1. Krishan Lal Suri, the respondent herein, filed a suit against Sant Lal Nagrath, the petitioner herein, for recovery of Rs. 1,100/- by way of damages for alleged illegal seizure of his shooting licence and his arms. The petitioner filed his written statement in the suit resisting the claim of the respondent herein. In the said written statement, the petitioner made certain allegations which according to the respondent constituted defamation. On the basis of these alleged defamatory remarks, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner under Section 500, I.P.C The learned Magistrate after perusing the complaint and the statements of the complainant and his witnesses passed an order under Sec. 204 Cr.P.C (old) on 30-3-1973 directing the issue of summons for the appearance of the petitioner in his Court on 26-4-1973. The petitioner appeared before the learned Magistrate and filed an application on 26-4-1973 for quashing the proceedings against him and for discharging the petitioner under Section 253(2) Cr.P.C on the ground that the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the petitioner for an offence under Section 500, I.P.C This application was dismissed by the learned Magistrate by his order dated 9-7-1973. The petitioner thereupon filed a revision petition in the Court of Session which was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, by his order dated 28-2-1974. The petitioner thereupon filed a revision petition in this Court for quashing the orders of the learned Magistrate dated 30-3-1973 and 9-7-1973. Safeer, J., before whom this revision petition came up for hearing on 26-4-1974, noticed that the petitioner had filed a single revision petition against two separate orders of the learned Magistrate and the learned Judge expressed his view that the two impugned orders of the learned Magistrate could not be challenged by a single revision petition. The petitioner thereupon withdrew me revision petition and the same was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the petitioner to invoke any other remedy open to him. The petitioner has filed the present petition on 27-4-1974 purporting to be under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the new Code). In filing this revision petition, the petitioner has prayed that the proceedings pending against him in the Court of the learned Magistrate including the order dated 30-3-1973 be quashed. In effect, the petitioner has filed a single petition challenging two separate orders of the learned Magistrate which he was not permitted to do by Safeer, J. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, stated that the revision petition may be treated as a petition challenging the order of the learned Magistrate dated 30-3-1973. Accordingly, this revision petition is treated as such.
2. Mr. Vijay Kishan, learned counsel for the respondent, has raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of this petition. According to the learned counsel, the order of the learned Magistrate dated 30-3-1973 is in the nature of an interlocutory order a revision against which does not lie by reason of sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the new Code. It is his contention that even though the present petition purports to be one under Section 482 of the new Code, it is in substance a revision petition under Section 397 of the new Code. It is his further contention that Section 482 of the new Code does not apply to cases where there is a specific provision in the Code. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that he has challenged the order of the learned Magistrate dated 30-3-1973 on the ground that the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the case by reason of Sections 197 and 199 of the new Code, and that in view of the nature of his challenge against the order of the learned Magistrate dated 30-3-1973, the present petition cannot be treated as a revision petition under Section 397 of the new Code but a petition under Section 482 of the said Code.
3. If the present petition is treated as one challenging the legality of the order of the learned Magistrate dated 30-3-1973 there cannot be any doubt that the present petition is not maintainable either under Section 397 or Section 482 of the new Code. What constitutes an interlocutory order has been discussed by me in an earlier case in Bhupinder Kumar v. State, reported in 1975 Rajdhani LR 228 : (1975 Cri LJ 1185) (Delhi). I have expressed the view that even an. order framing the charge against an accused person is in the nature of an interlocutory order and a revision against such an order does not lie by reason of sub-section (2) of Section 397. of the new Code. By the same reasoning an order under Section 204 Cr.P.C must be held to be an interlocutory order. A Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Revision No. 158 of 1974 (Amrik Singh v. State) decided on 26-2-1975 (Delhi), has also expressed its view that an order under Section 204 of the new Code is an interlocutory order. A revision petition against such an order is clearly barred by sub-section (2) of Sec. 397 of the new Code. This bar cannot be circumvented by having recourse to Sec. 482 of the new Code. It is now well settled that Section 482 does not apply to cases which are covered by specific provisions of the new Code. (R.P Kapur v. State Of Punjab. (AIR 1960 SC 866) : (1960 Cri LJ 1239)).
4. Even if the order of the learned Magistrate dated 30-3-1973 has been challenged on the ground of want of jurisdiction, it will still remain an interlocutory order. In V.N Abdul Rehman v. D.K Cassim and Sons, (AIR 1933 PC 58), Sir George Lowndes, J. made the following observation:
“It should be noted that the appellate Court in India was of opinion that the order it had made went to the root of the suit, namely, the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain it, and it was for this reason that the order was thought to be final and the certificate granted. But this was not sufficient. The finality must be a finality in relation to the suit. If, after the order, the suit is still a live suit in which the rights of the parties have still to be determined, no appeal lies against it under Section 109 (a) of the Code.”
5. Therefore, the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent against the maintainability of the present petition must be upheld.
6. Even if it is assumed for the moment that the present petition is maintainable under Section 482 of the new Code, the petition has no merit. The jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate to entertain the complaint filed by the respondent is challenged on two grounds, namely,—
(i) that the petitioner being a public servant, no complaint made against him can be taken cognizance of without the sanction of the Government, and
(ii) that the respondent himself being a public servant, cannot file a complaint against the petitioner without obtaining the sanction of the Government.
7. In support of these contentions the learned counsel for the petitioner seeks to rely upon Sections 197 and 199 of the new Code and also on Rule 19 of the Central Civil Services Conduct Rules 1964. The reference to Rule 19 of the Central Civil Services Conduct Rules is wholly irrelevant, as the only restrictions placed upon a Magistrate for taking cognizance of a complaint made against a public servant are the restrictions contained in Sections 197 and 199 of the new Code. Section 199 also is not very relevant, because this applies to complaints by a public servant against whom an offence under Section 500, I.P.C is alleged to have been committed. In other words, Section 199 applies to public servants who are victims of defamation and not the authors of defamation. The petitioner is not the victim of any defamation but is alleged to be the author of defamation. So far as the victims of defamation are concerned, Section 199 enables the filing of a complaint by the public prosecutor instead of by the public servant who is defamed, but does not prohibit the public servant who is defamed from filing the complaint himself. Sub-section (6) of Section 199 of the new Code clearly states that.
“Nothing in this section shall affect the right of the person aganist whom the offence is alleged to have been committed, to make a complaint in respect of that offence before a Magistrate having jurisdiction or the power of such Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence upon such complaint.”
8. Therefore, the respondent even though he may be a public servant has the right to himself file a complaint against the petitioner and the Magistrate has jurisdiction to entertain such a complaint.
9. Section 197 of the new Code will protect the petitioner only if the offence alleged against him is committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. In the present case it cannot be said that while making the defamatory remarks in his written statement in the suit the petitioner was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. The allegation of bribery made by the petitioner against the respondent in his written statement was not at all necessary to resist the respondent's claim of the amount of Rs. 1,100/- made against the petitioner and in making these remarks which are per se defamatory the petitioner cannot plead that he was doing so in the discharge of his official duty.
10. In any view of the matter there is no reason to interfere with the proceedings now pending against the petitioner in the Court of the learned Magistrate. This petition is, therefore, dismissed. The parties are directed to appear before the learned Magistrate on 18-8-1975. Petition dismissed.