Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The landlord (respondent) filed an ejectment application dated January 3, 1976 against his tenant (appellant), who occupied the ground floor of house No. E-130, Greater Kailash No. I, New Delhi, taken on July 1, 1971 at a monthly rent of Rs. 650. The landlord pleaded three grounds for ejectment: (1) bona fide requirement; (2) non-payment of rent; and (3) non-residence of the tenant or his family for more than one year.

The Additional Rent Controller (Smt. Manju Goel) initially dismissed the landlord's application. The landlord appealed to the Rent Control Tribunal, which on appeal ordered the tenant's ejectment on all three grounds by an order dated April 25, 1978.

Procedural history relevant to the non-payment claim: the landlord's counsel served a notice of demand on October 22, 1975 alleging arrears (stating Rs. 12,350 due up to October 31, 1975). The ejectment petition itself alleged Rs. 13,650 due. The tenant filed a written statement denying arrears, claiming payment up to October 1975 and that the November 1975 rent cheque had been returned; he sought to amend his defence under Order 6 Rule 17 (CPC) to plead deprivation of lawn and verandah and suspension of rent. That amendment application was dismissed by the Additional Controller on January 24, 1977 as vague and lacking a site plan.

The Additional Controller then passed an order under Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act directing the tenant to deposit arrears (calculated at Rs. 650 per month from November 1, 1975 to December 31, 1976). The tribunal confirmed that order on appeal (dismissed tenant's appeal on February 16, 1977). The tenant did not deposit the sums, his defence was struck out under Section 15(7) on September 27, 1977, and after limited evidence the Additional Controller (on a later hearing) again dismissed the landlord's ejectment application. On tribunal appeal the tribunal reversed that and ordered ejectment on all three grounds; that tribunal order is the subject of the present appeal to this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notice of demand served on October 22, 1975 constituted a valid "notice of demand for arrears of rent" required by the proviso to Section 14(1) (clause (a)) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, such that failure to pay within two months would justify an order under Section 15(1).
  2. Whether the order passed under Section 15(1) (ordering deposit of arrears) and the subsequent striking out of the tenant's defence under Section 15(7) were valid and whether they unjustly precluded the tenant from defending the ejectment proceedings.
  3. Whether the Additional Controller and/or the Tribunal were correct in refusing or allowing the tenant's application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC to amend his written statement to plead deprivation of lawn and verandah and suspension/abatement of rent.
  4. Whether the landlord properly pleaded and proved bona fide requirement (distinguishing claims under Section 14-A and Section 14(1)(e) of the Act) and whether the tribunal correctly found eviction on the bona fide requirement ground despite defects in pleading and proof.
  5. Whether the landlord proved non-residence (clause 14(1)(d) of the Act) to justify ejectment, and whether the tribunal was justified in overturning the Additional Controller's finding on this question of fact.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Tenant) — Main contentions described in the opinion

  • Denied that he was in arrears; alleged he had paid rent up to October 1975, and that the November 1975 rent was sent by cheque which was returned.
  • Sought to amend his written statement under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC to plead that from June 1, 1976 he had been deprived of the lawn and verandah included in his tenancy and therefore entitled to suspend/abate rent; this amendment request was rejected by the Additional Controller as vague and lacking a site plan (the tribunal later observed a site plan had been filed).
  • Asserted payment in cash in part and criticized the landlord for not issuing rent receipts; contended that the landlord's account was unreliable.
  • Contended that the defence was wrongly struck out and that he was thereby denied a proper trial and opportunity to prove suspension/abatement and other defences.

