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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • — Mr. Madan Bhatia, Advocate.
  • — Mr. B. D. Dhawan, Advocate.
Judges
  • Mr. Justice V.S. Deshpande
Acts
  • SECTION 39 DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT 1958
  • Section 9 (4). The Rent Control Tribunal Shri P. S. Pattar
  • provisions of Section 6. Though Section 9 (2)
  • Section 23 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • Section 6 (B) (2) (b) read with Section 9 (2)
  • SECTION 45 A EVIDENCE ACT
  • provisions of Section 6 (B) (2) (b)
  • Section 6 and Section 9 (4)
  • Section 6 (B) (2) (b)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • — Mr. Madan Bhatia, Advocate.
  • — Mr. B. D. Dhawan, Advocate.
Judges
  • Mr. Justice V.S. Deshpande
Acts
  • SECTION 39 DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT 1958
  • Section 9 (4). The Rent Control Tribunal Shri P. S. Pattar
  • provisions of Section 6. Though Section 9 (2)
  • Section 23 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • Section 6 (B) (2) (b) read with Section 9 (2)
  • SECTION 45 A EVIDENCE ACT
  • provisions of Section 6 (B) (2) (b)
  • Section 6 and Section 9 (4)
  • Section 6 (B) (2) (b)
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — V.S. Deshpande, J. (Oral)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a second appeal filed by the appellant landlord under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, challenging an order of the Rent Control Tribunal which confirmed, with some modification, the determination of the standard rent for premises occupied by the respondent-tenant.

Relevant procedural history and factual findings as recorded in the opinion:

  • The premises were leased by the landlord to the tenant on 14 May 1956. The tenant applied under Section 9(1) of the Act for fixation of the standard rent.
  • Shri Shiv Charan Dass Bajaj, Additional Controller, initially considered it was not possible to determine standard rent under Section 6 and fixed the rent under Section 9(4).
  • The Rent Control Tribunal (Shri P. S. Pattar) remanded the case for a fresh determination, indicating parties should be given opportunity to produce evidence for determination under Section 6.
  • Additional Controller Shri P. C. Saini then proceeded to determine the standard rent under Section 6. He found (on the evidence accepted) that construction was in 1943-44 (electric connection in 1944). No direct evidence was available of the actual cost of construction or market price of the land for that period.
  • The only documentary building-rate evidence available were CPWD schedules for 1935 and 1950. AW1 (Jugal Kishore) used the 1950 schedule to assess the superstructure cost at Rs. 1,440. The Controller used an assessed land component (derived from a divided CPWD-related figure) of Rs. 1,620, giving a total of Rs. 3,200 and calculating standard rent at 7½% = Rs. 240 per annum (Rs. 20 per month).
  • The Rent Control Tribunal (Shri C. G. Suri) accepted the Controller's basis but modified details, fixing standard rent at Rs. 23 per month.
  • This appeal raises whether the Controller and Tribunal correctly applied Section 6(B)(2)(b) and Sections 9(2) and 9(4) of the Act in determining the standard rent, and whether inadmissible evidence was relied upon.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the correct construction of Section 6(B)(2)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act as read with Section 9(2) and Section 9(4), particularly regarding the determination of "reasonable cost of construction" and "the market price of the land comprised in the premises on the date of the commencement of the construction"?
  2. What is the nature and quality of evidence required to determine the cost of construction and the market value of land for the purposes of Section 6(B)(2)(b)?
  3. When is it appropriate to abandon attempts to fix standard rent under Section 6 and instead apply the alternative criteria in Section 9(4)?
  4. Whether expert opinion evidence (architects' estimates) lacking primary factual foundation is admissible to prove the cost of construction or market value of land for the relevant period.

Arguments of the Parties

Landlord's Arguments (as recorded)

  • Learned counsel for the landlord (Shri Madan Bhatia) pointed out that there was evidence on the record that could be used for a Section 9(4) determination: two judgments/orders fixing standard rent of shops in the vicinity (Ex. AW 8/2 and Ex. RZ/1).
  • He argued that, if parties and lower courts had correctly construed Section 6, they would have attempted to obtain definitive evidence of prices and market values; because they did not, parties should be given an opportunity to adduce such evidence now.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of opposing party (tenant) arguments in any comparable form; therefore no separate summary of tenant submissions is provided.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Said-ud-Din v. Mahabir Singh, C.W. 600 of 1970 (decided 27-11-70) Illustration of the distinction between a primary finding of fact and a secondary inference drawn from primary facts (used to explain difference between "cost of construction" and "reasonable cost of construction"). The court invoked this authority to support the proposition that "cost of construction" is a primary factual matter to be proved by evidence, while "reasonable cost" is an inference from such primary facts; thus controllers must seek primary evidence before drawing inferences.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a statutory construction and evidence-law analysis, proceeding step by step from the language of the Act to evidentiary requirements and the consequences of admitting inadequate evidence:

