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Judgment Summary — Food Corporation of India matter (Judgment by Sri N. Paul Vasanthakumar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioners worked in the Food Corporation of India (FCI), entering as Assistant Grade III and being promoted to Assistant Grade I in 1977–78. A junior, Rajan C. Abraham, was promoted to Assistant Grade I in 1985. After a wage revision effective 1 February 1992, Rajan C. Abraham was placed on a higher pay scale, and with effect from 2 January 1993 he received higher pay than several seniors. Seniors in the Kerala region sought rectification by stepping up their pay on par with Rajan C. Abraham. FCI initially applied Circular No. 13 dated 9 July 1997 to step up pay for those seniors but later cancelled that order and ordered recovery of the enhanced pay.

A group of seniors in Kerala challenged the cancellation in O.P No. 13651 of 2001 before the Kerala High Court; the Single Judge allowed the petition on 20 October 2003. The Corporation appealed in W.A No. 293 of 2004; the Division Bench dismissed the appeal on 2 June 2005, upholding entitlement to stepping up. The Corporation filed S.L.P No. 20319 of 2005 in the Supreme Court, which was dismissed, and the Corporation implemented the Kerala High Court order on 20 October 2005, restoring stepping up and paying arrears for those petitioners.

The petitioners in the present writ petition assert they are identically placed to those who obtained relief in Kerala and that their pay had also been stepped up but later cancelled and recovered by the Corporation. Some petitioners (Nos.1–16) opted for voluntary retirement in 2004 and had alleged excess pay recovered from their retirement benefits. After the Kerala and Supreme Court outcomes, the petitioners sought extension of benefits to themselves; FCI's Zonal and Headquarters correspondence considered the issue and the Law and Finance Divisions recommended extension, but the petitioners' representations were not granted, prompting this writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioners in this writ petition are similarly placed to the petitioners who obtained relief in O.P No. 13651 of 2001 before the Kerala High Court (and whose position was sustained on appeal and by the Supreme Court), and hence entitled to extension of the same relief (stepping up of pay from 2 January 1993) with consequential arrears.
  2. Whether petitioners who accepted voluntary retirement (petitioners Nos. 1–16) are precluded from maintaining this writ petition or claiming refund of amounts recovered pursuant to cancellation of stepping up.
  3. Whether the respondents' recovery of allegedly excess pay (after having earlier sanctioned higher pay) is sustainable where petitioners did not misrepresent facts leading to the grant of higher pay.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners are identically/similarly placed to the petitioners who secured the Kerala High Court order and subsequent confirmation; therefore they are entitled to the same relief — stepping up of pay on par with Rajan C. Abraham with effect from 2 January 1993 and consequential arrears.
  • The Zonal Law Division and Zonal Finance Division had advised that similarly placed persons should be extended the same benefit to avoid multiplicity of litigation; the petitioners relied on that internal legal opinion as supporting restoration.
  • The denial of benefits to the petitioners is discriminatory and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
  • Petitioners Nos.1–16, despite having taken voluntary retirement and having had amounts recovered from retirement benefits, are not claiming a new right but only refund of amounts recovered; fundamental rights cannot be waived or estopped, so voluntary retirement does not preclude these claims.
  • The respondents could not legitimately recover amounts on the ground of erroneous fixation of higher pay where petitioners had not misrepresented facts; reliance was placed on precedents holding recovery unsustainable in such circumstances.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Circular No. 13 dated 9 July 1997 was wrongly applied in granting stepping up; upon discovering the mistake the Corporation validly cancelled the earlier orders and recovered the excess amounts.
  • Petitioners Nos.1–16 who opted for voluntary retirement have accepted the retirement package and thereby foregone claims to past rights; they cannot now agitate claims for enhancement or refund, relying particularly on A.K. Bindal v. Union of India and other cases urged by the respondents' counsel.
  • The respondents relied on several precedents (cited in the judgment) to contend that acceptance of voluntary retirement or similar settlement precludes subsequent claims in respect of past entitlements.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Govind Ram Purohit v. Jagjiwan Chandra Benefit of a judicial interpretation extends to all who qualify under the rule even if they were not parties to the petition (as quoted in the judgment). The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that once a point is decided in favour of a group, similarly placed persons are entitled to the same relief without each having to file a petition.