Respondent (Landlord) — Main contentions described in the opinion

  • Served a demand notice dated October 22, 1975 stating an omnibus lump sum (Rs. 12,350) was due up to October 31, 1975 and called upon the tenant to pay within two months or vacate.
  • In the ejectment petition alleged a sum of Rs. 13,650 was due for arrears despite repeated demands.
  • Pleit bona fide requirement (wording in the petition referenced vacating of government allotted accommodation and "Government policy"), and in evidence asserted occupation of other parts of the house and insufficiency of that accommodation.
  • Plead non-residence of the tenant (or his family) and relied on an account of cheques and a subsequent civil suit for recovery of rent which set out appropriation and periods claimed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raghunath v. Anant Narayan (C.A. No. 387 of 1964, decided April 5, 1966 (SC)) That a notice demanding a sum greater than the actual amount due is not automatically invalid — an over-demand does not vitiate the notice provided the method of calculation is indicated. The Court distinguished over-demand cases from the present case: the judgment shows that a demand may still be valid if it indicates how the amount is arrived at; the Court relied on this to say that an erroneous larger sum does not necessarily defeat a statutory demand, but here the landlord's notice failed for lack of particulars and period.
Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi, AIR 1918 PC 102 Rule that notices to quit should receive a liberal construction in favour of tenant aware of circumstances; but the Court noted demand under the Rent Act requires greater specificity. The Court accepted the liberal construction principle for notices to quit but explained that a statutory "demand" (which creates legal liability if unpaid) requires clear particulars so the tenant understands how the amount is computed.
Kehar Singh v. Raghunandan Saran ((1978) 1 Ren CJ 530 : AIR 1978 Delhi 236) That an order under Section 15(1) can be questioned by way of appeal against a final order of eviction. The Court relied on this authority to hold that an apparently invalid demand cannot be cured merely by a failure to appeal from an interim Section 15(1) order; the validity of the demand can be reviewed on appeal from the final ejectment order.
Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand ((1967) 3 Delhi LT 1 : AIR 1967 SC 799) That refusal to allow an amendment may seriously affect rights and is therefore reviewable on appeal. The Court invoked this rule to conclude that the Additional Controller's refusal to allow amendment (to plead deprivation of lawn/verandah and suspension of rent) improperly affected the tenant's rights and should have been allowed or corrected on appeal.
Bhagwanti v. Haveli Ram (1972 Delhi LT 217 : AIR 1972 Delhi 271) Support for the proposition that refusal of amendment affecting substantial rights is reviewable. Cited alongside Central Bank as authority that the order refusing amendment affected tenant's rights and justified correction on appeal.
Ratan Lal v. Vardesh Chander, AIR 1976 SC 588 Submission cited to argue that rules of pleadings have limited application in ejectment proceedings (the Court recorded and rejected this submission in part). The Court considered the submission but held that pleadings remain important in ejectment cases and that essential averments (e.g., no other suitable accommodation) must be made.
Abdul Hamid v. Nur Mohammad (1976 Ren CJ 738 : AIR 1976 Delhi 328) That in a bona fide requirement claim under Section 14(1)(e) the landlord must plead that he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. The Court relied on this authority to hold the landlord's pleadings defective for failing to aver the absence of other reasonably suitable accommodation when claiming eviction under Section 14(1)(e).
Ram Karan Das v. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1965 SC 1144 Principle that a plaint must disclose a cause of action; absence of essential averments defeats the cause of action. The Court used this principle to explain that the landlord's application, lacking required averments, did not disclose a cause of action under Section 14(1)(e).
Dr. Hans Raj v. Shyam Kishore ((1977) 2 Rent LR 253 (Delhi)) Referenced to note a contrary view (that Abdul Hamid's authority had been weakened) — Court declined to accept that view. The Court considered this authority but chose to follow Abdul Hamid and related Supreme Court authority, maintaining that pleadings required by statute must be made.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning may be summarized in sequential points based on the opinion's analysis:

  1. On the statutory requirement: Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 14(1) creates a liability to ejectment only when the landlord serves a notice of demand for arrears in the manner prescribed and the tenant fails to pay within two months. The Court emphasized that a demand which creates liability must be a proper demand.
  2. Specificity requirements for a valid demand: The Court set out two minimum requirements for a valid demand — (a) it must come from the proper quarter (landlord or his counsel), and (b) it must be a demand for a definite sum showing the period for which the rent is claimed and indicating how the sum has been computed. The tenant must be able to understand how the amount demanded is arrived at.
  3. Application to the facts: The notice dated October 22, 1975 merely stated an omnibus lump sum (Rs. 12,350) said to be due up to October 31, 1975 but gave no particulars of receipts or period-by-period calculations; the ejectment petition itself alleged Rs. 13,650 without specifying periods. Although the landlord later filed a statement of account, it was filed after the tenant's written statement and the Controller disbelieved the account as not being regularly kept and written much later.
  4. Consequence of invalid demand: Because the notice was not a proper statutory demand, the subsequent order under Section 15(1) (which required deposit of arrears) and the striking out of the tenant's defence under Section 15(7) were legally unsound. The Court reasoned that an invalid demand cannot later be cured by a failure to appeal from an interim order; an invalid demand does not create a legal liability that can be converted into a valid one merely by inaction.
  5. Amendment application (Order 6 Rule 17 CPC): The tenant had sought to amend his written statement to plead deprivation of lawn and verandah and suspension/abatement of rent. The Additional Controller rejected the application as vague and lacking a site plan; the tribunal deemed it not maintainable. The Court held the amendment should have been allowed — a plan had in fact been filed and the plea, if established, would entitle the tenant to abatement. Refusal to allow the amendment improperly deprived the tenant of a defence.
  6. On bona fide requirement: The landlord's petition and heading referenced both Section 14A and Section 14(1)(e), and the Court found a fatal lack of clarity. For a claim under Section 14(1)(e) an essential averment is that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation; this was not pleaded. The tribunal wrongly tried the case as if Section 14(1)(e) had been properly invoked and accepted the landlord's oral evidence despite deficient pleadings.
  7. On non-residence ground: The pleadings for non-residence were vague and contradictory (even mislabelled as clause (c) in the heading). The Additional Controller, who saw the witness, doubted the landlord's evidence and concluded there was insufficient proof that the tenant's family was not residing in the premises. The tribunal had no good reason to substitute its view of the facts for the Controller's evaluation.
  8. Effects of civil suit and subsequent payments: The landlord later instituted a civil suit (Suit No. 95 of 1977) claiming arrears and setting out appropriation and periods; that suit resulted in a decree which was executed and paid in full (with an admitted excess of Rs. 589.20). Parties also paid rent up to March 31, 1977 and certain amounts thereafter under this Court's earlier order; the opinion calculates adjustments and a net balance payable by the tenant.
  9. Ultimate evaluation of trial fairness: The Court characterized the trial as defective: the defence was struck out (depriving tenant of an opportunity to contest), the landlord's pleadings and proof were slipshod, the tribunal substituted its view for that of the Additional Controller without adequate basis, and the tenant was thus denied justice on the merits.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal allowed. The Court set aside the Rent Control Tribunal's ejectment order dated April 25, 1978 and restored the position consistent with the Additional Controller's findings that were in favour of the tenant on the merits of the eviction application.

Direct consequences and practical implications for the parties (as stated in the opinion):

  • The Court concluded that the tenant's defence had been wrongly struck out and that a proper trial did not occur; therefore the tribunal's order of ejectment was set aside.
  • Financial adjustments ordered in the opinion (as calculated and accepted in court):
    • The tenant is entitled to recover Rs. 589.20 (court-fee overpaid) and Rs. 341.25 (counsel's fee payment on which refund was due) — total Rs. 930.45.
    • Arrears difference (between Rs. 650 and Rs. 500) for 33 months = Rs. 4,950; after deducting Rs. 930.45 the net sum payable by the tenant to the landlord was calculated as Rs. 4,019.55.
    • The tenant agreed (through counsel) to pay Rs. 4,019.55 to the landlord within one month; after such payment rent would have been paid up to December 31, 1979 and the decretal amount in Suit No. 95 of 1977 would be fully satisfied.
    • Adjustments in relation to another suit (Suit No. 5 of 1978) were noted as having been effected and the remaining question of costs in that suit was left to the Subordinate Judge to decide.
  • Costs: The parties were ordered to bear their own costs throughout.

The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel or binding legal precedent beyond application and clarification of the statutory requirements for a valid demand under the Delhi Rent Control Act and the importance of correct pleadings and the right to be heard.

Appeal allowed.

    Hari Mohan Nehru v. Rameshwar Dayal .

    This is an appeal from the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated April 25, 1978.

    2. The appellant is a tenant of the ground floor of house No. E-130, Greater Kailash No. I, New Delhi on a monthly rent of Rs. 650/-. He took the premises on July 1, 1971. The respondent is the landlord. On January 3, 1976, the land-lord brought an application for ejectment of the tenant on three grounds. One was bona fide requirement. The second was non-payment of rent. The third was non-residence of the tenant in the premises for more than one year. The Additional Controller, Smt. Manju Goel dismissed the application. On appeal the tribunal ordered ejectment of the tenant on all the three grounds.

    3. I shall first take up the ground of non-payment of rent. On October 22, 1975, the landlord's counsel served a notice of demand on the tenant. In the notice the landlord said : “You are very irregular in payment of rent and a sum of Rs. 12,350/- is due from you on account of arrears of rent calculated up to October 31, 1975, after deducting the total amount paid by you up-till now since occupation of the tenancy premises by you.” In the end he called upon the tenant to pay the aforesaid arrears of rent within two months of the receipt of the notice and to vacate the premises.