  1. Interpretation of Section 9(2): The phrase "having regard to the provisions of section 6" requires the Controller to take Section 6(B)(2)(b) into account and to be satisfied that an amount arrived at in accordance with Section 6(B)(2)(b) is reasonable before fixing it as standard rent.
  2. Content of Section 6(B)(2)(b): The two constituent criteria are (a) the reasonable cost of construction (ascertained as at the date of commencement of construction) and (b) the market price of the land comprised in the premises on that date. These are factual matters to be proved.
  3. What "reasonable cost of construction" means: Ordinarily the Controller is bound to ascertain the actual cost of construction. Only if the actual cost is shown to be unreasonable (for instance through evidence of inflated payments or other anomalies) can the Controller determine a different "reasonable" cost. Thus the adjective "reasonable" does not relieve the Controller of attempting to find the actual cost.
  4. Evidentiary burden and types of acceptable evidence: The best evidence of actual construction cost lies in direct documentary proof (account books, cheques, receipts). If such evidence is unavailable (often because the construction is old or the landlord did not construct the premises), the next-best evidence is proof of prices of materials and wages on the relevant date or period — possibly by reference to construction of other premises in the same locality during that period — so that a reasonable inference of cost can be drawn.
  5. On the admissibility of CPWD schedule rates: The CPWD schedules (1935 and 1950) might be a useful guide for the year in which they were issued, but they cannot be used to infer costs for a different year (1943-44 in this case) unless there is an index or other data establishing how to translate rates from one year to another. Absent such an index, using CPWD rates of a different year to calculate a historic cost involves impermissible conjecture.
  6. On expert opinion evidence: Architects produced estimates of 1943-44 costs based on CPWD rates of other years. The court emphasized that under Section 45 of the Evidence Act, opinion evidence is admissible only on specified points and cannot substitute for primary factual proof. Experts cannot, without primary data about prices and wages of the relevant period, legitimately give admissible opinions as to the cost of construction for that period. Their statements were therefore treated as inadmissible opinion evidence where no primary factual foundation existed.
  7. Market value of land: The best evidence of market price is a purchase of the land immediately before construction; if not available, sale deeds of similarly situated land executed about the date of construction constitute the next-best evidence. Architect opinions on historical land market value without primary data are inadmissible.
  8. Proper meaning of "where for any reason it is not possible" (Section 9(4)): The court held that this phrase must be understood reasonably. It does not mean a controller must attempt Section 6 by any means (including reliance on inadmissible evidence). Rather, Section 9(4) applies when a reasonable attempt to comply with Section 6 fails because the required primary evidence is not available or admissible. If admissible and relevant primary evidence is absent so that a reasonable conclusion under Section 6 cannot be drawn, the Controller may then resort to Section 9(4).
  9. Application to the case facts: The court found that neither the primary documentary method nor the next-best method (period-specific price/wage evidence or contemporaneous comparable constructions/sales) had been properly followed. The lower authorities had accepted architects' opinions and CPWD rates from other years without proper foundational evidence or an index to translate rates, thereby admitting inadmissible evidence and drawing conclusions unsupported by relevant proof.
  10. Remedy chosen: Because parties and lower courts had not been apprised of the correct construction of Section 6 and thus had not attempted to obtain the appropriate primary or period-specific evidence, the court found it necessary to give the parties an opportunity to adduce such evidence. The court remanded the matter to the Additional Controller with directions to permit fresh evidence directed to the prices of materials, wages and fees for the period of construction and the market value of the land at the relevant date, and to determine standard rent under Section 6(B)(2)(b) if possible, otherwise under Section 9(4).

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): APPEAL ALLOWED; the orders of the Additional Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal are set aside; the application for fixation of the standard rent is remanded to the Additional Controller for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Directions and immediate consequences stated in the opinion:

  • The Additional Controller shall give parties an opportunity to adduce evidence of the prices of building materials, wages of labourers and fees payable to architects etc. during the period in which the premises were constructed and of the market value of the land comprised in the premises on the date of construction.
  • After receiving such evidence, the Additional Controller shall first attempt to determine the standard rent under Section 6(B)(2)(b); if this is not reasonably possible, the Controller shall determine the standard rent under Section 9(4).
  • In the circumstances, parties shall bear their own costs.
  • Parties were directed to appear before the Court of Additional Controller on 15-9-1971 (as recorded in the opinion).

