Mr. P.N Nag, J.— This revision petition has been filed against the order dated 16.7.1988 passed by Shri V.K Jain, Additional Rent Controller, Delhi whereby he has allowed the eviction petition of the respondent-landlady for bonafide requirement under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).

2. The relevant facts set out in the pleadings of the parties necessary for determining the point in controversy are that the respondent, who has stated herself to be the owner of Flat No. 6-B, Raj Hans, 33-Prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the premises), let out these premises to Milk Food Ltd i.e, the petitioner-tenant for the residence of its Managing Director Shri K.S Jaiswal at a monthly rent of Rs. 2,000/- plus Rs. 600/- for fixtures (in all Rs. 2,600/- per month). The respondent's husband, viz., Major Satish Khanna who had been in military services was getting subsidiary from the Government under the rules of Military services for the accommodation; he and the respondent were living in a house in Delhi on rental basis while in military service. However, the respondent's husband had been retired and relieved from military service w.e.f 30.11.1980 and his accommodation in the military service stands withdrawn. The respondent, therefore, required the premises for occupation as residence for herself and for the members of her family dependent upon her. According to the respondent-landlady, she has no other accommodation in Delhi except her own house/flat in dispute in which the petitioner-tenant is residing.

3. The petitioner-tenant has not disputed that the premises were let out to it for use for residential purposes but not for the residence of Mr. K.S Jaiswal only by the respondent-landlady. However, it has been emphatically denied that she is the owner of the premises and according to records of the L. & D.O Shri R.K Gupta, father of the respondent, is the owner of the premises. According to the petitioner. Shri R.K Gupta had similar accommodation in Flat No. 4-A, where the respondent was residing, but in the name of another daughter, namely, Miss Savitri Gupta as per the N.D.M.C records. The husband of the respondent was not dependent upon the respondent and it could not be said that she required the premises bonafide for occupation as residence for herself and the members of her family dependent upon her. The petitioner has also denied that the respondent-landlady did not have any other reasonable suitable accommodation.

4. The respondent-landlady, in order to succeed, has to prove: (i) that she is the owner of the property; (ii) that the premises in question were let out only for residential purposes; (iii) that she requires the premises bonafide for occupation as a residence for herself or for any member or her family dependent upon her; and (iv) that she has no other reasonable suitable residential accommodation.

5. Mr. L.R Gupta, Senior Counsel for the petitioner, has endeavoured to assail the impugned order/judgment of the Additional Rent Controller on two counts—(i) that the respondent-landlady has not proved that she is the owner of the premises; and (ii) that she has no reasonable suitable residential accommodation.

6. I will deal with first the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant on the question whether or not respondent-landlady has been able to prove/establish that she is the owner of the premises in dispute.

7. According to Mr. L.R Gupta, no doubt the respondent appearing as AW 1 has deposed that she is the owner of the property in dispute through a gift deed—Ext. CW 1/1 (objected to), made by her father on 26.3.1974, but the same is an unregistered deed. According to him, the gift deed should be registered and since the present gift deed is an unregistered one, the same cannot be looked into for establishing the ownership. According to L & D.O and other records the owner his Shri R.K Gupta, the father of the respondent, and, therefore, the respondent cannot be considered as an owner of the premises. He submits that on this ground alone, the petition requires to be dismissed.

8. The word “owner” as defined in the present context under Delhi Rent Control Act, 1959 has been interpreted to mean something more than a tenant by the Supreme Court in Smt. Shanti Sharma v. Smt. Ved Prabha, (AIR 1987 SC 2028). In paragraph 14 the Supreme Court has held that it could not be doubted that the term owner, has to be understood in the context of the background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. This Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the same time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bonafide requirement is one of such grounds on the basis of which landlords' have been permitted to have eviction of a tenant. In this context, the phrase ‘owner’ thereof has to be understood, and it is clear that what is contemplated is that where the person builds up his property and lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use, he should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction, the only thing necessary for him to prove is bonafide requirement and that he is the owner thereof. In this context, what appears to be the meaning of the term ‘owner’ is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e the owner should be something more than the tenant. In this context, the case of Rameshwar Narain (Deceased) through LRs. v. Saria Sarin (1992–46 DLT 70) decided by S.C Jain, J. may also be noticed. In that case the interpretation of the word ‘owner’ has been explained in paragraph 7 and it has been observed that “this interpretation of the word ‘owner’ has been accepted by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Smt. Bhanti Sharma v. Smt. Ved Parbha, AIR 1987 SC 2028. Under the Delhi Rent Control Act, the word ‘owner occurring in Clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1) is not used in the sense of absolute owner. It is only used in contradistinction with a landlord as defined, who is not an owner but who holds the property for the benefit of another person. A landlord as defined, who is holding the property for himself and for his own benefit and not for the benefit of another person is certainly the owner/landlord. This is the view which has already been taken by the Court in Kanwal Kishore Chopra v. O.P Dwivedi, AIR 1978 Delhi 53.

