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Summary of Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit was instituted by Devi Dayal (substituted by his legal representatives) on 18-01-1965 seeking recovery of Rs. 2,50,000 (comprised of Rs. 1,43,000 principal and Rs. 1,07,000 interest). The claim rested on promissory notes executed by Ch. Ram Narain, who allegedly had taken loans totalling Rs. 1,43,000. It was alleged that the defendants were the sons and legal representatives of the deceased Ram Narain and therefore bound to pay their father's debts.

While evidence was being recorded on commission on 06-02-1971, the defendants' advocate stated that defendant No. 2, Banwari Lal, had died on 31-01-1971. The plaintiff's advocate said the case could not proceed in the absence of the deceased defendant; the Commissioner adjourned and referred the matter back to the court.

Thereafter I.A. 492/72 (dated 20-03-1972) was filed by the defendants arguing that because the plaintiffs had taken no steps to bring the legal representatives of the deceased defendant No. 2 on the record, the suit had abated altogether, on the basis that liability was joint and indivisible and the right to sue did not survive against the remaining defendants alone. The plaintiffs filed a reply accepting the death but contending the heirs' liability was joint and several (or confined to each son's share) and that the right to sue survived against the other two defendants.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the death of defendant No. 2 (and the plaintiffs' failure to bring his legal representatives on record) caused the suit to abate wholly, partly, or not at all.
  2. Whether the heirs (the sons) of the deceased debtor are necessary parties or only proper parties to a suit for the deceased's debt.
  3. Whether Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act (the rule on joint promoters/promisors) applies to co-heirs who inherit the debt liability by operation of law, thereby permitting the creditor to sue any one heir for the entire debt.
  4. Whether, if the suit abates only as to the deceased defendant, proceedings can continue against the remaining defendants without bringing in legal representatives of the deceased.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments (Counsel for Defendants Nos. 1 and 3)

  • The liability of all three defendants as heirs of Ch. Ram Narain was joint and indivisible.
  • Because defendant No. 2 died and his legal representatives were not brought on record, the suit abates as a whole.

Plaintiff's Arguments (Counsel for Plaintiff)

  • The liability of the sons (defendants 1 to 3) was joint and several (or confined to the share each son enjoyed) and therefore the plaintiff could have sued any one or more of the sons without impleading the others.
  • Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act permits a creditor to sue any one or more joint promisors for the whole performance; reliance was placed on Chandra Bhan v. Misrimal (AIR 1955 Raj 11) and Mawaji Ramji v. Premji Kumbhabhai Chanda (AIR 1967 Orissa 158) in support of the contention that co-heirs could be treated as joint promisors.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chandra Bhan v. Misrimal, AIR 1955 Raj 11 Held that all sons were not necessary parties and a creditor may sue some of the sons of a deceased father; obiter that Section 43 of the Contract Act might be applicable in principle to co-heirs. The court considered this case but regarded its suggestion that Section 43 applies to co-heirs as obiter and based on a misapprehension; the present court declined to follow its broader application of Section 43.
Mawaji Ramji v. Premji Kumbhabhai Chanda, AIR 1967 Orissa 158 Applied Section 43 of the Contract Act to hold it was open to plaintiff to compel full performance from any one of co-heirs (plaintiff impleaded only sons, not daughters). The court rejected this view insofar as it treated co-heirs as falling under Section 43, finding the reliance on Kailash Chandra (Full Bench) misplaced and asserting Mawaji Ramji followed Chandra Bhan incorrectly on this point.
Shaik Sahed v. Krishna Mohan, AIR 1917 Cal 829 Held that Section 43 has no application where parties became jointly interested by operation of law (e.g., heirs); example that landlord cannot maintain suit without impleading all tenants who are necessary parties. The court cited Shaik Sahed in support of the conclusion that Section 43 does not apply to co-heirs and that heirs who become interested by operation of law may be necessary parties.
Kailash Chandra v. Brojendra, AIR 1925 Cal 1056 (Full Bench) Majority held heirs took as tenants-in-common and, on privity of estate, any one such tenant might be liable for the whole rent; obiter remarks about Section 43. The court distinguished the Full Bench reasoning (privity of estate) from the present facts and held that the Full Bench did not decide the precise question whether Section 43 applies to co-heirs; the court found Kailash Chandra not controlling for applying Section 43 to co-heirs.
Siba Krishna Sinha Sharma v. Jagat Chandra Talukdar, AIR 1918 Cal 145 Held that a landlord cannot maintain suit for arrears of rent against one of several heirs without joining the others; Section 43 not applicable. The court cited this earlier Calcutta decision as supporting the view that Section 43 does not apply to successors-in-interest who become jointly interested by operation of law.
Gurdas Mal v. Kashi Ram, AIR 1921 Lah 160 Held that where three persons were sued jointly as representing their late father's estate and one defendant died while plaintiffs delayed bringing in legal representatives, the appeal abated because right to sue did not survive against the remaining defendants alone. The court relied on this decision as supportive authority for the proposition that the right to sue may not survive against surviving defendants alone and that delay in bringing in legal representatives can cause abatement.
Hazara Singh v. Narinjan Singh, AIR 1929 Lah 783 Division Bench held Section 43 applies only where two or more persons made a joint promise and not where parties become jointly interested by inheritance. The court cited Hazara Singh as further support for the conclusion that Section 43 does not apply to co-heirs who become jointly interested by inheritance.
D.N. Dutt v. The Income-tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1960 SC 1317 Referred to Shaik Sahed; the Supreme Court held that Shaik Sahed was not applicable to the facts of that case but did not indicate it was wrongly decided. The present court noted that D.N. Dutt had referred to Shaik Sahed and that the Supreme Court did not repudiate Shaik Sahed, using that to bolster support for Shaik Sahed's continuing relevance.
Kedar Nath's case, AIR 1961 Punj 555 (Referred to in the opinion) Illustrative of a similar situation where continuation would be unfair to defendants by depriving them of the right of contribution. The court referred to Kedar Nath's case to illustrate why allowing proceedings to continue against survivors while dismissing claim against a deceased would create an unfair situation and preclude contribution claims.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a step-by-step legal analysis grounded in Hindu succession principles, principles distinguishing necessary and proper parties, and the scope of Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act as explained in the authorities cited.

