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AMICUS AI
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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • TAMIL NADU RECOGNISED PRIVATE SCHOOLS REGULATION ACT 1973
  • Article 14 of the Constitution of India and Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.
  • provisions of Articles 30(1). and 30(2) of the Constitution of India
  • provisions of the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973
  • Section 14(ii)(e) of the Tamil Nadu Recogpised. Private Schools Act,
  • provisions from the Act and the Rules. Section 19
  • Section 125 (Art. 309 of the Constitution of India)
  • Section 39 of the Fire Force Act, 1964 as the Act
  • ARTICLE 14 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Rule 15 as follows:Rule 15. Qualifications,
  • ARTICLE 162 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • ARTICLE 39 A CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act
  • provisions of Articles 14 and 16
  • Sub-section (3) of Section 6
  • Rule 15(6) of the Rules,
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 15
  • school.12. Section 20
  • University Act, 1978.
  • Rules. Rule 9(3)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • TAMIL NADU RECOGNISED PRIVATE SCHOOLS REGULATION ACT 1973
  • Article 14 of the Constitution of India and Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.
  • provisions of Articles 30(1). and 30(2) of the Constitution of India
  • provisions of the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973
  • Section 14(ii)(e) of the Tamil Nadu Recogpised. Private Schools Act,
  • provisions from the Act and the Rules. Section 19
  • Section 125 (Art. 309 of the Constitution of India)
  • Section 39 of the Fire Force Act, 1964 as the Act
  • ARTICLE 14 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Rule 15 as follows:Rule 15. Qualifications,
  • ARTICLE 162 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • ARTICLE 39 A CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act
  • provisions of Articles 14 and 16
  • Sub-section (3) of Section 6
  • Rule 15(6) of the Rules,
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 15
  • school.12. Section 20
  • University Act, 1978.
  • Rules. Rule 9(3)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary: Common Order (Writ Petitions concerning Secondary Grade (Junior) Teachers)

Factual and Procedural Background

Multiple writ petitions raising identical issues were consolidated and decided by a common order. The petitioners comprised Secondary Grade Teachers working in aided/private schools, teachers' associations and managers of private aided schools. They sought records and reliefs challenging a series of Government Orders issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu (including G.O.Ms. No. 1524 dated 12.11.90, G.O.Ms. No. 1669 dated 13.12.90 and subsequent related G.O.s) and consequential directions of the Director of School Education.

Factual matrix (as stated in the opinion): certain teachers were appointed in 1990 in sanctioned vacancies to the post of Secondary Grade Teacher in the regular time-scale (scale of pay Rs.1,200 p.m. fixed by Fifth Pay Commission). Subsequently, some school managements announced reduction of pay to consolidated amounts (Rs.800 p.m. or Rs.500 p.m.) and sought refund of amounts said to be paid in excess. The managements relied on a Director of School Education circular dated 14.11.90 which in turn relied on G.O.Ms. No. 1524 (Education dated 12.11.90). The G.O. created/recognised posts called Secondary Grade (Junior) on consolidated pay and directed that certain vacancies be filled on that basis.

Petitioners contended that the G.O.s effectively downgraded existing sanctioned posts and created a separate category without statutory backing, reduced pay for persons doing the same work and violated Articles 14 and 16 (and Article 39(d) was also invoked). A common counter-affidavit was filed for respondents; the Government defended the policy as intended to provide temporary contractual employment to trained but unemployed teacher-training candidates and relied on its power under the Grant-in-aid provisions and executive authority to issue such orders.

The Court heard counsel for petitioners and the Additional Advocate General for respondents and delivered this common order disposing of all the consolidated writ petitions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether G.O.Ms. No. 1524 (and consequent G.O.s) is valid insofar as it creates a new post called Secondary Grade (Junior) teacher which is not provided in the statutory cadre under the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 and the Rules framed thereunder, and whether such G.O. is ultra vires the Act and the Rules.
  2. Whether the executive (Government) can, by executive order, downgrade sanctioned regular posts and alter conditions of service (including pay) when the field is occupied by statutory rules (the doctrine of occupied field / effect of statutory rules on executive power).
  3. Whether the impugned orders are discriminatory and violative of the principles of equal pay for equal work and Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) of the Constitution.
  4. Whether G.O.Ms. No. 20 dated 8.1.93 (regularising pay from 1.9.92) and G.O.Ms. No. 365 dated 20.8.97 (regularising specialist teachers with monetary benefit from 9.4.96) are valid in respect of temporal effect of monetary benefits.
  5. Whether the Government (without amending the Rules) could down-grade posts created by executive order, and whether Section 19 read with Rule 15 prevents such downgrading.
  6. Whether agreements executed by the contract appointees (on consolidated pay) are binding where bargaining power was unequal and the agreement affects fundamental rights.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The G.O. (G.O.Ms. No. 1524 and related orders) is illegal and ultra vires the Act and Rules because it creates a post not existing in the statutory cadre.
  • The doctrine of “occupied field”: once legislature enacts conditions of service, the executive cannot displace them; the impugned order is without jurisdiction.
  • Government lacks power under the Act to issue executive instructions downgrading the post of Secondary Grade Teacher.
  • The impugned orders are discriminatory, violative of equal pay for equal work since persons with same qualifications and duties would be paid less (Rs.800) than existing time-scale holders.
  • Validity of G.O.Ms. No. 20 dated 8.1.93 (regularisation from 1.9.92) was questioned as to whether it could give regular pay irrespective of date of appointment.
  • Validity of G.O.Ms. No. 365 dated 20.8.97 concerning special teachers and monetary benefits from 9.4.96 was questioned.
  • Downgrading by executive order without amending Rules violates Section 19 and Rule 15; executive cannot alter recruitment/conditions embedded in Rules.
  • Even policy decisions must conform to Articles 14, 16 and 39; they cannot violate fundamental rights.
  • Contracts entered under economic compulsion and unequal bargaining power (poverty, unemployment) that impinge on fundamental rights are void.

Respondents' (Government) Arguments

  • No challenge was made to G.O.Ms. No. 846 dated 25.6.1990 (which created 1,200 Secondary Grade (Junior) contractual posts at Rs.800).
  • G.O.Ms. No. 1524 creates equality among the particular group appointed under that scheme and is not discriminatory.
  • There is no arbitrariness or discrimination in the Government action; restriction was for a limited period (two years) and was a policy measure to provide employment to unemployed trained candidates and raise educational standards.
  • Government has power to issue directions and regulate grant-in-aid; payment of grant may be regulated and reduced subject to conditions in the Act and Rules.
  • Teachers and managements being parties to the contractual agreements are bound by those terms and cannot challenge the Government; hence some writ petitions are not maintainable.
  • Contentions on violation of Article 39(d) are untenable according to the respondents.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
G. Rajesh v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (1995 Writ L.R. 389) When the legislative field is occupied by statute/rules, the executive cannot exercise power contrary to those statutory provisions (doctrine of occupied field). The Court applied the dictum to hold that the Government cannot downgrade statutory posts (Secondary Grade Teacher) to Secondary Grade (Junior) by executive order without amending the Rules.
K. Public Service Commission v. Narinder Mohan (AIR 1994 S.C. 1808) Executive power under Article 162 cannot supplant statutory rules; appointments must conform to statutory rules once made. Reinforced the proposition that once statutory rules govern service matters, the executive cannot displace them by general executive power; used to support striking down downgrading.
A.B. Krishna v. State of Karnataka (AIR 1998 S.C. 1050) Rules made by the State under statute have precedence over rules made by the executive under Article 309; executive amendments cannot displace statutory prescriptions. Cited to show that executive-made changes cannot override or displace conditions set by primary legislation or statutory rules.
Rajendran, P. v. Government of Tamil Nadu (1991 Writ L.R. 694) Government cannot grant reliefs/exemptions or relax statutory qualifications where no provision exists in the Act or Rules; such orders can be quashed for want of jurisdiction. Used as precedent to conclude that the Government lacked jurisdiction to downgrade statutory posts or relax rules without legislative amendment.
State of Haryana v. Rajpal Sharma (1996) S.C.C. 273 Principles on parity in pay between aided school teachers and government school teachers — equal pay for equal work where nature of work is the same. Relied upon for the principle that teachers in analogous positions doing the same work must be paid equally; supported holding that different pay for same work violated constitutional principles.
State of U.P. v. Ministerial Karamchari Sangh (AIR 1998 S.C. 303) Equal pay for equal work depends on nature of work; evaluations for pay must be accepted unless mala fide; differentiation must have rational nexus and be bona fide. Applied to determine that where qualifications, mode of recruitment and nature of work are the same, unequal pay lacks an intelligible differentia and attracts Article 14.
Indian Council of Agricultural Research v. A.N. Lahiri (AIR 1997 S.C. 2259) Equal pay for equal work applies where two sets of employees have same nature of work, qualifications and recruitment source; discrimination cannot be sustained. Supported the conclusion that two groups of teachers with similar qualifications and duties cannot be paid differently.
State of Haryana v. Ram Chander (AIR 1997 S.C. 2468) Explains the “equal pay for equal work” doctrine and factors like quantity and quality of work; identical duties justify parity. Used to reinforce that differences in nomenclature do not justify differential pay where duties and responsibilities are substantially the same.
Swapan Kumar v. Tapas Chakravorty (AIR 1996 S.C. 622) Courts should not revise recruitment rules; however, where a strong case for forming a common cadre exists, State should apply its mind and correct anomalies. Consulted regarding formation of common cadre and equal pay; Court noted the need for statutory compliance and redress where disparities exist.
State of H.P. v. Recognised and Aided Schools Managing Committees (1995 4 S.C.C. 507) Teachers in aided private schools are entitled to parity in pay and allowances with counterparts in government schools. Supported the conclusion that unequal pay for same work (aided vs government) is not permissible.
Alvaro Noronha Ferriera v. Union of India (AIR 1999 S.C. 1356) Parameters for invoking equal pay include nature of work and common employer; differences in pendency or workload do not by themselves make nature of work different. Reinforced that substantial similarity of duties requires pay parity; used to support orders for arrears where parity denied.
Surinder Singh v. Engineer in Chief CFWD and others (1986-I-L.L.J. 403) Article 39: equal pay for equal work should be paid from date of employment and cannot be postponed by Government. Applied to hold that monetary benefits cannot be arbitrarily deferred; taught that equal pay must be provided from date of employment.
Karnataka State Private College Stop-Gap Lecturers Association v. State of Karnataka (1993 (1) LAV. 25) Even for temporary appointments, if nature of work is same as regular teachers, adopting a different method of payment violates Article 14. Used to show temporary/contractual status does not justify different pay for same work.
Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986 3 S.C.C. 156) Court will not enforce unfair, unconscionable contracts where parties are unequal in bargaining power; unconscionable clauses contrary to Article 14/contract law can be struck down. Applied to hold that agreements executed by unemployed teachers under compulsion could be void insofar as they enforce unfair terms affecting fundamental rights; justifies striking down unconscionable contractual clauses.
Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress (AIR 1991 S.C. 101) Illustrates principles on unequal bargaining power and enforceability of unfair contractual terms. Cited among authorities supporting the proposition that unconscionable employment terms may be struck down.
Uptrol India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhaki (AIR 1998 S.C. 1681) Authority concerning unenforceable/unfair contractual terms where bargaining power is unequal. Referred to support invalidation of unfair contractual clauses imposed on weaker party.
Union of India v. No. 664950 IM Havildar/Clerk (1999 3 S.C.C. 709) Example where classification for benefits was held not arbitrary because competent authority had rational basis and facts were distinguishable. Distinguished on facts by the Court; the Court found the present case distinguishable and not analogous to the Army case relied upon by respondents.
K. Narayanan v. State of Karnataka (1994 Supp (1) S.C.C. 44) Policy decisions are generally immune from interference, but they cannot violate Articles 14 and 16; rule-making authority must not act arbitrarily. Referred to emphasize that policy cannot override fundamental rights; Court held impugned orders violated constitutional guarantees despite being policy measures.
St. Stephen Middle School v. State of Tamil Nadu (W.P. No. 6781/93 etc.) and related single-judge decisions Single-judge decisions addressing financial position, grant-in-aid and related aspects; relied upon by respondents in argument. The Court observed those decisions were not directly applicable to the central issues (downgrading and equal pay) in the present batch of petitions.
C. Stephenson Roobasingh v. State of Tamil Nadu (1993 Writ L.R. 544) Illustrates that Government has powers in implementation of Acts/Rules, but such powers must conform to statutory/constitutional constraints. Noted by the Court while considering scope of executive power, but Court held statutory/constitutional limits restrain such power here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court structured its analysis around statutory provisions, the scope of executive power and constitutional guarantees set out in Articles 14, 16 and 39(d).