9. The respondent-landlady appearing as AW 1 has clearly denied the suggestion that she is not the owner of the premises and her father is the owner of such premises. She has clearly stated that she is the owner of the property and in May, 1976 she let out this property to the respondent for residential purposes and a lease deed was also executed at the time of letting out of the premises to the tenant and that she has been issuing the rent receipts to the petitioner-tenant and she had let out the premises as the owner of the premises. Further the petitioner-tenant has never challenged the ownership rights of the respondent-landlady till date. Furthermore, Shri R.K Gupta, the father of the respondent appearing as Court witness has clearly stated and admitted that after the gift was made by him in favour of his daughter, i.e, the respondent, the respondent herself is looking after the property and dealing with the tenants in her own rights as an owner and she herself is receiving the rent and issuing rent receipts and he has no concern whatsoever with the property. In these circumstances it is clear that the respondent/landlady has been holding the property for herself and for her own benefit and not for the benefit of another person.

10. Major Satish Khanna, respondent's husband, appearing as AW 2 has also deposed that his wife is the owner of the property and dealing with the premises as owner.

11. The petitioner-tenant appearing as RW 1, has admitted that the premises were taken at a monthly rent of Rs. 2,000/- from the respondent-landlady in May, 1976 and on the respondent's asking for increase in the rent it was settled at Rs. 2,600/- in 1979. The addition of Rs. 600/- to be shown as higher charges for furniture and Rs. 2,000/- were to be paid as monthly rent. In other words, it has not been disputed by anybody that the premises were not taken from the respondent-landlady and negotiations for taking the premises on rent did not take place with the respondent-landlady. The petitioner is even paying rent to the respondent-landlady and getting rent receipts from her.

12. In the context of the interpretation of the word ‘owner’ given by the Supreme Court in Smt. Shanti Sharma's case (supra) and our High Court, the respondent has certainly to be held as the owner of the property as in the facts and circumstances of this case the respondent-landlady is certainly the owner vis-a-vis the tenant as her status vis-a-vis the petitioner is more than a tenant. Further, in the present case it has come on the record that the respondent-landlady has let out the premises herself being the owner of the property and is holding the property as such for herself and for her benefit and not for the benefit of other person. Therefore, certainly she is the owner and landlady of the premises. Therefore, she has to be held as the owner/landlady.

13. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that a witness Shri Ramji Lal. U.D.C from the L & D.O was examined as RW-4 who stated that at present the leasehold rights of the property vested in the President of India as the lease was determined on 25.11.1972 In this connection it is suffice to say that this witness himself has stated that 33, Prithvi Raj Road is in the name of Shri R.K Gupta, the father of the respondent-landlady. Further it is clear from the statement of this witness and appears that Shri R.K Gupta had to challenge the proceedings of eviction initiated against Shri Gupta under the public premises act by way of writ petition being CW 473/74 in the High Court of Delhi in which absolute stay of dispossession has been granted on 6.5.1974 till disposal of the writ petition and that order is operative. Nothing has been shown to the contrary that Shri RK. Gupta was evicted from the premises in dispute and the termination of lease has been upheld by the Court. No doubt Shri R.K Gupta was the original leesee but he has gifted this property to her daughter, the present respondent, by way of gift deed which of course is not registered. Therefore, this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner must fail.

14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has next assailed the finding of the learned Additional Rent Controller that the respondent even otherwise has perfected and acquired title to such property being in adverse possession for more than 12 years and she has become owner, on the ground that the plea of adverse possession has not been taken in the pleadings by the parties which is necessary under the law. In this connection, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon S.M Karim Alias Tamanna Sabeb v. Mst Bibi Sakina ., (AIR 1964 SC 1254, wherein it has been held that adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. A mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for ‘several 12 years’ or that the plaintiff had acquired ‘an absolute title’ was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession.

15. In the present case, no doubt such a specific plea could not be raised in the pleadings as at the time when the petition was filed the respondent-landlady had not perfected her title of adverse possession as the 12 years period had not expired, which expired during the pendency of the proceedings before the Trial Court. However, there is no dispute that in pleadings, the question of ownership of the landlady has been raised and she has claimed ownership on the basis of gift deed dated 26.3.1974 The starting point of limitation when possession of the respondent became adverse starts from 26.3.1974 when the gift deed was executed and the possession thereof was delivered to her on 26.3.1974 itself. In these circumstances to say that there are no pleadings at all to this effect is not correct.