    4. In the application the ground of non-payment of tent was set out in these words :

    “The respondent is a regular defaulter in the payment of rent and a sum of Rs. 13,650.00 is due from him towards arrears of rent which he has not paid in spite of repeated demands, oral as well as written”.

    5. The tenant in his written statement denied that he was in arrears. He alleged that he had paid rent up to October, 1975. The rent of November, 1975, he sent by cheque which was returned to him. The tenant said that he was prepared to pay the rent due from him from November 1975 onwards. He also took an objection that the landlord “has not stated from what date to what date the amount on account of rent is due from the respondent to the petitioner”.

    On November 11, 1976, the tenant made an application to the Additional Controller under Order 6 Rule 17, Code of Civil procedure. In the application he stated that on June 1, 1996, he had been deprived by the landlord of lawn and verandah which were in his tenancy and occupation. On this ground he claimed that he was entitled to suspend the rent. The tenant submitted that he may be allowed to incorporate in the written statement the plea of deprivation of lawn and verandah and suspension of rent. The landlord opposed this application. The Additional Controller on January 24, 1977, dismissed the application on the ground that the precise words sought to be added had not been specified and no site plan of the portion which has been ‘snatched’ from the tenant had been filed.

    6. After dismissing the application the Additional Controller proceeded to make an order under Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (the Act). As the tenant's counsel admitted before the Additional Controller that no rent was paid after October, 1975 she ordered the tenant to deposit all arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 650/- per month from November 1, 1975, to December, 31, 1976. within one month of the date of the passing of the order and subsequently rent month by month by the 15th of each succeeding month.

    7. The tenant appealed to the tribunal. The tribunal dismissed the appeal on February 16, 1977. But it observed that the site plan had been filed by the tenant indicating the portion of which he deprived. As the tribunal thought that it was open to a party to make a fresh application in proper form it held that the appeal was not maintainable as the order did not affect any rights. In the result it confirmed the order of the controller directing the tenant to deposit rent from November 1, 1975.

    8. The tenant did not deposit the rent. On September 27, 1977, his defence was struck out under Section 15(7) of the Act. After this the evidence of the landlord was recorded. The landlord examined himself. He examined no other witness. On this evidence the Additional Controller was not satisfied. She dismissed the application for eviction. On appeal the tribunal found that the landlord was entitled to ejectment on all the three grounds pleaded by him. It, therefore, ordered his (tenant's) eviction. Now the tenant appeals to this court.

    9. The central question is about the validity of the order under section 15(1) of the Act dated January 24, 1979. This order was assailed before me by counsel for the tenant. I have to see whether the tenant's defence was rightly struck out and he was justly precluded from defending the case. Under clause (a) of the proviso to Section 14(1) the Controller has the power to pass an order for recovery of possession of the premises on the ground, namely,

    “That the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for arrears of rent has been served on him by the landlord in the manner provided in Section 106, of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882”.

    10. Clause (a) requires “a notice of demand for arrears of rent” to be served by the landlord on the tenant. The landlord is not entitled to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent unless he serves a notice of demand for the arrears of rent and until there is a failure to pay. Now in the notice all that was said was that Rupees 12,350/- are due on account of arrears of rent calculated up to Oct. 31, 1975 after deducting the total amount paid. No details of the amount were given. How much the tenant had paid since occupation of the premises was not stated.

    11. In the ejectment application even this much was not alleged. There he made the barest allegation, namely, that “A sum of Rs. 13,650/- is due from him towards arrears of rent which he has not paid in spite of repeated demand.” There is no indication of the period for which rent is claimed. It is true that later on a statement of account was submitted by the landlord wherein he showed the various cheques which he had received from the tenant-from March 7, 1972, till October 17, 1975. But this statement was filed on September 13, 1976, after the tenant had filed his written statement. It is also true that the controller made an order under section 15(1) on the admitted footing that the tenant had not paid the rent after October, 1975.

    12. The real question is : Did the landlord make a valid demand of rent as required by sub-clause (a) of the proviso to Section 14(1) ? In my opinion, the notice of demand was invalid. The notice had merely stated that Rs. 12,350/- were due on account of arrears of rent calculated up to October, 1975. No particulars were given. Under clause (a) the liability to ejectment is created after a demand for rent is made and the rent is not paid for two months. Now logically, I think, it must follow that if liability under the statute is created by demand, the demand must be a proper demand. It is not easy to determine what are the essential requirements of a demand. But I have ho doubt, at any rate, as to two of them. Firstly, that a demand must come from the proper quarter; that means that it must come from the landlord or his counsel. The second requirement, as to which I have no doubt, is that a demand must be a demand for a definite sum alleged to be due on account of arrears of rent from the tenant to the landlord. The period for which the rent has fallen due must be stated, In this ease the Additional Controller rightly held that “the petitioner has not pleaded in specific terms the period from which date the rent is due.” The copy book containing the account of rent produced by the landlord in evidence was discredited by the Additional Controller because it was not regularly kept. She disbelieved the account as it was written in 1977 though the tenancy commenced in July, 1971. She held that on evidence it was not proved to her satisfaction that Rs. 13,650/- were due from the tenant on account of arrears of rent.