State of Karnataka v. N. Parameshwarappa Where relief relates to revision of pay scales, similarly placed members of that class who did not approach Court are entitled to benefit; judgment extended to others similarly placed. The Court applied this principle to hold that the petitioners, being similarly placed, should be extended the benefits granted by the Kerala High Court and confirmed by higher courts.
S.A. Kanthimathi v. Director of School Education, Madras Applied in support of the proposition that recovery is unsustainable where higher pay was granted without misrepresentation by the employee (as cited by the Court). The Court cited this decision to support its conclusion that recovery of allegedly excess pay was unsustainable because petitioners had not misrepresented facts when the higher pay was granted.
Sahib Ram v. State of Haryana Holds that recovery of amounts where higher pay was granted but not obtained by misrepresentation is not sustainable (as cited by the Court). The Court relied on this authority to hold that recovery of amounts paid on stepping up, where petitioners did not misrepresent, was unsustainable.
K.C. Sharma v. Union of India Cited for the proposition that relief granted to a class should be extended to others similarly situated (judgment text quoted regarding condonation and granting similar relief). The Court invoked this decision as part of the line of authority supporting extension of benefits to similarly placed persons.
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation Principle that there can be no estoppel or waiver of fundamental rights; plea of estoppel/waiver cannot negate Art.14 rights (as summarized in the judgment). The Court applied this principle to reject the argument that voluntary retirement or acceptance of payments estopped petitioners from asserting their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16.
Basheshwar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi Authority on the question of whether fundamental rights can be waived; cited in support of no waiver of fundamental rights. The Court treated this as foundational authority that fundamental rights (including equality under Art.14) cannot be waived, and relied on it in rejecting estoppel/waiver arguments.
Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India Holds that mere acceptance of retrenchment compensation does not mean surrender of constitutional rights; fundamental rights cannot be bartered away. The Court relied on this to support its conclusion that acceptance of retirement benefits did not bar petitioners from invoking fundamental rights to challenge discriminatory denial of benefits.
S. Pappa v. Government of Tamil Nadu Illustrates application of the principle that acceptance of consolidated pay under an agreement does not necessarily bar challenge to validity of a Government order concerning entitlements (as followed by the Court). The Court cited this Court's prior decision as consistent with the view that constitutional challenges may survive acceptance of certain payments.
A.K. Bindal v. Union of India Quoted by respondents to support the proposition that an employee who accepted voluntary retirement under a package cannot later agitate past rights; Supreme Court held that acceptance of package may bar raising past claims. The Court considered this decision but held that the present petitioners' case differed: petitioners sought refund of amounts recovered and invoked fundamental rights; the Court found no substance in the respondents' reliance on this authority to deny maintainability.
Harpal Kaur Chahal v. Director, Punjab Instructions The opinion records this case as relied upon by the Additional Advocate-General; the judgment text does not summarize the specific principle from this case. The Court noted it was relied upon by the respondents' counsel; the judgment does not record a specific application of this authority to the facts and the Court did not adopt it as decisive here.
Union of India v. J.V. Subhaiah Listed by the Additional Advocate-General in support of the respondents' position; the judgment text does not set out the principle in detail here. The Court observed that the decisions relied upon by the respondents (including this one) had no application to the facts of the present case, because the matter was already considered and rejected earlier by the Kerala High Court and the Supreme Court.
State of Karnataka v. G. Halappa Cited by the Additional Advocate-General; the judgment text does not elaborate the principle here. The Court held that this decision had no application to the facts of the present case for reasons discussed in the judgment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by identifying the central point for consideration: whether the petitioners before this Court are similarly placed as the petitioners who obtained relief in O.P No. 13651 of 2001 (Kerala High Court) and whose entitlement to stepping up of pay was sustained by the Division Bench and left intact by the Supreme Court.

1. The petitioners' affidavits uniformly averred that they were similarly placed and that their pay had been stepped up from 2 January 1993 and later cancelled with recovery ordered. The respondents' counter-affidavit did not deny similarity; it only advanced the general contention that neither group was entitled to stepping up under Circular No.13 dated 9 July 1997.

