Citation Codes

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Case Number

C.R No. 614/2000

Advocates

Mr. H.L Tikku, Advocate for the Respondent.
Mr. J.K Seth, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Shalini Kapoor Advocate for tne Petitioner.

Judges

R.C Jain, J.

Acts

Rule 13(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules 1968,
Section 13 (1) (1a) of the Hindu Marriage Act
Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage
provisions of Order 6 Rule 16 CPC
Rule 13(2) of the Rules.
Order 6 Rule 16

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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion by R.C. Jain, J. (Civil Revision concerning Order 6 Rule 16)

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision arises from an order dated 15.5.2000 of the Additional District Judge, Delhi, which dismissed an application under Order 6 Rule 16 CPC filed by the wife, Smt. Rekha Singal. The wife sought deletion of certain allegations in a divorce petition filed by her husband, Mr. Lavleen Singal, who had sought dissolution of the marriage on the ground of cruelty. The wife had filed the Order 6 Rule 16 application before filing her written statement, contending that parts of the husband's petition (portions of paragraphs identified in the application, including paras 4.6, 4.16, 4.18, 4.23 as pleaded) contained false, scandalous, frivolous and vexatious allegations about her character and extramarital relations and should be struck out. The husband opposed the application asserting relevance and his intention to prove the allegations. The trial court dismissed the application, holding the allegations necessary to explain the husband's case and not scandalous, but noting the wife could raise objections in her written statement. The wife filed this Civil Revision challenging the trial court's order. The revisional court heard counsel for both parties and considered cited precedents and principles of law before giving the judgment summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether allegations in a divorce petition that are described as scandalous, insinuating, frivolous or vexatious can be struck out under Order 6 Rule 16 CPC when a petition is founded on cruelty.
Whether allegations concerning conduct of the wife prior to solemnisation of marriage are relevant to a petition for dissolution on the ground of cruelty and therefore liable to be retained or must be deleted.
Whether allegations that suggest possible extra‑marital relations (but do not categorically allege voluntary sexual intercourse after marriage) are admissible as instances of cruelty and thus necessary for adjudication.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner-Wife's Arguments (Ms. Rekha Singal)

Counsel argued that specified allegations in paragraphs 4.5/4.6, 4.11, 4.16, 4.18 and 4.23 of the divorce petition were insinuating, false, scandalous, vexatious and irrelevant and therefore liable to be deleted under Order 6 Rule 16 CPC.
Relied on the Division Bench decision in Manjit K. Singh v. S. Kanwarjit Singh, 58 (1995) DLT 208 to support the proposition that pleadings which are unnecessary or likely to prejudice, embarrass or delay a fair trial should be struck out — particularly when allegations of adultery are retained despite the husband abandoning adultery as a ground and the alleged adulterer is not a party.

Respondent-Husband's Arguments (Mr. Lavleen Singal)

