, Kirti Nagar Industrial Area, New Delhi or any part of the said plot;
(c) pass such other or further orders as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.
2. The valuation of this suit is contained in paragraph 4 which read thus:
The value of the Suit for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction is as under:
Court Fees
Valuation
Court Fees paid,
(i) For grant of decree of declaration that the Agreement dated 19.11.03 entered into by Defendant No. 3 in favour of Defendants No. 1 and 2 is illegal, null, void and non-est and is not binding on the Plaintiff Company.
Rs. 200/-
Rs. 20/-
(ii) For the relief of permanent injunction, restraining Defendants No. 1 and 2 from disturbing the possession of the Plaintiff's plot No. 47, Block-9, Industrial Area, Kirti Nagar, New Delhi
Rs. 130/-
Rs. 13/-
………
………
Total
Rs. 330/-
Rs. 33/-
JURISDICTION
(i) For the relief of declaration of the value shown in agreement to sell dated 19.11.2003
Rs. 77,00,000/-
(ii) For the relief of injunction.
Rs. 130/-
………
Total
Rs. 77,00,130/-
………
3. The caption of the Plaintiff states it is a suit for Declaration and Permanent Injunction.
4. On the first date of hearing the Plaintiff pressed for and received an injunction directing the Defendants to maintain status quo with regard to the possession of the Plaintiff in the suit property. Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of Plaintiff, argues that it is only the Plaint that has to be read. There can be no two opinions on this proposition. He, however, makes an oral submission that the suit should be treated as one for Declaration simplicitor. It is not possible to view the suit as such and if the Plaintiff was desirous of giving up any relief, he ought to have filed an application for its deletion. As has already mentioned, he has already sought and obtained an injunction.
5. The facts of the case are that the Plaintiff allegedly entered into an Agreement to Sell with Defendants No. 1 & 2. The Plaintiff had also entered into an Agreement to Sell with Defendants No. 3 to 9 to purchase their fifty per cent share of the property. Defendant No. 10 is the the fifty per cent owner of the remaining lease hold rights. The contention of Bawa Shiv Charan Singh is that the provisions of Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act are not applicable since Section 7 (iv) (c) does not find mention therein. As has already been noticed above the suit is not one for simplicitor Declaration since an injunction has been prayed for also. A conjoint reading of Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act and Section 7 of the Court Fees Act enjoins that the valuation for the purposes of Court Fees and jurisdiction must be the same. As has already been seen the suit has been valued for the relief of Declaration of Rs. 77 lakhs. The Plaint must also therefore be valued for Rs. 77 lakhs for the purposes of court fees and the appropriate court fees must be paid.
6. This question had arisen on the last date of hearing also but the contention of Bawa Shiv Charan Singh still remains that the Plaint has been correctly valued and that ad volerm court fees has not to be paid. The contention is rejected. Reference to the decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Sri Krishna Chandra v. Mahabir Prasad and others AIR 1933 Allahabad 488 is of no assistance or applicability for the simple reason that the suit before the Court was one for Declaration only. This is how the conundrum was clarified by the Court—
But where a plaintiff expressly asks for something more than a mere declaration, for example, cancellation or the setting aside of a decree, it is difficult to hold that the claim is one merely for obtaining a declaratory decree. The difficulty arises only where he simply asks that it be declared that a certain decree which has been passed against him previously is null and void and is not binding upon him.
The view taken in some cases of the other High Courts is that in such a suit the plaintiff is trying to get rid of a decree which stands in his way and which is capable of being executed against him and that without having that decree set aside or cancelled the plaintiff would have no right to resist its execution, and accordingly such a relief is not one merely for obtaining a declaratory decree but is for obtaining a mere substantive relief, which is not specifically provided for in the Court-fees Act and would accordingly fall under Art. 1, of the Sch. 1. It cannot be denied that there is something to be said for such a view because in substance the object of the plaintiff is to frustrate a decree which has been passed against him and to nullify it and to get it out of his way. On the other hand, the Court-fees Act is a fiscal measure and is to be construed strictly and in favour of the subject. There is also no doubt that there is a long course of decisions in this Court in which it has been laid down consistently, and over and over again, that where nothing more than a mere declaration is sought for, the suit is one for obtaining a declaratory decree and no ad valorem court-fee for such a relief can be charged. We may in this connection refer only to the recent cases of this Court in Radha Krishna v. Ram Narain; Brij Gopal v. Suraj Karan; Lakshmi Narain Rai v. Dip Narain Rai and Muhammad Ismail v. Liyaqat Hussain.