  1. Statutory framework: The Court examined the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 (the Act) and the Rules (in particular Sections 14, 18, 19, 20 of the Act and Rule 15 and Annexure V of the Rules). These provisions govern appointment, qualifications, conditions of service and grant-in-aid for private schools. Rule 15 and Annexure V do not recognize a post called Secondary Grade (Junior); the statutory scheme contemplates appointment to the sanctioned posts in the cadre (Secondary Grade Teacher).
  2. Occupied field and limits of executive power: Relying on well-known precedents, the Court held that where matters of service are governed by statute and rules, the executive cannot, by executive order, effect changes that displace or alter statutory provisions. The Court applied the doctrine that executive power cannot be exercised to supplant the law when the field has been occupied by the legislature. Thus the Government could not, without amending the statutory Rules, downgrade existing statutory posts by creating/declaring posts of Secondary Grade (Junior).
  3. Classification and equal pay: The Court examined the effect of the impugned orders which caused identical or substantially similar posts and duties to be performed by two classes of teachers (existing Secondary Grade Teachers on a time-scale and newly appointed Secondary Grade (Junior) teachers on consolidated pay of Rs.800). The Court found no distinguishing features in qualification, nature or volume of work shown in the impugned orders to justify differential pay. Citing multiple Supreme Court authorities, the Court held that where the nature of work is same and qualifications and recruitment are the same, the principle of “equal pay for equal work” (reflecting Articles 14 and 39(d)) applies; differentiation must be founded on intelligible differentia with rational nexus to the object.
  4. Contracts and unequal bargaining power: The Court considered that the contract agreements executed by the appointees were drafted pursuant to Government direction, and that unemployed qualified teachers had little bargaining power. Applying the doctrine in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation and related authorities, the Court held that unconscionable or unfair employment terms (entered into under inequality of bargaining power) can be struck down and are not a bar to a challenge under fundamental rights. Thus the existence of agreements did not preclude judicial review of the impugned orders.
  5. Temporal effect of regularisation and monetary benefits: The Court scrutinised subsequent G.O.s (regularising service from 1.9.92 but granting monetary benefit only from 9.4.96) and held that the Government offered no adequate reason for deferring monetary benefits. In light of authorities on Article 39(d), equal pay must be paid from date of employment; arbitrary postponement is impermissible.
  6. Conclusion on vires: On the basis above, the Court found the impugned Government Orders downgrading posts and fixing consolidated pay to be void and ultra vires; the orders resulted in unequal pay for identical work and intruded into statutory field of service regulation without legislative amendment.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The impugned Government Orders which downgraded the posts of Secondary Grade Teacher and Specialist Teacher (and created/treated vacancies as Secondary Grade (Junior)/Specialist (Junior) to be filled on consolidated emoluments of Rs.800 per month) are void and ultra vires; those orders and consequential directions of the Director of School Education are quashed. All the writ petitions in the batch are allowed.

Direct Consequences on the Parties:

  • All appointments made pursuant to the impugned Government Orders shall be treated as regular appointments.
  • Persons appointed under G.O.Ms. No. 1524 (and related G.O.s) shall be given regular time-scale of pay from the respective date of their initial appointment (i.e., they are entitled to regular scale from date of appointment).
  • They are also entitled to monetary benefits from the date of their respective initial appointment; the Government's grant of monetary benefit from a later date (9.4.96) was not sustained for lack of reason.
  • The impugned orders and all consequential proceedings are quashed; all interim petitions are closed; no costs were awarded.

Broader Implications: The Court applied settled principles (doctrine of occupied field, equal pay for equal work, unenforceability of unconscionable employment clauses where bargaining power is unequal) to restrain executive action that attempts to alter statutory service conditions without legislative change. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel principle of law but enforces established constitutional and statutory limits on executive power in the service context.

RR/VCS. (Court's concluding internal notation as recorded in the opinion.)

    S. Pappa And 6 Others v. Government Of Tamil Nadu, Rep. By The Secretary To Government, Education Department, Fort St. George, Madras - 9 And 2 Others.

    COMMON ORDER

    The issues raised in all the Writ petitions are common in nature. Therefore, the same are being disposed of by the following common order.

    The Writ Petitioners are Secondary Grade Teachers, Aided Schools, Secondary Grade Teachers Association, Private Aided Primary Middle School Managers and Teachers Association. Generally the petitioners have sought for directionns by calling for the records relating to the following Government Orders issued by respondent/Government of Tamil Nadu and consequential order of Director of School Education:—