Broader implications (as explained in the opinion):

  • The opinion clarifies the evidentiary standard required to determine "cost of construction" and "market price of land" under Section 6(B)(2)(b): these are primary factual matters which must be proved by relevant and admissible evidence under ordinary rules of evidence, not by expert conjecture or by translating rates from other years without proper indexation or foundation.
  • Expert opinion evidence (architects' estimates) lacking primary facts about prices and wages for the relevant period is inadmissible to establish these primary facts for the purpose of Section 6.
  • Section 9(4) is an alternative only when a reasonable attempt to satisfy Section 6's criteria by admissible evidence fails; it is not to be rendered redundant by accepting speculative or inadmissible evidence for Section 6.

The opinion does not state that a new legal rule or binding precedent beyond the court's interpretative application in this case is being created; the immediate practical effect is the remand and the directives listed above.

Show full summary ...

    Dewan Chand v. Tirath Ram

    V.S Deshpande, J. (Oral):— This second appeal by the appellant landlord is filed under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, hereinafter called the Act, against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal confirming with some modification the determination of the standard rent for the premises occupied by the respondent-tenant.

    The premises were leased by the landlord to the tenant on the 14th of May, 1956. The application of the tenant for the fixation of the standard rent was made under Section 9 (1) of the Act. Section 9 (2) of the Act requires that “in fixing the standard rent of any premises, the Controller shall fix an amount which appears to him to be reasonable having regard to the provisions of section 6 and the circumstances of the case.” As the premises were a shop, the standard rent thereof had to be determined according to the criteria laid down in Section 6 (B) (2) (b) of the Act i.e “calculated on the basis of 7½ per cent per annum, of the aggregate amount of the reasonable cost of construction and the market price of the land comprised in the premises on the date of the commencement of the construction.” This is the rule to be followed by the Controller in the first instance. If, however, this rule cannot be followed, then an alternative rule is laid down in Section 9 (4) in the following words: —
    “9 (4): Where for any reason it is not possible to determine the standard rent of any premises on the principles set forth under Section 6, the Controller may fix such rent as would be reasonable having regard to the situation, locality and condition of the premises and the amenities provided therein and where there are similar or nearly similar premises in the locality, having regard also to the standard rent payable in respect of such premises.”
    Shri Shiv Charan Dass Bajaj, Additional Controller who first dealt with the application was of the view that it was not possible to determine the standard rent of these premises under Section 6 of the Act in the absence of sufficient evidence and, therefore, he determined the standard rent under Section 9 (4). The Rent Control Tribunal Shri P. S. Pattar was, however, of the view that even if evidence was not sufficient for determining the standard rent under Section 6, a further opportunity should be given to the parties to produce such evidence. He, therefore, remanded the case for a fresh determination of the standard rent. The order of remand seems to have created the impression that the rent must be determined under Section 6 of the Act. The Additional Controller Shri P. C. Saini, therefore, proceeded to do so. He found that the construction of the premises commenced before 5-11-42 and the electric connection to the building was given in 1944. Accepting the evidence of' Ramesh Chander, RW 4 he held that the building was constructed in 1943-44. There was no evidence about the cost of construction of this particular building. Nor was there any evidence as to what was the cost of construction of such a building in the year 1943-44. The only evidence was that of the schedule of the rates of building work issued by the Central Public Works Department in two years, namely, 1935 and 1950. The Controller thought that the rates of 1935 were too low as compared with the prices prevailing in 1943-44 and that the rates of 1950 could serve as a better guide. He, therefore, accepted the assessment of Rs. 1,440/- made by AW 1 Jugal Kishore on the basis of the schedule of rates of the Central Public Works Department for the year 1950, as to the cost of construction of the super structure of the premises as correct.
    No evidence was available regarding the market price of the land comprising the premises for the year 1943-44 or 1942-43. Phool Chand, RW 4 purported to assess it at the rate of Rs. 240 per square yard on the basis of the market price of 1947. The Controller observed that this assessment appears to be without any basis. He nevertheless thought that the premises being a part of a three storeyed building, the rate of Rs. 250 per square yard, if divided by three, gave a rate of Rs. 80 per square yard for the land comprising the premises which consisted of a shop on the ground floor. The Controller, therefore, calculated the cost of the super structure to be Rs. 1,440, that of the land to be Rs. 1,620 and thus the round total to be Rs. 3,200. He worked out the standard rent to be Rs. 20 per month, that is, Rs. 240 per annum which was 7½ per cent of the above total. The Rent Control Tribunal Shri C. G. Suri accepted the basis on which the Controller had proceeded but modified some details of his reasoning and varied the standard rent to Rs. 23 per month.