2. The Court examined the Kerala High Court Single Judge's reasoning and the Division Bench's observations: the Division Bench had upheld the grant of higher salary as valid and held cancellation unjustified. The Supreme Court dismissed the S.L.P filed by the Corporation. The Corporation thereafter restored stepping up and refixed pay for 24 petitioners pursuant to the Kerala High Court order implementation on 20 October 2005.

3. The Court noted documentary material (Zonal office letters, legal division opinion and finance concurrence) showing that the Corporation's Law and Finance Divisions recommended extending similar benefits to other similarly placed persons. These internal opinions recognized the risk of multiplicity of litigation and advised extension of benefits to avoid infructuous litigation.

4. The respondents' primary counter-argument — that petitioners Nos.1–16 cannot maintain the petition because they accepted voluntary retirement and thus forewent past claims — was examined. The Court considered the A.K. Bindal precedent relied upon by the respondents (which held that an employee who accepts voluntary retirement package may be precluded from raising past claims) but distinguished or limited its applicability here. The petitioners were not seeking a new right but a refund of amounts recovered and asserted violation of fundamental rights (Arts.14 and 16).

5. The Court reaffirmed the well-settled constitutional principle (as stated in Olga Tellis and Basheshwar Nath and followed in Nar Singh Pal and S. Pappa) that there can be no estoppel or waiver against the enforcement of fundamental rights such as Article 14. Acceptance of a compensation package or retirement benefits does not necessarily extinguish the right to challenge violations of constitutional rights.

6. The Court further relied on authorities (Govind Ram Purohit, State of Karnataka v. Parameshwarappa, K.C. Sharma) establishing that when a legal point is decided in favour of a class, the benefit must be extended to others similarly placed without requiring each person to litigate separately, so as to do complete and substantial justice.

7. On the question of recovery, the Court accepted petitioners' submission (supported by Sahib Ram and S.A. Kanthimathi) that where higher pay was sanctioned and there was no misrepresentation by the employees, recovery of amounts on the ground that the pay was erroneously fixed is unsustainable.

8. On the respondents' reliance on other precedents urged to support non-entitlement (for example, Union of India v. J.V. Subhaiah, State of Karnataka v. G. Halappa and certain other decisions), the Court held those decisions had no application to the present facts because the very contention (wrong application of Circular No.13) had been fully considered and rejected in the proceedings before the Kerala High Court and thereafter before the Supreme Court.

9. Synthesizing the above, the Court concluded that the petitioners were similarly placed, that denial of the benefit was discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16, that voluntary retirement did not estop petitioners from pursuing a refund where fundamental rights were asserted, and that recovery of allegedly excess pay was unsustainable in the facts of this case.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The writ petition is allowed.

Directives and immediate consequences:

  • The respondents are directed to repay the recovered amounts and to pay arrears of pay to the petitioners within four weeks from receipt of a copy of the order.
  • No costs were awarded. The connected writ miscellaneous petition is closed. The order concludes with "Petition allowed."

Broader implications and precedent-setting: The Court applied and reiterated established constitutional principles — notably that fundamental rights (including Article 14 equality) cannot be waived or defeated by estoppel and that the benefit of a judicial decision extends to similarly placed persons even if they did not individually approach the Court. The judgment applies settled precedents to these facts; it does not purport to create a novel legal principle beyond the application of those authorities. The immediate legal effect is the repayment and restoration orders in favour of the petitioners; the Court did not announce a new precedent but applied existing holdings on equality, non-waiver of fundamental rights, and extension of benefits to similarly situated persons.

Order excerpt in the source: "Petition allowed." Respondents directed to repay recovered amount and arrears within four weeks. No costs. Connected W.P M.P closed.

    N.S. Balasubramanian v. Food Corporation Of India

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Sri N. Paul Vasanthakumar, J.:— Prayer in the writ petition is to issue a direction to the respondents to extend the benefits arising from the judgment of the Kerala High Court made in O.P No. 13651 of 2001, dated 20 October, 2003, as confirmed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in W.A No. 293 of 2004 as well as by the Supreme Court in S.L.P No. 20319 of 2005, to the petitioners, who are identically situated, by stepping up petitioner's pay on par with that of the petitioner's junior Rajan C. Abraham with effect from 2 January, 1993 with all consequential benefits including arrears of pay, etc.