16. However, the question that remains to be considered is that is that in the absence of a specific plea of adverse possession can these subsequent events be taken into consideration by the Court in revision petition for determining whether the respondent-landlady has become owner by virtue of adverse possession.

17. In my opinion in view of the latest pronouncements specifically covering the case of bonafide requirements under the Act to be discussed hereinafter such facts can be taken into consideration by this Court.

18. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders. (AIR 1975 SC 1409) the Supreme Court has clearly held that it is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to Court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the Tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice—subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the Trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed.

19. This judgment in Pasupuleti Venkaieswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders, (supra) was followed by the Supreme Court in M.M Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma, (AIR 1981 SC 1113) and the later case was followed in Variety Emporium v. V.R.M Mohd. Ibrahim Naina., (AIR 1985 SC 207).

20. In view of these aforementioned judgments there remains no manner of doubt that if certain facts about which there is no dispute and which have material bearing on the case and the relief asked for, such facts can not only be taken into consideration in revision by this Court but also the Court is duty bound to take note of subsequent events in such proceedings. In view of the admitted facts as stated above the question whether or not the respondent-landlady has perfected her title of possession can be gone into, more particularly pleadings to this effect whether one is owner or not was already there and the parties were alive to the point in controversy and the evidence has been recorded on behalf of both the parties in this connection and no prejudice would be caused to either party. At the cost of repetition since the respondent-landlady after the gift made on 26.3.1974 has entered into possession and claimed the property as her own not only against the donor but against all the persons and she let out the same as owner to the petitioner-tenant and such a position was never disputed by anybody she has perfected her title during the pendency of the proceedings as has held by the Trial Court. My view stand fortified by a decision in Rameshwar Narain (Deceased) through LRs. v. Sarla Sarin (supra) decided by S.C Jain. J.

21. In N. Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal, (AIR 1919 PC 44) wherein in similar circumstances it has been held that where the donor did not effect a registered gift deed but allowed donee to enter into possession of the gifted property and the donee thus remained in possession for over 12 years, his title became perfected as against donor's heirs.

22. In this connection the case of Venkatryadu v. Subbamma, (Vol. Madras Journal Reports 302) may also be noticed wherein it has been held that when an oral gift is made by the last male owner to his daughter and the latter remained in possession for over 12 years, she was the owner by virtue of the gift; she perfected her title by adverse possession.

23. I find the approach of the learned Additional Rent Controller as correct and the finding to the effect that the respondent-landlady is the owner of the property is just and reasonable and cannot be interfered with in revision.

24. The next argument advanced by Counsel for the petitioner was that admittedly Shri R.K Gupta has expired during the pendency of the proceedings and there is no will. Therefore, the property has devolved on all the children of Shri R.K Gupta, including the present respondent—one of the children and the present respondent has become a co-owner of the flat in which she is presently residing. After the death of her father, her status has ceased to be a tenant and she has become a co-owner. Unless there is partition and Flat No. 4-B, Raj Hans is allotted to her sister Miss Savitri Gupta, the respondent continues to be the owner and, therefore, it cannot be said that she has no other reasonable suitable accommodation.

25. This argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner can also not be accepted. Rather if this argument is accepted, it goes against the petitioner. In Shri Kishan Lal. v. Shri Rajan Chand Khanna, (AIR 1993 Delhi, 1) it has been held by me in paragraphs 35 and 36 that A.C Khanna the original owner was deed and his sons were naturally being heirs would be one of the co-owners of the property and shall be entitled to file petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. The respondent, therefore, is entitled to maintain the petition.

26. However, anticipating that the aforesaid argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, if accepted, would demolish the very case which the petitioner has tried to set up that the respondent landlady is not the owner of the premises in dispute. Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, did not press this argument.

27. It was next contended by Counsel for the petitioner that the flat No. 4-B, 33 Prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi where the respondent-landlady is at present residing on rent is adjacent to the flat in dispute and is in occupation of the petitioner, i.e, Flat No. 6-B, 33 Prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi and both these flats have same accommodation and are in the same locality. According to learned Counsel, it has not been shown that eviction proceedings have been initiated or decree has been passed for eviction against the present respondent by her landlady, namely, Miss Savitri Gupta or that the accommodation in occupation of the respondent-landlady is much smaller or insufficient in comparison to the accommodation in occupation of the petitioner of which the respondent is the owner. Therefore, in these circumstances it cannot be said that the respondent has no other alternative suitable residential accommodation.

