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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns a criminal original petition under which the petitioner seeks to quash proceedings pending as C.C No. 1476 of 1998 before the XIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras. A private complaint had been preferred by the respondent alleging that Alsa Constructions and Housing Ltd. (the first accused), its managing director (second accused, Salim Pasha) and other directors committed an offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The complaint alleges that two cheques were issued by the second accused (dated 26 February 1997 for Rs. 10,00,000 and 14 June 1997 for Rs. 20,00,000) towards liabilities of the company arising from bill-discounting facilities provided by the complainant. The complaint states that Salim Pasha signed the cheques as managing director and acted as per instructions of accused Nos. 3 to 8 (directors). The petitioner, who is arrayed as the sixth accused and a director of the company, filed the present quash petition contending that (a) he is not the drawer of the cheques, (b) the complaint does not specify his involvement in issuing the cheques, and (c) the complaint is silent regarding his role in management or day-to-day affairs so as to attract section 141(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The court heard both sides and delivered the impugned order dismissing the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the averment in the complaint that the petitioner “is in charge of the day-to-day affairs” of the first accused company is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 141(1) (and, as framed in argument, section 141(2)) of the Negotiable Instruments Act for prosecuting a director for an offence under section 138.
  2. Whether specific averments describing an overt act by the director are necessary in the complaint to summon and prosecute a director under section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner is not the drawer of the cheques and there are no specific averments in the complaint showing his involvement in issuing the cheques.
  • The complaint is silent about the petitioner's role in the management or day-to-day affairs of the company; therefore the essential element required to prosecute a director under section 141(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act is lacking.
  • Counsel for the petitioner argued that, because there are no averments detailing any overt act committed by the petitioner, section 138 is not attracted against him and relied on State of Haryana v. Brij Lal Mittal.

Respondent / Complainant's Case (as reflected in the complaint)

  • The complaint alleges that the second accused issued the cheques in his capacity as managing director and as per instructions of the directors (accused Nos. 3 to 8).
  • The complainant specifically averred that the petitioner (sixth accused) is a director “in charge of the day-to-day affairs” of the first accused company.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Haryana v. Brij Lal Mittal, [1998] 93 Comp Cas 329 (SC) : (1998) 5 SCC 343 : AIR 1998 SC 2327 Cited for the proposition (in a Drugs & Cosmetics Act context) that where there are no averments that directors were in charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of its business, there is no basis to infer vicarious liability of directors from mere presumption. The petitioner relied on this decision to argue that absence of specific averments defeats prosecution of directors. The court referred to this authority but distinguished the present case on the basis of the actual averment in the complaint that the petitioner was in charge of day-to-day affairs.
Natasha Singh v. Klen and Marshalls Manufacturers and Exporters P. Ltd., [1999] 96 Comp Cas 538 Explains the distinction between sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of section 141: under sub-section (1) persons in charge and responsible may attract a deeming/presumption; under sub-section (2) persons not shown to be in charge can still be prosecuted if consent, connivance or neglect is alleged and proved (no presumption available under sub-section (2)). Also illustrates that specific averments of responsibility for non-payment can bring directors within s.141(2). The court relied on this decision to reinforce the statutory distinction and to support its conclusion that the averment of being in charge of day-to-day affairs satisfies section 141(1) and justifies summoning the director; it noted that under s.141(1) a presumption can arise and may be rebutted by the accused under the proviso.
Unreported judgment: A. Ramamurthi J., Crl. O.P No. 11316 of 1999 dated October 11, 1999 (cited in the opinion) Cited as an instance where factual material was considered to determine whether a director was in charge of or responsible for the company's day-to-day affairs; illustrates that such determinations may turn on factual evidence. The court cited this unreported decision to note that factual inquiries can be determinative and that absence of material to infer charge/responsibility can lead to quashing on facts; but distinguished it as being decided on its particular factual matrix.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reproducing and analysing section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (both sub-sections (1) and (2) together with the proviso and explanation). The court emphasized three aspects evident from the section as read: (i) the company is liable; (ii) every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business, is deemed guilty (subject to the proviso allowing rebuttal by proof of lack of knowledge or exercise of due diligence); and (iii) sub-section (2) extends liability to directors, managers, secretaries or other officers if the offence is shown to have been committed with their consent or connivance, or is attributable to their neglect.

The court noted the legal effect of the deeming/prospective presumption in sub-section (1) and that the proviso permits a person to rebut that presumption by proving want of knowledge or exercise of due diligence. The court further explained that sub-section (2) “widens the scope” because it allows prosecution of persons who may not have been expressly in charge if consent, connivance or neglect is proved, but that the presumption under sub-section (1) is not available under sub-section (2).