    2. The brief facts necessary for disposal of the writ petition are as follows:

    (a) Petitioners entered into the services of the Food Corporation of India as Assistant Grade III and subsequently they were promoted to Grade-II and then to Grade I in the year 1977–1978. Petitioners' junior Rajan C. Abraham was promoted to Assistant Grade-I in the year 1985. Subsequent to the wage revision that took place with effect from 1 February, 1992, the said junior was paid higher pay than the petitioners with effect from 2 January, 1993. Petitioners with other seniors, who were working in the Kerala region, made representation to the Regional/Zonal/Head Office for rectification of the pay anomaly by stepping up their pay on par with that of Rajan C. Abraham. Respondent/Corporation, stepped up the pay by applying circular No. 13, dated 9 July, 1997, and removed the pay anomaly and enhanced their pay on par with that of their junior Rajan C. Abraham. The said order was erroneously cancelled by the respondent and ordered recovery of the enhanced pay.

    (b) The seniors of Kerala Region filed O.P No. 13651 of 2001 (A) before the Kerala High Court at Emakulam and challenged the cancellation of stepping up of pay and the said O.R was allowed by the learned Single Judge by order, dated 20 October, 2003. The respondent/Corporation preferred W.A No. 293 of 2004. A Division Bench of Kerala High Court dismissed the writ appeal on 2 June, 2005 and held that petitioners therein, who are seniors, are entitled for stepping up of their pay on par with that of their juniors and quashed the revision of salary. The respondent/Corporation filed S.L.P No. 20319 of 2005 before the Supreme Court and the same was also dismissed on 18 May, 2005 and thereafter the respondent/Corporation imptemented the said order on 20 October, 2005 and consequently the original order of stepping up of pay issued in favour of the seniors on par with their junior Rajan C. Abraham was restored and consequential arrears was paid.

    (c) The case of the petitioners is that they are also identically placed and their pay was also stepped up on par with their junior, viz., Rajan C. Abraham. The respondent/Corporation has chosen to cancel the order stepping up petitioners' pay and ordered recovery of excess pay allegedly drawn by the petitioners. Petitioners 1 to 16 opted for voluntary retirement in the year 2004 and their alleged excess pay was recovered in one lumpsum from their retirement benefits, ranging from Rs. 75,000 to Rs. 80,000.

    (d) Petitioners further stated that consequent to the dismissal of the S.L.P filed by the respondents, against the Kerala High Court's order, petitioners submitted representation to the respondent/Corporation seeking extension of benefits flowing from the judgment of the Kerala High Court. Petitioners also submit that some of the petitioners are seniors to those persons who preferred O.R before the Kerala High Court and the same can be ascertained from the seniority list issued on 31 December, 1992. The Zonal Office in Chennai addressed letters on 8 November, 2005, 22 November, 2005 and 7 December, 2005 to the headquarters at New Delhi and stated that the petitioners are also identically situated as that of the petitioners before the Kerala High Court and the Headquarters' advise was sought as to whether the benefit of Kerala High Court judgment could be extended to the petitioners. Seniority in the grade of Assistants Grade-I was maintained zonewise and the southern zone include four states, viz., Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, which has a Zonal office. The representation given by the petitioners having not been considered and the recovery having been made, which is contrary to the decision of the Kerala High Court referred above, petitioners have filed the present writ petition.

    3. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the claim of the petitioners is fully sustainable and the letter of the Zonal office, Chennai, dated 8 November, 2005, addressed to the Deputy General Manager, Food Corporation of India, New Delhi, after getting a legal opinion from the legal division recommended for restoration of petitioners stepping up of pay and the said recommendation is extracted hereunder:

    “The legal division has opined that when similarly placed persons are denied for want of Court order, the same benefit which were extended to the petitioners, it would lead to number of litigations and ultimately the order passed in the W.A No. 293 of 2004 and in S.L.P No. 20319 of 2005 is likely to follow and would lead to infructuous/avoidable expenditure on legal cases. Legal Division has, therefore, opined that it would be appropriate to extend similar benefit to all similarly placed persons to that of the petitioners. Zonal Finance also concurred with the above views.

