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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Dalveer Bhandari, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

A large number of Letters Patent Appeals (LPAs) challenged a common judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 22.2.1992 that disposed of many writ petitions. The issues in those appeals were identical, so the Court proceeded to decide them by a single judgment. The Court set out the facts of LPA No. 58/1992 (arising from Writ Petition No. 1110/89) as representative.

In that representative matter, Respondent No.1 joined the appellant company on 1 June 1943 and was allotted a residential quarter on 2 January 1964 on a leave-and-licence basis, on the specific condition that he would vacate the accommodation within four days of cessation of service. The respondent retired on 6 June 1983 but continued to occupy the quarter and had not vacated it at the time of the proceedings.

Because the quarter was not vacated, the appellant initially withheld the respondent's dues, including gratuity. The respondent applied to the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act (with an application for condonation of delay). The Controlling Authority directed payment of gratuity with 10% interest. The appellant appealed under Section 7(7) of the Act; the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal and confirmed that gratuity could not be linked to vacation of the quarter. The appellant then filed a writ petition under Article 226; the learned Single Judge upheld the Appellate Authority's order directing payment of gratuity with 10% interest.

During the pendency of the writ petition, the gratuity and interest were paid in this case and in connected cases. The central question for the Court was whether the direction to pay gratuity (with interest) was illegal and whether the Court should order the respondents to refund the gratuity because they had not vacated the quarters.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the direction to the appellant to pay gratuity (with interest) to respondents who had not vacated employer‑allotted residential quarters was illegal.
  2. Whether the courts below erred in condoning delay in filing the application for directions for payment of gratuity and in refusing to withhold gratuity on account of non‑vacation of quarters.
  3. Whether the respondents, having remained in unauthorised occupation of quarters after retirement, are obliged to refund gratuity (with interest) already paid.
  4. Whether courts should have exercised their discretion to withhold gratuity or to require surrender of quarters before directing payment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Controlling Authority erred in condoning the delay in filing the application for directions to release gratuity and interest.
  • The Appellate Authority and the learned Single Judge were wrong in not interfering with the Controlling Authority's order.
  • Reliance on UOI & Anr. v. K. Balakrishna Nambiar: interest should not be payable where the employee was in unauthorised occupation of Government accommodation.
  • Reliance on Life Insurance Corporation of India v. John Anton D’ Souza: employer entitled to withhold provident fund contribution till surrender of staff quarter.
  • The respondents’ conduct (not vacating quarters for years after retirement) was unreasonable and the court should not have exercised discretion in their favour; the appellant was entitled to a refund of gratuity paid or, alternatively, a direction for eviction.
  • The learned Single Judge should have directed the respondents to vacate the quarters and should have followed precedents (such as K.T. Lakshmanan) where discretion was refused to employees wrongfully withholding quarters.
  • Reliance on Charan Singh v. Birla textiles (Payment of Gratuity Act interest prospective) — the learned Single Judge erred in not applying that principle.
  • The appellant did not press any argument based on resignation (employees who resigned were not pressed as an issue because of subsequent Supreme Court developments regarding resignation and gratuity).

Respondents' Arguments (as recorded)

