C.M Nayar, J.— The present petition is directed against the judgment dated October 18, 1997 passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, allowing the petition of the respondent for eviction under Section 14D read with Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).
The tenancy premises comprises of one room and kitchen which is part of property No. IV-C/21, Old Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi. The petitioner is a tenant in the premises since 1969. The husband of the respondent expired on November 17, 1994 and the petition for eviction was, therefore, filed under Section 14D of the Act on the ground of bona fide requirement. The respondent does not possess any other residential accommodation except the suit premises where she is living with her elder son Vijay Kapoor whose family consists of his wife and three growing children. The accommodation in their possession comprises of only one room and a kitchen. The petitioner filed his Leave to Defend application and raised various pleas and contended that the matter raises triable issues. The premises were let out for commercial purposes by previous landlord Jai Raj Nath and were being used for such purpose with his consent and knowledge. The said Jai Raj Nath had filed eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act in the year 1980 where similar plea was taken by the respondent. The premises were purchased by the respondent vide Sale Deed dated December 14, 1991. Therefore, it is contended that the respondent having acquired the property by transfer could not bring suit for eviction prior to the expiry of period of five years as contemplated in the provisions of Section 14(6) of the Act. This plea is elaborately taken and discussed in paragraph 3 of the judgment which reads as follows:
“3. Now during arguments Id. respondent counsel referring Supreme Court judgment in a case Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India 1991-DLT-447 argued that petitioner having acquired suit premises by transfer and thus term “premises was let out by her or by her husband” the petitioner was incompetent to file petition under special provision of Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act. She could have filed petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and that too after expiry of 5 years period referred to in Section 14(6) of the D.R.C.Act On the other hand petition counsel argued that petitioner having acquired property before she become widow i.e during life time of her husband and present petition filed after demise of her husband could not be imputed mala fide particularly in the glaring facts and circumstances that she was living only in one room accommodation with her son who was having a wife and three children, Ld. counsel refer to recent Supreme Court judgment 1994-RLR-365 V. Rajaswari v. Bombay Tyres Intl. Ltd.. where it has been held that in a petition under Section 14D tenant practically had no defence whatsoever. Another judgment referred to by ld. counsel is of our own High Court in a case Smt. Gurdeep Kaur v. Sh. Kartar Singh Khurana and another reported as 1995-IV-AD-(Delhi) 49. In this case the petitioner widow's mother had acquired the property by purchase in 1962 whereas the property was let out in 1958 by erstwhile owner. It was held that in a petition under Section 14-D landlord does not have to prove ownership as such, still the fact that petitioner was owner/landlord is established by mutation of the property in favour of the petitioner. It was further held that it was not necessary in a petition under Section 14-D of the Act that premises must have been let out by the widow herself, as the law it now stands the premises in such a case could be one let out by her husband or even by her predecessor in interest. Now in the present case petitioner has placed on record the document in support of her counter affidavit that property stood mutated in her name in the concerned department of the Government. It is not a case where property has been acquired by petitioner when she was widow and invoked this special provision of Section 14D in respect of tenant which was there in the property much prior to purchase of this property. Petitioner acquired this property in 1991 and the respondent attorned tenancy in petitioner's favour since then. Petitioner's husband passed away in November, 1994. Upto that period provision of Section 14(6) would have operated bar against any bonafide petition against respondent. The petitioner becoming widow subsequent to purchase of property particularly where during life time of her husband tenant attorned tenancy in her favour should not be treated either malafide or incompetent to invoke Section 14-D of the Act where petitioner had a clear case of compelling need for accommodation when she was residing in one room accommodation with her married sons having wife and children. So far as respondent questioning petitioner's title alleging sale deed of the property executed in petitioner's favour in December, 1991 as null and void document I find arguments of petitioner counsel acceptable that tenant should not be considered competent to question petitioner's title. The only competency to question such a title is with the vendor or his L.Rs Moreover in a petition under Section 14D of the Act this Court is not required to go into the question of title.”
The learned Additional Rent Controller over-ruled the objections of the petitioner and held that the respondent became a widow subsequent to purchase of property and during the life time of her husband the petitioner attorned tenancy in her favour. The provisions of Section 14D of the Act were applicable as the respondent was in dire need of accommodation for herself and members of the family dependent upon her. The plea that the respondent did not have the valid title on the ground that the alleged sale deed executed in her favour was null and void was repelled. Similarly, the plea that the property was let out for commercial purposes was also turned down.
The respondent purchased the property by a valid Sale Deed executed on December 14, 1991 during the life time of her husband and it cannot be said that she is not the owner nor any relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties. The petitioner at no stage denied that the respondent was her landlady. In a petition for restoration of electricity, supply of water and sanitary service under Section 45 of the Act the petitioner accepted that relationship of landlady and tenant and conceded in his testimony that he treated the respondent as his landlady. There is, therefore, no scope for interference in the finding that relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties.
The next question which arises for consideration is as to whether the respondent could maintain a petition for eviction in view of the embargo as contained in Section 14(6) of the Act. This provision reads as follows:
“14. Protection of tenant against eviction
(6) Where a landlord has acquired any premises by transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under sub-section (1) on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso thereto, unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date of the acquisition.”
