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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • sec. 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short called the Act)
  • Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972
  • Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Madras High Court. Section 31
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • sec. 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short called the Act)
  • Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972
  • Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Madras High Court. Section 31
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 5 July 1976 of Shri S.N. Kapoor, Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, which rejected an application to amend the tenants' written statement.

Facts (as set out in the opinion): The first floor of 2, Malka Ganj, Delhi (with ground-floor parking) was let by the landlord, Shri Kundan Lal Khanna, to M/s. Mool Chand Chander Bhan and its partners in 1954–55 for the residence of Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin at a rent of Rs. 160 per month. On 18 December 1970 the landlord filed for eviction on grounds including non-payment of rent and alleged sub-letting or parting with possession in favour of M/s. Macka Hard Private Ltd. and Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin.

In a joint written statement the tenants pleaded that the premises were let to the partnership firm for use of its manager (Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin), that in 1960 the firm requested the landlord to make Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin a direct tenant and the landlord agreed, and that the firm stood guarantee for rent; the plea asserted that Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin was a direct tenant and in possession in his own right (denying the landlord–tenant relationship with the firm).

The Additional Rent Controller initially declined to pass orders under section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 due to these pleadings. After evidence was recorded, by order dated 11 July 1974 the Additional Rent Controller found that the tenancy continued in the name of M/s. Mool Chand Chander Bhan and its partners and that Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin was not the tenant. An order under section 15(1) directed the tenants to pay arrears and current rent at Rs. 160 per month. Appeals to the Rent Control Tribunal and to this Court were dismissed (the second appeal was dismissed in limine on 19 January 1976).

On 6 April 1976 the tenants applied under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC to amend their written statement to bring pleadings into conformity with the Additional Rent Controller's factual findings (i.e., to admit that the firm remained the tenants and Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin was merely manager). The Additional Rent Controller rejected the amendment application by order dated 5 July 1976 on grounds including alleged mala fide intent and that the application sought to escape the effects of prior admissions and orders; the controller also relied on factual observations (e.g., no record showing the firm continued business after 1967 and Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin not drawing pay from the firm after 1967).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order of the Additional Rent Controller rejecting the application to amend the written statement should be set aside under Article 227 of the Constitution.
  2. Whether a party may retract or explain an admission made in an earlier written statement and, in particular, whether such an amendment to the defence can be allowed to bring pleadings into conformity with subsequent findings of fact.
  3. Whether the Additional Rent Controller was justified in rejecting the amendment application on the basis that it was mala fide or intended to circumvent prior admissions and judicial findings, without examining evidence.
  4. What is the proper approach to applications to amend a written statement (Order 6 Rule 17 CPC read with Section 151 CPC) when prior admissions and judicial findings exist.
  5. Whether this Court should exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to interfere with the Additional Rent Controller's discretionary refusal to allow amendment.

Arguments of the Parties

Tenants' Arguments (counsel: Mr. R.K. Makhija)

  • The proposed amendment sought to bring the written statement into conformity with the factual findings recorded by the Additional Rent Controller on 11 July 1974.
  • There was no mala fides in explaining or retracting earlier admissions; the amendment was an honest attempt to align pleadings with established facts.
  • Reliance was placed on the judgment of Avadh Behari, J. in Vishwa Nath v. Chaman Lal (1975 RCJ 514) to support allowing amendment that corrects a prior mistake and conforms to judicial findings.

Respondent/Landlord's Arguments (as advanced in Court — counsel: Mr. Rawal and Mr. Bawa)