    1). G.O.Ms No. 1524, Education, dated 12.11.90,

    2). G.O.Ms No. 1669, Education, dated 13.12.90,

    3). G.O.Ms No. 20, Education, dated 8.1.93,

    4). G.O.Ms No. 495, Education, dated 19.5.93,

    5). G.O.Ms No. 279, Education, dated 9.4.96,

    6). G.O.Ms No. 5, Education, dated 6.1.97, and

    7). G.O.Ms No. 365, School Education, dated 20.8.97

    As stated earlier, all the contentions in these Writ Petitions are identical and common in nature. For the convenience, I shall refer the case of the petitioners in W.P No. 221 of 91. The first petitioner in that Writ Petition, who is a Secondary Grade Teacher, was appointed as Secondary Grade Teacher on 20.4.90 as approved by the District Educational officer in his letter dated 26.5.90 and is working in Sivanthi Vinayakar Elementary School, Mamspuram. Like-wise, petitioners 2 to. 7, working in different Aided private management Schools, were appointed on 4.6.90, 2.7.90, 29.6.90, 9.7.90 respectively and the appointments were approved by the District Educational Officer. Petitioners 6 and 7 were also appointed as such and their appointments were approved by the District Educational Officer. After passing Secondary Grade Teacher Training Course and after completion of the said course, they were appointed as Secondary Grade Teachers in the respective schools in the sanctioned vacancy in the scale of pay of Rs. 1,200/- p.m as fixed by Fifth Pay Commission. They are being paid Rs, 1,200/-p.m with usual allowances, as admissible to the post of Secondary Grade Teacher. Whileso, the School managements announced that the scale of pay has been reduced to a consolidated sum of Rs. 800/- p.m and the amount which so far was paid excess is liable to be refunded and in future, the petitioners will be paid only a consolidated sum of Rs.<500/- p.m when it was enquired with the managements for this sudden change, they relied upon a Circular issued by the Director of School Education on 14.11.90 in Rc. No. 89688 080/90-1, which in turn relies upon a Government Order issued by the Government in G.O.Ms No. 1524, Education dated 12.1.90 It is further stated that as per the said Government Order, the vacancies of Secondary Grade teachers now available and which are likely to arise in the academic year 1990-91 in Government Municipal Corporation, Township, Panchayat Union and Aided Schools on account of retirement, resignation and promotions, shall be filled only by posting incumbents on consolidated pay of Rs. 800/-. p.m though the Government Order in question will not apply to the already sanctioned post, the post of Secondary Grade Teacher since has been now stated as class by itself as Secondary Grade (Junior) cannot be equated with thai of (he posts which are already in existence in the time scale of pay. If this Government Order is to be intercept with those posts, then the said Government Order is liable to be quashed as arbitrary and discriminatory in nature, violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The persons who are now working as Secondary Grade Teachers are governed by Special Rules and their pay is governed by the Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. By Executive instructions, the same cannot be altered. Further, the sanctioned posts have been stated as Secondary Grade (Junior). The respondents want to applythe Government Order to the persons who are working like the petitioners, the Government Order is arbitrary, illegal in as much as it reduces the scale of pay which is being paid by Government now. It is further stated that the post now described as Secondary Grade (Junior) has not been distinguished from the present Secondary Grade teachers. So long as the posts are same and qualifications are similar, there cannot be two sets of scale of pay. Further, the nature of work for the Secondary Grade Teachers either who are already working or now introduced as Secondary Grade (Junior) in the consolidated sum are same. Both the teachers are taking classes which they could take. The hours of work arc also same. So, as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court, there cannot be different pay for the same category of persons doing similar work. Therefore, the newly introduced consolidated pay to the persons who are working similarly to that of the persons who are already working is arbitrary and liable to be struck down, because the rule of law which governs the filed is, equal work, equal pay. It is also stated that the petitioners were appointed in regular vacancy and the same are not the posts which are being described as Secondary Grade (Junior). In the Government Order, it is stated that the vacancies on account of retirement, resignation, death etc. shall also be filled up only by consolidated emoluments of Rs. 8007- p.m the post concerned in respect of such vacancies shall be deemed to have been down-graded as the post of Secondary Grade (Junior), which again is per se arbitrary, illegal. In such circumstances, having no other remedy, the petitioners have approached this Court. Similar contentions have been raised in the other Writ Petitions; hence I am not transversing the same.

    2. On behalf of the respondents, first respondent has filed a common counter affidavit in the above batch of Writ Petitions. The stand taken by the respondents is briefly stated hereunder; -

    Prior to the year 1989, there were a large number of private self-financing Secondary Grade Teacher Training Institutions running in the State of Tamil Nadu and in every year, large number of candidates were coming out successfully on completion of such Teacher Training Course from the Institutions. Therefore, thousands of Secondary Grade Teacher Training qualified candidates were left unemployed seeking opportunities for employment. It is further stated that the Government having intended to give employment avenue to the unemployed candidates who are qualified with Secondary Grade Teacher Training course and also to upgrade the standard of education, took a policy decision that in addition to the post of Secondary Grade Teachers as stipulated in the Rule, to create a new order of Posts, namely, the Secondary Grade (Junior) Teachers on contractual temporary basis for a period of two years on a consolidated pay of Rs. 8007- per month. Accordingly, the Government having considered the then financial budgetary provision, issued orders in G.O.Ms No. 846, Education, dated 25.6.90, as to supplement the Rule, creating 1,200 new Secondary Grade (Junior) Teachers posts to be filled up with qualified Secondary Grade-Teacher Training candidates on a contractual temporary basis for a period of two years on a consolidated pay of Rs. 800/- per month and these posts have to be distributed among the schools under all kinds of managements including Government, Local body (Municipality/Corporraton/Township Panchayat Union) and Private Aided Schools. It is further stated that in order to adopt uniformity in the recruitment of Secondary Grade Teacher posts and that of the recruitment of the newly created 1200 additional posts, the Government issued orders in G.O.Ms No. 1524, Education, dated 1.2.11.90 directing that apart from the 1200 newly created Secondary Grade Teachers (Junior) posts, the posts which have fallen vacant due to retirement, resignation and death, etc., shall be deemed to have been downgraded as posts of Secondary Grade (Junior) Teacher and therefore, these posts shall also be filled up only on consolidated emolument of Rs. 800/-per month, for an initial period of two years from the respective dates of filling up with new appointees. It also insists that the various appointing authorities should obtain written agreement from the appointees expressing their specific willingness to work on the consolidated emoluments indicated and a contract agreement would be entered into with every such appointee. As per the contract, it is open to the appointing authority or any higher authority to terminate the services of those persons by giving three months notice.

    3. The Government in G.O.Ms No. 1669 Education dated 13.12.90, have issued orders that as in the case of downgradation of. Secondary Grade Teachers post as per G.O.Ms No. 1524 Education dated 12.11.90, vacant posts of specialised Teachers such as physical Education Teacher, Drawing Masters, Craft Instructors, Sewing Mistress, Music Teachers etc., drawing the Secondary Grade Scale of pay in Government, Local body (Municipal/Corporation/Township/Panchayat Union) and Aided Schools in 1990-91 on account of retirement, resignation, death etc., shall be deemed to have been downgraded as posts of Secondary Grade (Junior) Teachers and these vacancies shall be filled up only on the basis of the consolidated pay of Rs. 800/- per month. Subsequently, on the basis of representations made by various Teacher's Associations and various private Aided School Managements, the Government have taken a policy decision to dispense with the recruitment of Secondary Grade (Junior) teachers on contract basis on consolidated pay, and issued orders in G.O.Ms No. 20 Education dated 8.1.93, according to which, the Secondary Grade (Junior) Teachers, who were recruited during the year 1990-91 and 1991-92 on a fixed pay for a period of two years are brought into regular scales of pay with effect from 1.9.92 In G.O.Ms No. 495 Education dated 19.5.93 have issued orders extending the benefit and regularising the services of the B.T Assistant (Junior/Tamil Pandit (Junior)/P.G Assistant (Junior)) who were appointed during 1990-91 and 1991-92 on contract basis and on fixed pay in terms of G.O.Ms No. 1524 Education dated 12.11.90, and brought them into regular scales of pay with effect from 1.9.92 as that of the benefit extended to the Secondary Grade (Junior) Teachers as per G.O.Ms No. 20 Education dated 8.1.93 Similarly, the Government in G.O.Ms No. 279 Education, Science and Technology Department dated 9.4.96 issued orders regularising the Specialist Teachers who were appointed as Junior Grade Specialist Teachers on contractual temporary basis on consolidated emoluments of Rs. 800/-per month in Government Schools, and brought them into regular scale of pay from 1.9.92 as ordered in the case of Secondary Grade (Junior) teachers but the monetary benefit shall be given with effect from the date of issue of Government Order that is from 9.4.96 In view of the various orders of this Court, the Government in G.O.Ms No. 5 Education, Science and Technology Department dated 6.1.97, having extended the monetary benefit from 1.9.92 to the Specialist teachers who were regularised from 1.9.92, but given monetary benefit only from 9.4.96 subject to the outcome of the main Writ Petition. Thereafter, as per the proposal* pf the Director of School Education, the Government issued orders in G.O.Ms No. 365 School Education dated 20.8.97 regularising the services of specialist teachers appointed in all Government Aided High and Higher Secondary Schools from 1.9.92 with monetary benefit from 9.4.96

    4. It is further stated that being the parties and executants of the contract, the teachers and the managements of the institutions are bound by the terms of the contract and they cannot now come out from the contractual liabilitiies. The scheme under the impugned Government Orders is applicable not only to private aided schools but also applicable to schools under all kinds of Managements viz., Government, Municipality, Township/Panchayat Union Schools etc. Like-wise the down-grading of the post is done to avoid disputes being raised relating to seniority between teachers appointed under the newly created posts and those who are appointed in the vacancy in the existing post. There were no discrimination in the mode of recruitment or selective test. There were also no discrimiation on the basis of religion, race, sex, descent, caste, culture and place of birth, etc. Therefore, the allegation that the impugned Government Orders violative the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 are totally wrong, baseless, misconceived and mis-construed. It is also stated that the grant-in-aid code does not confer any right on the management of any Educational Institution to get aid from the Government. As per Section 14(ii)(e) of the Tamil Nadu Recogpised. Private Schools Act, the Government is empowered to fix the grant at such rate and for such purpose as may be prescribed. Under Section 14(ii)(a) and (d), the payment of grant is subject to the availability of fund and the Rules, orders and notification issued by the Government from time to time. The impugned Government Orders do not discriminate the minority institutions as the Government Orders are applicable to all the institutions irrespective of status that is Government schools, Municipality school etc. Therefore, the allegations that the impugned Government’ Orders violate the provisions of Articles 30(1). and 30(2) of the Constitution of India are totally wrong and baseless; The contention of the petitions that the Government cannot plead paucity of funds and downgrade the approved sanctioned posts and that it would be contrary to the Judgment of the Courts and violative of Article 30(2) are denied by the respondents. The contentions that the impugned Government Order hit Articles 39(d) are denied by the respondents. The contentions that the impugned Government Orders hit Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India is also untenable. The impugned Government Orders were purported for a scheme to create more posts of teachers, and therefore, the quality and standard of Education would be considerably improve but would not cause suffer as alleged by the petitioners. The impugned Government Orders were purported for a scheme to create more posts of teachers and, therefore, the quality and standard of Education would be considerably improved. The Government introduced the scheme of creating new posts of Junior Teachers in the interest of unemployed candidates and also for the welfare of the students and for the Welfare of State for having high standard of education. With these averments, they prayed for dismissal of the Writ Petitions.