1. Starting point: The court noted settled Hindu law (citing Mulla, para 288) that an heir's liability for a deceased's debts is limited to the assets inherited by him; the heir is not personally liable beyond his inherited share. Under the Mitakshara school (Mulla, para 31), co-heirs take as tenants-in-common.

2. Necessary vs. proper parties: The court framed the key issue as whether the heirs sued were necessary parties (without whom no decree could be passed) or only proper parties (whose absence would not bar continuation). If heirs were merely proper parties, the suit could proceed against surviving defendants; if necessary parties, failure to bring legal representatives of a deceased defendant would cause abatement.

3. Analysis of Section 43: The plaintiffs relied on Section 43 (which allows a creditor to sue any one of joint promisors for full performance and obtain contribution later). The court explained that Section 43 presupposes each promisor is severally liable for the whole debt (i.e., true joint and several liability). The court illustrated with a numerical example to show that if the property inherited by a single heir is insufficient, that heir cannot be treated as liable for the whole amount merely by invoking Section 43.

4. Application to co-heirs: The court reasoned that co-heirs do not become joint and several promisors by the death of a single promisor. The liability of each heir is confined to his share of the estate; thus the heirs' liability is joint and indivisible as to the estate but not joint and several personally. The death of the sole debtor distributes liability among heirs only to the extent of their inherited interest; that does not convert each heir into a promisor liable for the entire debt.

5. Evaluation of precedent: The court examined cases relied on by the parties. It treated Chandra Bhan and Mawaji Ramji as supporting plaintiffs' contentions but found those decisions founded on a misapprehension of Section 43's scope or as relying on obiter remarks. The court found support for its approach in Shaik Sahed, Siba Krishna Sinha Sharma, Kailash Chandra (distinguished on privity of estate grounds), Gurdas Mal, Hazara Singh, and others, concluding the better view is that Section 43 does not apply to co-heirs who obtain interest by operation of law.

6. Practical consequence and rule of finality: The court noted that if the suit were dismissed as against the deceased defendant but allowed to proceed against the surviving defendants, the surviving defendants would be deprived of the right of contribution from the dismissed (or non-joined) estate or its legal representatives, and contradictory decrees could arise. To avoid such unfairness and conflict, and because the right to sue did not survive against the remaining defendants alone, the court held that the omission to bring in legal representatives meant the suit abated.