  • Mr. Rawal relied on Ram Singh v. Mukhtiara Singh (A.I.R. 1953 Papsu 105) to argue that an amendment which goes back on admissions and would change the nature of the suit (or result in disproving facts previously asserted and decided against the applicant) should not be allowed, particularly at an advanced stage such as appeal.
  • Mr. Rawal (and submissions cited) emphasized authorities that disfavor allowing amendments that constitute a direct negation of admissions in a written statement.
  • Mr. Bawa relied on Laxmi Narain Oil Mills v. Mamraj Musadilal (A.I.R. 1969 Delhi 311) to urge that the Additional Rent Controller had jurisdiction to disallow an amendment on the ground of mala fides, and that this Court's power under Article 227 should be exercised sparingly.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vishwa Nath v. Chaman Lal (1975 RCJ 514) Principle that courts should allow amendments which bring pleadings into conformity with the true state of things established on evidence; courts should not punish litigants for mistakes and exist to do justice by allowing correction where amendment aligns with findings. The Court relied on and quoted Vishwa Nath to support the proposition that an amendment to correct a prior mistaken admission and to conform to judicial findings should be allowed. The Court found the distinction drawn by the Additional Rent Controller between that case and the present one to be "wholly on an artificial basis."
Ram Singh v. Mukhtiara Singh (A.I.R. 1953 Papsu 105) Rule that an amendment of the plaint which would allow a party to go back on admissions and disprove facts previously asserted (thereby changing the nature of the suit) cannot be allowed at the stage of appeal; distinction between amendment of plaint and of written statement. The Court noted this authority had been relied upon by opposing counsel but distinguished it because Ram Singh dealt with amendment of the plaint rather than amendment of a written statement; the Court emphasized that courts are more liberal in allowing amendments of defence than of plaint and that Section 31 of the Evidence Act (as discussed in the opinion) means admissions are not conclusive.
Shaik Masthan Sahib v. Palavani Balarami Reddi (A.I.R. 1953 Madras 958) Authority holding that it is not proper to allow a defendant to raise an amendment which is a direct negation of an admission in his written statement. The Court observed this case was relied upon by opposing counsel but noted that the Madras High Court decisions there had not considered Section 31 of the Evidence Act; the present Court stressed that admissions may be explained and are not conclusive, so the authority did not preclude allowing the amendment here.
Laxmi Narain Oil Mills v. Mamraj Musadilal (A.I.R. 1969 Delhi 311) Principle that the Rent Controller has jurisdiction to disallow an amendment on the ground of mala fide; cited for the proposition that Article 227 should be used sparingly to interfere with such discretion. The Court acknowledged the authority and the limited scope of Article 227, but held that where the subordinate court's order suffers from clear legal infirmities and results in miscarriage of justice (as the Court found here), Article 227 intervention is justified. The Court thus quashed the impugned order despite the authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded as follows, using only the material contained in the opinion:

  1. The Court examined the record of the original proceedings (including the Additional Rent Controller's detailed judgment of 11 July 1974) and noted that the Controller had found that the tenancy remained in the firm and not in Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin. The tenants filed the amendment application on 6 April 1976, which the Controller rejected on 5 July 1976.
  2. The Court addressed the Additional Rent Controller's ground that "the Court cannot allow any litigant to get rid of their statements and admissions made in their written statement." The Court analyzed Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act (as discussed in the opinion) to hold that admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted and can be shown to be erroneous or made under a mistake; admissions may operate as estoppel only under specific conditions but, in general, are an item of evidence and open to explanation.
  3. The Court distinguished authorities which disallow amendments that are a direct negation of admissions (or that concern amendments of the plaint) by noting a material legal distinction: amendment of a plaint is treated more strictly than amendment of a written statement or defence. The Court emphasized that adding, altering or substituting a defence does not raise the same problem as altering the cause of action.
  4. The Court found that the Additional Rent Controller had improperly adopted a prima facie approach and had refused the amendment on the allegation of mala fides without going into the evidence or hearing the supplementary statements made in court on 5 July 1976. The Court held that an allegation of mala fides should not be the basis for refusing amendment at the preliminary stage where the truth of such an allegation depends on evaluation of the evidence.
  5. The Controller's factual remarks (e.g., that there was nothing on record to indicate the firm continued business after 1967 and that Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin had not drawn pay from the firm after 1967) were criticized as "half-hearted reasoning" that improperly affected the merits of the eviction petition. The Court held the Controller could not brand the proposed amendment as patently mala fide on that basis.
  6. The Court acknowledged the principle that Article 227 is to be used sparingly (and that the Controller has jurisdiction to disallow on mala fides as held in Laxmi Narain) but held that supervisory jurisdiction must be exercised where a subordinate court or tribunal violates established legal principles or there is a grave dereliction of duty resulting in miscarriage of justice. The impugned order suffered from clear legal infirmities and therefore warranted interference.
  7. Applying these principles, the Court concluded the amendment should have been permitted to bring the written statement into conformity with the Controller's own findings and that the Controller's refusal was contrary to law.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court declared the impugned order of the Additional Rent Controller dated 5 July 1976 to be quashed and allowed the tenants' application to amend their written statement.