    5. In the light of the above pleadings, I have heard Mr. C. Selvaraju, Mr. N. Paul Vasanthakumar, Mr. R. Ganesan, Mr. M. Joseph Thatheus Jerome, Mr. P. Peppin Fernando, Mr. R. Sasidharan, Mr. G. Geremiah, Mr. S. Muthuramalingam, Mr. Ramajagadeesan, Mr. Kamalanathan, Mr. S.V Pandiarajan and Mr. M.V Krishnan for petitioners and Mr. T.R Rajagopalan, Additional Advocate General for respondents.

    6. The main points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners are as follows:—

    (i) Whether G.O.Ms No. 1524-Education (M) Department dated 12.11.1990 is valid as it creates a new post, namely, Secondary Grade (Junior) teacher which is not in the cadre both under the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) and the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”). The impugned Government Order is illegal and ultra vires the provisions' of the Act and the Rules; accordingly the same is liable to be struck down.

    (ii) Once a legislature intervenes to enact a law relating to conditions of service, the power of the Executive including the President or the Governor, as the case, may be, is totally displaced on the principle of “Doctrine of occupied field”. In the instant case legislature has already occupied the field and enacted law as referred to above which includes service conditions. Therefore, the impugned order is without jurisdiction.

    (iii) The Government have no power under the Act to issue such executive instructions to downgrade the post;

    (iv) The impugned Government Order is discriminatory and violative of principles of equal pay for equal work, since for doing the same work with same qualification, Rs. 800/- per month alone is being paid to the teachers;

    (v) Whether G.O.Ms No. 20 dated 8.1.93 is valid, giving regular pay to Secondary Grade Teachers from 1.9.92 irrespective of the date of appointment?

    (vi) Whether G.O.Ms No. 365 School Education dated 20.8.97 is valid giving regular scale to Special Teachers with monetary benefits from 9.4%?

    (vii) Downgrading a post which is created by way of an executive order is violative of Section 19 read with Rule 15 of the Rules? Without amending the Rules, it is not possible for the Government to downgrade the Secondary Grade (Junior) teacher.

    (viii) Even the policy decision of the Government cannot offend the Constitution, particularly Articles 14, 16 and 39 of the Constitution of India; and

    (ix) Unreasonable clause in the Contract entered into between the parties who are not equal in Bargaining Power cannot be sustained and any agreement affecting Fundamental Rights is void and not binding.

    7. The contentions raised by learned Additional Advocate General are summarised hereunder:—

    i) The petitioners have not challenged G.O.Ms No. 846, Education, dated 25.6.1990 wherein the Government have sanctioned 1200 new Secondary Grade (Junior) Teachers posts to be filled up with qualified Secondary Grade Teacher Training candidates on a contractual temporary basis for a period of two years on a consolidated pay of Rs. 800/-

    ii) G.O.Ms No. 1524, Education, dated 12.11.90 creates equality among the particular group of persons;

    iii) There is no discrimination or arbitrariness in the action of the Government as contended.

    iv) Even the so-called restriction is only for a period of two years;

    v) Power to issue directions rests with the Government; accordingly they are justified in passing the impugned orders. The Government is also entitled to regulate the aspects regarding the payment of grants.

    vi) As per the Rules, in a given situation grant or aid can be reduced by the Government. In any event in as much as the teachers and the management have entered into agreements, they cannot have any grievance against the Government; hence the Writ Petitions filed by the teachers are not maintainable; and

    vii) The contention regarding violatiion of Article 39(d) of the Constitution is untenable.

    8. I have carefully considered the rival submissions.

    9. Before considering the rival submissions made by the petitioners and the learned Additional Advocate General, it is worth-while to refer certain provisions from the Act and the Rules. Section 14 of the Act speaks about payment of grant. It runs as follows:—

    “14. Payment of grant - (1) Notwithstanding contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, or in any decree, order or direction of any Court or other authority:—

    (i) no private school shall, only on the ground of having been granted recognition under this Act, be entitled to any grant or other financial assistance from the Government:—

    (iii) the Government may, subject to,-

    (a) the availability of funds;

    (b) the norms and conditions specified in the Grant-in-aid Code of Tamil Nadu Education Department;

    (c) the condition that every private school receiving any grant or financial assistance from the Government levies and collects from the pupils only such fee, charge or other payment as may be specified by the competent authority, which shall not be in excess of the fee, charge or other payment, levied and collected from the pupuls studying in the schools or institutions established and administered or maintained by the State Government, or any local authority in the locality;

    (d) the rules, orders and notifications issued by the Government, from time to time; and

    (e) such other conditions as may be prescribed, pay to the private school grant or other financial assistance at such rate and for such purposes as may be prescribed.

    2. The Government may withhold permanently or for any specified period the whole or part of any grant referred to in sub-section (t) in respect of any private school,-

    (i) which does not comply with any of the provisions of this Act or any rules made or directions issued thereunder insofar as such provisions, rules or directions are applicable to such private school, or

    (ii) in respect of which the pay and allowances payable to any teacher or other person employed in such private school are not paid to such teacher or other person in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder, or

    (iii) which contravenes or fails to comply with any such condition as may be prescribed.

    3. Before withholding the grant under Sub-section (2), the Government shall give the educational agency an opportunity of making its representation.”

    10. Appointment of teachers of the private school, fixation of their pay and definition of their duties etc., are defined in Section 18(1)(b) of the Act as follows:—

    “18. Functions of the School Committee and responsibility of educational agency under the Act:— (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, the school committee shall have the following functions namely:—

    (a)xxx

    (b) to appoint teachers and other employees of the private school, fix their pay and allowances and define their duties and the conditions of their service; and

    (c) x x x

    11. Qualifications, conditions of service, etc., of teachers as defined in Section 19 are as follows:—

    “19. Qualifications, conditions of service, etc., of the teachers and other persons employed in private schools:— The Government may make rules regulating the number, qualifications and conditions of service (including promotion, pay, allowances, leave, pension, provident fund, insurance and age of retirement and rights as respect disciplinary matters) of the teachers and other persons employed in any private school.”

    12. Section 20 is as follows:—

    “20. Appointment of teachers and other employees in private schools:—

    (1) No person who does not possess the qualifications prescribed under Section 19 shall on or after the date of the commencement of this Act, is employed as teacher or other employee in any private school.

    (2) Nothing contained in this section or any rule made thereunder shall apply to any person who, on or before the date of the commencement of this Act is employed as teacher or other employee in any private school.”

    13. As regards qualifications, conditions of service, it has been stated in Rule 15 as follows:—

    “Rule 15. Qualifications, conditions of service of teachers and other persons:— (I) The number of teachers and other persons employed in a private school shall hot exceed the number of posts sanctioned by Director of School Education from time to lime, with reference to the academic requirements, teacher-pupil ratio and overall financial considerations.

    (2)(i) The School Committee of every private school shall enter into an agreement with the teacher or other persons in Form VII(A) or VIJ(B) if the appointment is for a period exceeding three months.

    (ii) Three copies of the agreement shall be executed, one copy shall be furnished to the teacher or other person concerned, the other copy shall be retained by the School Committee and the third copy shall be forwarded to the District Educational Officer.

    (3) In a regular vacancy, a full qualified candidate shall be appointed only on a regular basis. However, in a temporary vacancy, i.e, leave vacancy, deputation for training or suspension of the teacher's certificate, a teacher or other person may be appointed for a specified period. In such cases, the agreement to be executed shall be in Form VII (B).

    In addition to these, Annexure V prescribes qualifications for appointment as teachers in private schools.

    It prescribes qualifications for all teachers including Secondary Grade Teacher.

    14. It is explained in the counter affidavit of the Government that prior to the year 1989, there were a large number of private self-financing Secondary Grade Teacher Training Institutions running in the State of Tamil Nadu and in every year, large number of candidates were coming out successfully on completion of such Teacher Training course from the Institutions and that, therefore, thousands of Secondary Grade Teacher Training qualified candidates were left unemployed seeking opportunities for employment. It is also explained that the Government having intended to give employment avenue to the unemployed candidates who are qualified with Secondary Grade Teacher Training Course and also to upgrade the standard of education, took a policy decision that in addition to the post of Secondary Grade Teachers as stipulated in the Rule, to create a new order of posts, namely, the Secondary Grade (Junior) Teachers on contractual temporary basis for a period of 2 years on a consolidated pay of Rs. 800/- per month.