Addressing the core question, the court examined whether the averment in the complaint (that the petitioner is a director "in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the first accused company") is sufficient for the purposes of section 141(1) or whether the complaint must contain specific averments of overt acts by the director. The court observed that where such an averment is made in the complaint that the directors were in charge and responsible for day-to-day affairs, prima facie a case for summoning the accused directors is made out. The court further held that it is not permissible for the High Court in a quashing petition to go into the factual minutiae at that stage to conclude the director was not in charge; such factual inquiries are for the trial court. The court relied on the distinction drawn in Natasha Singh and on the cited authorities to conclude that the averment of being in charge of day-to-day affairs is sufficient to satisfy section 141(1).

Consequently, the court held that it was not necessary for the complainant to aver the specific overt act of the petitioner as a director; the mere averment that he is a director and in charge of the company's affairs sufficed to attract the deeming provision in section 141(1), subject to the petitioner's right to rebut under the proviso. The court therefore declined to quash the proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The criminal original petition is dismissed. Consequently, Crl. M.P. Nos. 10794 and 10799 of 1999 are also dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The proceedings in C.C No. 1476 of 1998 against the company and its directors (including the petitioner) are not quashed and will proceed; the trial court may determine the liability of other directors.
  • Burden and process: An averment in a complaint that a person is a director "in charge of the day-to-day affairs" is, in the court's view, sufficient at the prima facie stage to invoke the deeming provision in section 141(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act; it is then for the accused to rebut the presumption under the proviso at the appropriate stage.
  • No broader precedent beyond the decision: The opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond applying existing statutory interpretation and cited authorities; the decision turns on the sufficiency of the averments in the complaint and leaves factual determinations to the trial court.

    R. Kannan v. Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd.

    B. Akbar Basha Khadiri, J.:— The instant criminal original petition is to quash the proceedings pending in C.C No. 1476 of 1998 on the file of the XIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras.

    2. This Crl. O.P has arisen in this way:

    3. The respondent herein preferred a private complaint alleging that Alsa Constructions and Housing Ltd., a company and its managing director, chairman and directors have committed an offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. According to the petitioner, the second accused Salim Pasha issued two cheques dated February 26, 1997, for Rs. 10,00,000 and June 14, 1997, for Rs. 20,00,000 towards the liability of the company towards bill discounting facilities given by the complainant to the accused. In the complaint, the complainant had stated that the cheques were issued by the second accused Salim Pasha in his capacity as managing director of the first accused company as per instructions of accused Nos. 3 to 8 herein, who are the directors and in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the first accused company. The petitioner herein is one of the directors of the company, who is arrayed as the sixth accused. He has come forward with the instant quash proceedings contending that he is not the drawer of the cheque and the complainant does not specify any involvement of the petitioner in the alleged issue of the cheques. According to the petitioner, the complaint is silent about the role of the petitioner with regard to management of the first accused company or its day-to-day affairs, and thus the essential element required to prosecute the director under section 141(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act is lacking. Heard both the sides.

    “141. Offences by companies. —(1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:

    Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

    (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.

    Explanation.— For the purposes of this section,—

    (a) ‘company’ means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and

    (b) ‘director’ in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.”

    4. A reading of the section would go to show that (i) the company is liable, (ii) the person who was (a) in charge, (b) responsible to the company, and (c) for the conduct of the business of the company, is liable; and (iii) other officer of the company including director, manager, secretary or other officer is liable if there had been (a) consent, or (b) connivance, or (c) an act attributable to, or (d) due to negligence on his part.

    5. Admittedly, the petitioner is a director. Admittedly, there is averment in the complaint that he is “in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the first accused “company”. The only question that arises is whether such averment would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of section 141(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act or there should be specific averments as against the petitioner, with respect to his role in the conduct of the affairs of the company on whose behalf the cheque was issued. There is no allegation with respect to the role played by the accused in relation to the commission of the offence by the company.

    6. It is noteworthy that sub-sections (1) and (2) to section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act attach a sort of vicarious liability on such person. A combined reading of sub-section (1) of section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act with the proviso thereto, would show that every person who, at the time when the offence was committed, was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence. There is a deeming provision, but the deeming provision can be rebutted, if such person proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he has exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

    7. Sub-section (2) to section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act widens the scope of the vicarious liability as it lays down that where it is proved that the offence by the company has been committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer, shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. It would thus be clear that an offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is committed by a company or a firm, every director of the company, every partner of the firm and every officer, etc., of the company or the firm shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence, provided at that time when such offence was committed, such person was in charge of, and was responsible to the company or the firm for the conduct of the business of the company or the firm. The proviso to section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act introduces an exception to the rule in the main clause, in that it is for such person to prove that the offence was committed without his knowledge, etc.