7. Conduct of the plaintiff: The court observed that information of defendant No. 2's death was available to the plaintiff within a week of his death, yet no steps were taken to bring legal representatives on record and no explanation was provided for that delay.

8. Conclusion of analysis: On the basis of the legal rules, authorities, and fairness considerations, the court concluded defendant No. 2 was a necessary party; because legal representatives were not brought on record within the time allowed, the suit abated as to that defendant and, for the reasons given, abatement had to be total rather than partial.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court's final decision was that the suit has totally abated and is dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The suit is dismissed in its entirety because defendant No. 2 was a necessary party and his legal representatives were not brought on record within the time prescribed; there will be no order as to costs.
  • Broader implications: The opinion applies established principles (as discussed) and relies on existing authorities to reject the proposition that Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act makes co-heirs joint and several promisors for the whole debt. The opinion does not purport to announce a new precedent beyond applying these principles to the facts; its decision is limited to the consequences between the parties in this suit.

Disposition

Suit dismissed.

    Devi Dayal v. Bhupinder Kumar

    1. This suit was filed by Devi Dayal (who has since been substituted by his legal representatives) for the recovery of Rs. 2,50,000/-. It was alleged in the suit that one Ch. Ram Narain Bishnoi took from the plaintiff different loans totalling Rupees 1,43,000/- and executed pronotes in favour of the plaintiff on the said dates. It was also stated in para 4 of the plaint that about a year back Ch. Ram Naxain died and the defendants are his sons and legal representatives of his estate and are bound to pay the just debts of their father. A decree for Rupees 2,50,000/- comprising of Rs. 1,43,000/- as principal and Rs. 1,07,000/- as interest was therefore prayed. Suit was filed on 18-1-1965. In the suit when the evidence was being taken on commission on 6-2-1971 the advocate for the defendants made a statement that Banwari Lal, defendant No. 2 had died by failure of heart on 31-1-1971. On this the advocate for the plaintiff stated that the case could not proceed in the absence of the deceased defendant and the case was, therefore, adjourned for further proceedings. On this the Commissioner adjourned the matter and returned the proceedings to the court for further necessary action.

    2. I.A 492/72 dated 20-3-1972 has been filed in which it is stated that as three defendants had been sued jointly as representing the estate of their father, Ch. Ram Narain, and the plaintiffs having taken no steps to bring the legal representative of deceased, defendant No. 2, on record the suit of the plaintiffs has abated altogether as the right to sue did not survive against the other two defendants as their liability if any was joint and indivisible.

    3. A reply has been filed on behalf of plaintiffs. The factum of death of defendant No. 2 is not denied. The liability of the sons is stated to be not personal and is only confined to the share of each son enjoyed by him of the ancestral property. The liability is, therefore, stated to be joint and several and the right to sue survives against the other two defendants. It is denied, therefore, that there is any abatement. The position thus boils down to this that the suit was filed against three defendants, each representing the estate of Ch. Ram Narain who was alleged to have taken the loan from the plaintiff. Admittedly defendant No. 2 died on 31-1-1971 but no legal representative of the deceased has been brought on record. The question that arises in these circumstances is whether the suit as such has abated partly or wholly or not at all.

    4. The contention of Mr. Gupta, learned counsel for defendants Nos. 1 and 3 is that the liability of all the three defendants as heirs of Ch. Ram Narain was joint and indivisible and as defendant No. 2 has died and his legal representatives have not been brought on record the suit abates as a whole. Mr. Sood learned counsel for the plaintiffs, however, maintains that the liability of defendants 1 to 3 was joint and several and, therefore, it was open to him even in the first instance to file a suit against any one of the sons of Ram Narain without impleading other sons and, therefore, the fact that one of the defendants has died during the pendency of the suit and his legal representatives have not been brought on record is of no consequence and the suit can proceed in their absence.

    5. Now as regards the liability of an heir of a deceased Hindu to pay the debts of the deceased, it is settled law that he is liable only to the extent of the assets inherited by him from the deceased. The heir is not personally liable to pay the debts of the deceased vide para 288, Hindu Law by Mulla, 13th Edition. Also under the Hindu Law, according to the Mitakshara school two or more persons inheriting jointly take as tenants-in-common vide para 31 Hindu Law by Mulla.