Counsel contended that the impugned allegations were relevant to decide the real controversy and he intended to prove them; they were instances of cruel conduct attributable to the wife rather than mere scandalous allegations.
Relied on Supreme Court authorities including V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (Mrs.) (1994) 1 SCC 337 and Ramesh Chander v. Savitri (1995) 2 SCC 7 to show that the allegations could legitimately be treated as instances of mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(i‑a) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
Also cited English authorities (Chalcroft v. Chalcroft (1969) 2 All E.R. 1172 and Walker v. Walker (1961) 3 All E.R. 14) to support the position that allegations of improper association or belief in adultery in a petition grounded on cruelty may be treated as allegations of cruelty rather than formal allegations of adultery under certain rules.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Manjit K. Singh v. S. Kanwarjit Singh, 58 (1995) DLT 208 (Division Bench)	Principle that the Court can strike out pleadings which are unnecessary or which tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay a fair trial; where adultery is no longer relied on as a ground, retaining such allegations may prejudice the fair trial, especially if the alleged adulterer is not a party.	Cited by the petitioner-wife; the Court considered the decision and applied its reasoning to delete allegations in paras 4.4 and 4.6 that related to conduct prior to solemnisation and which involved an alleged third person not made a party.
V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994) 1 SCC 337	Explication of "mental cruelty" under Section 13(1)(i‑a) of the Hindu Marriage Act: mental cruelty defined by reference to conduct that inflicts such mental pain and suffering that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together; contextual factors to be considered.	Relied upon by the respondent-husband; the Court quoted the decision's expansive definition of mental cruelty and used it as a lens to assess whether certain post‑marriage allegations could constitute instances of cruelty and thus remain in the petition.
Ramesh Chander v. Savitri (1995) 2 SCC 7	Used to illustrate that various instances of conduct can constitute cruelty and be relevant to a cruelty petition.	Relied upon by the respondent-husband to show that the allegations complained of could be treated as incidents of cruelty; the Court considered this authority when deciding that certain post‑marriage allegations were relevant and therefore not to be deleted.
Chalcroft v. Chalcroft (1969) 2 All E.R. 1172	English authority holding that an allegation of condoned adultery or of a reasonable belief in adultery in a petition founded on cruelty is not necessarily an allegation of adultery for some procedural rules, but may amount to an allegation of improper association relevant under a different rule.	Cited by the respondent; the Court considered the proposition (along with Walker v. Walker) when assessing whether allegations suggesting improper association could be regarded as instances of cruelty rather than formal allegations of adultery to be struck out.
Walker v. Walker (1961) 3 All E.R. 14	English authority which held that conduct inducing a reasonable belief of adulterous association and causing injury to health may amount to persistent cruelty.	Cited by the respondent; the Court noted this authority in evaluating whether allegations that suggest extra‑marital association could be retained as relevant instances of cruelty.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first set out the governing principles: a petition for dissolution of marriage founded on cruelty must succinctly state events and instances post‑solemnisation that constitute cruel conduct under Section 13(1)(i‑a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The Court also accepted that conduct pointing to extra‑marital relations could amount to grave cruelty.

The Court then examined the specific impugned allegations (which had been reproduced in paragraph 2 of the revision petition but are not reproduced in the judgment). It proceeded on the following analytical steps, grounded in the authorities and the facts before it:

The Court acknowledged that the offending allegations were serious and could be termed scandalous or insinuating, but the decisive question was whether they were relevant and necessary for a just adjudication of the petition.
Applying the principles articulated in Manjit K. Singh (and the scope of Order 6 Rule 16 powers), the Court determined that allegations in paragraphs 4.4 and 4.6 related to alleged conduct of the wife prior to solemnisation of the marriage. Because cruelty as a ground must relate to conduct after solemnisation, those pre‑marriage allegations were irrelevant to adjudication, were scandalous, and therefore liable to be deleted.
The Court further noted an additional reason for deletion of the pre‑marriage allegations: the person allegedly involved with the wife was not impleaded as a party to the divorce petition, which increased the risk of prejudice and unfairness if the allegations remained.
As to other allegations (paras 4.16, 4.18 and 4.23), the Court held that these pertained to conduct after solemnisation and could thus be considered instances of cruel conduct relevant to the cruelty ground. Although they vaguely suggested the possibility of extra‑marital relations, they did not categorically allege voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than the husband after marriage. Given that factual posture and the governing definition of mental cruelty (as in V. Bhagat), these allegations were not to be deleted and could be retained in the petition for adjudication.
On balance, the Court exercised its striking‑out power selectively: it removed those allegations that were irrelevant (pre‑marriage) and potentially prejudicial, but retained allegations that might legitimately be relied upon to establish cruelty occurring after the marriage.

Holding and Implications

PARTLY ALLOWED

Holding (direct effect):

The revision petition was partly allowed and the trial court's order dated 15.5.2000 was set aside insofar as it refused to delete specified portions.
The petition under Order 6 Rule 16 was allowed to the extent that the offending portions of paragraphs 4.4 and 4.6 (as reproduced in paragraph 2 of the revision petition) are ordered to be deleted from the divorce petition.
The respondent‑husband is directed to make the requisite amendment in the petition within four weeks from the date of the order, and the trial court record is to be returned forthwith.

Implications:

The decision requires the deletion of specified pre‑marriage allegations from the husband's petition on the grounds of irrelevance and potential prejudice, reinforcing that pleadings in a cruelty petition should principally relate to post‑marriage conduct that can establish cruelty under Section 13(1)(i‑a).
The judgment allowed retention of post‑marriage allegations that may amount to cruelty even if they vaguely suggest extra‑marital associations, indicating a careful, fact‑specific approach to striking out: allegations are deleted only where they are both irrelevant and likely to prejudice or embarrass the parties or delay fair trial.
The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general rule beyond these conclusions; the decision applies existing authorities to the facts before the Court and resolves the particular deletion issue between these parties. No broader precedent beyond the application of the cited principles is announced in the text of the opinion.

