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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 380, 403 and 409 I.P.C read with Section 201 of Indian Penal Code
  • Sections 200 or 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
  • Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act,
  • Section 156(3) of Criminal Procedure Code,
  • SECTION 200 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 630 read with Section 11
  • SECTION 630 COMPANIES ACT
  • Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C
  • Section 200 of Cr.P.C
  • Section 190 of Cr.P.C
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 380, 403 and 409 I.P.C read with Section 201 of Indian Penal Code
  • Sections 200 or 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
  • Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act,
  • Section 156(3) of Criminal Procedure Code,
  • SECTION 200 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 630 read with Section 11
  • SECTION 630 COMPANIES ACT
  • Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C
  • Section 200 of Cr.P.C
  • Section 190 of Cr.P.C
Smart Summary

Annotated Summary of the Opinion (J.K. Mehra, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The accused (son) and the complainant (father) are related and the complainant, Shri Hans Raj Jaiswal, acting for and on behalf of Jaiswal Packaging Private Limited, filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Pradeep Jaiswal under Sections 380, 403 and 409 I.P.C read with Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code, alleging removal of important machinery parts (e.g., feeder of Dominical Offset Printing, gauge of polar automatic paper cutting machine, belts and parts of Heidelberg machines) and misappropriation of books of account and funds. The complaint was marked by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to another Metropolitan Magistrate who referred the matter to the S.H.O. for investigation.

While police investigation was ongoing, the accused filed a Company Petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act (C.P. No. 98 of 1990) before this High Court; a Commissioner was appointed in that petition and certain proceedings (possession of account books and parts) were recorded on commission. The S.H.O., during investigation, took note of material produced before the Commissioner and recorded statements; on that basis the S.H.O. returned a finding that no offence was made out.

The complainant thereafter filed a "Protest Application". The Metropolitan Magistrate independently appraised the material (including the police report and material from the commission) and concluded that prima facie a case under Section 409 I.P.C. was made out, issuing summons to the accused. The accused challenged the order of summoning by the present petition in the High Court.

Relevant dates and procedural markers appearing in the opinion: complaint filed on 28 April, 1990; machinery and books removed on 27 and 29 April, 1990 (per the accused's concession); Company Petition filed towards the end of May, 1990; Protest Petition filed on 5 July, 1990.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Metropolitan Magistrate erred in issuing summons without complying with the mandatory requirement of recording statements under Section 200 Cr.P.C. (i.e., whether non-observance of Section 200 was fatal).
  2. Whether the Magistrate could validly refer the complaint to the police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and thereafter rely upon the police material without repeating the recording exercise under Section 200.
  3. Whether parallel proceedings before the High Court (Company Petition under Sections 397/398 Companies Act) barred or required staying criminal proceedings (i.e., whether the criminal complaint should be quashed or stayed to avoid parallel/conflicting decisions).
  4. Whether Section 630 of the Companies Act (read with Schedule 11/Section 11 as referenced) was the specific statutory route and hence criminal prosecution was inappropriate or barred.
  5. Whether the books of account and machinery parts alleged to have been removed constituted 'property' and whether the accused's conduct involved mens rea to constitute a criminal offence.

Arguments of the Parties

Accused / Applicant (represented by Mr. P.C. Khanna)

  • Conceded that items (books and parts) were removed but contended the same items were later returned and there was no mens rea to commit an offence.
  • Argued that books of account are not property of value for the purposes of theft/related offences, and their retention did not constitute an offence.
  • Submitted that the dispute is primarily civil and parallel proceedings on the same property were pending before the Company Judge; therefore criminal proceedings should not proceed.
  • Contended that the Magistrate committed a serious jurisdictional error by issuing process without complying with Section 200 Cr.P.C., i.e., the Magistrate did not record witness statements and proceeded merely on police material.
  • Argued that Section 630 read with Schedule 11 of the Companies Act (and Section 11 as later referenced) was the specific statutory remedy and should have been invoked instead of general criminal statutes.
  • Maintained it was improper for the Magistrate to rely on records of this Court (the Company Petition file) and that the summoning order was an abuse of process; sought quashing of summons and complaint.
  • Relied on several authorities in support of the contention that Section 200 is mandatory and non-observance vitiates proceedings (cases listed in the opinion).
  • Contended that cognizance had been taken earlier by administrative marking and that should be treated as cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C. (court found marking was merely administrative).