    In order to achieve the above object, according to the Government taking note of the then financial budgetary provision, issued orders in G.O.Ms No. 846, Education, dated 25.6.1990, creating 1200 new Secondary Grade (Junior) Teachers posts to be filled up with qualified Secondary Grade Teacher Training candidates on a contractual temporary basis for a period of two years on a consolidated pay of Rs. 800/- per month and these posts have to be distributed among the schools under all kinds of managements including Government, local body (Municipality/Corporation/Township/Panchayat Union) and Private Aided Schools. As stated by the learned Additional Advocate General, none of the petitioners has questioned the said Government Order, namely, G.O.Ms No. 846, Education, dated 25.6.1990 They are all aggrieved by the subsequent orders commencing from G.O.Ms No. 1524, Education dated 12.11.90 I have already narrated the salient features of various Government Orders while explaining the stand of the Government as indicated in the counter affidavit of the first respondent. In G.O.Ms No. 1524, Education, dated 12.11.90, the Government issued orders directing that apart from the 1200 newly created Secondary Grade Teachers (Junior) posts, the post which have fallen vacant due to retirement, resignation and death, etc., shall be deemed to have been downgraded as posts of Secondary Grade (Junior) Teacher and, therefore, these posts shall also be filled up only on consolidated emolument of Rs. 800/- per month, for an initial period of two years from the respective dates of filling up with new appointees. I have already extracted the relevant provisions from the Act and the Rules. Section 19 enables the Government to make. Rules regulating the number, qualifications and conditions of service (including promotion, pay, allowances, leave, pension, provident fund, insurance and age of retirement and rights as respect disciplinary matters) of the teachers and other persons employed in any private school. Rule 15 prescribes qualificatins, conditions of service of teachers and other persons. Among other clauses, sub-rule (3) of Rule 15 says that in a regular vacancy a fully qualified candidate shall be appointed only on a regular basis. Form VILA is the agreement form in respect of permanent teachers, while from VIIB is in respect of temporary teachers. As per Rule 15(6) of the Rules, the teachers and other persons employed in Private Schools shall possess the qualifications specified in Annexure - V. Annexure - V contains the names of the posts and the qualifications required to those posts. A careful perusal of the above referred provisions of the Act, Rule and the Annexure would go to show that the matters relating to service of a teacher are occupied by Legislature. In other words, appointments of teachers, defining of their nature of service, etc., are governed by statutory provisions, namely, Act, Rules, Annexure etc., A perusal of those provisions shows that they do not contain a post called Secondary Grade (Junior) Teacher as specified in G.O.Ms No. 846, Education, dated 25.6.1990 and G.O.Ms No. 1524, Education, dated 12.11.1990 Further, the latter Government Order downgraded the post of Secondary Grade teacher as Secondary Grade (Junior) teacher. In para 2(i) of the said Government Order, it is stated that the vacancies arising in the Cadre of Secondary Grade Teachers in Government Local Body (Municipal/Corporation/township Panchayat at Union and Aided Schools in 1990-91 on account of retirement, resignation, death etc., be filled up only on the consolidated emoluments of Rs. 800/- p.m It further says that the posts concerned in respect of all such vacancies shall be deemed to have been downgraded as posts of Secondary Grade (Junior) on consolidated emoluments of Rs. 800/- p.m for an initial period of two years, from the respective dates of filling up with new appointess. I have already stated that as per the Legislation, the post availabls is in the cadre of Secondary Grade Teacher. Now, the Government, by the impugned Government Order, have downgraded the said post as Secondary Grade (Junior) Teacher. At this juncture, learned Additional Advocate General would contend that in the absence of any challenge to G.O.Ms No. 846 dated 25.6.90, the Government is competent to issue directions to upgrade or reduce the post and regulate payment of grants to various Institutions. No doubt, Section 14 of the Act empowers the Government to issue directions with regard to payment of grant. However, in the light of the statutory provisions referred to above, particularly the service of the teachers, as rightly contended, without amending the statutory Rules, the Government cannot “downgrade” the post as Secondary Grade (Junior) Teacher. The first decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioners on this aspect is a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Rajesh, G. v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (1995 Writ L.R 389). In this decision, the Writ Petitioner before the Division Bench sought for issue of a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents therein to give effect to G.O.Ms No. 466 dated 8.6.94, and admit him in I year M.B.A course under Sports Quota. Anna University is established under the Anna University Act, 1978. It conducts several courses leading to Graduation and Post-Graduation. M.B.A, Course is one such to which only Engineering Graduates can seek admission.

    The last date for submitting the application was 6.5.1994 Entrance Examination was held on 29.5.1994 The result of the entrance Examination was published on 20.7.1994, whereas Government Order in G.O.Ms No. 466 came to be issued on 8.6.1994 The classes for I semester commenced on 8.8.1994 and it was over in the month of November, 1994. The petitioner did not secure marks above the cut-off marks in the entrance examination. Therefore, he could not be admitted. However, the petitioner claimed admission under Sportsquota. The direction issued by the State Government in the form of Government Order related to reservation for Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Backward Class candidtes. However, G.O.Ms No. 446 dated 8.6.1994 came to be issued for reservation of two per cent of the seats for the post Graduate Courses in the Colleges and Universities in Tamil Nadu. The case of the petitioner is that as the State Government has got the power under Article 162 of the Constitution of India to issue directions of the nature contained in the impugned G.O.Ms No. 466 dated 8.6.1994 and such Government Order is the law, it is binding upon the University and as such, the University cannot afford to disobey it and cannot refuse to give one seat for sports quota, and the petitioner being the only candidate coming for admission under the sports quota, he is entitled to be admitted to the M.B.A Course. On the contrary, it is the contention of the University that as per Section 6(3) of the Act, it is not at all open to the State Government to issue any direction, which falls outside the scope of Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act, that the direction relating to reservation for sportsmen is not covered by Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act. Government Order in G.O.Ms No. 466, dated 8.6.1994 is not binding upon the University, since the Course is a professional course and the Government Order in question is not intended to apply to professional course and the petitioner, having not secured the required percentage of marks, is not entitled to an admission. It is also the stand of the State Government that G.O.Ms No. 466 dated 8.6.1994 is not intended to apply to the professional course, because following the said Government Order, further action is not taken to apply the said Government Order to professional course. In the light of the said factual position, after framing necessary points for consideration, the Division Bench has made the following conclusion:—

    “. It is settled position of law that when the field is occupied by the Statute, executive power cannot be exercised. Sub-section (3) of Section 6 specifically provides that the State Government can issue directions regarding the reservation of seats for the students belonging to Scheduled Castes. Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes. It is not possible to hold that the State Government, in exercise of its executive power, can issue a direction to the 1 University to reserve seats for students falling under the sports category. It is, no doubt, true that the executive power, under Article 162 of the Constitution of India, extends to all matters to which the legislative power extends. But once that Legislative power is exercised and the field is occupied by the law, passed by the legislature, unless that law is amended, the executive power cannot be exercised contrary to those contained in the law. Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act is the law relating to reservation of seats for a particular class or category, and there is no scope in that to add another category other than Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Backward Class. Reservation for sports category is an additional class or category, which cannot be held to fall within Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act. There is no other word or provision in Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act which can be interpreted by applying the rule of ejusdem generis. Hence, we are of the view that, in the light of the provisions contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act, it is not open to the State Government to issue a direction for reservatiion to other categories other than specified in Section 6(3) of the Act. However, such a direction, if approved by the Syndicate, would be binding upon the University. In the instant case, the Government Order in G.O.Ms No. 466 dated 8.6.1994 is not approved by the Syndicate. First point is answered accordingly.”

    It is clear from the said decision that when the field is occupied by the Statute, Executive power cannot be exercised. I have already stated that in our case also the field has already been occupied by the Legislature and in the absence of any specific legislation by way of amendment, the Government cannot modify the Statute by way of Executive power, viz., by issying the impugned Government Order to downgrade the existing post and also to create a post called Secondary Grade (Junior) Teacher. The Dictum laid down by the Division Bench is directly applicable to our case.

    15. The same position has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of/and K. Public Service Commission v. Narinder Mohan (AIR 1994 S.C 1808). The following observation of their Lordships is relevant:—

    “7- Existence of statutory Rules is not a condition precedent to appoint an eligible and fit person to a post. The executive power is co-extensive with legislative power of the State and under Art. 162, the State can create Civil posts and fill them up according to executive instructions consistent with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is settled law that once statutory rules have been made, the appointment shall be only in accordance with the rules. The executive power could be exercised only to fill in the gaps but the instructions cannot and should not supplant the law, but would only supplement the law. The Governor exercising the power under proviso to Section 125 (Art. 309 of the Constitution of India) made the rules which do not expressly give the power to the State Government to make adhoc appointments. No such rule has been brought to our notice. No express power was conferred and, in fact, cannot be conferred to relax the rules of recruitment. Having made the rules, the executive cannot fall back upon its general power under Art. 162 to regularise the ad hoc appointments under the Rules. Rule 9(3) empowers only to relax the qualification of age in particular exigencies which cannot be called in aid to relax the rules of recruitment “

    16. In the case of A.B Krishna v. State of Karnataka (AIR 1998 S.C 1050), • similar question was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the conclusion of Their Lordships arrived at in para 14 is as follows:—

    “Applying the above principles to the instant case, it will be noticed that the Rules made by the State Government under Section 39 of the Act prescribe the qualifying examination as a condition precedent for promotion to the post of Leading Firemen. These Rules have not been touched, altered or amended and they exist in their original form. What has been done by the Government is that it has amended the General Recruitment Rules by providing therein that any promotion made on the higher post would not be on the basis of examination, if any prescribed but on the basis of seniority. This is a Rule made by the Executive, namely, the Governor tinder Article 309 of the Constitution. The amendment in the General Recruitment Rules would not have the effect of displacing or altering the Rules made under Section 39 of the Fire Force Act, 1964 as the Act of the Legislature would have precedence over any Rule made by the Executive under the proviso to Article 309.”