    13. The demand at any rate ought to tell the tenant on whom the demand is made in some detail the amount that is claimed from him and the period for which it is claimed. It is true that no particular form of demand is prescribed. But it is obvious that if an omnibus demand is made for a lump sum without particularising the amount due to the landlord and the amount received from the tenant, as was the case here, it can not be said to be a proper demand. There can be no ejectment unless there is a legal liability to pay and a legal liability to pay is to start with demand. In my opinion, a demand which fails in either of these two matters is not a demand which creates a legal liability to pay. The landlord must serve a proper notice of demand. So it must be held that there is no enforceable claim until a demand is made in accordance with clause (a) Of course nothing I have said means that if a wrong sum is in the demand, because too much is demanded, that that takes the demand outside the Act. (See Raghunath v. Anant Narayan, C.A No. 387 of 1964 decided on April 5, 1966 (SC)). In this case Rs. 7,000/- were demanded in the notice while actually Rs. 6,900/- were due according to the courts below. The Supreme Court held that the notice was not bad because more was demanded than due). So long as it is a demand of rent indicating how the amount demanded is arrived at, it is a demand which complies with the statute, and is one which is good on the face of it. The actual amount due will have to be ascertained by the Controller.

    14. The liability to ejectment is founded on non-payment of rent in two months after the service of notice of demand. The Controller is then empowered to make an order under section 15(1). He can give relief to the tenant once. But having obtained the benefit once the tenant is not entitled to the benefit again if he makes a default a second time in the payment of rent for three consecutive months. Therefore, it is a matter of great consequence to the tenant. The authorities the Act have to see whether a proper demand was made on the tenant and whether in spite of it he has failed to pay the rent. The word “demand” used in the Act suggests something more than mere asking. The “demand” of rent holds out a threat to enforce it by eviction proceedings, if not paid within two months of service of notice.

    15. See what has happened in this case. The notice made an omnibus demand. A lump sum was stated due up to October, 1975. No details were given. Nor were any particulars given in the ejectment application. Later on they were supplied. But at that stage it was too late. The tenant had already incurred the liability of non-payment after service of the notice of demand and the expiry of two months therefrom. He had become liable to be sued in ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent. The Controller made an order under Sec. 15(1), The tenant did not pay. His defence was struck out. All this happened because of an improper notice of demand and its non-compliance.

    16. I am conscious of the rule that the Privy Council laid down as long ago as 1918 that a liberal construction should be put upon a notice to quit in order that it is not defeated by inaccuracies either in the description of the premises or the name of the tenant or the date of expiry of the notice, and that the test of its sufficiency was not what its contents would mean to a stranger ignorant of all the facts and circumstances but what they would mean to the tenant conversant with all those facts and circumstances and the mistakes should not be construed with a desire to find faults. (See Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi, AIR 1918 PC 102). But with demand it is different. A demand unsettles the mind. It takes away the free will of the demand. It has therefore to be specific. I cannot see how the Section can apply at all unless the tenant knows exactly how the amount demanded is arrived at. There has to be a good demand to create a legal liability. The notice is quite sufficient if the tenant understands what is meant. (Harihar Banerji p. 107). I do not think that the tenant here can understand how the amount demanded has become due from him. More so when the landlord did not issue receipts and the tenant contended that he was paying rent in cash also.

    17. It was then said that the order under section 15(1) has become final. I do not agree. The order can be questioned in appeal against the final order of eviction made by the Controller. (See Kehar Singh v. Raghunandan Saran, (1978) 1 Ren CJ 530 : (AIR 1978 Delhi 236)). If the document called the demand is one which does not create a legal liability to pay, it cannot subsequently create a legal liability because of a failure to appeal to this court. If the demand is not a good demand I cannot for my pert see how a neglect to appeal can turn it into a good demand.