    6. The main question, therefore, that arises is whether it was open to the plaintiffs to have filed the suit against any one of the sons of the deceased, Ch. Ram Narain. In other words, were all the heirs of the deceased necessary parties to the suit or were they only proper parties. It is apparent that if the answer is that all the heirs are not necessary parties but only proper parties then in that case the fact that one of the parties who was only a proper party has died while the other two defendants are on record will not result in the suit abating. But on the other hand, if all the heirs are necessary parties then obviously on the death of one of the defendants the right to sue does not survive to the defendants alone and if in that case the legal representatives of the deceased have not been brought on record within limitation the result must of necessity be that the whole suit will abate. This consequence follows because as is well known, necessary party is that without whose presence no decree can be passed while proper party is that whose presence may be only necessary to enable the court to adjudicate more effectually and completely. Thus, if a necessary party is not impleaded the suit cannot proceed whereas if only a proper party is not added the suit can be continued in its absence. Mr. Sood however, maintains that the heirs of the deceased are in the position of a joint promisor and, therefore, by virtue of Section 43 of the Contract Act, it is open to the plaintiff to compel any one or more of the defendants to perform the whole of the promise. The argument is that as the liability is joint and several suit could be filed against any one of the sons of deceased and the death of one of the sons i.e defendant No. 2 is, therefore of no consequence. In this regard he refers me to Chandra Bhan v. Misrimal, AIR 1955 Raj 11. In that case a suit had been filed against some of the sons of the deceased for the recovery of the amount due from the deceased. Objection was taken that all the sons had not been impleaded. The learned Judge, however, held that all the sons were not necessary parties to the suit as a creditor may bring a suit against some of the sons of a deceased Hindu father leaving aside the others and that if that is done such a suit need not be necessarily held to be bad for want of other sons on the record. The learned Judge also observed, but it seems with respect, more as obiter, that the case of a co-sharer cannot be placed on a better or higher footing than that of co-promisees on any principle, and that Section 43 of the Contract Act may wed be held applicable in principle to the case of co-heirs, and in any event, to the kind of heirs, who are sons in the present case. This view was also followed in Mawaji Ramji v. Premji Kumbhabhai Chanda, AIR 1967 Orissa 158. In that case the plaintiff had filed a suit for the recovery of Rs. 6,800/- on the basis of promissory note executed by the deceased, Ramji Haridas. The Plaintiff had impleaded only the sons and not the daughters. Objection was taken that as the daughters had not been impleaded the suit was not maintainable. This was negatived and the bench held applying Section 43 of the Contract Act that it was open to the plaintiff to compel performance of whole of the promise from any one of the co-heirs who by operation of law became joint promisors after death of single promisor though sisters are not impleaded as parties to suit. The Bench did not agree with the earlier view taken in Shaik Sahed v. Krishna Mohan, AIR 1917 Cal 829, and purported to follow the Full Bench decision in Kailash Chandra v. Brojendra, AIR 1925 Cal 1056 (FB).