    17. In the case of Rajendran, P. v. The Government of Tamil Nadu reported in (1991 Writ L.R 694), S. Ramalingam, J, in paragraph 4 has observed thus:—

    “Mr. T. Martin, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the order of the Government impugned in this Writ Petition is liable to be quashed for want of jurisdiction. He would state that neither in the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 nor in the Rules framed thereunder, power is vested with the Governor to grant relaxation of the requisite qualification as prescribed in G.O.Ms No. 720 (Education) dated 28.4.1981 In view of the said contentiion, the learned Government Pleader was directed to produce the file of the Government relating to G.O.Ms No. 888, Education, dated 28.6.1990 The Government has produced the said file along with a cover note, in which it is stated as follfows:

    “The Director of School Education has recommended to the Government to grant exemption from possessing the requisite experience qualification laid down in the rules governing the post. The Government, as a special case, granted exemption in favour of Thiru S. Backiaraj (7th respondent) in G.O.Ms No. 888, Education dated 28.6.1990 It may, however, be mentioned that there is no provision either in the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act or the rules made thereunder to grant exemption relaxing the qualification laid down for the post.”

    In view of the above statement from the Government, there can be no hesitation in quashing the G.O.Ms No. 888, Education, dated 28.6.1990 on the ground of want of jurisdiction.”

    In the light of the above legal position, even though it is stated by the learned Additional Advocate General that power to issue direction rests with the Government, I am of the view that when the field is occupied by the Statute, the executive power cannot be exercised. By the impugned Government Order the Executive down-graded the post of Secondary Grade Teacher created under the Statute as Secondary Grade (Junior) Teacher. In such circumstances, I am in agreement with the contention, raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that without amending the Rules, it is not open to the Government to down-grade the post of Secondary Grade Teacher.

    18. Now, I shall consider whether the Government is justified in granting consolidated emoluments of Rs. 800/- per month while filling up the post of Secondary Grade Teacher in Government, Local Body (Municipal/Corporation/Township/Panchayat Union) and Aided Schools in the acadmeic year 1990-91 on account of retirement, resignation, promotion, death etc., It is clear from para 2(i) of the impuned Government Order that the posts, concerned in respect of all such vacancies from 1991, the persons appointed are entitled for the Post of Secondary Grade (Junior) Teachers only on a consolidated emoluments of Rs. 800/- per month from the respective dates of filling up with the new appointees. It is pointed out that the said order is per se illegal because the post now described as Secondary Grade (Junior) Teacher has not been distinguished from the present Secondary Grade Teacher. The qualifications are similar for the post of Secondary Grade Teacher and Secondary Grade (Junior) Teacher. The nature of work for the Secondary Grade Teacher, who are already working and the newly introduced Secondary Grade (Junior) Teacher in the consolidated sum are the same. Both the teachers are taking classes which they could take. The hours of work are also same. In other words, by the impugned order, the resultant position would be that there are two classes of secondary Grade Teachers possessing the same qualifications and performing the same functions drawing unequal emoluments. The scale of pay applicable to the post of Secondary Grade Teacher is Rs. 1200-30-1560-40-2040. On the other hand, for the very same post by virtue of the Government Order, the persons appointed in the vacant post after the said Government Order would get a consolidated pay of Rs. 800/- per month. Hence, it is stated that the impugned Government Order which brings about the above result would be violative of Article 39(d) of the Constitution as it would result in unequal pay of equal work. It is also demonstrated before me that there are no details regarding the nature of work, period of duty etc., for the persons appointed under the consolidated pay of Rs. 800/-. Hence, for doing the same work, persons appointed prior to 1990 would get the time scale of pay of Rs. 1200-30-1560-40-2040 and other allowances and persons appointed in the year 1991 by way of the impugned Government Order would get a consolidated pay of Rs. 800/- per month. It is also argued that in as much as the contract teachers under the impugned Government Order are doing similar work as being done by the regular teachers, the impugned order is violative of Articles 14, 16 and 39 of the Constitution of India and also opposed to the principle namely “equal pay for equal work”. Now, I shall consider various decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners on this aspect. In State of Haryana v. Rajpal Sharma (1996) S.C.C 273), the question of pay parity between privately managed aided schools and their counter-parts in Government Schools was considered by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court and the conclusions arrived at by them is as follows:—

    “. . . . The question of parity in pay scales between the teachers of a recognised aided school and the teachers of a government school, as in the present case, came up for consideration in the case of Haryana State Adhyapak Sangh v. State of Haryana (1908 4 S.C.C 571: 1989 SCC (L and S) 21.) This Court came to the conclusion that the teachers of aided schools must be paid the same pay scale and dearness allowance as teachers in government schools for the entire period served by them and that the expenditure on that account should be apportioned between the State and the management in the same proportion in which they share the burden of the existing emoluments of the teachers. The aforesaid decision of this Court was considered again by a three-judge Bench in the case of Haryana State Adhyapak Sangh v. State of Haryana (1990 Supp SCC 306: 1991. SCC (L and S) 307) and by way of clarifying the earlier decision, this Court observed: (SCC p. 310, para 6)

    “These observations leave no scope for doubt that this Court has directed that the teachers of aided schools must be paid the same scales of pay and dearness allowance as teachers in government schools and that the said payment must be made for the entire period claimed by the appellants and the petitioners in these cases.”

    6. The positive direction in Haryana State

    Adhyapak Sangh v. State of Haryana (cited supra) to the effect that as from 1.4.1990, the teachers employed in aided schools shall be paid the same salary and dearness allowance as is paid to teachers employed in government schools, leaves no room for doubt about the grant of the said benefit to the respondents herein who are the teachers in privately managed aided schools in Ambala District in the State of Haryana.”

    It is clear from the said decision that the teachers employed in aided schools shall be paid the same salary and other allowances as is paid to the teachers employed in Government Schools if their nature of work is one and the same.

    19. In the case of State of U.P v. Ministerial Karamchari Sangh reported in (AIR 1998 S.C 303), Their Lordships have observed thus:—

    “16. It is also settled proposition that the evaluation of such jobs for the purpose of pay scales must be left to expert body and unless there are any mala fides, its evaluation should be accepted. In the case of Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognised) v. Union of India, 1988 3 SCC 91: AIR 1988 SC 1291, this Court observed as follows (para 7 of AIR):—

    “Equal pay for equal work is a fundamental work. But equal pay must depend upon the nature of the work done. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work, there may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. One cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scale of pay and other conditions of service. So long as such value judgment is made bona fide, reasonably on an intelligible criterian which has a rational nexus with the object of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. It is important to emphasize that equal pay for equal work is a concomitant of Article 14 of the Constitution. But it follows naturally that equal pay for unequal work will be a negation of that right,”

    In our case, the mode of recruitment, qualification, nature and volume of work etc., for the Secondary Grade Teacher and newly created post, namely Secondary Grade (Junior) teacher are one and the same. In such circumstance, the principle of “Equal pay for equal work” comes into picture and if there is any disparity, undoubtedly Article 14 attracts.

    20. In the case of Indian Council Of Agricultural Research v. A.N Lahiri reported in AIR 1997 S.C 2259, the following conclusion arrived at by Their Lordships is pressed into service:—

    “9. The Tribunal has held that the work which the respondent was doing as a scientists was of the same type as was being carried out by scientists who had been inducted in the ARS, Not only that his juniors who were actually working under him, as he was the Head of the Department, and who had joined ARS got the benefit of higher pay scale of Rs. 4500-7300. The nature of work which they were doing was of the same type as was done by their Head of the Department. Qualification-wise, there was no-distinction between the two sets of employees. Their initial source of recruitment was also the same. Their employer was also the same, namely, ICAR. It is the same employer who had two sets of employees, one governed by ARS system of service and the others who were outside ARS but still very much doing the same type of work as scientists and belonging to the same institution, namely, ICAR, of course forming a separate wing of employees. Under these circumstances, therefore, the doctrine of Equal Pay for Equal work got squarely attracted “

    21. In the case of State of Haryana v. Ram Chander reported in (AIR 1997 S.C 2468), Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, after explaining the principle of “Equal Pay for Equal Work” and after cataloguing certain salient features have arrived at the following conclusion' (paras 12 and 13):—

    “12. . .. These aspects deal with the quality of work. So far as the quantity of work is concerned it is well established that in school cadre in Education Department a Lecturer teaches 30 periods in a week, one period is of 40 minutes duration, i.e, 20 hours in a week, whereas the Language Teachers like the respondents teaching in Technical institutes teach for 24 hours in a week, one period being of one hour duration, Le., 24 hours in a week. Thus even quantitatively, the work which the respondents do is more intensive as compared to the work done by their counterpart teachers in higher secondary schools. That the difference in the nomenclature between the two sets of employees, namely, Language Teachers like the respondents in technical institutes and Lecturers in higher secondary schools does not represent any substantial cleavage in the quantity and quality of work done by both these sets of employees

    13. In the light of these salient features which are well-established on record, there would be no escape from the conclusion that but for the difference in educational qualifications, both these sets of employees are similarly circumscribed. So far as the educational qualifications difference is concerned that would have, as noted above, made some vital difference but for the fact that the appellants themselves in their own wisdom thought it fit to ignore this difference in the educational qualifications by offering a uniform time scale of Rs. 1640-2900/- to all Post-Graduate Lecturers in higher secondary schools. For all these reasons, no fault can be found with the decision rendered by the High Court especially in the light of the latter developments at the end of the appellants themselves who treated all these teachers at par by promulgating the Revised Pay Rules in the light of the recommendations of the Pay Revision Committee as well as Pay anomalies Commission as noted in details by us earlier.”