Complainant / Respondent (represented by Mrs. Pappu)

  • Argued that the Metropolitan Magistrate lawfully referred the matter to the police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and, when the police conducted the investigation and recorded witness statements, it was not necessary for the Magistrate to duplicate that exercise under Section 200.
  • Submitted that once the police report and supporting material were on the Magistrate's file, the Magistrate was entitled to appraise that material independently and form his own opinion, including issuing summons.
  • Characterized the present case as not being one that required procedures under Sections 200 or 202 Cr.P.C.
  • Supported the argument with case-law authorities that, in effect, permit reliance on police investigation where a magistrate has sent the complaint for police inquiry.
  • Argued that cognizance is taken when the Magistrate, after application of mind, issues process summoning the accused — not at the mere administrative stage when a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate marks the complaint to another Magistrate.
  • Urged that the accused should not be shown indulgence and should face the trial.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, AIR 1962 SC 876 Cited by the accused to support the contention that non-observance of Section 200 Cr.P.C. is fatal/mandatory. The court considered these authorities in the context of the Section 200 argument but held that no irregularity arose because the police had already recorded statements under Section 156(3) and the Magistrate could rely on that material.
Emperor v. Heman Gope, AIR 1920 Patna 232 Cited by the accused in support of the mandatory nature of Section 200 or related procedural contentions. The court treated this and similar older authorities as part of the accused's submissions but found the facts here (police investigation and recorded statements) rendered the Section 200 objection without force.
Jeoomal Tikamdas v. Emperor, AIR 1939 Sind 208 Cited by the accused in support of the contention on Section 200 procedure. Considered among other authorities; court concluded no procedural irregularity given the referral to police and the police-recorded material.
Braja Lull Dutta v. Kenaram Pal, AIR 1919 Patna 202 Cited by the accused on the issue of magistrate's duty/procedure under Section 200. Part of the accused's authorities — court nonetheless found in the specific circumstances that the magistrate's action was permissible.
Abhoy Charon v. Bangshadhar Mitra, AIR 1949 Calcutta 58 Cited by the accused in support of procedural objections to non-recording under Section 200. Considered by the court but did not alter the court's conclusion that the magistrate could rely on police material.
State of Bihar v. Deodar Jha, AIR 1958 Patna 51 Cited by the accused for procedural/content-based support regarding Section 200. Considered in the submissions; court held that where police have investigated under Section 156(3) and recorded statements, the absence of initial magistrate-recorded statements under Section 200 was not fatal.
Niranjan Singh Karan Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja, (1990) 4 SCC 76 : AIR 1990 SC 1962 Cited by the accused in support of the Section 200 / procedural contentions and related submissions. Court noted the citation as relied upon by Mr. Khanna; after considering submissions, the court's analysis led to acceptance of the validity of the magistrate's procedure in this case (police inquiry under Section 156(3)).
Hareram Satpathy v. Tika Ram Aggarwal, (1978) 4 SCC 58 : AIR 1978 SC 1568 Cited by the complainant to support the proposition that a magistrate may refer a complaint to the police and thereafter rely on police material without repeating Section 200 procedures. The court accepted the general principle — that a magistrate may send a complaint under Section 156(3) to police and then appraise police material — and applied it to hold no illegality in the Magistrate's conduct here.
T.K. Kodandaram v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1993 Cr. L.J. 1926 Cited by the complainant to support reliance on police investigations and related procedural matters. Considered as part of the complainant's supporting authorities; the court's conclusion aligned with the principle that referral to police under Section 156(3) permitted reliance on police material.
India Carat Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1989) 2 SCC 132 : AIR 1989 SC 885 Cited by the complainant for the proposition that the Magistrate may appraise police material and that such procedure can be valid. The court regarded the authority as supporting the respondent's position and applied the same reasoning to uphold the Magistrate's power to summon after appraising police material.
Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State Of Maharashtra, (1971) 2 SCC 654 : AIR 1971 SC 2372 Cited by the complainant for the proposition that cognizance is taken when a Magistrate, after conscious application of mind, issues process — not when a case is merely administratively marked. The court agreed with this principle and held that marking by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was merely administrative and not a taking of cognizance; cognizance arises when the Magistrate applies his mind and issues summons/process.
State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma (1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : AIR 1991 SC 1260) Cited by the complainant to support timing of cognizance and related procedural principles. Referenced by the court in considering the complainant's submissions; the court accepted the broader propositions relied upon and applied them to the factual matrix.
State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal (1990 (2) SCC 1066) Cited by the complainant to support the position on issuance of process and the circumstances in which criminal proceedings may proceed. Used by the court as part of the complainant's supporting authorities; the court's reasoning was consistent with accepting the magistrate's discretion to appraise police material and issue process.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully weighed the submissions and the authorities cited on both sides and proceeded with the following legal analysis (as stated in the opinion):