  • The learned counsel for respondents contended that gratuity is not dependent on vacating Government/employer accommodation and relied on several authorities to show that gratuity should not be withheld for non‑vacation.
  • Reliance on R. Kapur v. Director of Inspection and on State of Kerala v. M. Padmanabhan Nair to support the proposition that pension and gratuity are valuable rights; delay in payment attracts interest at market rates and gratuity is not linked to vacating accommodation.
  • Reliance on Jarnail Singh and Anirudh Pandey to support the position that gratuity/pension may be treated as enforceable rights and that courts have granted interest where payments were delayed, even where occupation issues existed.
  • Reliance on Travancore Plywood Industries Ltd. and other High Court authority to argue that withholding gratuity for failure to surrender employer property is not permissible unless permitted by the Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
UOI & Anr. v. K. Balakrishna Nambiar, 1998 (2) SCC 706 Held that interest could not be payable where respondent was in unauthorised occupation of Government accommodation. The appellant relied on this authority to argue interest should not have been awarded; the Court recorded the reliance but placed it against other authorities favouring gratuity payment.
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. John Anton D’ Souza and others, 1996 LCR 499 (Bombay High Court) Observation that employer may be entitled to withhold provident fund contribution until employee surrenders vacant possession of staff quarter. The appellant cited this decision; the Court noted it but treated it as not overruling the broader principle that gratuity cannot be withheld except on grounds specified by the Act.
K.T. Lakshmanan (Bombay High Court) [referenced] Authority where Court refused to exercise discretion in favour of employees wrongfully withholding quarters and who would not give undertaking to vacate. The appellant urged the learned Single Judge should have followed this approach; the Court noted the reliance but did not adopt it as governing in light of other binding precedents and statutory purpose.
Charan Singh v. Birla textiles, AIR 1988 SC 2022 Stated that provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act regarding interest are prospective. The appellant contended this should have been applied; the Court recorded the submission but based its conclusion on the welfare purpose of the Act and other Supreme Court decisions.
Indian Hume Pipe Company v. The Workman, AIR 1960 SC 251 Held that gratuity is intended to help workmen after retirement; gratuity is a retiral benefit tied to length of service. Used by the Court to explain the purpose of gratuity and to underline the social‑welfare character of the statute.
Burhanpur Tapti Mills Ltd. v. Burhanpur Tapti Mills Mazdoor Sangh, AIR 1965 SC 839 Defined gratuity as a lump sum for orderly and humane elimination of superannuated or disabled employees; highlighted social benefits of gratuity. Cited to reinforce the characterization of gratuity as social welfare and a necessary retiral benefit to be protected.
Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Its Workmen, 6 Factory Journal Reports 453 Observed that gratuity is a retirement benefit and that provident fund alone may be insufficient; gratuity should be allowed when finances permit. Relied upon to stress that gratuity aims to provide relief in old age and forms part of retiral benefits deserving protection.
Workmen Employed under Powells Ltd. v. Powells Ltd., 1952 LAC 334 Noted gratuity is modest but important assistance to workmen upon retirement consistent with social justice. Cited to support the view that gratuity is meant for sustaining employees in old age and is socially valuable.
Bakshish Singh v. Darshan Engineering Works and others, 1994 (1) SCC 9 Analyzed gratuity concept; held Payment of Gratuity Act is a welfare measure akin to Minimum Wages, Payment of Bonus, Provident Funds Acts and grounded in constitutional social‑welfare provisions. Relied upon heavily to demonstrate the Act's welfare character and constitutional backing; used to support the proposition that gratuity should not be withheld except as provided by the Act.
Crown Aluminium Works v. Workmen, AIR 1958 SC 30 Principle that industry has no right to exist if it cannot pay at least a bare minimum wage; social justice obligations on employers. Cited to reinforce the wider social‑justice context in which gratuity and labour welfare statutes operate.
State of Haryana and others v. K.N Dutt, 1995 (3) SCC 144 In peculiar facts, Supreme Court permitted deduction of Government dues from gratuity and pension. Referenced as an exception in peculiar facts where dues were deducted; Court noted it but treated it as distinguishable from the present fact situation.
R. Kapur v. Director of Inspection (Painting and Publication) Income Tax and another, (1994) 6 SCC 589 Authority relied on to show gratuity not dependent on vacating Government accommodation and to support award of interest for delay. Relied upon by respondents; the Court recorded its use as supporting the proposition that gratuity is an enforceable right not contingent on surrender of accommodation.
State of Kerala v. M. Padmanabhan Nair, (1985) 1 SCC 429 Held pension and gratuity are valuable rights; delay in settlement attracts penal interest (court cited this to justify interest for delay). Cited by respondents and noted by the Court as supporting the view that gratuity/pension attract interest for delay and are not mere bounty.
Jarnail Singh v. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and Others, (1993) 1 SCC 47 Interpreted Rule 3(1)(o) of Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules: 'pension' includes gratuity except where contradistinguished; for recovery of Government dues, pension amount could be withheld. Cited to explain when withholding might be permissible in the context of recovery of government dues; Court treated it as limited to statutory contexts.
Anirudh Pandey v. Bihar State Road Transport Corporation and another, AIR 1995 SC 1129 Where employee failed to vacate and surrender house, the Court directed payment of interest at 15% and costs. Noted by the Court as an example where interest and orders were made despite occupation issue; used in the matrix of authorities showing varied approaches.
Travancore Plywood Industries Ltd. v. Regional Joint Labour Commissioner & Others, 1996 (2) LLJ 85 (Kerala High Court) Held gratuity due cannot be withheld except on grounds mentioned in the Act; refusal to surrender employer land not a ground to withhold gratuity. Relied upon by respondents and noted by the Court as supporting the view that withholding gratuity for non‑vacation is impermissible.
D.V. Kapoor v. Union of India and others, AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1923 Held that withholding gratuity as a penalty is illegal and beyond jurisdiction. Cited to support the proposition that gratuity cannot be withheld as punishment for misconduct or breach involving accommodation.
Ramjilal Chimanlal Shanna v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mill Co. Ltd. and another, 1984 LAB I.C 1703 (Bombay High Court) Held it is not permissible under the Payment of Gratuity Act to withhold gratuity for reasons such as holding back possession of premises. Referenced as supporting the strict approach that non‑vacation alone is insufficient to justify withholding gratuity.
Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Asstt. Labour Commissioner (Central) & Controlling Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act, Allahabad and Others, 2000 (1) LLJ 1221 Observed that non‑vacation of quarter may not be a ground for withholding gratuity. Cited by the Court to reinforce the conclusion that non‑vacation does not justify withholding gratuity under the Act.
H. Rajendra Pai v. Canara Bank and another, (1998) 78 Factory and Labour Reports 650 (Kerala High Court) Held non‑vacation of bank quarter is not a ground for withholding gratuity. Noted by the Court as a supporting High Court view aligned with the conclusion reached in the present matters.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeded from statutory purpose to application of authority:

  1. The Court examined the aims and objects of the Payment of Gratuity Act and emphasized repeatedly that the Act is a social‑welfare legislation intended to confer an extra retiral benefit on employees to assist them at retirement. The gratuity is characterized as a gratuitous but social welfare payment to ensure some sustenance for old age.
  2. The Court pointed to Section 13 of the Payment of Gratuity Act which expressly protects gratuity from attachment in execution of any decree or order of any civil, revenue or criminal court. The legislature's intent was to reserve the gratuity amount for long service and retirement, and courts must give this provision its true meaning and respect that intent.
  3. The Court reviewed a range of Supreme Court and High Court decisions (as catalogued above) that had analyzed the nature of gratuity and the statutory scheme. Several apex court decisions were highlighted to show that the Act is a welfare measure comparable to Minimum Wages, Payment of Bonus, Provident Funds Acts and is grounded in constitutional social‑welfare obligations.
  4. Although the Court acknowledged that there are some authorities where courts have declined to order payment of gratuity in particular circumstances (or have allowed deductions), it regarded those as distinguishable or exceptional. On balance, and in view of the number of direct and categorical decisions of the Apex Court emphasizing the welfare character of the Act and the protective provisions, the Court concluded that gratuity cannot be withheld merely because an employee failed to vacate employer‑provided quarters.
  5. The Court noted that the appellant had initiated separate eviction proceedings in relation to the quarters and that those matters were pending in various courts; these proceedings were separate from the statutory regime governing gratuity.
  6. Given the statutory protection, the object of the Act, and binding authorities stressing gratuity's welfare character and the narrow grounds on which it may be withheld, the Court found no ground to interfere with the orders of the Controlling Authority, the Appellate Authority, or the learned Single Judge that directed payment of gratuity with interest.