    The second appeal lies only on a “substantial question of law”. If the basis on which the Controller and the Tribunal have proceeded is held to be in accordance with Section 6 then this court would have no jurisdiction to question the finding of the Tribunal in as much as it is not for me to reappreciate the evidence. Unfortunately, the Controller as well as the Tribunal have proceeded on an entirely wrong view of Section 6 (B) (2) (b) of the Act and I am, therefore, constrained to interfere. The true construction of Section 6 (B) (2) (b) read with Section 9 (2) on the one hand and with Section 9 (4) on the other hand, according to me, is as follows: —
    The primary rule laid down by Section 9 (2) is that the Controller has to fit the standard rent at an amount which appears to him to be reasonable having regard to the provisions of section 6. The expression “having regard to” means that the Controller must take into account the provisions of Section 6 (B) (2) (b) in fixing the standard rent and must be satisfied that the amount arrived at in accordance with Section 6 (B) (2) (b) is a reasonable one before he can fix it as the standard rent. The criteria laid down by Section 6 (B) (2) (b) are two-fold, namely, (a) the reasonable cost of construction may be due to various reasons. For instance, in the premises, the latter being ascertained as on the date of the commencement of the construction of the premises. What is the meaning of “reasonable cost of construction” ? In my view, the Controller is bound to ascertain normally, the actual cost of construction of the premises. It is only if it is found that the actual cost of construction is unreasonable that the Controller has to determine the reasonable cost of construction. The unreasonableness of the actual cost of construction may be due to various reasons. For instance, certain materials available at a lower rate of prices may have been purchased or shown to have been purchased at a higher rate of price without justification. Or the building contractor or the architect may have been paid consideration higher than reasonable consideration for constructing the premises without justification. It would be a very exceptional case and a very difficult job to show that the actual cost of construction is not a reasonable one. Therefore, in the vast majority of cases the actual cost of construction would furnish the basis on which the Controller can act. The use of the adjective “reasonable” to qualify the cost of construction does not, however, mean that the Controller does not, have to find or attempt to find the actual cost of construction at all. It does not mean that the Controller may determine what was the reasonable cost of construction of the premises without any reference to what was the actual cost of construction. The word “reasonable” does not mean what is reasonable in the subjective opinion of the Controller. The opinion of the Controller as to what is the reasonable amount to be fixed as standard rent under Section 9 (2) and what is the reasonable cost of construction under Section 6 (B) (2) (b) is ordinarily to be based on the actual cost of construction unless the Controller can justify departure from the actual cost of construction for some special reasons as are envisaged above.
    The expression “cost of construction” denotes the actual expenditure incurred in constructing the premises. Normally, the information as to such expenditure is in the special knowledge of the landlord if he has constructed the premises or is within the special knowledge of some predecessor of the landlord who may have constructed them. It is, therefore, the duty of the landlord, if he has constructed the premises, to produce the direct evidence about the cost of construction consisting of entries of the expenditure in his account books or cheques or other receipts showing the various amounts paid by him for the purchase of the materials and for the wages and fees of persons employed in the construction. If such direct evidence is not available either because the construction is an old one or because the landlord has himself not constructed the premises, then it would be difficult to prove the actual expenditure incurred for the construction of the particular premises. The next best course then would be to determine the date or the period in which the premises were constructed and to give evidence of the prices of the building materials used in the premises and of the wages and fees payable to the persons employed in such construction work on the relevant date or during the relevant period. Such evidence may relate to the construction of other premises in the locality or the township but it must relate to the period during which the premises were constructed. It could then be said that the cost of construction during that period being proved by evidence the Controller would be justified in holding that the cost of construction of the premises during the same period of time in the same locality and under the same circumstances must be the same.