    As the Headquarters has been monitoring the progress of the case from time to time and issuing directions and guidelines at the various stages right from the beginning in the case filed by Sri C. Madhavan Pillai and others, W.P No. 10651 of 2000 filed by Sri B. Gurumurthy and 8 others, W.P No. 26440 of 2001 filed by Jacob Zachariah, W.P No. 21084 of 2003 filed by Sri L.L.N Murthy and 4 others, it is felt that the head office may consider the case of non-petitioners in south zone for extension of similar benefits on par with the petitioners in O.P No. 13651 of 2001 and also to the petitioners in various writ petitions, W.P No. 10651 of 2000 filed by Sri B. Gummurthy and others, W.P No. 26440 of 2001 filed by Jacob Zachariah and W.P No. 21084 of 2003 filed by Sri L.L.N Murthy and 4 others in A.P High Court and communicate decision with regard to extension of the benefits in terms of Supreme Court in S.L.P No. 20319 of 2005 or otherwise at an early date.”

    The learned counsel therefore submitted that the legal division of the southern zone properly advised the respondent/Corporation to extend the benefits to the petitioners also and the inaction on the part of the respondent is discriminatory and in violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. Learned senior counsel cited the decisions reported in Govind Ram Purohit v. Jagjiwan Chandra, [1999 S.C.C (L & S) 788]; State of Karnataka v. N. Parameshwarappa, [(2003) 12 SCC 192]; S.A Kanthimathi v. Director of School Education, Madras, [2006 (3) L.L.N 301]; Sahib Ram v. State of Haryana, [(1995) 1 S.C.C (Supp.) 18]; and K.C Sharma v. Union of India, [1998 (2) L.L.N 69]; and submitted that the petitioners are entitled to the same benefits as they are also seniors to Rajan C. Abraham.

    4. The learned Additional Advocate-General submitted that circular No. 13, dated 9 July, 1997, was wrongly applied and the said mistake having been found, the stepping up of pay was cancelled and recovery was made. The learned counsel cited the decision reported in A.K Bindal v. Union of India, 2003 (2) L.L.N 1112, and contended that petitioners Nos. 1 to 16 having accepted for voluntary retirement, have foregone all their rights and it is not open to them to contend that they had to exercise their option under any compulsion. The learned Additional Advocate-General also relied on the decisions reported in Harpal Kaur Chahal v. Director, Punjab Instructions, Punjab, [(1995) 4 S.C.C (Supp.) 706]; Union of India v. J.V Subhaiah, [(1996) 2 SCC 258 : A.I.R 1996 S.C 2890]; and State of Karnataka v. G. Halappa, [2002 (3) L.L.N 40].

    5. I have considered the submissions of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners as well as the learned Additional Advocate-General appearing for the respondents/Corporation.

    6. The point raised for consideration in this writ petition is whether the petitioners herein are similarly placed to that of the petitioners before the Kerala High Court, who were granted relief of stepping up of their salaries on par with their junior Rajan C. Abraham with effect from 2 January, 1993.

    7. In the affidavit filed by the petitioners it is categorically stated that the petitioners are also similarly placed and their salary was also stepped up from 2 January, 1993 and subsequently the order of recovery was made by the respondents by cancelling the order of stepping up of their salary. In the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents, nowhere it is stated that the claim of the petitioners are not similar to the one of the petitioners before the Kerala High Court. The reason stated in the counter-affidavit is that the petitioners herein and the petitioners before the Kerala High Court are not entitled to stepping up of their pay as per circular No. 13, dated 9 July, 1997.

    8. The learned Additional Advocate-General appearing for the respondents stated that the Kerala High Court never declared any law and also not decided any principle. A perusal of the order of the learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court reveals that the sanction of higher salary to the petitioners therein on par with Rajan C. Abraham under Exhibit P3 is held to be in order and cancellation of the same issued under Exhibit P7 is held not justifiable. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in W.A No. 293 of 2004 considered the validity of Exhibit P3 and Exhibit P7 and held as follows:

    “…. the fact remains that Rajan C. Abraham was promoted much later than the petitioners, but he was given a higher scale of pay as Assistant Grade I, petitioners were seniors to Rajan C. Abraham and merely because Rajan C. Abraham was involved in a vigilance case, he cannot be given a higher scale than his seniors. The stepping up of pay given to the petitioners as per Exhibit P3 is correct. We fully agree with the reasoning of the learned Single Judge.”