The summary above is prepared solely from the content of the provided opinion and does not introduce information not present in that text.

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Rekha Singal. v. Lavleen Singal.

R.C Jain, J.— This Civil Revision is directed against the order dated 15.5.2000 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Delhi thereby dismissing an application under Order 6 Rule 16 filed by the wife Smt. Rekha Singal praying for a direction on the husband to strike out and delete certain allegations contained in the divorce petition, as the allegations are stated to be scandalous, frivolous, vexatious and likely to prejudice and embarrass the wife and delay the fair trial of the divorce petition.

2. The petitioner herein Ms. Rekha Singal is facing a divorce petition filed by the respondent-husband Mr. Lavleen Singal seeking dissolution of the marriage between the parties on the around of cruelty. Before filing her written statement to the divorce petition, the petitioner-wife filed an application under the provisions of Order 6 Rule 16 CPC with the averments that although the dissolution of marriage was not sought on the ground of ‘adultery’ or on the ground that the wife having had sexual intercourse with persons other than the spouse, after solemnisation of the marriage, yet the husband has made several false, scandalous allegations against the character of the wife without impleading the persons which according to him and illicit relations with his wife. The said allegations are contained in paras 4.6, 4.16, 4.18, 4.23 and 4.23 of the petition for divorce and the offending portions of the paragraphs containing the said allegations were detailed with in the said application. The application was opposed by the husband and it was stated that the allegations are relevant for deciding the real controversy between the parties and that he intends to prove the same. On a consideration of the matter, the learned trial Court dismissed the application primarily for the reason that allegations made by the petitioner in the petition were necessary for the purpose of explaining his case and cannot be said to be of scandalous nature or tiable to be deleted. It was, however, observed that the petitioner-wife would be at liberty to take whatever objections she may have in her written statement.

3. I have heard Shri J.K Seth, senior advocate on behalf of the petitioner-wife and Shri H.L Tikku, advocate representing the respondent-husband and have given my thoughtful consideration to their respective submissions. In support of his contention that some of the allegations made in paragraph 4.5, 4.6, 4.11, 4.16, 4.18 and 4.23 of the divorce petition are insinuating, false, scandalous, vexations and irrelevant and are liable to be deleted from the divorce petition as the husband is not seeking the dissolution of marriage on the ground of adultery, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Manjit K. Singh… v. S. Kanwarjit Singh…., 58 (1995) DLT 208 In the said cited case, the husband had filed a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce on the grounds of adultery, cruelty and disertion. However, as the case progressed, the husband gave up the ground of adultery for seeking dissolution of marriage still the husband, wanted to rely upon and adduce evidence qua the allegations of adultery in support of the ground of cruelty on the premises that the adulterous acts alleged in the petition amounted to cruelty. By means of an application the wife sought deletion of certain portions from the petition on the ground that the allegations were scandalous, frivolous, vexatious and unnecessary. The application was, however, dismissed by the learned trial court. The Division Bench of this Court, on a consideration of the matter reiterated the legal position that the Court has ample power to order striking out of pleadings which may be unnecessary, which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit and further held that after the husband had given up the ground or in that behalf the allegations of adultery, allowing the same to remain a part of the pleadings more especially in the absence of the alleged adulterer being a party will definitely tend to prejudice the fair trial of the suit which will have to be tried on the basis of allegations which may amount to cruelty whether physical or mental. The Court ruled that the allegations as noticed were not only unnecessary but might tend to prejudice and also delay the fair trial of the proceedings. The Court ordered the deletion of the allegations from the petition which amounted alleging adultery on the part of the wife.