  1. The court observed that marking of the complaint by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to another Metropolitan Magistrate was a mere administrative act and did not amount to the Magistrate's taking of cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C.; cognizance, the court accepted, occurs when a Magistrate after conscious application of mind issues process summoning the accused.
  2. The central procedural objection by the accused was non-observance of Section 200 Cr.P.C. — i.e., that the Magistrate should have recorded witness statements himself before issuing process. The court examined this objection in the factual context: the Magistrate, on receipt of the complaint, elected to entrust the matter to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
  3. The court held that where a Magistrate sends a complaint to the police under Section 156(3) and the police conduct investigation (including recording of statements and placing material on the file), it is not necessary for the Magistrate to repeat the exercise under Section 200. On receipt of the police report, the Magistrate is fully empowered to appraise the material produced by the police and form his own opinion.
  4. The court explained that even if the police opinion is in favour of no offence, the Magistrate is not bound by that opinion; the Magistrate may independently conclude that a prima facie case exists and summon the accused on his own appraisal of the material. Thus, reliance by the Magistrate on material recorded by the police (including material placed by virtue of Commission proceedings) was not fatal to the complaint or the order summoning the accused.
  5. On the contention that Section 630 of the Companies Act (read with Section 11 / Schedule 11 as referred) should have been the exclusive remedy, the court expressed a prima facie view that the penalty/procedures under the Companies Act do not necessarily prejudice or dilute the complainant's right to prosecute offences under the I.P.C.; however the court declined to decide this complex question at the interlocutory stage, leaving it open for trial consideration.
  6. The court recognized factual overlap between the criminal complaint and the Company Petition; given the possibility of parallel proceedings producing conflicting decisions, the court considered it in the interest of justice to avoid immediate concurrent litigation on common factual matters.
  7. On balance, and having applied the legal principles and authorities to the facts before it, the court found no procedural irregularity in the Magistrate's conduct under Sections 156(3) and 200 Cr.P.C., but for reasons of avoiding parallel/conflicting adjudication it ordered a stay of the criminal proceedings during the pendency of the Company Petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court ordered that the proceedings before the Metropolitan Magistrate be stayed during the pendency of the Company Petition. Cr.M(M) was disposed of in those terms with no order as to costs. The appeal (or petition) was disposed of.

Implications:

  • The immediate and direct effect is a stay of the criminal proceedings before the Metropolitan Magistrate for the duration of the Company Petition's pendency in this High Court.
  • The court held that the Magistrate did not commit procedural irregularity by relying on police-investigation material obtained after sending the complaint under Section 156(3); therefore, the accused's Section 200 objection failed on the facts of this case.
  • The court did not finally decide the statutory interplay between remedies under the Companies Act (Section 630 read with Section 11 as referenced) and criminal prosecution under the I.P.C.; it expressly left that issue to be determined at trial or in appropriate proceedings.
  • No broad new precedent was declared on the Companies Act point; the decision resolved the controversy in this case by applying existing principles concerning reference to police under Section 156(3) and the magistrate's power to appraise police material.

Disposition: Ordered stay of the Metropolitan Magistrate proceedings during the pendency of the Company Petition; Cr.M(M) disposed of; no order as to costs. Appeal disposed of.

    Pradeep Jaiswal & Others v. Jaiswal Packaging Private Limited & Others

    Mr. J.K Mehra, J.— The petitioner in the pesent case is the accused in criminal case, pending before Metropolitan Magistrate. Briefly stating, the facts of the case are as under:—