Core Ruling: The impugned order rejecting the amendment is quashed and the amendment sought to the written statement is permitted; the amended written statement was to be filed within one week.

Direct consequences and directions given by the Court (as stated in the opinion):

  • The impugned order of the Additional Rent Controller is quashed.
  • The amendment to the written statement is allowed; the amended written statement was to be filed within one week.
  • The Court directed that the case be disposed of expeditiously, preferably within six months, and allowed the parties an opportunity to lead additional evidence.
  • No order as to costs was made.
  • The parties were directed to appear before the successor Additional Rent Controller (Shri R.L. Ghugh) on 10 May 1979.
  • The appeal was allowed.

Broader implication: The opinion does not announce a new statutory interpretation beyond applying established principles (e.g., that admissions are not conclusive under Section 31 of the Evidence Act and that amendments to written statements ought to be considered without premature merits-based or prima facie rejection on mala fide grounds). The Court exercised Article 227 supervisory jurisdiction because it found violation of established legal principles and resulting miscarriage of justice in the subordinate court's order.

    Seth Kewal Ram Mool Chand Anand & Others v. S.N Kapoor, Addl. Rent Conroller, Delhi & Others

    S.S Chadha, J.:— This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking the setting aside of the order dated 5th July, 1976 passed by Shri S.N Kapoor, Additional Rent Controller, Delhi rejecting an application of the amendment of the written statement.

    2. The first floor of 2, Malka Ganj, Delhi along with the parking place for car on the ground floor was let out by Shri Kundan Lal Khanna (for short-landlord) to M/s. Mool Chand Chander Bhan and its partners (for shortcalled the tenants) in the year 1954-1955 for the residence of Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin at a rent of Rs. 160/- per month. On 18th December, 1970, the landlord filed an application for eviction of the tenants on the ground of nonpayment of rent and sub-letting or otherwise parting with possession in favour of M/s. Macka Hard Private Ltd. and Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin. In the joint written statement, a plea was taken that the premises in question were initially let out to M/s. Mool Chand Chander Bhan, a partnership firm for use of the Manager, hat the Manager of M/s. Mool Chand Chander Bhan, namely. Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin has been residing in the premises, that in the year 1960 M/s. Mool Chand Chander Bhan asked the landlord to make Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin as a direct tenant and create direct tenancy in favour of Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin, that the landlord agreed and since then Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin is a direct tenant of the premises under the landlord that at the time when the tenancy was changed in favour of Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin, M/s. Mod Chand Chander Bhan on the request of the landlord, stood guarantee for payment of rents to the landlord and that in view of these facts, it is stated that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin is a direct tenant under the landlord and he is in possession of the premises in the own rights. The question arose for passing orders under sec. 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short called the Act) as one of the grounds for eviction was non-payment of arrears rent inspite of the expiry of the period of two months after service of notice. The Additional Rent Controller declined to pass orders in view of the pleadings of the parties about the denial of existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant. An appeal by the landlord before the Rent Control Tribunal was also dismissed but a direction was issued to consider the passing of the orders under section 15(1) after recording of the evidence. The evidence was recorded. The Additional Rent Controller by order dated 11th July, 1974 held that the tenancy in favour of M/s. Mool Chand Chander Bhan and its partners continued and they are the tenants and Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin is not the tenant in the premises in dispute. Accordingly, an order under sec. 15(1) was passed directing the tenants to pay or deposit the arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 160/- per month from Ist December, 1967 up-to the date within one month of the order and to continue to pay or deposit future rent month by month at the same rate by 15th day of each next-following tenancy month. An appeal against the order dated 11th July, 1974 was dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal on 2nd September, 1975. The second appeal against the said orders was dismissed by this Court in limine on 19th January, 1976. On the 6th April, 1976, the tenants made an application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for amendment of the written statement in view of the findings of fact recorded by the Additional Rent Controller on 11th July, 1974. By the proposed amendment, the tenants wanted to delete pleas in the previous written statement and to take the plea that the tenants admit that M/s. Mool Chand Chander Bhan and its partners continue to be the tenants in the premises and are still the tenants and Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin is merely a Manager. By the impugned order Shri S.N Kapoor, Ist Additional Rent Controller, Delhi observed that the tenants wanted to get rid of their admission and statements made in this regard and want to escape from the effect of those orders that the application has been filed with a mala fide intention after a delay of six years in order to circumvent those admission and that the Court cannot allow any litigant to get rid of their statements and admissions made in their written statement. The second ground of rejecting the application for amendment is that there is nothing on record to indicate that M/s. Mool Chand Chander Bhan continued to do business after 1967 and it is also admitted that Kundan Lal Bhasin is presently working with some other company and he has admittedly not drawn any pay from M/s. Mool Chand Chander Bhan from 1967 and in view of these facts, the application appears to be mala fide and has to be rejected.