    The S.L.P Civil No. (S) 20319 of 2005 filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by the respondents was also dismissed on 18 October, 2005. The respondents herein, pursuant to the dismissal of the S.L.P by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, implemented the order of the Kerala High Court by proceedings, dated 20 October, 2005, and the said order is extracted hereunder:

    “Food Corporation of India

    Regional Office,

    Thiruvananthapuram-4

    No. WRC/1/18/97-PF-Vol. IX

    Dated: 20 October, 2005

    PROCEEDINGS

    Sub: Judgment, dated 20 October, 2003, of Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in O.P No. 13651 of 2001 and 18 October, 2005 in S.L.P No. 20319 of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India — Fixation of Pay — Reg.

    Ref: Proceedings No. WRC/1/18/97-PF-Vol. II, dated 10 March, 2001, of SRM.FCl.Tvm

    In compliance with judgment, dated 20 October, 2003, of Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in O.P No. 13651 of 2001 stepping up of pay sanctioned on par with Sri Rajan C. Abraham, then AGI (A/cs) with effect from 2 January, 1993, which was subsequently, cancelled vide proceedings first cited, is restored and pay of 24 petitioners is refixed as detailed in the annexure enclosed. They are entitled for payment, as per refixed pay with effect from 2 January, 1993, after adjusting all payments already made to them.

    M.K Padmanabhan

    Regional Manager,

    For Sr. Regional Manager.”

    9. Some of the petitioners herein submitted a representation on 31 October, 2005 and requested to refund the amount recovered pursuant to the cancellation order, which was marked as Exhibit P7 before the High Court of Kerala in O.P No. 13651 of 2001 and prayed for restoring their pay. The Law Department of the respondents gave an opinion that when similarly placed persons are denied the benefit for want of Court order, it will lead to multiplicity of proceedings and the order passed in W.A No. 293 of 2004 by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court is likely to be followed and that would lead to infructuous/avoidable expenses for legal cases. The relevant portion of the report of the legal division is extracted hereunder:

    “… Legal Division has, therefore, opined that it would be appropriate to extend similar benefit to all similarly placed persons to that of the petitioners. Zonal finance also concurred with above views. As the headquarters has been monitoring the progress of the case from time to time and issuing directions and guidelines at the various stages right from the beginning in the case filed by Sri C. Madhavan Pillai and others, W.P No. 10651 of 2000 filed by Sri B. Gurumurthy and 8 others W.P No. 26440 of 2001 filed by Jacob Zachariah, W.P No. 21084 of 2003 filed by Sri L.L.N Murthy and 4 others, it is felt that the Head Office may consider the case of non-petitioners in south zone for extension of similar benefits on par with the petitioners in O.P No. 13651 of 2001 and also to the petitioners in various W.Ps Writ Petition No. 10651 of 2000 filed by Sri B. Gurumurthy and others No. 26440 of 2001 filed by Jacob Zachariah and No. 21084 of 2003 filed by Sri L.L.N Murthy and 4 others in A.P High Court and communicate decision with regard to extension of the benefits in terms of Supreme Court in S.L.P No. 20319 of 2005 or otherwise at an early date.”

    The finance department of the respondents/Corporation also concurred with the view expressed by the Law Department and the same is made clear in the letter, dated 22 November, 2005. The above materials reveal the undisputed fact in this case that the petitioners' claim is similar to the one decided by the Kerala High Court and in the light of the above documents available on record, it has to be ascertained as to whether the petitioners are entitled to get the relief asked for in the writ petition.

    10. The learned Additional Advocate-General appearing for the respondents argued that the petitioners 1 to 16, having submitted voluntary retirement application, they are not entitled to maintain this writ petition at this stage. In support of the said submission, the learned counsel cited the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A.K Bindal v. Union of India, [2003 (2) L.L.N 1112] (vide supra). In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the employee leaving the services of the company or industrial establishment and foregoing all his rights in a package deal of give and take, and that there is no question of his again agitating for any kind of his past rights with his erstwhile employer, including making any claim with regard to enhancement of pay-scale for an earlier period. It is further held that if the employee is still permitted to raise a grievance regarding enhancement of pay-scale from a retrospective date, even after he has opted for voluntary retirement scheme and has accepted the amount paid to him, the whole purpose of introducing the scheme would be totally frustrated.

