| Benaras Bank v. Har Pershad, AIR 1936 Lahore 482 |
History: decision of Lahore High Court affirming the 27-2-1931 compromise which formed part of decree |
The compromise was held to be part of the decree; later litigation stems from that compromise. The court relied on this to describe the procedural history. |
| Kiron Soshi Dasi v. Official Assignee of Calcutta, AIR 1933 Calcutta 246 |
Rule 95: if person in possession holds on his own account and not as representative of judgment-debtor, application must be dismissed |
Used to support the rule that persons holding on their own account are not removable in execution under rule 95. |
| Sobha Ram v. Tursi Ram, AIR 1924 Allahabad 495 |
Scope of executing court's power under rule 95 — limits on dispossession of persons not bound by decree |
Cited alongside Kiron Soshi Dasi to establish that only judgment-debtor or persons bound by decree can be dispossessed under rule 95. |
| Ek Nawaz Khan v. Competent Officer, AIR 1960 Allahabad 626 |
Rule 95 cannot be used to evict a trespasser; special procedure needed |
Used to show that rule 95 does not apply to those who hold on their own account (even trespassers); supports that ejectment must be by suit. |
| Bhagwat v. Kasturi, AIR 1974 M.P. 26 |
Nature of resistance/obstruction in execution — resistance need not be by force |
Cited to explain that executing court may refuse warrants initially and that resistance can be by assertion in writing; supports discussion of procedural safeguards under Order 21. |
| Mahabir Pershad v. Delhi Traders, AIR 1977 Delhi 45 |
Similar procedural points on execution resistance and procedure |
Cited for procedural principles regarding execution and resistance (in context of rule 95–98 analysis). |
| All India Film Corporation v. Raja Gyan Nath, (1969) 3 SCC 79 |
General proposition: mortgagee's interest and leases created by him are co-terminous with mortgagee's interest; observations on s.76 applying more commonly to agricultural land (word "seldom") |
The Court treated the decision as authority for the general rule (mortgagee's derivative title ends with mortgage) but held that the Supreme Court left open the specific question of applicability to urban property; Court analyzed and treated the "seldom" remark as obiter and not prohibitory. |
| Mahabir Gope & others v. Harbans Narain, AIR 1952 S.C. 205 |
Part of Supreme Court authority listing that leases by mortgagee are ordinarily co-terminous with mortgage |
Included among six Supreme Court decisions cited to establish the general proposition about co-terminous nature of mortgagee-created tenancies. |
| Harihar Prasad v. Deonarain Prasad, AIR 1956 S.C. 305 |
Supreme Court authority on mortgagee-created tenancies |
One of the six decisions relied upon for the general rule that mortgagee's interest as lessor is co-terminous with his mortgagee interest. |
| Asa Ram v. Mst. Ram Kali, AIR 1958 S.C. 183 |
Supreme Court authority on mortgagee's tenant rights |
Cited among decisions supporting the general proposition about termination of mortgagee-created leases on redemption. |
| Prabhu v. Ramdeo, AIR 1966 S.C. 1721 |
Effect of binding tenancy after redemption — rent control protection applies |
Used to show that if a tenancy binds the mortgagor after redemption, Rent Acts can protect tenants — cited as settled law. |
| M/s Sachalmal Parasram v. Ratnabai, AIR 1972 S.C. 637 |
Application of s.76: whether lease was prudent management; left question of applicability to urban property undecided |
Cited to show Supreme Court did not decide applicability to urban property; decision turned on whether lease was prudent management in the facts. |
| Jagan Nath v. Mittar Sain, AIR 1970 Punjab & Haryana 104 (FB) |
Full Bench holding (interpreting All India Film Corp.) that s.76 exception applies only to agricultural land |
Cited by auction purchaser's counsel; relied upon by Court as representing an opposing view which the Court considered and rejected on statutory grounds. |
| Purshottam v. Madhavji Meghaji, AIR 1976 Gujarat 161 (FB) |
Full Bench decision adopting view that s.76 exception is limited to agricultural tenancies |
Cited by auction purchaser; Court noted this decision but disagreed with its reasoning and did not follow it. |
| Tajammul Hussain v. Mir Khan, AIR 1974 Allahabad 234 (FB) |
Full Bench holding that s.76(a) applies equally to urban immovable property |
The Court preferred this view and applied the reasoning that s.76's language and policy support application to urban property; the judge expressly preferred this authority. |
| Smt. Ram Piari v. Ram Adhin, AIR 1953 All. 472 |
Instances where mortgagee-created tenancy in urban property enured after redemption |
Cited as examples where urban property tenancies created by mortgagee were held to bind after redemption, supporting applicability of s.76 to urban cases. |
| Hardai v. Wahid Khan, AIR 1954 All. 16 |
Another instance of urban tenancy binding after redemption |
Used as example evidencing the extension of s.76 principles to urban property in prior cases. |
| Ghulam Mohammad v. Rajeshwar, AIR 1940 Lahore 333 |
Application of principles underlying s.76 as equity before the T.P. Act applied in a jurisdiction |
Cited to show equitable principles akin to s.76 were applied even where T.P. Act formally did not apply at the time of transaction. |
| Dwarkadas Sriniwas v. Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co., AIR 1954 SC 119 |
Quotation and use of equitable reasoning in property matters (cited by author) |
Cited in the judgment by way of a supporting quotation on the effect of taking away means of livelihood; used illustratively. |