Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

C.R.P No. 1612 of 1989 and C.M.P No. 4489 of 1995

Advocates

For the Appellant: V. Natarajan, for . K.R. Thiagarajan for Respondent.
For the Respondent: V. Natarajan, for . K.R. Thiagarajan for .

Judges

A.R Lakshmanan, J.

Acts

S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision arises from a landlady's challenge to an Appellate Authority's reversal of an eviction order originally granted by the Rent Controller. The landlady purchased the property on 11-1-1983 from her aunt; at purchase three tenants were in occupation, including the respondent (the tenant in these proceedings). She filed three eviction petitions (one against each tenant) under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, claiming owner's occupation. The Rent Controller ordered eviction of the respondent (R.C.O.P No. 46 of 1985) on 23-1-1987. Two other tenants subsequently vacated their portions and the landlady occupied those portions. The tenant appealed to the Appellate Authority (R.C.A No. 43 of 1987) and sought appointment of a Commissioner, who reported that the landlady was occupying a portion vacated by the other tenants. The Appellate Authority reversed the Rent Controller, finding the landlady was occupying part of the building and that the portion she occupied was sufficient for her family. The landlady filed the present civil revision and an application to raise additional grounds (referred to in the opinion as C.M.P No. 4489 — the opinion refers at different points to 1995 and later to 1994 for the C.M.P number). The revision challenges the Appellate Authority's reversal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Appellate Authority was justified in reversing the Rent Controller's eviction order on the basis of the landlady's subsequent occupation of parts of the premises during pendency of proceedings.
Whether a landlord who, at the time of filing, lacked accommodation but later acquired and occupied portions of the premises during pendency, is thereby disentitled to relief originally sought under S. 10(3)(a)(i) and/or to claim relief for additional accommodation under S. 10(3)(c) of the Act.
Whether the landlady could be permitted to raise additional grounds (seek relief under S. 10(3)(c) for additional accommodation) at the revisional stage and whether any delay in raising such grounds disentitles her to do so.
Whether the Appellate Authority correctly assessed the sufficiency of the portion occupied by the landlady and whether it complied with the mandatory requirement of comparing hardship and advantage to the parties.
Whether non-production of documentary proof (such as a sale deed) was fatal to the landlady's case.

Arguments of the Parties

Landlady's Arguments (Revision Petitioner)

The Appellate Authority's finding that the landlady was not residing in a rented premises and its reversal of the Rent Controller's order, despite no legal proof to contradict the Rent Controller's findings, is contrary to law and unsustainable.
Filing of an earlier application by the vendor of the landlady is not a bar to the present application.
The Appellate Authority erred in determining that the portion occupied by the landlady was more than sufficient; that finding was beyond its proper scope and should be set aside.
The landlady sought to raise additional grounds (C.M.P No. 4489) to claim relief under S. 10(3)(c) for additional accommodation following subsequent events (vacation of two tenants and her occupation of those portions).

Tenant's Arguments (Respondent)

The Appellate Authority's order is well reasoned and should not be interfered with by this Court.
The landlady did not place before the Court proof of her occupation of the rented premises (arguing absence of documents such as a sale deed or proof of renting).
The landlady's claim for owner's occupation is not bona fide because she already occupied two portions vacated by other tenants; non-production of sale deed is alleged to be fatal to the landlady's case.
The tenant objected to entertaining the belated additional grounds application at the revisional stage.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
K. Ganesan v. K. Padmavathi Ammal, (1987) 100 Mad LW 381 : AIR 1989 NOC 137	That subsequent events (the landlord coming into possession of some accommodation during pendency of eviction proceedings) do not automatically disentitle the landlord to relief for owner's occupation; the court must examine entitlement to relief on the facts established rather than be prevented by such subsequent events.	The court relied on this authority to support its view that the landlady's subsequent occupation of some portions during pendency did not disentitle her to relief originally sought and that she could seek relief under S. 10(3)(c) for additional accommodation; this precedent informed the court's allowance of the belated additional-ground application and the setting aside of the Appellate Authority's order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a fact-based assessment of the pleadings, evidence and subsequent events and applied the applicable legal principles as follows:

Evidence assessment: The landlady testified (as PW1) that she was living in rented premises (Door No. 7) paying Rs. 200 per month and that she did not own any other house. The tenant did not elicit contrary facts in cross-examination to discredit that testimony. On re-examination the landlady stated two tenants had vacated during the pendency and she occupied those portions. The tenant's evidence contested bona fides and production of documents but did not specifically repel the landlady's evidence that she had been living in a rented house.
Subsequent events: The Court held that subsequent events which occurred before final adjudication can be considered. The landlady was not in possession of any premises of her own at the time of filing; she later occupied portions vacated by other tenants. The Court found that such subsequent occupation does not automatically disentitle her to relief and that she can pursue relief under a different sub-section (S. 10(3)(c)) given the changed circumstances.
Amendment / belated grounds: The Court permitted the landlady to raise additional grounds (C.M.P No. 4489) at the revisional stage, rejecting the tenant's objection to the belated filing. The court reasoned that entertaining the application avoided multiplicity of proceedings and unnecessary litigation expenses and that courts in similar matters had allowed such requests.
On the Appellate Authority's approach: The Court found two main errors in the Appellate Authority's approach: (a) it treated the landlady's subsequent occupation as a ground to deny relief without properly considering the legal effect of subsequent events; and (b) it concluded that the portion already in the landlady's occupation was "sufficient" without undertaking the mandatory comparative assessment of hardship and advantage to the parties. The Court emphasized that it is not for the tenant (or the Court in that manner) to dictate which portion the landlord should occupy and that the sufficiency determination must follow proper legal analysis.
Precedential support: Relying on the cited case (K. Ganesan v. K. Padmavathi Ammal), the Court reiterated that the law does not permit a claim to be thrown out merely because the landlord acquired some accommodation during pendency; the entitlement to relief must be determined on established facts and applicable legal provisions.
Substantive conclusion: The Court concluded that the landlady's original petition was maintainable when filed and that, in view of subsequent events, she was entitled to maintain an application for additional accommodation under S. 10(3)(c). For these reasons, the Court considered the Appellate Authority's reversal unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court's dispositive order is that the revision and the additional-ground application are allowed. Specifically:

Result: The Civil Revision Petition and C.M.P No. 4489 (as referred to in the opinion) are allowed and the order of the Appellate Authority is set aside.

Consequences and practical effects:

The Rent Controller's eviction order (previously reversed by the Appellate Authority) is effectively restored by setting aside the Appellate Authority's order.
There will be no order as to costs.
After pronouncement, the tenant's counsel sought time to vacate; the Court directed that any request for time will be considered upon the tenant filing an affidavit of undertaking within three weeks.

The opinion applies an existing precedent regarding consideration of subsequent events; it does not purport to announce a novel legal principle beyond the application of that precedent and the statutory provisions cited (S. 10(3)(a)(i) and S. 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960). The opinion does not elaborate broader implications beyond the immediate effect on the parties in this case.

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S. Balamani v. V. Periaswami .

1. The landlady has preferred the above revision against the order of the Appellate Authority reversing the order of the Rent Controller ordering eviction. The landlady originally filed the petition for eviction for owner's occupation under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) since she was residing in a rental premises. She purchased the property in question on 11-1-1983 from her aunt. When she purchased the same, the property was under the occupation of three tenants including the respondent herein. She filed three R.C.O.Ps, against the three tenants for eviction on the ground of owner's occupation. The petition filed against the respondent herein is R.C.O.P No. 46 of 1985. The Rent Controller ordered eviction on 23-1-1987. In the meanwhile, two tenants by name Ramachandra and Mahalingam have vacated the portions in their occupation. Thereupon, the landlady occupied the portions vacated by the two tenants.

2. Against the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, the tenant/respondent herein filed R.C.A No. 43 of 1987 before the Appellate Authority/Subordinate Judge, Madurai. The tenant has also filed a petition for appointment of a Commissioner before the Appellate Authority to find out as to whether the landlady was occupying her own house or residing in a rental premises. The Commissioner filed a report stating that the landlady has been in occupation of a portion of her own premises which was vacated by the tenants Ramachandran and Mahalingam. On this subsequent event, the Appellate Authority has reversed the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller on the ground that the landlady is occupying a portion of her own premises and that the portion under her occupation is more than sufficient for her family. Aggrieved against the order of the Appellate Authority, the landlady has filed the present revision. I have heard Mr. V. Natarajan for the landlady/revision petitioner and Mr. K.R Thiagarajan for the tenant/respondent.

3. According to Mr. V. Natarajan, the finding of the Appellate Authority that the landlady is not residing in a rented premises, in the absence of any legal proof contrary to the findings of the Rent Controller is against law and not sustainable, and that the Appellate Authority has erred in reversing the well reasoned order of the Rent Controller. It is also further contended that filing of earlier application by the vendor of the landlady cannot at all be a bar for the present application being filed. Therefore, Mr. V. Natarajan contended that the entire approach of the Appellate Authority is patently wrong and that the further finding of the Appellate Authority that the portion in the occupation of the landlady is more than sufficient for her is beyond the scope of the Appellate Authority and, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside.