    3. Mr. R.K Makhija, the learned counsel for the tenants took me through the record of the case and urged that the proposed amendment was to bring the pleadings in confirmity with the findings recorded by the Additional Rent Controller on 11th July, 1974 and there was no mala fides in explaining the admissions made in the earlier written statement. Reliance is heavily placed on a judgment of Avadh Behari, J. in “Vishwa Nath v. Chaman Lal” 1975 RCJ. 514. That case was noted by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi but distinguished on facts by saying that in that case Managing Director Vishwa Nath took the premises in his own name, took the plea that the company was a tenant and he continued to be the Managing Director of that firm and in that way, he continued to remain in possession of the premises in dispute, being the Managing Director of that Company The Distinction drawn by the Additional Rent Controller is wholly on an artificial basis.

    4. In the judgment dated 11th July, 1964 of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi the plea of the parties as well as the evidence placed is discussed. A clerk from DESU was summoned along with the file and in that file there are two letters; one written by the landlord and other written by Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin and they were received in the D.E.S.U Office on 10th January, 1961. In the letter, Ex. R-1 the landlord writes to the D.E.S.U that he wants that domestic power may be sanctioned in the name of Kuhdah Lal who is his tenant and he is consuming electric energy in light purposes from KN 82052 The landlord admits this letter but gives an expiahatioh that it was given to facilitate the taking of electric connection in the name of Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin but by that letter the landlord never intended to create tenancy in the name of Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin nor the landlord ever accepted Kundan Lal Bhasin as his tenant and nor ever charged any rent. This explanation is accepted by the Additional Rent Controller in returning the finding that the tenancy continued to remain in the name of the tenants and was not surrendered or later transferred to Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin Other oral evidence of the tenants was not accepted when a finding was returned that the tenancy of the tenants continued. The tenants filed an appeal against the order dated 11th July, 1974 and the appeal was dismissed on 2nd September, 1975 The Second appeal was dismissed on 19th January, 1976. The application for amendment of the written statement was filed on 6th January, 1976. Thus there is no inordinate delay in bringing the written statement in conformity with the findings of the Additional Rent Controller dated 11th July, 1974.

    5. In Vishwa Nath's case (supra), it was held:—

    “As the landlords were accepting rent from the company Vishwa Nath thought that the company had become the tenant. He did not consider that the previous legal relationship between him and the landlords continued. He assumed not entirely without justification that now the company was the tenant. He said so in his written statement. The landlords proved the tenant's letter which he wrote at the inception of the tenancy and the draft rent note which he had signed. The Rent Controller came to the conclusion that Vishwa Nath was the tenant and that he had created an interest in favour of the company. In appeal the tenant wanted to retrace his steps and say what had been jurisdicially found to be the true state of things. He wanted to plead by way of amendment that the tenant was Vishwa Nath and not the company. This was in consonance with the findings of the Controller. It was not a new case. That was the landlord's own case. It was the holding of the Controller as well as the tribunal. The Courts do not punish the litigants for the mistakes they make. Courts of law are not courts of penal jurisdiction. They exist for the sake of doing justice. If truth was as I think it was that Vishwa Nath was the tenant the Tribunal should have allowed the amendment. Landlord's own case was this. The tenant accepted that case in his application for amendment so that ejectment order is not passed against him on the ground of his own admission that the company is the tenant.”