The respondent, admittedly, acquired the premises by a registered Sale Deed dated December 14, 1991 though she came in possession of the same in the year 1990. This was during the life time of her husband. Therefore, it is contended that she could not have filed a petition for eviction prior to the expiry of five years from the date of acquisition as contemplated in the provision of Section 14(6) of the Act which has been reproduced above. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court as reported in S. Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India and another 43 (1991) Delhi Law Times 447. Reference is made to para 21 which reads as follows:
“21. It was next urged that sub-section (6) of Section 14 is also attracted to applications under Section 14-B to 14-D. This contention overlooks the express wordings of sub-section (6). It refers to premises acquired by transfer and thereby transferee becoming the landlord. Such a landlord cannot bring an action for eviction of tenant in possession of the acquired premises within a period of five years from the date of acquisition. After five years such a landlord can ask for eviction of the tenant under Section 14(1)(e). This is indeed, as we said earlier, a protection to the tenant. The original landlord who cannot evict the tenant since he has got many houses under his occupation cannot use the device by transferring one of the houses to a third party who could easily evict such a tenant. The tenant in occupation of the transferred premises gets a protection from eviction for a minimum period of five years. Section 14-B and other allied provisions refer to the premises let out and not acquired by transfer. One may become an owner of the premises by transfer but the tenant in occupation of the transferred property cannot be evicted by resorting to Sections 14B to 14D. If the transferee wants to evict the tenant of such premises he must take action only under Section 14(1)(e). Equally, sub-section (7) of Section 14 has no application to eviction under Sections 14-B to 14-D. Nor the amended provisions under Section (25C)(2) would be attracted since it applies exclusively to tenants of the landlords covered under Section 14(A). But that does not mean that the tenants covered under Sections 14-B to 14-D are not entitled to any time for surrendering possession of the premises. It is always left to the Controller who is a quasi-judicial authority to exercise his discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The Controller must exercise his judicial discretion in every case of eviction and grant a reasonable time to the tenant.”
The above passage does not support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner as the right to approach under the provisions of Section 14D is confined to a particular class of persons i.e a ‘widow’ and in case she acquires the premises by transfer it is possible to conclude that she cannot bring in a suit for eviction prior to the expiry of period of five years from the date of acquisition. The bar as contained in Section 14(6) of the Act would have operated for a period of five years from the date of acquisition in case the husband continued to live during that period. However, in the present case, the husband of the respondent passed away in November, 1994 i.e prior to the expiry of period of five years from the date respondent acquired the property in 1991. The bar contained in Section 14(6) of the Act will, therefore, be of no application to the facts of the present case. The provisions of Section 14D may be reproduced as under:
“14D. Right to recover immediate possession of premises to accrue to a widow
(1) Where the landlord is a widow and the premises let out by her, or by her husband, are required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.
(2) Where the landlord referred to in sub-section (1) has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to her to make an application under that subsection in respect of any one of the premises chosen by her.
The reading of the above will clearly show that the right of a widow is not circumscribed by any other provision and she is entitled to move an application for eviction when she became the widow and in such a situation the provisions of Section 14(6) of the Act will have no application. The law as cited in the judgment of S. Surjit Singh Kalra (supra) clearly supports this interpretation and is in no way of any assistance to the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner. The observations, if read in isolation, as made in this case can be of no application to the case of the petitioner as the classified landlords who have been conferred with certain rights as incorporated in Section 14-B to 14-D form different categories and possess rights as incorporated in these provisions. The provision of Section 14D will become redundant if the interpretation as canvassed by learned counsel for the petitioner is followed. In the case as reported in V. Rajaswari v. Bombay Tyres Intl. Ltd.. 54 (1994) Delhi Law Times 494 the Supreme Court while dealing with a petition under Section 14(1)(e) allowed the same under Section 14D of the Act which came in operation pending the revision before the High Court. The following paragraph from this judgment may be reproduced as under:
“4. On a careful consideration of the above arguments, we are of the view that under Section 14-D, the tenant has practically no defence whatever. All that has to be proved under the said Section which has been extracted above, are; (i) that the landlady is a widow, (ii) the premises are required by her for own residence. In this case, both these requirements are satisfied. As regards the first, we do not want to state the obvious. Regarding the second, the fact that she is living with her daughter or any other person, is no ground to say that the premises in question is not required for her residence. If this be so, we are unable to see as to how her demand for increased rent would militate against her plea. Having regard to this established fact, we think that the trial of the application under Section 14-D before the Rent Controller, will only be redundant. Therefore, we direct eviction of the respondent-tenant under Section 14-D.”
There is, therefore, no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petition for eviction could not be filed prior to the expiry of a period of five years as contemplated in the provisions of Section 14(6) of the Act.
The learned Rent Controller has next analysed the bona fide requirement of the respondent/landlady elaborately and came to the conclusion that the respondent is not possessed of sufficient and alternative accommodation which will house the entire family. These are conclusions of fact and are not open to challenge in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Indeed it is necessary that the respondent has to establish her bona fides as laid down in Rahabhar Productions Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajendra K. Tandon 1998 III AD (S.C) 221. The onus has been duly discharged in the present case and it will not be open for this Court to interfere in exercise of revisional powers.
The other plea of the petitioner that the premises were being used for non-residential purposes is also without merit. The nature of the property is residential and the mere incidental user of a room for stitching cannot convert the same to user for commercial purposes. There is no force in this plea as well and the same is liable to be rejected.
In view of the above, there is no merit in this petition which is dismissed. The petitioner is, however, granted time for a period of three months from the date of passing of the order to vacate the demised premises. There will be no order as to costs.