4. Mr. K.R Thiagarajan, on the other hand, contended that the order of the Appellate Authority is a well reasoned one and that the same is not liable to be interfered with by this Court. He would also submit that the landlady has not placed before Court any proof in regard to her occupation of the rental premises.

5. I have carefully gone through the entire pleadings and the documents filed by both parties and of the evidence tendered. It is seen from the eviction petition filed by the landlady that she was in occupation of Door No. 7, Bharathiar Road, Madurai-10. Admittedly, she filed three eviction petitions against the respondent herein and two other tenants. The petitions were filed under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act for owner's occupation of the entire premises under the occupation of the three tenants in Door No. 8-A, Bharathiar Road, Madurai-10. The landlady has specifically stated that she purchased the house bearing Door No. 8-A, Bharathiar Road under the occupation of the tenants for her own use and that she and her children are living in a rented house and that, therefore, the building in question is absolutely necessary for the purpose of their own occupation and, therefore, the respondent/tenant is liable to be evicted.

6. The tenant filed a statement of objection denying the allegations contained in the eviction petition. Though it is contended by Mr. K.R Thiagarajan that there is no proof to show that the landlady is occupying Door No. 7, Bharathiar Road, Madurai-10, the same has not been specifically denied by the tenant in his statement of objections. The tenant has also denied the purchase of the property in question by the landlady for her own use. The tenant has further stated that the landlady is having her own house and is living there.

7. The landlady examined herself as PW 1. In the chief-examination, she has specifically stated that she is living in a rented house by paying a sum of Rs. 200/- by way of rent. Even though the tenant has denied the landlady's occupation of a rented premises, nothing has been elicited from the landlady in cross-examination to discredit her specific evidence in chief-examination. Even in cross-examination the landlady has specifically stated that she does not own any other house and that she is not occupying her own house. She was recalled on 1-12-1986 and in the re-examination she deposed that Ramachandran and Mahalingam have vacated the portions in their occupation during the pendency of the proceedings in Court and that she filed the eviction petition for her own occupation. The tenant examined himself as RW1. According to him, the claim of the landlady for her own occupation is not bona fide, that the has no knowledge about the landlady living in a rented house and that the landlady, her mother and brother are not living in a rented house.

8. As stated above, the tenant filed the appeal before the Appellate Authority and contended that the landlady is residing only in a rented house and that the finding of the Rent Controller, in the absence of any document or proof of her occupation of a rental premises is absolutely wrong. It is also contended that no sale deed or any other document has been produced by the landlady and that the non-production of the same is fatal to her case. It is further alleged that the landlady is already in occupation of two portions, which were vacated by the other two tenants and, therefore, her claim for occupation of the portion under the occupation of the tenant cannot at all be considered as bona fide.

9. During the pendency of the revision, the landlady filed G.M.P No. 4489 of 1995 to raise additional grounds. The same was served on the counsel for the tenant on 16-3-1995. The tenant has not filed any counter to the same. However, the learned counsel for the tenant very strongly objects to the petition being entertained at this belated stage.

10. It is well settled that any subsequent event can be taken into account before the final adjudication of the matter by this Court. As already stated, the landlady was not in possession of any premises of her own when she filed the eviction petition. According to her, she was occupying a rental premises. Thereupon, she purchased the entire house on 11-1-1983 for her occupation. At that time, there were three tenants occupying three different portions. Therefore, the landlady filed three petitions for eviction of the tenants for her own occupation. During the pendency of the proceedings, two of the tenants have admittedly vacated the premises. Since two of the tenants have vacated, the order of eviction was passed against the present respondent alone by the Rent Controller. The landlady occupied the portions vacated by the two other tenants. Since she intends to occupy the portion now in the possession of the respondent herein also, she filed the present application C.M.P No. 4489 of 1995 for raising additional grounds in view of the subsequent event of her occupation of the two portions vacated by the two tenants in the very same premises. In similar matters, this Court has entertained and allowed such requests. I shall deal with the authority on this point later.

11. When the landlady filed the petition for owner's occupation under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act, the Rent Controller has ordered eviction on the established facts. The subsequent event, therefore, in my opinion, would not disentitle the landlady to get the relief against the present respondent for seeking relief under S. 10(3)(c) of the Act. As already seen, the landlady filed three eviction petitions for her own occupation of the entire premises bearing Door No. 8-A, Bharathiar Street, Madurai-10. Now that the two tenants have vacated the premises under their occupation, the landlady has occupied those portions. In my opinion, the landlady is entitled to maintain this application in view of the changed subsequent circumstances. Therefore, I allow C.M.P No. 4489 of 1995 for the reasons to be stated infra.