The Court limited its analysis to the statutory scheme and the authorities cited; it did not order eviction nor disturb separate pending eviction proceedings.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeals and writ petitions filed by the appellant are DISMISSED.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The Court declined to interfere with the directions of the lower authorities that the appellant pay gratuity with interest to the respondents; the Court therefore upheld the payment orders already made (and noted that such amounts had in fact been paid during the pendency of litigation).
  • The appellant's plea for refund of gratuity on account of non‑vacation of quarters was rejected. The Court did not order refund of gratuity by the respondents.
  • The appellant's separate eviction proceedings remain a distinct avenue and are pending in various courts; the Court did not adjudicate eviction in these proceedings.
  • The parties were directed to bear their own costs in the appeals and writ petitions.

Implications regarding precedent and legal principle:

The Court reaffirmed the established position—that the Payment of Gratuity Act is a welfare statute, gratuity is a protected retiral benefit and, except on grounds expressly provided by the statute (or in narrowly distinguishable factual situations), gratuity cannot be withheld merely because an employee wrongfully continues to occupy employer accommodation after retirement. The opinion did not state that it was creating a new precedent beyond applying and synthesising existing decisions; rather, it relied on direct and categorical judgments of the Supreme Court and relevant High Court authorities to reach its conclusion.

    Texmaco Limited. v. Roshan Singh & Others

    Dalveer Bhandari, J.— A large number of Letters Patent Appeals have been filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 22.2.1992 by which a large number of writ petition were disposed of. The questions of law involved in these appeals are exactly identical, therefore, we propose to dispose of these appeals by one common judgment. The learned Single Judge also disposed of all the writ petitions by a common judgment.

    2. The learned Single Judge has dealt with the facts of one writ petition. We also deem it appropriate to reiterate the facts of only LPA No. 58/1992 arising out of writ petition No. 1110/89 in order to appreciate the controversy involved in the case.

    3. Respondent No. 1 joined the appellant company on 1st June, 1943. On 2.1.1964 he was allotted a residential quarter in the premises of the appellant mill. The respondent retired from service on 6.6.1983 The respondent was allotted a quarter on leave and licence basis on the specific condition that he would vacate the accommodation within 4 days of cessation of the service by the management. Admittedly till date the respondent has not vacated the quarter which is the main grievance of the appellant before us. In other connected appeals also the respondents-workmen have not vacated the quarters though they have retired from the service of the appellant mill several years ago.

    4. Initially because of the non-vacation of the quarters, respondent's dues, including the gratuity amount, were not released. The respondent applied to the Controlling Authority under the Act for the release of the gratuity amount along with interest. The application was moved along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the application for directions for payment of his gratuity. The Controlling Authority directed the appellant to pay the gratuity with 10% interest.

    5. The appellant aggrieved by the order of the Controlling Authority filed an appeal under Section 7(7) of the Act. The appeal was dismissed and the finding of the Controlling Authority that the amount of the gratuity cannot be linked with the vacation of the quarter was confirmed by the Appellate Authority. The appellant still not satisfied with the order of the Appellate Authority approached the learned Single Judge by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge by a detailed judgment upheld the order of the Appellate Authority directing the appellant to pay the gratuity amount with 10% interest.

    6. It may be pertinent to mention that during the pendency of the writ petition because of the direction of the court, the gratuity amount along with interest has been paid in this case and in all other connected cases. Now, the short question which falls for our consideration is whether the direction to the appellant for making the payment of gratuity to the respondents-workmen was illegal and this court should direct the workmen to refund the gratuity with interest because they did not vacate the residential quarters allotted to them while they were in the employment of the appellant? The appellant in these appeals has made the following submissions.

    7. Mr. Harvinder Singh the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Controlling Authority erred in condoning the delay of the respondent in filing the application for directions to the appellant to release the gratuity along with interest. He further submitted that the Appellate Authority and the learned Single Judge were in error in not interfering with the judgment and order of the Controlling Authority.

    8. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on UOI & Anr. v. K. Balakrishna Nambiar, 1998 (2) SCC 706. In this case their Lordship of the Supreme Court observed that interest could not be payable by the Union of India to the respondent on the gratuity amount of Rs. 23,888.00 for the respondent was in unauthorised occupation of the Government accommodation and the period of one month after his vacating the same.