    18. The second point to consider in this case is the application for amendment which the tenant made before the order under section 15(1) was passed. The tenant pleaded that on June 1, 1976, he had been deprived of lawn and verandah and, therefore, he was entitled to suspend rent. The Additional Controller dismissed the application on two grounds. Firstly, that it was vague and secondly, no plan of the portion deprived was filed. Consequently, the Additional Controller made an order under section 15(1) against the tenant directing him to deposit rent from November, 1975, at the agreed rate of Rs. 650/- per month, It is true that after October, 1975 the tenant had admittedly not paid rent. But his plea of suspension of rent was a defence and this was turned down. He was not allowed to plead this subsequent event. His application was rejected by the Additional Rent Controller. On appeal the tribunal affirmed the order.

    19. In my opinion, both the Additional Controller and the tribunal were in error. The application for amendment ought to have been allowed. A plan was filed showing the portion of lawn and verandah ‘snatched’ from the tenant. In the application it was clearly mentioned that on June 1, 1976, the landlord had deprived the tenant of the lawn and the verandah which were included in his tenancy. This plea in justice should have been allowed to be raised. It was unjust to require the tenant to deposit rent at the agreed rate of Rs. 650/- even when the landlord had deprived the tenant of a part of the tenanted premises.

    20. The tenant had a prima facie case of suspension of rent. In the notice dated October 22, 1975, he was described as a tenant of the ground floor. In the ejectment application there is not a word that the lawn is excluded from the tenancy of the tenant. In his evidence the landlord for the first time affirmed that the lawn was in his possession. This shows that the landlord has no regard for the rules of the game. Pleadings are, after all, rules of the game which we must observe if there has to be a fair trial.

    21. The application for amendment ought to have been allowed by the Additional Controller and if she did not do it, it was open to the Tribunal to correct the error. The amendment sought affected the rights and liabilities of the tenant. If he had been deprived of a part of the premises he had a right to abatement of rent. Appeal to the Tribunal was competent because on the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand, (1967) 3 Delhi LT 1 : (AIR 1967 SC 799) the order refusing amendment seriously affected the rights of the tenant. (See also Bhagwanti v. Haveli Ram, 1972 Delhi LT 217: (AIR 1972 Delhi 271)). I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the amendment was improperly declined.

    22. The upshot of the discussion is that the defence of the tenant had wrongly been struck out. There are two reasons. Firstly, there was no proper demand of rent in the notice served by the landlord on the tenant. Secondly, the order under section 15(1) of the Act directing the tenant to deposit rent from October 1975 was wrong because the tenant was not allowed to plead suspension of rent. The result of the striking out of the defence is that there was no proper trial. The tenant was not heard. There was denial of justice. The tenant was ordered to vacate.

    23. It is necessary to mention here that the ground of non-payment of rent no longer survives. On March 31, 1977, the landlord instituted a suit against the tenant for the recovery of Rs. 23,400/- on account of arrears of rent. In paragraph 2 of the plaint he stated that a total amount of Rs. 20,270/- had been received from the tenant and this amount he had appropriated towards rent due to him for the period from July 1, 1971 to March 31, 1974. He claimed that Rs. 23,400/- were due to him from April 1, 1974, up to March 31, 1977 after giving credit to the tenant for Rs. 180/- which, it was said, the tenant had spent on account of the cost of the slab replaced by him in the kitchen.

    24. I revert to the question of validity of notice of demand. The landlord's pleadings in the suit disclosed the appropriation of the rent paid, the period for which the claim was made and the adjustment of Rs. 180/- for replacement of a slab. In the notice nothing of the kind was said. The tenant could not divine appropriation or adjustment. He was left guessing. It was a case of its own kind.

    25. It was said that it is the tenant's obligation to pay rent and he ought to know better. This is true. But there is equally a corresponding obligation of the landlord to issue receipt of rent. (See Sec. 26(2) of the Act). If he does not, he must give details in the notice of the amounts received, how and when. When a notice of demand is required by law the demandee is entitled to know how the amount demanded from him is claimed. More so when the account runs from the inception of tenancy over a period of five years or more and no receipt is issued. A notice, it is true, has not to be worded with the accuracy of a plea. But the tenant must know how the amount demanded is arrived at so that he can pay. The landlord's civil suit demonstrates how insufficient the notice of demand was.