    8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that because there are no averments detailing the overt act committed by the petitioner, offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not attracted against him. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a decision in State of Haryana v. Brij Lal Mittal, [1998] 93 Comp Cas 329 (SC) : (1998) 5 SCC 343 : AIR 1998 SC 2327, wherein while dealing with a case under section 34(1) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act (23 of 1940), their Lordships of the apex court had an occasion to deal with a question if there are no averments in the complaint that the accused were in charge of the company and also responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. Their Lordships pointed out that so far as the directors are concerned, there is not even a whisper nor a shred of evidence nor anything to show, apart from the presumption drawn by the complainant, that there is any act committed by the directors from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that they could also be vicariously liable. That was a case which arose under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and there was no whisper in the complaint to show that the directors were in charge of the company and also responsible to the company for the conduct of its business.

    9. Learned counsel for the petitioner also cited another unreported judgment rendered by my learned brothef A. Ramamurthi J. in Crl. O.P No. 11316 of 1999 dated October 11, 1999, wherein the noble judge has considered how far the averment that the petitioner therein who was a director, “was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company” would clinch the issue. In that case, there was evidence to show that the director who sought to quash the proceeding on the ground that she was a resident of Nilgiris and the company was at Madras. It was held that there was no material to infer that the petitioner was in charge of or responsible to the company for its day-to-day affairs. That decision was rendered on the factual aspect of the case.

    10. Now, the question is whether the averment that the petitioner is in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the first accused company, would be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of sub-section (1) to section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The company is admittedly situated at Madras. The petitioner is also a resident of Madras, who claims himself to be an auditor and that he has been inducted as a director, but he is not involved in the day-to-day administration of the work.

    11. Where there is averment in the complaint that the directors were in charge of and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company, on the face of the averment in the complaint, prima facie a case for summoning the accused directors had been made out. The liability of the other directors of the company other than the director who signed the cheque can be determined by the trial court. The question is whether this court can go into this aspect whether he was not in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the company. A recent decision in Natasha Singh v. Klen and Marshalls Manufacturers and Exporters P. Ltd., [1999] 96 Comp Cas 538 my learned brother M. Karpagavinayagam J. had an occasion to deal with a similar matter. What has been stated supra by me regarding the distinction that exists between sub-sections (1) and (2) to section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been expressed by the noble judge. The noble judge had stated that sub-section (2) to section 141 starts with the non obstante clause and under sub-section (1) the persons in charge of and responsible to the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence. Under sub-section (2) even persons who are not stated to be in charge of and responsible to the company can be prosecuted, if it is alleged and proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of or attributable to any neglect on the part of any of these persons prosecuted. No doubt, it is true that in the case of prosecution of persons under sub-section (1) to section 141, a presumption of their guilt can be inferred, but the said presumption cannot at all be available under sub-section (2) to section 141. If it is merely mentioned in the complaint that they are director, manager, etc. then the case would have been different. In that case, there were no averments that the directors were in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. The allegations made in that complaint were:

    “The complainant states that the first accused as the company and the second accused as the chairman and authorised signatory of the first accused, the third accused as the managing director of the first accused, the fourth accused as the director of the first accused, the fifth accused as the general manager (finance) of the first accused-company, are responsible for the failure to make payment of the sums claimed under the notice and are guilty of the commission of an offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and are liable to be punished therefor.”

    12. The learned judge pointed out that besides stating about the position which the accused held, it was specifically mentioned in the complaint that they were responsible for the non-payment of the cheque amount after receipt of notice within the statutory period, which alone would create the offence. The learned judge pointed out that in the context of those allegations mentioned in the complaint, it cannot be stated that there were no averments that the offence was committed with the consent of the chairman, managing director and general manager respectively and the averments referring to their position and that they are responsible for failure to make payment of sums claimed under the notice and therefore are guilty of offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, would be sufficient to bring their case within the fold of section 141(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

    13. In the instant case, the complainant had stated in the complaint that the petitioner is a director in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the first accused company. This averment is sufficient to satisfy the provision of section 141(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. I feel, it is not necessary that the petitioner should specifically aver the overt act committed by the petitioner as a director of the company. The mere fact that he is a director is sufficient to show that he is responsible for the affairs of the company and it is for him to prove that he comes within the proviso to section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This criminal original petition is therefore dismissed. Consequently, Crl. M.P Nos. 10794 and 10799 of 1999 are also dismissed.

    sub-section (2) to section 141

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    R. Kannan v. Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd.
    (Nov 3, 2000)