28. I am afraid I am unable to accept this contention. It has come on record by way of evidence of the respondent appearing as AW 1 and corroborated by her husband's (Major ‘Satish Khanna) statement appearing as AW 2 that Major Satish Khanna was in military service and that the respondent along with her husband and two children came to Delhi in December, 1978 when Major Khanna was transferred to Delhi and lived with the respondent's father. She lived there upto the end of February 1979 and then she took the present accommodation, viz., Flat No. 4-A, Raj Hans, 33 Prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi on rent at the rate of Rs. 2,225/- from Miss Savitri Gupta, her sister. This Premises No. 4-A Raj Hans was withdrawn by the army authorities on 29.1.1981 from Major Satish Khanna on his retirement, from military service. It appears, the respondent was allowed to occupy the same premises by Miss Savitri Gupta on the same amount of rent, i.e, Rs. 2,225/- p.m which was being paid earlier. It has also been proved from the statement of AW 1 and other evidence on record that the respondent had asked the petitioner to vacate the premises time and again but the petitioner had failed to vacate the premises in spite of assurances given to that effect and since there was no other accommodation available with the respondent, there was no option left to the respondent but to persuade her sister Miss Savitri Gupta to allow her to continue to live in the same premises, i.e, 4A Raj Hans, 33 Prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi on the same amount of rent of Rs. 2,225/- p.m, it appears temporarily, as thereafter she filed the present eviction petition against the petitioner for possession for bonafide requirement. This itself shows that the respondent does not have alternative suitable residential accommodation. I am fortified in taking this view by a judgment in a case R.B Kapoor… v. Manik N. Dastoor…. (1991–43 DLT 127). In that case, Sunanda Bhandare, J. has held that when the landlord takes another accommodation on rent for compelling reasons during the pendency of the eviction petition, that itself shows that the landlord does not have other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. In such a case, whether the landlord can afford to pay the rent or whether there are enough number of rooms to accommodate his family is irrelevant.

29. Learned Counsel for the petitioner while relying heavily on a case Rakesh Kumar Sehgal v. Nem Chand, (1987–2 RCJ 571) decided by N.N Goswamy, J., has strenuously argued that in the present case it has not been shown that the present accommodation in the tenancy of the respondent is insufficient for her residence and that merely that she wants to shift to her own house is not sufficient to enable her to seek the order of eviction against the petitioner.

30. I am afraid such a contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is not acceptable as the case relied upon by him is distinguishable. In the present case, as already stated, respondent had to take the premises on rent from her sister Miss Savitri Gupta under compelling reasons as she has no other house to live in except the one which is in occupation of the petitioner as otherwise she would have been put on the road. Therefore, the present case is covered by the decisions R.B Kapoor v. Manik N. Dastoor and Rakesh Kumar Sehgal v. Nem Chand (supra).

31. Further the very fact that the respondent has filed the eviction petition against the petitioner coupled with the fact that Miss Savitri Gupta being sister allowed the respondent to occupy the premises on the same rent, i.e, Rs. 2,225/- p.m after the withdrawal of accommodation of her husband by the Army Authorities when the same premises could fetch much more market rent shows that there seems to be some understanding between the respondent and Miss Savitri Gupta that the respondent would vacate the flat in case her own flat is vacated by the petitioner. In this connection Full Bench decision of this Court in Mohan Lal… v. Tirath Ram Chopra & Another…. Chopra, (1982–2 RCJ 161) may also be noted wherein it has been held that if an owner, who is residing in tenanted premises, makes a commitment to return the premises to his landlord, and that commitment is genuine one and not sham or fraudulent, then it cannot be argued that the need of the said landlord for recovery of possession of residential premises from his tenants is not a bonafide need.

32. This argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is further not tenable as the flat which the respondent is occupying is of Miss Savitri Gupta and there is nothing on record to show that their relations are strained and that Miss Savitri Gupta would institute some litigation against the respondent to take back the possession of the flat, particularly when the respondent landlady and Miss Savitri Gupta are sisters.

33. It was further contended that the respondent is in a happy rent position that she has to pay Rs. 2,225/- as monthly rent to the landlady Miss Savitri Gupta whereas she receives Rs. 2,600/- p.m

34. No doubt the respondent is getting Rs. 2,600/- p.m as rent but she must be paying property taxes etc. and there is left not much difference between the rent she is receiving and the rent she is paying to Miss Savitri Gupta.

35. The finding of the Trial Court that the respondent has no reasonably suitable residential accommodation is neither perverse nor unreasonable and is hereby affirmed.

36. In view of the above the revision petition is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.

Petition dismissed.