    6. One of the basis of the order is that the court cannot allow any litigant to get rid from there admissions in their written statement. This is concontrary to law. Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972 provides that admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted. But they may operate as estoppels under the provisions there after contained. Admissions are not conclusive of facts stated and can be shown that they are erroneous or made under a mistakes relief. Mr. Rawal relied upon on “Ram Singh v. Mukh-tiara Singh”, A.I.R 1953 Papsu 105 to urge that where an amendment does not amount to a mere clarification of the position put forward in the plaint or rectification of any formal defect therein, but, it allowed, would result in plaintiff's going back upon his own admissions and disproving facts which he himself asserted in the plaint and got a decision against him; such amendment would necessarily change the nature of the suit and cannot be allowed at the stage of appeal. A distinction has to be made between amendment of plaint and amendment of written statement. Adding of new ground of defence or substituting or altering a defence does not raise the same problem as adding, altering or substituting a new cause of action with the result that the Courts are more liberal in allowing amendments of defence than of plaint. In Ram Singh's case (supra), the court was dealing with an application for amendment of the plaint. No refere-was also made to Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 that the admission are not conclusive proof of the facts stated. Reliance is also placed on “Shaik Masthan Sahib v. Palavani Balarami Reddi”, A.I.R 1953 Madras 958 wherein it was held that it is not proper to allow the defendant to raise an amendment which was a direct negation of the admission in his written statement. Again, the provisions of Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 have not been noticed by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court. Section 31 means that an admission, unless it amounts to estoppel, is not conclusive against the maker, as he can establish that it was erroneous or was made under a mistake of fact or law. It is open to a party to explain the circumstances and facts under which the admission was made. Admissions by themselves are nothing more than an item of evidence. The admission do not have the quality of conclusiveness. It will be for the Additional Rent Controller to determine the weight to be attached to the admission made in the first written statement and now retracted. But the Court cannot say that it will not allow any litigant to explain the effect of the admission made in the earlier written stetement. The approach by the Court below is contrary to the principles of law.

    7. The finding of the mala fide nature of the application for amendment cannot stand scrutiny. The Court below could not determine without going into the evidence placed on the record in the statements already recorded and the supplementary statement recorded in Court on 5th July, 1976. An amendment should not be refused at the when preliminary stage on the allegations of mala fides when the truth of the allegation was to be adjudged on the true valuation of the facts and evidence on the record. A prima facie view is uncalled for. It is well settle 1 that the Court should not go into the merits of the purposed pleas while considering the applications for amendment of the written statement. The Court cannot go into or give a finding on the merits of the amendment sought. The court below records that there is nothing on record to indicate the M/s. Mool Chand Chander Bhan continued to do business after 1967 and Shri Kunianlal Bhasin is working with some other company and, therefore, found the proposed plea patently mala fide. In order to succeed in a plea of eviction under Section 14(l)(b) of the Act, the landlord has to establish that the tenant has sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with possession of the tenancy premises. If the finding of the Additional Rent Controller dated 11th July, 1974 is that there was no surrender of the tenancy in 1960 and the original letting to the tenants from the year 1954-1955 continued, then the landlord can only succeed if he establishes on the record that Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin is a sub-tenant or an assigned or the tenants have parted with possession in favour of Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin An half hearted reasoning by the Additional Rent Controller in saying that Shri Kundan Lal Bhasin has not drawn any pay from 1967 and that the tenants are not doing any business from 1967 cannot be appreciated, for it affects the merits of the eviction petition. On this reasoning the Additional Rent Controller Delhi could not brand the proposed plea as patently mala fide.

    8. Mr. Bawa relied upon “Laxmi Narain oil Mills v. Mamraj Musadilal” A.I.R 1969 Delhi 311 to urge that the Additional Rent Controller had jurisdiction in disallowing an amendment on the ground of mala fide and, therefore, this Court cannot interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution with the exercise of that discreation. It is true that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases, for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The jurisdiction under Article 227 may be only supervisory but in its process it is also implicit to find out whether the Additional Rent Controller has or has not acted in accordance with the established principles. When there is violation of law or where grave derelication of duty on the part of the Tribunal is shown; the discretionary power can be exercised. As the order of the Additional Rent Controller suffers from clear legal infirmities and has resulted in miscarriage of justice, this Court will not hesitate in striking down that order. In the result CM. (M) 230 of 1976 succeeds and the impunged order is quashed. The amendment prayed for his allowed. The amendment written statement be filed within one week. As the case has been pending for a considerable long time, it is desirable that it should be expeditiously disposed, of preferably within six months, after allowing the parties an opprtunity of leading additional evidence. I make no orders as to costs.

    9. The parties are directed to appear before the successor (Shri R.L Ghugh) Additional Rent Controller, Delhi on 10th May, 1979.

    10. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Seth Kewal Ram Mool Chand Anand & Others v. S.N Kapoor, Addl. Rent Conroller, Delhi & Others
    (May 4, 1979)