    7. With respect, the view taken in above cases that Section 43 of the Contract Act will be applicable to the case of the coheirs of the deceased is based on mis-apprehension of the scope of Section 43 of the Contract Act. It is quite apparent that the liability of a son for the debt incurred by the father is limited only to the extent of the share of the property inherited by him. Now one of the essential conditions for the applicability of Section 43 of the Contract Act is that it is open to a creditor to sue any one or all debtors whose liability is joint and several for the recovery of the whole of the amount. Take an illustration; if the amount claimed is Rs. 11 lakhs from these three joint promisors, it is open to the creditor to sue only one of them and obtain a decree for the full amount of Rs. 11/2 lakhs from him. Of course in such a case latter part of Section 43 of the Contract Act gives a right to such a person to compel contribution from other joint promisor. But that is a matter inter se between the joint promisors. The real thing, however, is that creditor is not limited to recovering from one joint promisor only a proportionate amount but can recover the whole amount. Now applying this illustration to the case of a debt incurred by the deceased father which is sought to be realised from the three sons, it cannot be said that one son could have been sued for the recovery of the full amount even if the property fallen to his share was not sufficient to discharge the whole debt. Thus for instance that if the property left by the father was of the value of Rs. 75,000/- and the property was inherited by the sons then it is apparent that the liability of each son is only limited to Rs. 25,000/-. In such a case if the creditor was to sue one son it is not suggested that he can recover the whole of the debt due from the father even if the property in the hands of one son was very much less than the debt due. If that position is correct then it is not understood how the co-heirs of the deceased can be considered in the position of joint promisors and, therefore, per se liable not only jointly but severally for the whole debt. The essential prerequisite of a joint and several liability is that each of the promisors is liable for the full amount due to the creditor. If in the illustration given by me above one son is not liable for the full amount but only for the proportionate amount due to his share it is quite obvious that he cannot be put in the position of a joint promisor. The heirs are in the position of having one indivisible debt due from the whole of the property which they have jointly inherited. It is not possible to split up the same for the purpose of making only one of them liable for the full amount due. The discussion in Chandra Bhan's case and Mawaji Ramji's case which follows it, about pious obligation of the son to make full payment of just debt of his father does not carry the matter any further. Even if the debt has not been incurred for unlawful or immoral purposes the liability of the son is confined only to their interest in the coparcenary property. Thus if the son inherited no property from the deceased father, the pious obligation does not extend to his discharging the debt due from tho father and the creditor cannot proceed against the separate property of the son. If as the learned Judges themselves accept that tho liability of each son is to the extent of the property inherited by him then it is not understood how it is further held that tho liability of the sons is joint and several because several liability pre-supposes that tho person is liable to clear off the whole debt irrespective of the extent of the property devolved on him. When the learned Judges accept that each son is only liable to tho extent of the property inherited by him it obviously implies that the liability is joint and indivisible. The death of the deceased does not make all the heirs jointly and severally liable because the only difference caused by the death is to make liable instead of the deceased, the various heirs to the extent of property inherited and the liability is thus by operation of law transferred from one person to a number of persons who constituted in law one heir. It is for this reason that I cannot agree that Section 43 of the Contract Act is applicable in the case of tho co-heirs of the deceased.

    8. This view of mine finds support from Shaik Sahed's case, AIR 1917 Cal 829 where it was held that Section 43 of the Contract Act can have no application where parties became jointly interested by operation of law in a contract made by a single person. It was in that case held that if the landlord brings a suit for recovery of rent without impleading all the tenants who are necessary parties, the suit is not maintainable. It appears that there was a conflict of views and the matter was referred to Full Bench in AIR 1925 Cal 1056. Minority judgment of C.C Ghose and Mukerji, JJ., held that the heirs or successors-in-interest of a deceased tenant are all necessary parties and the lessor is bound to implead in his suit all the lessees. Mukerji, J., also held that the liability of all the persons on whom the tenancy devolves on the death of the original tenants is a joint liability to the extent of the interest which devolves and not a joint and several liability in respect of that interest, as the whole body of persons, who succeed in this way constitute in law but one heir. Mukerji, J., also held specifically that except in the case of original lessees or persons who were parties to the contract, the provisions of Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act have no application. Majority judgment was written by B.B Ghose, J with whom Walmsley, J. Greaves, J. and Ghose. J. agreed and it took the view that all the heirs of the tenant took the property as tenants-in-common and that therefore law imposes a liability for payment of rent by reason of privity of estate and any one of such tenants is liable for the payment of entire rent due to the landlord. The learned Judge also went on to observe and it seems with respect that it was completely obiter that this may be either in accordance with the provisions of Section 43 of the Contract Act which applies to express as well as implied promises, or under the general law based on privity of estate. It will thus be seen that the majority judgment in Kailash Chandra's case, AIR 1925 Cal 1056 (FB) was based mainly on the reasoning that the liability of all the tenants on whom the rights have devolved is by privity of estate and responsibility of each of such tenants and therefore, they may be sued. The reasoning was that each of the tenants was entitled to possession of every part of the estate and thus there was privity between him and the landlord in the whole of the lease-hold. This reasoning is obviously distinguishable. The majority assumes that as one of the tenants has a privity with the landlord for the whole of the estate it is not necessary to implead all of them. The other two judges did not accept this view. Reference to Section 43 of the Contract Act was only in the nature of obiter and was not necessary because if as the majority held that there was a privity of estate there is a case which especially falls in the category of joint promisor and joint and several liability accrues. The question whether Section 43 of the Contract Act applies to the case of co-heirs of a deceased did not arise in that case. I have already given my reasons to show why it is not possible for me to agree with the reasoning given in Mawaji Ramji's case, AIR 1967 Orissa 158 which supported Chandra Bhan's case, AIR 1955 Raj 11. In these two cases Kailash Chandra's case, AIR 1925 Cal 1056 (FB) was relied on. In my view the facts in the Full Bench case cannot be held to come to a finding that Section 43 of the Contract Act applies to the co-heirs of a deceased.