    11. In reply to the said proposition, learned senior counsel for the petitioners argued that the petitioners 1 to 16 are not claiming any new right and their claim is only to refund the recovered amount, which was rightly sanctioned and paid by the respondents themselves. Therefore the petitioners' claim cannot be denied on the said proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court as the issue before the Supreme Court was a new claim. The learned senior counsel further argued that the petitioners before this Court as well as the petitioners before the Kerala High Court are similarly placed and their pay was stepped up on par with their junior Rajan C. Abraham and they have been paid the benefit with effect from 2 January, 1993. The learned counsel further added that once the petitioners are identically placed like the petitioners before the Kerala High Court, they are entitled to be treated equally and there cannot be any discrimination, otherwise it will be in violation of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Learned senior counsel further argued that the petitioners 1 to 16 even though went on voluntary retirement, they can still maintain this writ petition since their fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 14 and 16 are violated, because if is well-settled in law that there is no estoppel against or waiver of fundamental rights.

    12. (a) The principle that there is no estoppel against or waiver of fundamental right is well-settled in the decision reported in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, [(1985) 3 SCC 545 : A.I.R 1986 S.C 180]. In Para. 29 of the judgment, the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:

    “The plea of estoppel is closely connected with the plea of waiver, the object of both being to ensure bona fides in day-to-day transactions. In Basheshwar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi, [A.I.R 1959 S.C 149], a Constitution Bench of this Court considered the question whether the fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution can be waived. Two members of the Bench (Das, C.J, and Kapoor J.,) held that there can be no waiver of the fundamental right founded on Art. 14 of the Constitution. Two others (N.H Bhagwati and Subba Rao, JJ.) held that not only could there be no waiver of the right conferred by Art. 14, but there could be no waiver of any other fundamental right guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. The Constitution makes no distinction, according to the learned Judges, between fundamental rights enacted for the benefit of an individual and those enacted in public interest or on grounds of public policy.” Therefore, the Supreme Court rejected the objection raised by the State with regard to the estoppel and waiver pleaded against the respondents.

    (b) In Basheshwar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi (vide supra), also the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental rights. The said decision is followed in the latter judgment cited above.

    (c) In yet another judgment reported in Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India, [2000 (2) L.L.N 407], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that mere acceptance of retrenchment compensation paid to the employee does not mean that he had surrendered all his constitutional rights in favour of the respondents. It is also held that the fundamental rights cannot be bartered away and compromised nor there can be any estoppel against exercise of fundamental right available under the Constitution.

    (d) The above referred Judgments reported in Basheshwar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi (vide supra) and Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (vide supra), were followed by this Court in the decision reported in S. Pappa v. Government Of Tamil Nadu (represented by Secretary to Government), Madras, 1999 (3) L.L.N 741, and the learned Single Judge repelled the contention advanced by the State Government that the petitioners having entered into an agreement and received a consolidated pay are not entitled to challenge the validity of the Government Order.

    13. Here in this case, the claim of the petitioners are that they are entitled to be treated like similarly placed persons, who are the petitioners before the Kerala High Court and who are paid the recovered amount. In effect, the contention of the petitioners is that they shall be treated equally and if any discrimination is made on the ground that petitioners 1 to 16 have received voluntary retirement scheme benefits and therefore they are not entitled to get the recovered amount, the same will be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India.

    14. Article 14 of the Constitution of India clearly prohibits discrimination and if any, discrimination without any intelligible differential, certainly violation will be hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution of India, which is a guaranteed fundamental right available to any person. The said right being the fundamental to treat equally among equals, cannot be negatived on the plea of waiver or estoppel as rightly held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court.

    15. In the light of the above submissions and judgments, there is no substance in the arguments of the learned Additional Advocate-General appearing for the respondents that petitioners Nos. 1 to 16 are not entided to maintain the writ petition after accepting the voluntary retirement scheme.