    2. That the accused and the complainant are related to each other as son and father respectively. The complainant, Shri Hans Raj Jaiswal, acting for an on behalf of Jaiswal Packaging Private Limited, had filed a complaint against Mr. Pradeep Jaiswal under Sections 380, 403 and 409 I.P.C read with Section 201 of Indian Penal Code in the Court of Shri M.L Sahni, Metroplitan Magistrate (as he then was). It is alleged in the complaint that the accused had removed important parts of the machinery from the factory such as Feeder of Dominical (0715) Offset Printing, Gauge of Polar Automatic Paper Cutting Machine, Belt and other parts of Heidelberg machines etc. apart from books of account misappropriated funds. The complaint after being marked by the A.C.M.M to Shri Akshay Kumar, Metropolitan Magistrate, who in turn referred the complaint to S.H.O, Okhla Industrial Area. While the matter was being investigated by the S.H.O, Shri Pradeep Jaiswal filed a Company Petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, being C.P No. 98 of 1990. In that matter, Shri Pradeep Jaiswal got a Commissioner appointed and got certain proceedings recorded on commission, such as possession of account books of the company and certain important parts of the machinery without which the machines cannot operate. The S.H.O, in the course of his investigations, took note of what was produced before the Commissioner, appointed by the High Court in the said Company Petition and also recorded statements of certain individuals including watchman. On the basis of this material, he returned a finding that no offence is made out. As such, no action was taken by the Metropolitan Magistrate until the complainant moved again by means of an application, which was described as Protest Application. The Metropolitan Magistrate heard the parties in response to the said Protest Application and looked into the material brought on record by the S.H.O, appraised the material independently and came to the conclusion that prima facie a case was made out under Section 409 and issued the summons.

    3. The accused, feeling aggrieved from the said order of summoning, moved the present petition, challenging the order of summoning on various grounds such as:—

    (1) On the plea that books of accounts are not property as these have no value and they are movable or retention by the accused, who was at one time Director Incharge of the Company, did not commit any offence;

    (2) The dispute complained of is of civil nature and parallel proceedings relating to the same property are already pending before the Company Judge of this High Court. Therefore, also no summons should have been issued;

    (3) The Magistrate has committed serious error of jurisdiction in issuing process without complying with the mandatory requirement of Section 200 of Criminal Procedure Code in as much as no statements of the witnesses were recorded by the Magistrate and the Magistrate proceeded merely on the material placed on record by the S.H.O;

    (4) If any action had to be taken, then Section 630 of the Companies Act read with Schedule 11 was the specific provision, which should have been invoked and not the general criminal law provision; and

    (5) It was highly improper on the part of the Magistrate to rely upon the record of this Court even though it was forming part of the Magistrate's file alongwith S.H.O's report and that order summoning the accused is an abuse of the process of Court.

    4. For these reasons, it was submitted that the order summoning the accused as also the complaint be quashed.

    5. At the hearing before me, Mr. Khanna conceded that the accused did remove the books of account and machinery parts, but further stated that the parts of the machinery and the books brought back by the accused are the same, which were removed by Mr. Pradeep Jaiswal from the factory on 27th and 29th April, 1990. He stated that he had done so to prevent sale of machinery and to acquaint himself with accounts and there was no mens red to commit any crime. At present, I need not pronounce on the first and second contention of Mr. Khanna.

    6. Coming to the third contention alongwith the third plea, Mr. Khanna has laid a lot of stress on the non-observance of mandatory condition of Section 200 and has relied upon the following authorities:—

    (1) Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, AIR 1962 SC 876.

    (2) Emperor v. Heman Gope, AIR 1920 Patna 232.

    (3) Jeoomal Tikamdas v. Emperor, AIR 1939 Sind 208.

    (4) Braja Lull Dutta v. Kenaram Pal, AIR 1919 Patna 202

    (5) Abhoy Charon v. Bangshadhar Mitra, AIR 1949 Calcutta 58

    (6) State of Bihar v. Deodar Jha, AIR 1958 Patna 51.

    7. Mr. Khanna also relied upon Niranjan Singh Karan Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja, (1990) 4 SCC 76 : AIR 1990 SC 1962. Mr. Khanna further argued that in any event expediency demands that the proceedings before Magistrate should be stayed to await the outcome of the Company Petition since both the matters relate to the same Company and its properties. It will be appropriate to notice that the complaint was filed on 28th April, 1990 and the Company Petition was filed towards the end of May, 1990. Each side has accused the other of initiating action to prevent the other side from invoking law appropriately. The complainant's case was that son came to know that complaint had been filed and only to dilute its effect, he initiated the proceedings under Sections 397 and 398, which are alleged to be a counter blast only. While Mr. P.C Khanna states that when the Company Petition was filed, his client did not even know of the complaint having been filed and that it was only after the Protest Petition was filed on 5th July, 1990 that the accused became aware of filing of the complaint.

