| Prem Narain v. Ram Charan and others, AIR 1932 PC 51 |
The Privy Council held that under Section 93 the "previous sanction" of the Local Government is necessary for the exercise of powers by a Collector or other officer; appointment plus previous sanction are both necessary for the provisions of Section 93 to be utilized. |
The court relied on this authority to explain that previous sanction must be strictly proved and that the absence of such sanction renders consent vulnerable; it distinguished the prior invalid consent in the earlier suit on this very ground, and it applied Prem Narain to confirm the legal requirement satisfied in the current record (i.e., the court examined whether the present consent suffered that defect). |
| Shavax v. Masood Hosain (Shavax v. Syed Masood Hossain), AIR 1965 AP 143 |
Authority for the proposition that the Advocate-General's order under Section 92 is not quasi-judicial; the Advocate-General need not hold an enquiry or hear parties and acts in an administrative capacity in granting or refusing consent. |
The court cited this case to support the conclusion that the Advocate-General (and his delegate) need not hear the defendant or conduct a quasi-judicial inquiry before granting consent; it applied the principle to reject the contention that notice to the defendant or presence of all applicants was required. |
| Sadhu Singh Sunder Singh v. Mangalgir Mohatmin Dera, AIR 1956 Pepsu 65 |
A solitary decision taking a contrary view (impliedly treating the order as having a different character). |
The court noted this decision as an exception and treated it as a solitary contrary authority; it did not follow it, explaining that the weight of authority is against its correctness. |
| Amrita Nand v. Advocate-General, AIR 1974 Punjab and Haryana 334 |
Authority among a preponderance of High Court decisions holding that the Advocate-General's order under Section 92 is administrative and not quasi-judicial. |
Used to support the general proposition that the Advocate-General's grant of consent requires only satisfaction of a prima facie case and does not decide rights—court relied on this collective authority to treat the consent as administrative. |
| A.K. Bhaskar v. Advocate-General, AIR 1962 Ker. 90 (FB) |
One of the High Court decisions supporting the administrative character of the Advocate-General's act under Section 92. |
Cited as part of the preponderant view that the Advocate-General's order is not quasi-judicial; court relied on these authorities to explain the limits of judicial review of consent. |
| Raju v. Advocate-General, AIR 1962 Mad. 320 |
Another authority supporting the administrative character of consent under Section 92. |
Referred to as part of consistent jurisprudence that the Advocate-General does not adjudicate rights when granting consent; court treated it as supporting the settled view. |
| K.M. Abdul Kasim v. P.M.N. Mohamed Dawood, AIR 1961 Mad. 244 |
Authority on the administrative nature of the Advocate-General's functions under Section 92. |
Used to buttress the court's conclusion that the Advocate-General need not conduct a hearing or inquiry before granting consent. |
| Swami Shantanand Saraswati v. Advocate-General, AIR 1955 All. 372 |
Authority to the same effect (Advocate-General's function non-judicial). |
Counted among the High Court authorities establishing the preponderant view relied upon by the court. |
| Shrimali Lal Kasliwal v. Advocate-General, AIR 1955 Raj. 166 |
Authority supporting the administrative view of the Advocate-General's act under Section 92. |
Included in the array of authorities the court relied on to treat the consent as administrative and not quasi-judicial. |
| Desraj v. Deputy Commissioner, Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1962 J & K 86 |
Another High Court decision endorsing the administrative character of consent under Section 92. |
Referred to as part of the prevailing judicial consensus the court applied to its analysis. |
| Satyananda v. Phani Lal, AIR 1955 Cal. 155 |
Cited for the proposition that where previous sanction is necessary, the obtaining of such sanction must be strictly proved and courts will not draw presumptions under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that formalities have been complied with. |
The court cited Satyananda to emphasize that proof of prior sanction under Section 93 must be strict and that no presumption can be drawn that due formalities were followed; it applied this to examine the present record for a valid appointment and sanction. |