    16. (a) The learned senior counsel for the petitioner cited the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in K.C Sharma v. Union of India, [1998 (2) L.L.N 69], wherein in Para. 6, at page 70, it is held as under:

    “Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that this was a fit case in which the Tribunal should have condoned the delay in the filing of the application and the appellants should have been given relief in the same terms as was granted by the Full Bench of the Tribunal. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is set aside, the delay in filing of O.A No. 774 of 1994 is condoned and the said application is allowed. The appellant would be entitled to the same relief in the matter of pension as has been granted by the Full Bench of the Tribunal in its judgment, dated December 16, 1993, in O.A Nos. 395 to 403 of 1993 and connected matters. No order as to costs.”

    (b) In another decision cited by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner reported in State of Karnataka v. N. Parameshwarappa (vide supra), in Paras. 8 and 9 the Supreme Court held as under:

    “8 … we do not find any reasonable justification to confine the relief to only such of the teachers who approached the Court and having regard to the fact that relief related to the revision of scales of pay, every one of that class of teachers who approached would be entitled to the benefit, notwithstanding that they have not approached the Court. We are in equal agreement with the Division Bench in denying the payment of interest at compounded rates which, in our view, cannot be justified at all on the facts and circumstances of the case wherein a serious and genuine doubt existed about the applicability of the Government order, dated 30 March, 1990, as raised in the proceedings.

    9. For all the reasons stated above, the appeals filed both by the State as well as by the private respondent-teachers fail and shall stand dismissed. Our declaration to extend the benefits of the judgments to others who have not approached the Court, but similarly placed is to do complete and substantial justice. No costs.”

    (c) In yet another decision reported in Govind Ram Purohit v. Jdgjiwan Chandra (vide supra), in Para. 3 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:

    “It was lastly contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that whereas the petition had been filed by only respondent 1, the High Court while finally concluding the matter has given a direction to promote all those who were senior to the appellants even though they were not parties to the petition. Once the High Court had placed a particular interpretation on the Rules, the benefit of that interpretation had to go to all those who qualified under the seniority-cum-merit rule. There was no point in waiting for each and every person to file a petition. Therefore, we do not see any reason why we should entertain such a technical plea when the High Court has done substantial justice to all concerned.”

    From the analysis of the judgments cited above, it is beyond doubt and clear that once the point is decided in tavour of a group of persons, there is no further point in waiting for each and every person to file petition and pray for the same relief. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the benefit of the judgment is equally applicable to similarly placed persons to do complete and substantial justice.

    17. The Law Department as well as the finance department of the respondents/Corporation considered the similarity of the issue involved and recommended to the respondents to pay the recovered amount to the petitioners as well. Hence the denial of the said benefit to the petitioners is unreasonable and violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The decisions cited by the learned Additional Advocate General reported in Union of India v. J.V Subhaiah (vide supra), and State of Karnataka v. G. Halappa, [2002 (3) L.L.N 40] (vide supra), have no application to the facts of this case because of the submission that circular No. 13, dated 9 July, 1997, was wrongly applied by the respondents while stepping up of the pay. The said contention was raised before the Kerala High Court and before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the same was not accepted. Hence it is not open to the respondents to raise the said plea in this writ petition as they were parties to the proceedings before the Kerala High Court.

    18. The last submission of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner is that even assuming without admitting that the respondents have stepped up the pay by wrong understanding of the circular as contended by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents/Corporation, petitioners have not misrepresented anything and the higher pay having been given, it is not open to the respondents to recover the same as held by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Sahib Ram v. State of Haryana (vide supra), and the decision of this Court reported in S.A Kanthimathi v. Director of School Education, Madras, [2006 (3) L.L.N 301] (vide supra). There is much force in the said contention. The learned Additional Advocate-General has no answer to the said submission. The recovery made by the respondents on the alleged ground of excess pay, even assuming it was erroneously fixed, is unsustainable in view of the fact that the petitioners never misrepresented and secured the order stepping up of their pay on par with the said Raj an C. Abraham. The above referred judgments of the Supreme Court and of this Court (decision of mine) equally apply to the facts of this case. Hence I hold all the points in favour of the petitioners and the petitioners are entitled to get refund of the recovered amount and arrears of pay.

    19. In the result, the writ petition is allowed as prayed for. The respondents are directed to repay the recovered amount and arrears of pay within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. No costs. Connected W.P M.P is closed.

    Petition allowed.

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