    22. In the case of Swapan Kumar v. Tapas Chakravorty reported in (AIR 1996 S.C 622), Their Lordships in para 14 have observed thus:—

    Thus, there is much force in the contention of Shri Satish Chandra that as in the main wing of Inspectors of Factories, there are electrical experts, mechanical experts and civil experts, in the chemical wing, there are chemical experts. According to us, the learned Single Judge of the High Court was right in stating that if electrical, mechanical and Civil engineers could form part of one cadre, so could, chemical engineers. Even so, we would agree with the learned Solicitor General that by giving the directions, in question, the High Court almost revised the recruitment rules which was not within its competence. We also agree that by directing the State to make available the higher post to Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories (Chemical), a legal error was committed, as the same amounted to laying down conditions of service of Government employees, which either the State Legislature in exercise of the powers under Article 309 of the Constitution, or the State Government in exercise of the power under the proviso to that article can do. However, on being satisfied that a strong case for forming a common cadre for all exists, we require the State Government to apply its mind to this aspect of the matter and, so too, to make available the same pay scale to all types of Inspectors of Factories. The distinction which has been repeatedly highlighted by the learned Solicitor General in the working of different wings is, according to us, a distinction without a difference. This submission of the learned State Counsel has, therefore, not impressed us.”

    In State of H.P v. Recognised and Aided Schools Managing Committees (1995 4 S.C.C 507), Their Lordships of the Supreme Court has held that the teachers in the Aided Private schools are entitled to parity in pay and allowances with their counterparts in Government Schools.

    In the case of Alvaro Noronha Ferriera v. Union of India ((AIR 1999 S.C 1356): 1999 Lab., and Industrial Cases 1639), Their Lordships while considering the aspect as regards principle of “Equal pay for Equal Work”, have made the following conclusions:—

    “Para 11. The parameters for invoking the said principles would include, inter alia, nature of work and common employer. There can be no two views that the nature of work of District and Sessions Judges is the same though in some areas pendency of cases would be higher than others. Differences in the backlog are not uncommon even in two different stations of the same territory, nay, in two different Courts of the same station. Such lopsidedness is hardly the ground to conclude that the nature of work done by one Judicial Officer at one place is different from other. The duty hours would be substantially the same, the powers to be discharged are in no way different, whether they are District Judge in Goa or in Delhi. It would be a futile exercise to make an endeavour for drawing a distinction between the work pattern at the two different places, for, such differences are discernible everywhere. But that would not make the nature of work different. It was not necessary to cast the burden of proof on the appellants to establish “the pendency of litigation or the norms fixed for disposal of cases by the Delhi Court to enable comparision between the nature of duties and the responsibilities carried by the officers of the Delhi Terirotiry and the Goa Territory.”

    In that case, the District Judges working in Delhi and in Goa are being paid differently. After holding that, both of them are doing the same type of work. Their Lordships have directed the Union of India to disburse the arrears of pay to the appellants therein (District Judges from Goa) on par with their counterparts in the Union Territory of Delhi during the period between 1.3.1982 and 31.3.1987 and the same was ordered to be disbursed within six months from the date of Judgment.

    In the case of Surinder Singh and another v. Engineer in Chief CFWD and others (1986-1-L.LJ. 403), Their Lordships of the Supreme Court after reiteratiing the principle of “Equal Pay for Equal Work”, have held that as per Article 39 of the Constitution of India equal pay for equal work should be paid from the date of employment and the Government cannot postpone it.

    In the case of Karnataka State Private College Stop-Gap Lecturers Association v. State of Kamataka and others (1993 (1) LAV. 25), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that an appointment may be temporary or permanent, but the nature of work being same fixation of salary to a temporary teacher by adopting a different method of payment from that of a regular teacher is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

    27. I have already-stated that the scale of pay applicable to the post of Secondary Grade Teacher is Rs. 1200-30-1560-40-2040 and the said scale of pay continues to apply and govern those Secondary Grade Posts which arc continued to be manned by teachers who arc qualified to hold the said post on the date of the impugned Government Order. On the other hand, by the impugned Government Order, a few posts borne on the category of Secondary Grade Teacher which becomes vacant on account of retirement, resignation, death etc., are to be filled up with persons possessing the same qualifications with a consolidated pay of Rs. 800/- per month. The resultant position would be that there would be two clauses of Secondary Grade Teachers possessing the same qualifications and performing the same functions drawing unequal emoluments. In the absence of any such clarification or details in the impugned Government Order with regard to different types of work or lesser work, undoubtedly the impugned Order violates Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India and it would result in unequal pay for equal work. Accordingly, the impugned Government Order and the consequential direction of the Director of School Education are liable to be struck down as being ultra vires the Constitution. Even though it is stated on behalf of the respondents that the said reduction is only for a period of two years, in the light of what is stated above, I am unable to accept the contra argument of the learned Additional Advocate General and sustain the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners.

    28. The other attack on the side of the petitioners is that in view of less Bargaining Power on the part of the unemployed Secondary Grade Teachers, all of them were forced to execute an agreement as directed by the Government. Learned Additional Advocate General by drawing my attention to the Agreement executed by the employer, namely, School Management and the employee for appointment to the post of Secondary Grade (Junior) Teacher on consolidated emolument, would contend that in the light of the various clauses therein, it is not open to the teachers to challenge the impugned orders in the present Writ Petitions, and according to him, the same arc not maintainable. In this regard, it is contended on behalf of the petitioners that in view of lack of bargaining power, the teachers were forced to execute the Agreement due to poverty and unemployment, any agreement affeecting fundamental rights is void and not binding. A perusal of the Agreement would show that all the Secondary Grade (Junior) Teachers have agreed to abide by certain terms and conditions including a consolidated pay of Rs. 800/- per month for a period of two years on duty. Apart from this, it is also contended that having executed a valid agreement abiding by certain terms and conditions on the principle of waiver, the teachers cannot agitate the same before this Court. As rightly pointed out, there is no question of waiver of fundamental rights. In this regard, the following observation by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Basheshar Nath v. IT. Commissioner (AIR 1959 S.C 149) is pressed into service:—

    “It is obsolutely clear on a perusal of Article 13 (2) of the Constitution that it is a constitutional mandate to the State and no citizen can by any act or conduct relieve the State of the solemn obligation imposed on it by Article 13(2) and no distinctiion can be made a all between the fundamental rights enacted for the benefit of the individual and those enacted in the public interest or on grounds of public policy.”

    29. In the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. Brojo Nath Ganguly reported in (1986 3 S.C.C 156), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the terms of contract of employment which is unfair unconscionable and against the fundamental rights is void even if it is accepted by the employees. In the said decision, one of the terms in the contract, namely, that even the service of the permanent employee can be terminated by notice with 3 months salary. Likewise the workman can also leave the employer by adopting the same method. The said clause was considered by the Supreme Court. After highlighting the entire case laws from United States, United Kingdom as well as earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, Their Lordships after posing so many questions, have concluded thus:— (page 215 in para 89)

    “Should then our courts not advance with the times? Should they still continue to cling to outmoded concepts and outworn ideologies? Should we not adjust our thinking caps to match the fashion of the clay? Should all jurisprudential development pass us by, leaving us floundering in the sloughs of 19th Century theorities? Should the strong be permitted to push the weak to the wall? Should they be allowed to ride roughtshod over the weak? Should the Courts sit back and watch supinely while the strong strample underfoot the rights of the weak? We have a Constitution for our country. Our Judges are bound by their oath to “uphold the Constitution and the laws”. The Constitution was enacted to secure to all the citizens of this Country social and economic justice. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws. The principle deducible from the above discussions on this part of the case is in consonance with right and reason, intended to secure social and economic justice and conforms to the mandate of the great equality clause in Article 14. This principle is that the Courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power. It is difficult to give an exhaustive list of all bargains of this type. No court can vizualize the different situations which can arise in the affairs of men. One can only attempt to give some illustrations. For instance, the above principle will apply where the inequality of bargaining power is the result of the great disparity in the economic strength of the contracting parties. It will apply where the inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the parties or not. It will apply to situations in which the weaker party is in a position in which he can obtain goods or services or means of livelihood only upon the terms imposed by the stronge party or go without them. It will also apply where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a caluse in that contract or form or rules may be. This principle, however, will not apply where the bargaining power of the contracting parties is equal or almost equal. This principle may not apply where both parties are businessmen and the contract is a commercial transaction. In to-day's complex world of giant corporations with their vast infrastructural organisations and with the State through its instrumentalities and agencies entering into almost every branch of industry and commerce, there can be myraid situations which result in unfair and unreasonable bargains between parties possessing wholly disproportionate and unequal bargaining power. These cases can neither be enumerated nor fully illustrated. The Court must judge each case on its own facts and circumstances.”

    I have already observed that at the time of passing of the impugned Government Order, even according to the Government, there were thousands of qualified trained Secondary Grade Teachers waiting for employment. In such a situation, they have no other option except to accept and abide by all conditions mentioned in the agreement. Even though the said agreement is to be executed by the School Management and the teacher, the terms and conditions have been drafted and formulated by the Education Department of the Government. Undoubtedly, the unemployed teachers are in a position of inequality in bargaining power which is the result of great disparity in the economic strength of the contracting parties. In other words, among the two, one of the parties namely, the Secondary Grade (Junior) Teacher is a weaker party and he has no choice but to give his assent to a contract and to sign the same in token of his acceptance, however, unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules as observed in the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation case (cited supra).