    8. Mr. Khanna has referred to Section 190 of Cr.P.C and argued that cognizance of the complaint was taken by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate when he marked the complaint to Mr. Akshay Kumar, Metropolitan Magistrate. I find from the record that no such application of mind on the merits of the complaint had taken place and it was a mere administrative act of marking the complaint to another Magistrate to deal with the complaint.

    9. The above arguments of Mr. Khanna have been met by Mrs. Pappu, who has contended that the Magistrate instead of himself conducting the preliminary inquiry and recording statements, had the full authority to refer the matter for investigation to police authorities under Section 156(3) of Criminal Procedure Code, which he did, and when such procedure is adopted, it is not necessary to repeat the exercise of recording evidence and the Magistrate can without following the procedure laid down in Section 200 appreciate or appraise the material brought on record by the police and can draw his own inference and take appropriate action, which in the present case was done by the Magistrate. According to her, this was not a case, which fell under Sections 200 or 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In support of her arguments, she has relied upon the following authorities:—

    (1) Hareram Satpathy v. Tika Ram Aggarwal, (1978) 4 SCC 58 : AIR 1978 SC 1568

    (2) T.K Kodandaram v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1993 Criminal Law Journal 1926

    (3) India Carat Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1989) 2 SCC 132 : AIR 1989 SC 885.

    10. While arguing on the question as to when the cognizance should be deemed to have been taken by the Magistrare, she contended and I think rightly, that it is only at the stage when the Magistrate after conscious application of mind issues the process summoning the accused. That it can be said that the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence and not when Chief Metropolitan Magistrate merely marks the case to a Metropolitan Magistrate. In support of her contention, she referred to the decision in the case of Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State Of Maharashtra, (1971) 2 SCC 654 : AIR 1971 SC 2372. She also cited the cases of Stare of Bihar v. Shri P.P Sharma etc. etc., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : AIR 1991 SC 1260 and State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1990 (2) Scale 1066 to support her arguments. It has also been stated by Mrs. Pappu that the accused in the circumstances of the case should not be shown any indulgence by this Court and he should face the trial.

    11. After giving careful thought to the arguments of the parties and the case law cited at the Bar, I am of the considered opinion that no irregularity of procedure is committed by the Metropolitan Magistrate in not recording statements of the witnesses under Section 200 of Cr.P.C when that exercise had already been done by the police authorities under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C on being entrusted with the job by the Metropolitan Magistrate. The Metropolitan Magistrate was entitled to either record the statements himself on receipt of the complaint, as provided under Section 200 of Cr.P.C or send it to police for investigation as provided in Section 156(3) of Cr. P.C which did in the present case.

    12. On receipt of the report, the Metropolitan Magistrate is fully empowered to either accept the report or on his own to appraise the material brought on record by the police authorities and on the basis thereof reach his own conclusion. In case, on appraising the material on record, the Metropolitan Magistrate comes to the conclusion that prima facie an offence is made out, he would not be bound by the opinion of police authorities and would be free to summon the accused on his own appraisal of the material and opinion that the Metropolitan Magistrate forms on the basis thereof. In case the Police Officer had taken on record the report of the Commissioner and the statements recorded by her, the adverting to such material got placed on record by the accused himself would not be fatal to the complaint or order summoning the accused. As such, I find no force in contentions Nos. 3 and 5.

    13. Coming to contention No. 4, I am prima facie of the view that the penalty provided under Section 630 read with Section 11 does not in any manner prejudice or affect or dilute the right of the complainant to prosecute the accused of any offence which an accused may be alleged to have committed and which is punishable under I.P.C But at this stage, I do not consider that it is necessary to decide this question which can be gone into in detail at the time of trial.

    14. In the peculiar facts of the present case, I find that the allegations and counter-allegations in the Company Petition also relate to the conduct of the accused and covers the questions of fact, some of which are common in the complaint and the Company Petition and to that extent, it could be said that if the complaint proceeds further, it would amount to parallel proceedings relating to the same facts and possibility of conflict of decision cannot be overruled. For that reason, I consider it to be in the interest of justice to stay the proceedings before the Metropolitan Magistrate during the pendency of this Company Petition. Ordered accordingly.

    15. Cr.M(M) is disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs.

    Appeal disposed of.
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    Pradeep Jaiswal & Others v. Jaiswal Packaging Private Limited & Others
    (Mar 16, 1995)