    9. The learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High. Court passed in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. John Anton D’ Souza and others, 1996 LCR 499. The Court observed that the employer is entitled to withhold his contribution to the provident fund till such time the employee surrenders vacant possession of the staff quarter.

    10. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that looking to the conduct of the respondent-workman of not vacating the quarter, the court's discretion ought not to have been exercised in favour of the respondent-workman by the Controlling Authority and the Appellate Authority as well as the learned Single Judge of this Court were clearly in error in not interfering with the impugned order.

    11. Those employees who have voluntarily resigned were not entitled to gratuity but were given gratuity in view of the Supreme Court judgment by which the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Darshan Engineering Works was overruled. Therefore, the appellant did not press the question of resignation in this appeal and in the connected appeals.

    12. In the appeal it has been urged that the learned Single Judge though expressed strong displeasure at the attitude of those employees who had left the service of the company but continued to retain the company's quarters but was in error in not directing the respondents workmen to vacate the quarter.

    13. The learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that the learned Single Judge was in error in not following the judgment of K.T Lakshmanan of Bombay High Court in which the Court refused to exercise the discretion in favour of the employees who were wrongfully withholding the quarters and were not prepared to give undertaking to vacate the same.

    14. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in not applying the case of Charan Singh v. Birla textiles, AIR 1988 SC 2022 which clearly stated that Payment of Gratuity Act in regard to the interest are only prospective.

    15. During the course of arguments the principal submission of the learned counsel for the appellant has been that the respondents-workmen even after superannuating from the employment of the appellant several years ago have not vacated the quarters, and in view of the most unreasonable and unfair conduct of the respondent-workman, the court was not justified in giving directions to the appellant to pay the gratuity alongwith interest.

    16. He submitted that this direction ought not to have been given and the appellant is entitled to the refund of the amount paid to the workmen. In the alternative the Court must give direction to the respondent workmen to vacate the appellant's quarter without further loss of time. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, we deem it appropriate to deal with the Objects and Reasons of Payment of Gratuity Act.

    17. In Indian Hume Pipe Company v. The Workman, AIR 1960 SC 251 their Lordship of the Supreme Court observed that gratuity paid to workmen is intended to help them after retirement whether the retirement is a result of rules of superannuation or physical disability. The general principle is that by their length of service the workmen are entitled to claim a certain amount as a retirai benefit.

    18. The gratuity, as the term itself suggests, is a gratuitous payment given to an employee on discharge or retirement. The Act is not intended to do away with other retirai benefits already existing and available to the employees. By enacting, the legislation clearly intended to confer extra benefits on the employees. This is a social legislation which has been enacted to help the employees at the time of their retirement.

    19. In Burhanpur Tapti Mills Ltd. v. Burhanpur Tapti Mills Mazdoor Sangh , AIR 1965 SC 839 their Lordship of Supreme Court tried to define the concept of gratuity. According to them the gratuity is a lump sum payment considered necessary for an “orderly and humane elimination” from industry of superannuated or disabled employees who but for such retiring benefits would continue in employment even though they function inefficiently. The voluntary retirement of an inefficient or old or worn out employee on the assurance that he is to get a retirai benefit leads to the avoidance of industrial disputes, promotes contentment among those who look for promotions, draws better kind of employees and improves the tone and morale of the industry. It is beneficial all round. It compensates the employee who, as he grows old knows that some compensation for the gradual destruction of his wage earning capacity is being built up.

    20. In Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Its Workmen, 6 Factory Journal Reports 453, the court observed that the fundamental principle in allowing gratuity is that it is a retirement benefit for long service as a provision for old age. Provident fund provides a certain measure of relief only and a portion of that consists of the employee's wages that he and his family would ultimately receive, and that this provision in the present day conditions is wholly insufficient relief and to retirement benefits, gratuity and provident fund, when the finances of the concern permit ought to be allowed.

    21. In Workmen Employed under Powells Ltd. v. Powells Ltd., 1952 LAC 334 the Court observed that the gratuity may not amount to too much but it is kind of help which the workmen are in need on retirement. It is also in accordance with our present notions of social justice that those who have put in long service should on retirement have something to sustain them in their old age.