    Asking the weaker party to execute an agreement which contains unconscionable clauses is void and not binding. In such a situation, this Court is competent to strike down the unfair and unreasonable terms in the agreement entered into between the parties who are not equal in bargaining power. This position has been enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following decisions:—

    i) AIR 1986 S.C 1573, Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Brojo/Nath.

    ii) AIR 1991 S.C 101 (Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress).

    iii) AIR 1998 S.C 1681 (Uptrol India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhaki)

    Even though it is stated by the learned Additional Advocate General that the said agreement is only between the teacher and the School Management, for the reasons mentioned above, irrespective of the agreement, I am of the view that the teachers are entitled to challenge the impugned Government Orders as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. Accordingly, the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners on this aspect are well-founded.

    30. The learned Additional Advocate General by pointing Out the provisions relating to sanctioning of grant or aid, would contend that the Government is well within their power to regulate with regard to the grants or aid and that in a given situation grant or aid can be reduced. In support ot the above contention, he very much relied on an unreported decision of P. Shanmugam, J., in Writ Petition No. 6781/93 etc., batch dated 22.3.1999, a decision of S.S Subramani, J. in W.P No. 8588/95 etc., batch dated 25.8.98 and in North Arcot Ambedkhar and Samburvarayar District Recognised Private Aided Primary and Middle Schools Managers and Teacher-Managers Association v. Ttie Sate of Tamil Nadu ((1999) I M.L.J 635)

    I have already extracted the relevant provisions from the Act and Rules relating to sanctioning of grant/aid. Even though the learned counsel for the petitioners have contended that it is not open to the Government to reduce the grant or do away with the payment of grant or aid, the provisions contained in Section 14 of the Act and Rule 11 of the Rules undoubtedly support the stand taken by the learned Additional Advocate General. In other words, in a given situation, it is open to the Government to refuse to provide grant or aid to a particular Institution. Considering the grievance of the petitioners who are mostly teachers, I am of the view that it is unnecessary to go into the said aspect in detail in these Writ Petitions. No doubt, some of the Managements have also filed Writ Petitions questioning the very same Government Orders. If the other points are acceptable, it is unnecessary to go into the said aspect. Further, it is stated that against all the decisions, namely W.P No. 6781/93 etc., batch dated 22.3.1999 (St. Stephen Middle School v. State of Tamil Nadu); W.P No. 8588/95 etc., batch (North Arcot Ambedhkar and Sambtivarayar District Registered Private Aided Primary and Middle Schools Manager and Teacher-Managers Association v. The State of Tamil Nadu dated 25.8.98 and 1999-I-M.L.J page 635 (cited supra), Writ Appeals have been filed. Even otherwise, after going through those decisions, I am of the view that they are not directly applicable to the issues in our cases. W.P No. 6781/93 etc., batch dated 22.3.99 (cited supra) relate to payment of grant to Education Institutions. The learned single Judge of this Court has upheld the stand of the Government, viz., its inability to provide financial assistance to private schools in view of the present financial position. The question raised in W.P No. 8588/95 etc., batch dated 25.8.98 (cited supra) relates to payment of salary to a teacher appointed in a leave vacancy. In the light of the factual position, I am of the view that those decisions are not helpful to either of the parties. In 1999-I-M.L.J 635 (cited supra), the question that was decided relates to fixation of staff strength which we are not concerned in the present batch of Writ Petitions. By pointing out a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in C. Stephenson Roobasingh v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (1993 Wru L.R 544), it is contended on behalf of the respondents that power to issue directions rests with the Government. Absolutely there is no dispute with regard to the competency of the Government in the matter of implementation of various Acts and Rules framed thereunder. At the same time, it is to be seen whether the statutory provisions or Constitutional mandate are violated while exercising such power.

    31.”Learned Additional Advocate General by relying on a decision in the case of Union of India v. No. 664950 IM Havildar/Clerk (1999 3 S.C.C 709), would contend that the impugned Government Orders create equality among the particular group of persons and absolutely there is no discrimination or arbitrariness. In the said desicion, the benefit of study leave not making available to the other category of officers except commissioned officers in the Army was challenged as violative of Articles 14 and 16. In reply to the said contention, it is seen from the particulars furnished by the Army Authorities that for officers of other ranks, there are other institutions where courses are conducted for these categories of personnel and by sending them for these courses, proper care is taken to ensure efficiency in the Armed Forces. In fact, the petitioner therein had admitted that two weeks' computer course in Jodhpur University was organised by the Army Authorities. Apart from this, it has also been stated in the counter that there cannot be any dispute that the character and duties of Junior Commissioned Officers and Noncommissioned Officers are different as compared to that of Regular Commissioned Officers. In such circumstance, on the facts of that case, Their Lordships have concluded that if the competent authority thought it fit and proper that the case for study leave for commissioned Officers should be considered and this benefit should not be given to other categories of officers, as for this category Army Authorities take adequate care for training them in their own institutions or outside, it cannot be said that the impugned Order No. 11 of 1987 is arbitrary or irrational. The facts in that decision are distinguishable and the same cannot be applied to the facts of our cases. I have already demonstrated that down-grading the post of Secondary Grade Teacher as Secondary Grade (Junior) Teacher and asking both of them, namely, the existing Secondary Grade Teacher and the newly appointed Secondary Grade (Junior) Teacher doing same work, however, on a consolidated pay of Rs. 800/- p.m is not founded on intelligible differntia and the same has no relation with the object sought to be achieved. Broadly speaking, the concept of equality has an inherent limitation arising from the very nature of the guarantee under the Constitution and those who are similarly circumstanced are entitled to enual treatment. If there is a rational classification consistent with the purpose tor which such classification was made, equality is not violated. Article 16 of the Constitution does not bar a reasonable classification of employees or reasonable tests for selection. Equality of opportunity of employment means equality as between the members of the same class of employees and not equality between the members of separate independent classes. Thus it could be held that Article 14 read with Article 16(1) accords right to an equality or an equal treatment consistent with the principles of natural justice. In other words, an employee in a public employment also must not be arbitrarily, unjustly and unreasonably be deprived of his/her livelihood which is ensured in continued employment till it is terminated in accordance with just, fair and reasonable procedure. Otherwise any law or rule in violation thereof is void. Though there are certain details in the counter affidavit of the first respondent such as policy decision of the Government, paucity of fund, giving employment avenue to the unemployed candidates, etc., nothing has been elicited in the impugned Government Orders. As observed by the Division Bench of this Court in K. Arunachalam v. State (AIR 1997 Madras 412), an order has to be sustained on the reasons given in the order and not on the basis of the subsequent reasons given in the counter affidavit. Like wise, even though it is stated in many places that the first impugned order as well as the subsequent orders were emanated in view of the policy decision of the Government, it is settled law that even the policy decision cannot violate the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, it is worthwhile to refer a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in K. Narayanan v. State of Karataka (1994 Supp (1) S.C.C 44) wherein Their Lordships have held thus:—

    “… A policy decision taken by the Government is not liable to interference, unless the Court is satisfied that the rule-making authority has acted arbitrarily or in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 …”

    I have already demonstrated how the impugned order is violative of Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) of the Constitution of India.

    32. It is also held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1986-I-L.L.J 403 (cited supra). that in terms of Article 39 of the Constitution of India equal pay for equal work should be paid from the date of employment and the Government cannot postpone the equal pay to a later date.

    33. Though all appointments for the post of Secondary Grade Teachers and other posts were brought into regular scales of pay with effect from 1.9.1992 in G.O.Ms No. 20, Education Department dated 8.1.1993 and G.O.Ms 495 Education-Mi-Department dated 19.5.93, the monetary benefits were given only from 9.4.96 i.e, the date of the order, No. 279 Education dated 9.4.96 For the reasons mentioned in the earlier paragraphs, I hold that all the persons for whom appointments were made under G.O.Ms No. 1524. Education dated 12.11.90 and G.O.Ms No. 1669, Education dated 13.12.90 be given regular scale of pay from the respective date of appointment and they are also entitled monetary benefits fromm the date of their respective initial appointment. No reason was assigned in G.O.Ms No. 279, Education dated 9.4.96 and G.O.Ms No. 5 Education dated 6.1.97 for giving monetary benefit only with effect from 9.4.96, when all the teachers and other persons, appointed earlier, are getting time scale of pay and performing the same work. Though the Government after realising the mistake, brought all those persons into regular scale of pay with effect from 1.9.92, the reasons for giving monetary benefit from 9.4.96 is not explained. In the absence of any reason, the action of the Government cannot be sustained. As a matter of fact, learned Additional Advocate General is also not in a position to sustain the order giving monetary benefit from 9.4.96 As observed in 1986-I-L.L.J 403 (cited supra), in terms of Article 39(d), equal pay for equal work should be paid from the date of employment and without any reason much less acceptable reason, and the Government cannot postpone the equal pay and fix a future date arbitrarily..

    34. Under these circumstances, the impugned Government Orders down-grading the posts of Secondary Grade Teacher and Specialist Teacher drawing Secondary Grade scale of pay as Secondary Grade (Junior Teacher and Specialist Teacher (Junior/respectively on consolidated emoluments of Rs. 800/- per month in Government, Local Body (Municipal/Corporation/Panchayat Union) and Aided schools in the year 1990-91 on account of retirement, resignation, death etc., are void. All appointments made in pursuance of the impugned Government Orders shall be treated as regular appointments and the petitioners are entitled to regular time-scale of pay with effect from the date of their respective initial appointments and not from the date as indicated in the Government Orders. The impugned Government Orders and other orders/proceedings issued thereto are quashed. Consequently all the Writ Petitions are allowed. No costs in all the Writ Petitions. All the interim petitions are closed.

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