4. As against the above, learned counsel for the respondent-husband has placed reliance upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994) I SCC 337 and in the case of Ramesh Chander v. Savitri (Smt), (1995) 2 SCC 7 in order to show that the allegations of which offence has been taken by the wife are nothing, but various instances of cruel conduct attributable to the wife. In the case V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (Mrs.) (supra), the Supreme Court more fully expounded the meaning of cruelty as referred to in Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Age, 1995 in the following words:—

“Mental cruelty in section 13(1)(i-a) can broadly be defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with the other. Mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary to prove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of the petitioner. While arriving at such conclusion, regard must be had to the social status, educational level of the parties, the society they move in, the possibility or otherwise of the parties ever living together in case they are already living apart and all other relevant facts and circumstance which it is neither possible nor desirable to set out exhaustively. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a matter to be determined in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. If it is a case of accusations and allegations, regard must also be had to the context in which they were made.”

5. Reliance has also been placed on two English decisions. In the case of Chalcroft v. Chalcroft, (1969) 2 All. E.R 1172 and the case of Walker v. Walker, (1961) 3 All. E.R 14 laying down that an allegation of condoned adultery or of a reasonable belief in adultery in a petition founded on cruelty is not an allegation of adultery for the purpose of Rule 13(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules 1968, but is an allegation of improper association within Rule 13(2) of the Rules. In the later case, it was held that a husband who carries on deliberately such a course of conduct as induces in his wife a reasonable belief that he is carrying on an adulterous association and thereby causes injury to her health, is guilty of persistent cruelty towards her.

6. Bearing in mind the above legal preposition, I may now proceed to examine if the allegations which are sought to be deleted from the divorce petition are relevant and necessary for the just and proper adjudication of the petition or are scandalous, insinuating, vexatious and irrelevant. The allegations which are stated to be offending and liable to be deleted have been reproduced in paragraph 2 of the revision petition and are purposely being not reproduced in this order.

7. The said allegations are undoubtedly serious in nature and may also be termed as scandalous or insinuating but the question to be answered is as to whether the same are relevant for the purpose of adjudication of the petition and should be allowed to remain on record. There is no denial of the legal position that in a petition for dissolution of marriage, based on the ground of cruelty, the petitioner has to succinctly state the events and instances which according to the petitioner constitute cruel conduct within the meaning of Section 13 (1) (1a) of the Hindu Marriage Act but such instances of cruel conduct must, however, relate to a period after the solemnisation of the marriage and not prior thereto. There is also no doubt that any conduct of the spouse which points to his/her extra marital relations would be the conduct amounting to utmost cruelty to the other spouse. Judging above referred allegations in this light, this Court is of the opinion that so far as the allegations which form part of paras 4.4 and 4.6 of the petition which pertains to the alleged conduct of the wife prior to the solemnisation of the marriage cannot be said to be relevant for the just and effective adjudication of the divorce petition. These allegations are, therefore, irrelevant besides being scandalous and, therefore, are liable to be deleted from the petition. Yet another reason why the Court should not permit the retention of these allegations is the alleged person with whom the wife is stated to have been sexually involved has not been made a party in the divorce petition. So far as other allegations contained in paragraphs 4.16 4.18 and 4.23 are concerned, this Court is of the opinion that the allegations no doubt being of serious nature and tend to be scandalous but as they are attributable to the conduct of the wife after solemnisation of the marriage may be considered to be the instances of cruel conduct for establishing the ground of cruelty on which the petition for divorce has been filed. The said allegations no doubt vaguely suggest that the wife might be indulging in extra-marital relations, but it is not categorically alleged that the wife having had after solemnisation of the marriage voluntarily sexual intercourse with any person other than the husband. Accordingly these allegations are not liable to be deleted and can be allowed to be retained in the petition.

8. In the result, this revision petition is partly allowed. The impugned order of the learned trial court dated 15th May, 2000 is hereby set aside and the application of the petitioner under Order 6 Rule 16 is allowed to the extent that the allegations as contained in the portion of paragraphs 4.4 and 4.6 and as reproduced in para 2 of the Revision Petition are ordered to be deleted from the petition. The respondent husband shall make requisite amendment in the petition within four weeks from the date of this order.

The trial Court record shall be sent back forthwith.

Rekha Singal. v. Lavleen Singal.

Summary of Opinion by R.C. Jain, J. (Civil Revision concerning Order 6 Rule 16)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner-Wife's Arguments (Ms. Rekha Singal)

Respondent-Husband's Arguments (Mr. Lavleen Singal)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Rekha Singal. v. Lavleen Singal.

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