    22. Section 13 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 clearly indicate the intention of the Legislature that this amount shall not be liable to attachment in execution of any decree or order of any civil, revenue or criminal court. Section 13 reads as under:

    13. Protection of gratuity: No gratuity payable under this Act [and no gratuity payable to an employees employed in any establishment, factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port, railway company or shop exempted under Section 5] shall be liable to attachment in execution of any decree or order of any civil, revenue or criminal court.

    23. The legislature in its wisdom has incorporated this Section to give sanctity to the amount of gratuity that this amount is reserved for long service of the employee given to him at the time of his retirement. This amount cannot be attached in execution of any decree or order of any civil, revenue of criminal court. This intention of the legislature has to be given true meaning and has to be respected.

    24. In Bakshish Singh v. Darshan Engineering Works and others, 1994 (1) SCC 9 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have analysed a large number of cases dealing with the concept of gratuity. The Supreme Court observed that it would be apparent both from its object as well as from its provision that the Act was placed on the statute book as a welfare measure to improve the service conditions of the employees. The Court further mentioned that the Payment of Gratuity Act is of the genre of Minimum Wages Act, the Payment of Bonus Act, the Provident Funds Act, Employees State Insurance Act and other like statutes. These statutes lay down the minimum relevant benefit which must be made available to the employees. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further observed that “we have solemnly resolved to constitute this country, among others, into a socialist republic and to secure to all its citizens, which, of course, include workmen, social and economic justice.” In this judgment, their Lordships referred to Article 38 of the Constitution and mentioned that “the requirement of the State to strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may, a social order in which, among other things, social and economic justice shall inform all the institutions of the normal life.”

    25. Reference has also been made in the aforesaid case to the Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution of India. The Court observed that “Article 39 states that the State shall, in particular, direct its police towards securing among others, that the citizens have the right to an adequate means to livelihood and that the health and strength of workers are not abused. Article 41 of the Constitution directs the State to make effective provision, among others, for securing public assistance in old age and in other cases of undeserved want.” Articles 41 and 43 of the Constitution require, the State of endeavour to secure by suitable legislation to all workers a living wage, conditions of work, ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure, social and cultural opportunities. Article 47 of the Constitution requires that the State shall regard the raising the level of nutrition and standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health and one of its primary duties. In the said case, Court further observed that there is a restriction placed on the exercise of the Fundamental Rights under Article 19(1)(g) by clause 6 of the said Article. Clause 6 states that nothing in sub-section (g) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law imposing in the interests of general public reasonable restriction on the exercise of right conferred by that sub-clause. The Court observed that it cannot be disputed that the present Act is a welfare measure introduced in the interest of the general public to secure social and economic justice to workmen to assist them in their old age and to ensure them a decent standard of life on their retirement.

    26. In Crown Aluminium Works v. Workmen AIR 1958 SC 30 the Supreme Court observed as under:

    “There is, however, one principle which admits of no exceptions. No industry has a right to exist unless it is able to pay its workmen at least a bare minimum wage. It is quite likely that in under-developed countries, where unemployment prevails on a very large scale, unorganised labour may be available on starvation wages; but the employment of labour on starvation wages cannot be encouraged or favoured in a modern democratic welfare. If an employer cannot maintain his enterprise without cutting down the wages of his employees below even a bare subsistence or minimum wage, he would have no right to enterprise on such terms.”

    27. A reference has been placed on State of Haryana and others v. K.N Dutt, 1995 (3) SCC 144. In the peculiar facts and circumstances, the Supreme Court reversed the Division Bench judgment of the High Court by which the order of the learned Single Judge was set aside, and it was directed that the respondent State was competent to deduct the Government dues from the gratuity and pension.