    9. I may mention that Shaik Sahed's case, (AIR 1917 Cal 829) was referred to in D.N Dutt v. The Income-tax Investigation Commission, (AIR 1960 SC 1317). Though it is true that this case was held not applicable to the facts of the case but it is however to be noted that the Supreme Court did not indicate that it was wrongly decided. I may also notice that in the earlier Calcutta case i.e Siba Krishna Sinha Sharma v. Jagat Chandra Talukdar, (1918) 45 Ind Cas 732 : (AIR 1918 Cal 145 (2)). Woodroffe, J., held that a landlord cannot maintain a suit for arrears of rent against one of several heirs of a deceased tenant without joining the others as defendants and Section 43 of the Contract Act has no applicability to such a case.

    10. My view finds support from the decision in Gurdas Mal v. Kashi Ram, AIR 1921 Lah 160 (2) where it was held that where three persons were sued jointly as representing the estate of their late father, and their liability, if any, was joint and indivisible, and during the pendency of appeal by the plaintiff one of the defendants died but plaintiff did not apply for nearly two years to bring his legal representatives on the record, the appeal abated inasmuch as the right to sue did not survive only against the two defendants alone.

    11. Same view was expressed in Hazara Singh v. Narinjan Singh, AIR 1929 Lah 783 by a Division Bench consisting of Shadir Lal, C.J and Hilton, J., where it was held that Section 43 applies only where two or more persons have made a joint promise and not where two or more persons have become jointly interested by inheritance in a contract made by a single person.

    12. As a result of above discussion it has to be held that defendant No. 2 was a necessary party to the suit and the suit would not have been maintainable had he not been impleaded. He was, therefore, correctly impleaded in the first instance. In a case where one or more defendants die and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendants alone and where within the time limited by law, legal representatives of the deceased defendant have not been made a party to the suit, the suit shall abate as against the deceased defendant as provided in Order 22, Rule 4 of the CPC. As no legal representative of deceased defendant No. 2 has been brought on record the consequence is that the suit must be held to have abated as against deceased defendant No. 2. Now the question is that whether it can be held that this can be partial abatement or total abatement. In my view it can not be held that the suit has only partially abated. This is because the consequence of a suit having been dismissed against defendant No. 2 is that he is not held liable for any amount which may he due from the deceased father because of the dismissal of the suit. If the suit is allowed to proceed against defendants 1 and 3 and a decree is passed for the entire amount they will not be in a position to sue for contribution as provided in Section 43 of the Contract Act in a subsequent suit because of the decision in the present suit by which the claim against defendant No. 2 and his legal representatives has been dismissed. This position must follow, because it is well settled that the Court would not countenance a situation where two contradictory decrees could be passed. In such a situation to hold that proceedings can continue against defendants 1 and 3 would really be as was stated in Kedar Nath's case (AIR 1961 Punj 555) in similar situation, to lead to an unfair situation for them inasmuch as they would be deprived of the right of contribution against the legal representatives of defendant No. 2. They would thus not be in a position to have the contribution which is condition precedent to the applicability of Section 43 of the Contract Act. This also shows that Section 43 cannot be held applicable.

    13. It is indeed surprising that though the information of the death of defendant No. 2 was available to the plaintiff within a week of his death as is clear from the proceedings before the commissioner yet no steps have been taken in order to bring the legal representatives on record. No reason has been suggested as to why even when the knowledge of death of defendant No. 2 was with the plaintiff the legal representatives were not brought on record. The suit originally framed was definitely on the allegation that all the sons i.e, defendants Nos. 1 to 3 are liable for the debt jointly due from them from the property inherited by them.

    14. Having definitely taken a stand that the sons are jointly liable it does look anomalous and strange that a complete reversal of the position is being now taken by contending that the liability of each son is a separate one. Such a position, however, is not maintainable in law as discussed by me above.

    15. As a result of the above discussion it has to be held that the suit has totally abated and is, therefore, dismissed as such. But in view of the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.

    16. Suit dismissed.

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    Comments

    Devi Dayal v. Bhupinder Kumar
    (Sep 4, 1972)