12. In fact, the Appellate Authority has taken the subsequent event of the landlady occupying a part of the building into consideration and reversed the finding of the Rent Controller ordering eviction. Of course, as pointed out by Mr. K.R Thiagarajan, the landlady would have filed this application even before the Appellate Authority or at least in this Court immediately after the filing of the revision. However, the non-filing of the petition before the Appellate Authority or before this Court earlier will not, in my opinion, disentitle the landlady from moving such petition at this stage. I, therefore, reject the objection raised by the learned counsel for the tenant.

13. The Appellate Authority, as pointed out by Mr. V. Natarajan, has considered the ground of additional accommodation and held that the part of the building in her occupation is sufficient. In my opinion, it is not for the Court or for the tenant to say which portion should be occupied by the landlord or the portion available or already occupied by the landlord is sufficient or not. As such, the present application filed by the landlady by raising additional ground viz., requiring the premises in question for additional accommodation, in my view, would not cause any prejudice to the tenant.

14. The following are the additional grounds raised by the landlady:

(a) The landlady requires the part of the premises under the occupation of the tenant for additional accommodation for residential purpose under S. 10(3)(c) of the Act.

(b) The findings of the Appellate Authority that the part of the premises under the occupation of the landlady is sufficient are against law and not sustainable.

(c) The Appellate Authority has failed to consider the mandatory requirement of finding out the comparative hardship and advantages to the tenant and the landlady. As such, the order of the Appellate Authority is to be set aside.

15. As pointed out by Mr. V. Natarajan, the Appellate Authority has totally failed to consider the mandatory requirement of finding out the comparative hardship and advantages to the tenant and the landlady. As such, the order of the Appellate Authority is liable to be set aside. Likewise, the finding of the Appellate Authority that the part of the premises under the occupation of the landlady is sufficient is also not sustainable. In an identical matter, M.N Chandurkar, C.J, in K. Ganesan v. K. Padmavathi Ammal, (1987) 100 Mad LW 381 : (AIR 1989 NOC 137) has considered the Court's power in taking into account the subsequent events. That was also a case of the landlady coming into possession of some accommodation during the pendency of her eviction petition. The Court held that that cannot be a ground for disentitling her the relief of eviction on the ground of requirement for owner's occupation. I am also of the view that it would not be proper for the tenant to say that merely because the landlady has secured some accommodation during the pendency of the litigation before the Appellate Authority, her claim which was originally determined with reference to the provisions of Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act must be thrown out at this stage. M.N Chandurkar, C.J, has also pointed out that the provision of law mentioned in the petition does not determine either the nature of the proceedings or the nature of the relief to be granted to a party and that it is the duty of the Court to find out whether on facts established a party is entitled to any relief or not.

16. Therefore, even though originally the petition for eviction was made under Sec. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act on the ground that the landlady did not have any accommodation of her own and that she was living in a tented premises, the order of eviction cannot be interfered with merely on the ground that subsequently the landlady has come into possession of some accommodation even though that accommodation does not fully meet the need of the landlady. Here also, there is no doubt that the petition as framed originally when it was made was clearly maintainable because at that time the landlady was not in occupation of any premises of her own, and according to her, she was in occupation of a rented premises bearing Door No. 7, Bharathiar Road, Madurai-10. Therefore, I am of the view, that the present application is maintainable.

17. The subsequent event pointed out by me above will certainly entitle the landlady to maintain the application and also ask for relief under Sec. 10(3)(c) of the Act viz., additional accommodation. Allowing the said application would, in my opinion, only meet the ends of justice. The tenant is not prejudiced in any manner if the landlady is allowed to occupy the portion under his occupation. This apart, such petition in my view can be entertained even at the revisional stage in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings between parties and for avoidance of unnecessary litigation expenses. For all the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view, that the order of the Appellate Authority is liable to be set aside.

18. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition and C.M.P No. 4489 of 1994 are allowed and the order of the Appellate Authority is set aside. However, there will be no order as to costs.

19. After the pronouncement of the order, Mr. K.R Thiagarajan, learned counsel for the tenant wanted some time to vacate the premises. His request for grant of time will be considered on his filing an affidavit of undertaking from the tenant within three weeks from today.

20. Order accordingly.

S. Balamani v. V. Periaswami .

Structured Summary of the Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Landlady's Arguments (Revision Petitioner)

Tenant's Arguments (Respondent)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

S. Balamani v. V. Periaswami .

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