    In the present case, none of these two methods for determining the cost of construction has been followed. For, the evidence available was neither in respect of premises constructed during 1943-44 in the locality or town in which the premises are situated. The evidence was quite different, namely, consisting of the Central Public Works Department schedule of building rates for the years 1935 and 1950. Presumably the C.P.W.D rates form the basis on which quotations are invited by the C.P.W.D for Government construction work from the building contractors. If so, the persons who formulated these rates must have taken into account the current cost of construction. Therefore, these rates, if properly proved, would be a good guide to the cost of construction prevalent in the year in which these rates are issued for the type of construction to which they relate. It is not known if no such rates were issued by the C.P.W.D for the year in which the premises were constructed. In fact, we do not know definitely the date or the year of the construction of the premises at all. Nor is there any index available by which the cost of construction of a particular year can be found out by adding to or substracting from the C.P.W.D rates for a different year. For instance, the cost of living of a particular year may be found by deducting from or adding to the cost of living worked out for a basic year in accordance with the cost of living index. Such a use of the C.P.W.D rates is not possible in the absence of a similar cost of construction index relating to the C.P.W.D rates.
    The architects examined by the parties have purported to give their opinions as to the cost of construction of the premises in 1943-44. For instance. Jugal Kishore, AW 1, based his estimate of the cost of construction of the premises in 1943-44 on the schedule of rates of C.P.W.D for the year 1950, while Gian Chand, AW 7, based his estimate of the cost of construction of the premises in 1943-44 on the C.P.W.D rates of 1935. He is said to have added an amount equal to 170 per cent to the cost of construction in 1935 to arrive at the cost of construction in 1943-44. But there was absolutely no basis to determine the cost of construction of 1943-44 on the basis of the C.P.W.D rates of 1935 unless it is established by the maintenance of a cost of construction index that the rise in the cost of construction from 1935 to 1943 was 170 per cent. The cost of construction is a fact which is to be proved like any other fact. It consists of the actual prices of building materials and the rates of wages and fees payable for the construction of a building on a particular date or during a period of time. It is not a question of opinion at all. The architects may be experts for the purpose of designing and building houses, but they are not experts for the purpose of giving opinion as to what would be the cost of construction in a particular year without any data about the prices of materials and wages prevalent in that particular year. Under Section 45 of the Evidence Act, the points on which the opinion of experts is relevant are enumerated. Opinion evidence is not admissible outside that enumeration. The difference between “cost of construction” and “reasonable cost of construction” is the same as the difference between a primary finding of fact and a secondary finding of fact which consists of an inference drawn from the primary facts. This latter distinction is discussed in Said-ud-Din v. Mahabir Singh and other, C.W 600 of 1970, decided on 27-11-70 (1) by me. But the inference by the Controller as to what cost of construction is reasonable is not a matter of opinion but only of an inference from proved primary facts. As the architects did not have any primary evidence about the prices of materials and the wages prevalent in 1943-44, they could not draw any inference from them about the cost of construction of 1943-44. Their evidence was, therefore, irrelevant and inadmissible being only opinion on points on which opinion evidence was not admissible.
    The cost of construction under Section 6 (B) (2) (b) has, therefore, to be proved by definitive evidence. It cannot be arrived at by guesses and conjectures. If no evidence of the prices of the materials and wages prevalent at the time of the construction of the premises is available and no cost of construction index is available to infer the cost of construction of the year in question from the date relating to the cost of construction in another year then it would not be possible for the Controller to determine what amount would be reasonable to be fixed as standard rent having regard to the provisions of Section 6. Though Section 9 (2) requires that the Controller should first attempt to fix the standard rent under Section 6, the Legislature also contemplates that it may not be possible to fix the standard rent under Section 6. This is why Section 9 (4) provides an alternative basis for the fixation of the standard rent “where for any reason it is not possible to determine the standard rent under Section 6.” The very fact that the Legislature has provided an alternative basis in Section 9 (4) supports the view taken by me above that the determination of the standard rent under Section 6 has to be made on definitive evidence of prices of materials, wages and market value of the land of the relevant period and not by far-fetched conjectures. The meaning of the words “where it is not possible” must be understood properly to avoid confusion of thought. On the one hand, the Controller may be obsessed with the idea that he must anyhow fix the standard rent under Section 6. He may then go to the length of accepting even inadmissible evidence for this purpose as was done in the present case. For instance, a mere surmise can be drawn about the cost of construction and the market value of the land in a particular year from evidence available for a different year though there may not be any scientific co-relation between the prices of materials, wages and the market value prevalent during these two years as was done in this case. This could not be the meaning of the word “possible”. In such a far-fetched sense it would be always possible to fix the standard rent under Section 6 and Section 9 (4) to become a dead letter. There would be no possibility of the Controller ever fixing the standard rent under Section 9 (4). If the Legislature had contemplated that the standard rent must be fixed under Section 6 whether proper evidence is available or not then it would not have provided