    26. It is not disputed before me that in the suit for the recovery of rent the entire decretal amount of Rs. 23,400/- and costs have been paid and that an excess sum of Rs. 589.20 has been paid which the tenant is entitled to adjust. It is also admitted that the tenant has paid rent up to March 31, 1977. Rent is due from April 1, 1977 at the rate of Rs, 650/- per month. The plea about deprivation of a part of the tenanted premises was raised in the civil suit. It was negatived. The tenant did not appear on one of the hearings. The court therefore proceeded under Order 17, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure and decreed the suit for Rs. 23,400/- with costs. The tenant is therefore not entitled to raise the plea of suspension of rent in the present proceedings in view of the decision of the civil Court.

    27. On the question of arrears of rent it is agreed between the parties that rent up to March 31, 1977 at the rate of Rs, 650/- per month has been paid by the tenant to the landlord. This was paid in execution of the decree obtained by the landlord against the tenant in Suit No. 95 of 1977 decided on January 31, 1979. Arrears of rent from April 1, 1977 to December 31, 1979, i.e for the period of 33 months have also been paid to the landlord @ Rs. 500/- per month under the order of this court dated July 12, 1978 made without prejudice to the rights of the parties. Now the difference between Rs, 650/- and Rs. 500/- has to be paid by the tenant since the decision in the civil suit has gone against him. This difference comes to Rs. 150/- per month. The total amount for 33 months @ Rs. 150/- comes to Rs. 4,950/-.

    28. The tenant is entitled to recover the following two sums :—

    1. Rs. 589.20 on account of court-fee on Rs. 4,550/- which he was made to pay twice over to the landlord in execution of the decree.

    2. Rs. 341.25 which the tenant paid on account of counsel's fee on Rs. 4,550/- for which he confessed judgement. A certificate of fee was tiled on 7-7-1977 but after the order had been pronounced as is shown by the endorsement of the learned judge on the certificate. The tenant is therefore entitled to refund. (Total — Rs. 930.45).

    29. After deducting Rs. 930.45 from the sum of Rs. 4,950/- due to the landlord an amount of Rs. 4,019.55 remains payable by the tenant to the landlord. Mr. Kalra on behalf of the tenant agrees to pay this amount to the landlord within one month from today. This means that after payment of Rs. 4,019.55 the rent will have been paid to the landlord up to December 31, 1979. This also means that the amount of decree in Suit No. 95 of 1977 is fully paid up. Similarly, the amount claimed by the landlord in another suit pending between the parties in the court of Shri Jaswant Singh, Subordinate Judge, (Suit No. 5 of 1978) has also been paid because in that suit the landlord has claimed rent at the rate of Rs. 650/- from April 1, 1977 to December 31, 1977. The claim in that suit stands adjusted. The only question that remains for decision by the learned Subordinate Judge, Mr. Jaswant Singh, will be about costs. That question I leave to him to decide.

    30. Now I turn to the two other grounds of ejectment. The landlord pleaded three grounds of ejectment, as I have said. One of them was bona fide requirement. It was pleaded in these words :

    “The petitioner is the owner of the premises in occupation of the respondent which have been let out to him for residence. The premises are required bona fide by the petitioner for his residence as well as for members of his family. In view of the Government policy the petitioner had to vacate Government allotted accommodation being No. 996, Sector 5, R.K Puram.”

    In the heading of the application it was said that the petition is “under Sec. 14(1)(a), and (c) and Section 14-A of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958.” From this it would appear that the landlord based his claim of bona fide requirement under Section 14A and not Section 14(1)(e). The landlord did not plead that he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.” It is one of the essential ingredients of a claim under Sec. 14(1)(e). In the absence of this averment there is no proper pleading. On the other hand, the landlord referred to the “Government Policy” and to the vacation of a “Government allotted accommodation” which clearly suggests that he had in mind the newly introduced Section 14-A. The heading of the application shows that he brought the case under Section 14A. He said so expressly. But the Tribunal paid no attention to this aspect. The averment made was not an averment as required by Section 14(1)(e). The landlord had one foot in Section 14(1)(e) and another in Section 14A. Was his case of a needy private owner or of an evicted Government servant ? The case pleaded was neither the one nor the other. The two grounds of ejectment, namely, under sections 14(1)(e) and 14a are distinct. They are mutually exclusive, though the averment of need is common to them. This shows that there is a very good reason why the express statutory provision should be adhered to. The Additional Controller held that the landlord had not pleaded that he had no other reasonable suitable accommodation. She said : “In the absence of any specific pleading in this respect, the petitioner is not entitled to an order of eviction on the ground of his personal bona fide requirement.” I think she was right.