    28. The learned counsel for the appellant in reply to the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on a large number of cases. The learned counsel for the respondent in order to strengthen his submission to demonstrate that the gratuity is not dependent on vacating the Government accommodation, he placed reliance on various judgments. In R. Kapur v. Director of Inspection (Painting and Publication) Income Tax and another, (1994) 6 Supreme Court Cases 589. While relying on the judgment is ‘State of Kerala v. M. Padmanabhan Nair, (1985) 1 SCC 429’ stated that “pension and gratuity are no longer any bounty to be distributed by the Govt, to its employees on their retirement but have become, under the decisions of this Court, valuable rights and property in their hands and any culpable delay in settlement and disbursement thereof must be visited with the penalty of payment of interest at the current market rate, i.e 18% till actual payment.” The Court observed that gratuity is not dependent oil vacating the Government accommodation and not paying damages levied under relevant rules to other State.

    29. Reliance has also been placed on Jarnail Singh v. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and Others, (1993) 1 Supreme Court Cases 47. In this case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that in Rule 3(1) (o) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, the term of ‘pension’ defines that “it includes gratuity except when the term ‘pension’ is used in contradistinction to gratuity in consonance with the basic concept for recovery of the Government dues the amount of pension can be withheld.”

    30. In Anirudh Pandey v. Bihar State Road Transport Corporation and another, AIR 1995 SC 1129 their Lordships of the Supreme Court has taken the view that the appellant had failed to vacate and surrender the house to the Corporation. In this case the Court directed the payment of interest at the rate of 15% and costs.

    31. The counsel for the appellant placed reliance on Travancore Plywood Industries Ltd. v. Regional Joint Labour Commissioner & Others, 1996 (2) LLJ 85. In this case the Kerala High Court has taken the view that the amount of gratuity due of an employee can be withheld only on any of the grounds mentioned in the Act and not otherwise and at any rate refusal of the employee to surrender the land in his occupation in violation of the directive issued by the petitioner-company-employeer, even if it is assumed that the land belongs to the employer cannot be treated as failure to settle the account by the employee thereby forming a basis for withholding dispersal of arrears of gratuity.

    32. There is no provision of law by which gratuity can be withheld. The Court in D.V Kapoor v. Union of India and others, AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1923 observed that the order of withholding the gratuity as a measure of penalty is obviously illegal and is devoid of jurisdiction.

    33. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Ramjilal Chimanlal Shanna v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mill Co. Ltd. and another, 1984 LAB I.C 1703. It is observed that it is not permissible under the Payment of Gratuity Act to withhold the amount for any reason. Even though the conduct of the petitioner in holding back possession of the premises is not very praiseworthy still that is not a sufficient reason to deprive him of the right of gratuity.

    34. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Asstt. Labour Commissioner (Central) & Controlling Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act, Allahabad and Others, 2000 (1) Labour Law Journal 1221, the Court observed that non vacation of the quarter may npt be a ground for withholding the payment of gratuity.

    35. Similar view has been taken by Kerala High Court in H. Rajendra Pai v. Canara Bank and another, (1998) 78 Factory and Labour Reports 650. In this case the Court observed that non-vacating the quarter of the Bank is not a ground for withholding the gratuity.

    36. We have carefully considered the provisions the Payment of Gratuity Act, its aims and objects and cases cited at bar. From the aims and objects of the Gratuity Act, it is abundantly clear that the legislature did not want that the gratuity amount should be withheld for any reason except for the reasons specifically incorporated in the Act. The Courts have to translate the intention of the legislature. This Act has been enacted as a welfare legislation. There are some cases where the Courts have taken the view that the amount of gratuity can be withheld even for non-vacation of the quarter. But in view of the number of direct and categoric judgment of the Apex Court that the Payment of Gratuity Act is a welfare legislation, the amount of payment of gratuity cannot be withheld for non-vacation of the quarter. It may be pertinent to mention that the appellant has taken separate proceedings of eviction on this case and in other connected cases and those cases are pending in various courts.

    37. The learned Single Judge has carefully considered all the relevant judgments of the Supreme Court. On consideration of totality of the facts and circumstances, in our considered view no interference is called for. These appeals and writ petitions filed by the appellant are accordingly dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of these cases, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.

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    Texmaco Limited. v. Roshan Singh & Others
    (Mar 23, 2001)