for the alternative method of fixing the standard rent under Section 9 (4). Therefore, the proper way to understand the words “where it is not possible” is by giving them a reasonable interpretation. The possibility is not a mere physical possibility but a reasonable possibility, that is to say, it would be possible to fix the standard rent under Section 6 if a reasonable conclusion as to standard rent could be arrived at according to the criteria laid down in Section 6. It is essential that these criteria such as the cost of construction of the premises and the market value of the land must be proved according to the ordinary rules of evidence under the Evidence Act. These criteria are questions of fact which must be proved by relevant and admissible evidence. If such evidence is not admissible, the conclusion would be that it is not possible to prove compliance with these criteria under Section 6. It would then be said that it is not possible to fix the standard rent under Section 6 and the Controller would have to take resort to the alternative criteria laid down in Section 9 (4).
    The second constituent of the standard rent under Section 6 (B) (2) (b) is the market price of the land comprising the premises. The best evidence of the market price would be available if the land under the premises is bought immediately before the construction of the premises. That would be a literal compliance to the following words of Section 6 (B) (2) (b), namely, “the market price of the land comprised in the premises on the date of the commencement of the construction”. But it would be a rare case in which such evidence would be available. The next best evidence would be in the form of sale deeds of similarly situated land in the neighbourhood executed on or about the date of the construction of the premises. This is how, for instance, the market price of a piece of land is found for the purpose of pre-emption or to determine the amount of compensation for the acquisition of the land in accordance with the very first requirement specified in Section 23 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. In the present case there is absolutely no evidence as to what was the market value of the land comprised in the premises or of similarly situated land in the year of the construction of the premises. The architects have purported to give their opinions about such market values. These opinions are inadmissible in evidence just as such opinions were inadmissible in evidence to determine the cost of construction.
    As the lower courts failed to construe the words “cost of construction” and “the market price of the land comprised in the premises” used in Section 6 (B) (2) (b) correctly, they allowed inadmissible evidence to become the basis of their findings as to the standard rent. The result is that their findings are without any evidence and are vitiated by a wrong approach to the determination of the standard rent under Section 6. They are, therefore, set aside.
    Shri Madan Bhatia, learned counsel for the landlord has drawn my attention to the fact that evidence is available on the record for the determination of the standard rent under Section 9 (4) apart from the “situation, locality and condition of the premises”. Two judgments are on record fixing the standard rent of shops in the vicinity of the premises. One is the order of the Controller, Ex. AW 8/2, and the other is Ex. RZ/1. If the parties and the learned lower courts had been aware of the correct construction of Section 6 they would have attempted to obtain evidence of the prices of building materials and wages and of market value of land in the year of the construction of the premises. It is because they were not so aware that they did not attempt to do so. It is only when such an attempt is made but seems to be unsuccessful that it can be said within meaning of Section 9 (4) that “it is not possible to determine the standard rent under Section 6.” Before arriving at such a conclusion, therefore, it is necessary once again to give the parties an opportunity to adduce evidence of the prices of building materials and wages and of market value of land during the period in which the house was constructed. If such evidence is found not to be available then only resort could be taken to Section 9 (4) to determine the standard rent. As a rule, a remand should be avoided as it delays the final decision of the case. I would have been glad, therefore, to determine the standard rent myself under Section 9 (4). I refrain from doing so, however, as it would only be fair that the parties should have one opportunity of adducing evidence of the prices of the building materials and wages and of market value of land during the period of construction of the premises. They do not seem to have been aware of the necessity of doing so in the past.
    The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The orders of the Additional Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal are set aside and the application for the fixation of the standard rent is remanded back to the Additional Controller who will give an opportunity to the parties to adduce the evidence of the prices of building materials, wages of labourers and fees payable to architects etc. during the period in which premises were constructed and of the market value of the land comprised in the premises on the date of the construction thereof and then proceed to determine the standard rent under Section 6 (B) (2) (b) and if this is not possible then under Section 9 (4). In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs.
    Parties to appear before the Court of Additional Controller on 15-9-1971.
    Appeal allowed.
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    Comments

    Dewan Chand v. Tirath Ram
    (Aug 23, 1971)