We accordingly think that on the principle of state decisis, if nothing else, this course of decisions should not now be disturbed. We accordingly hold that inasmuch as the plaintiff in this case merely asked for a declaration that the previous decree was not in any way binding upon him and was altogether void and ineffectual, his suit was not for obtaining a declaratory decree only and falls under Art. 17(3) of the second schedule. The learned Advocate for the Respondents has further urged that inasmuch as the plaintiff added relief (b) which was to the effect that in addition to relief (a) any other relief which may, in the opinion of the Court, be just, may also be granted to the plaintiff against the defendants, he must be deemed to have claimed more than a mere declaratory decree. But such a relief is unnecessarily added in most plaints and is not intended to mean anything more than reminding the court of its power to grant other reliefs even though not specifically asked for. As the words are too vague and indefinite, and no specific and definite relief is referred to therein, we cannot regard it as one which requires the demand of additional court-fee nor do we consider that coupled with the declaratory relief it changes the nature of the relief claimed. Our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative. Let the answer be returned to the Bench concerned.
7. On the other hand the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Rm. Ar. S.Sp Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar AIR 1958 Supreme Court 245 are apposite:
What would be the value for the purpose of jurisdiction in such suits is another question which often arises for decision. This question has to be decided by reading S.7 (iv) of the Act along with S. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. This latter section provides that, where in any suits other than those referred to in Court-fees Act, S.7, paras, 5, 6 and 9 and para. 10, Cl. (d) court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Act, the value determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. In other words, so far as suits falling under S.7, sub-s. (iv) of the Act are concerned, S.8 of the Suits Valuation Act provides that the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. There can be little doubt that the effect of the provisions of S.8 is to make the value for the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the value s determinable for computation of court-fees and that is natural enough. The computation of court-fees in suits falling under S.7 (iv) of the Act depends upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of court-fees, that determines the value for jurisdiction. The value for court-fees and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such cases; but it is the value for court-fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be determined. The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of court-fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice versa. Incidentally we may point out that according to the appellant it was really not necessary in the present case to mention Rs. 15,00,000 as the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction since on plaints filed on the Original Side of the Madras High Court prior to 1953 there was no need to make any jurisdictional valuation.
Accordingly, if the valuation for court-fees is to govern the consideration, this Court would not possess pecuniary jurisdiction.
8. The question that may have arisen is whether it was open for the Plaintiff to give an artificial or unrealistic assessment of the value for the purposes of jurisdiction. I am of the opinion that where this occurs i.e where the value is extremely high so as to oust jurisdiction of one Court to bring it before another, or is very low for the same reason, it is the bounden duty of the Court to go into this question and pass appropriate orders. Obviously the valuation of Rs. 77 lakhs bares reasonable relation to the market value of the suit property regardless of whether it is the lease hold or free hold right. Therefore I would accept the valuation of Rs. 77 lakhs. The effect is that while this Court may have pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit, appropriate court fees has not been paid.
9. My attention has also been drawn to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 but I fail to see how it is of relevance for resolving the problem which has presently presented itself.
10. Since the appropriate court fees has not been affixed on the Plaint and since it is the contention of Bawa Shiv Charan Singh that the Court may delete or ignore the relief of injunction, the interim Order dated 20.5.2004 is recalled and the application is dismissed. The deficiency in the appropriate court fees be made good within two weeks.
11. Defendant No. 10 is present in person. He states that he has not entered into any Agreement to Sell either with Defendants No. 1 & 2 or with the Plaintiff. He prays that he should be struck off from the array of parties. In this connection Bawa Shiv Charan Singh submits that if Defendant No. 10 had not been impleaded, it would have been arguable that, since he is a half owner of the property, the contracts are not enforceable either in favour of the Plaintiff or in favour of Defendants No. 1 & 2. This contention only fortifies the view that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any injunction. As there is no privity of contract whatsoever between the plaintiff and Defendant No. 10, and admittedly no relief is sought against Defendant No. 10, he is struck off from the array of parties.
12. The Plaintiff shall pay cost of Rs. 10,000/- for today's hearing. The cost be paid within four weeks to the Prime Minister's Relief Fund.
13. Renotify on 10.3.2005