    31. I was referred to Ratan Lal v. Vardesh Chander, AIR 1976 SC 588 in support of the submission that the rules of pleadings have no application to ejectment cases. I do not agree. It is true that the pleadings are not elaborate and there is an sir of “comparative informality” in these proceedings because of the use of the prescribed statutory forms, as the Supreme Court has said. But it does not mean that all rules of the game have been thrown to the winds. Rules of pleadings have not been relaxed, if not tightened. That the landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation has to be a part of the pleaded case. This was so held in Abdul Hamid v. Nur Mohammad, 1976 Ren CJ 738 (742) : (AIR 1976 Delhi 328).

    32. I was referred to Dr. Hans Raj v. Shyam Kishore, (1977) 2 Rent LR 253 (260) (Delhi) where B.C Misra, J. took the view that the weight of the authority of Abdul Hamid v. Nur Mohammad, (supra) has been shaken in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ratan Lal v. Vardesh Chander. I do not think so. The landlord has to plead the cause of action. And in a case of bona fide requirement cause of action is not only the ownership and letting of, a residential house but also the averment that the landlord has no other suitable residential accommodation. Without his averment the application for ejectment will not disclose a cause of action. If the plaint discloses no cause of action, the court cannot pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff. This is no less true of ejectment suit. (See Ram Karan Das v. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1965 SC 1144 (1146)).

    33. Now what happened in this case is that the application was tried under Section 14(1)(e). The tribunal thought that it was a claim under Section 14(1)(e). The landlord gave evidence that he was in occupation of first floor and barsati floor of the house and that that accommodation was insufficient for him and the members of the family dependant on him. His evidence was accepted by the tribunal. The tenant was ordered to vacate not only on the ground of nonpayment of rent but also on the ground of bona fide requirement under Sec. 14(1)(e). This is another instance of miscarriage of justice. A claim expressly made under Section 14A was tried under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. This was a case of variance between pleadings and proof. The tenant's defence had been struck out. He was not allowed to contest or to give evidence. He was simply asked to vacate by the tribunal.

    34. The same is the case with the third ground. There the landlord pleaded that : “The respondent is living and posted at Lucknow, as such neither he nor any member of his family is residing therein since more than one year.” Was it the period preceding the institution of the petition ? Nothing is said in the pleadings, though in his statement the landlord added these words. This ground is covered by clause 14(1)(d). It was wrongly described as clause (c) in the heading. As the tenant's defence had been struck out he was not allowed to lead evidence on the point. The tenant's case was that though he himself was posted at Lucknow the members of his family were residing in the premises. The landlord in his cross-examination stated that he had recently prepared the plan of the premises filed in the case after taking full measurements. He was asked who was present at that time if the premises were not locked. He said that he did not remember. The Additional Controller was not satisfied with the answer. She found it evasive. She refused to order ejectment. The tribunal did not agree. It ordered ejectment holding that non-residence was proved. In my opinion the conclusion of the Additional Controller was sound. There was no cogent proof that the members of the tenant's family were not residing.

    35. I am satisfied that the appellate tribunal having none of the advantages which the Additional Controller enjoyed of hearing and observing the landlord in the witness box was not justified in concluding that, she as clearly wrong and in substituting its judgement of fact for hers.

    36. When asked the landlord did not deny that the tenant had paid electricity and water charges up to December 1975. The petition was brought on January 3, 1976. This showed that the tenant's family was in occupation. The Additional Controller saw the landlord and heard his evidence. She formed her estimate of him. His evidence did not inspire confidence in her. Her opinion is entitled to great weight. In my opinion the tribunal had no good reason to take a different view.

    37. What is the impression made on the mind of the trial. The landlord's case was slipshod, his pleadings slovenly. At the outset the tenant's defence was struck out. In a trial of unequal strength and surprises the tenant was badly mauled. The trial ended leaving scars of injustice all over. On the first ground of non-payment the tenant pleaded payment in cash. The landlord admittedly did not issue rent receipts. He maintained an account which was roundly condemned by the Additional Controller as unbelievable. On the second ground of bona fide need the application did not disclose a cause of action. On the third ground of non-residence there was no worthwhile evidence. The Additional Controller took a view favourable to the tenant, even though she ordered him to remain mute after the defence was struck out. The tribunal took a diametrically opposite view. I think the order of the Additional Controller must be restored if justice is to be done. This is my conclusion.

    38. For these reasons the appeal is allowed and the order of ejectment dated April 25, 1978 is set aside. The parties are left to bear their own, costs throughout.

    Appeal allowed.
    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Hari Mohan Nehru v. Rameshwar Dayal .
    (Feb 4, 1980)