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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
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Case Number
Advocates
  • Mr. K. Yamunam for Appellants.
  • Mr. P. Sukumar for Respondents.
Judges
  • Srinivasan
  • Thangamani, JJ.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • Mr. K. Yamunam for Appellants.
  • Mr. P. Sukumar for Respondents.
Judges
  • Srinivasan
  • Thangamani, JJ.
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of Opinion — Thangamani, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant (plaintiff at trial) instituted a suit for specific performance based on an agreement marked Ex. A1 dated 16.1.1973, said to have been entered into with the first defendant Manicka Naicker (since deceased). The appellant stated he conducted a joint family business under the name "Chellaiah Nadar and Sons" and asserted that Ex. A1 provided for the sale of premises bearing Door No. 4, Kalmandapam Road, Royapuram, Madras, for Rs. 57,000/-. According to the appellant, Rs. 22,000/- had been paid as advance and the balance was to be paid and the sale deed registered within eleven months from the agreement date. The appellant claimed occupation of part of the house and authority to collect rents from two other tenants.

The appellant alleged that the first defendant, purportedly in collusion with the third defendant (first respondent) and the appellant's son Chandra Bose, attempted to resile from the agreement. He sent a notice (Ex. A3) on 4.7.1974 and caused a publication (Ex. A2) in the newspaper on 7.7.1974. Despite these actions, defendants 1 and 2 conveyed the property to the fourth defendant (2nd respondent) by a deed marked Ex. B1 dated 11.7.1974. The appellant asserted he had performed his part and was willing to comply with the agreement terms, and that Ex. B1 could not derogate his rights under Ex. A1.

Defendants 1 and 2 denied entering into any agreement with the appellant, asserting the agreement was only with Chandra Bose individually. They said Chandra Bose failed to complete the transaction, released his rights by Ex. B7 dated 25.3.1974, requested return of the advance and surrendered possession; accordingly, the defendants conveyed the property to the fourth defendant by Ex. B1 dated 11.7.1974 and returned the advance to Chandra Bose (receipt Ex. B8). The defendants also alleged that the original agreement differed from the appellant's copy and that the appellant had interpolated or forged the document to make it appear in favour of Chellaiah Nadar and Sons.

The fourth defendant stated he satisfied himself of title and relied on letters from Chandra Bose before acquiring the property. The trial court found that Ex. A1, if genuine, had been executed only in favour of Chandra Bose in his individual capacity, that Chandra Bose later gave it up, and that the appellant lacked funds to complete the sale; on that basis the trial court dismissed the suit with costs. The present appeal challenged that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant was entitled to specific performance of the alleged agreement Ex. A1 dated 16.1.1973 in view of competing claims about the agreement's addressee and authenticity.
  2. Whether the apparent interpolation or forgery of Ex. A1 (as alleged by defendants) and the appellant's conduct disentitle him from the equitable relief of specific performance.
  3. Whether delay and the appellant's lack of funds to complete the transaction affected his right to seek specific performance.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant relied exclusively on Ex. A1 (agreement said to be dated 16.1.1973) as the basis for specific performance, asserting it was entered into between himself (on behalf of Chellaiah Nadar and Sons) and the first defendant.
  • He alleged performance of his obligations under the agreement, readiness and willingness to perform, and that the conveyance by Ex. B1 could not defeat his rights under Ex. A1.
  • He pointed to the notice (Ex. A3) and newspaper publication (Ex. A2) sent/published in July 1974 to assert he had taken steps to enforce his rights.

Defendants' Arguments

  • Defendants 1 and 2 contended they never entered into an agreement with the appellant; the agreement was with Chandra Bose individually.
  • They stated Chandra Bose failed to complete the purchase, released his rights by Ex. B7 dated 25.3.1974, and received return of his advance; possession had been surrendered by Chandra Bose.
  • They alleged the document relied upon by the appellant was forged or interpolated to show it was in favour of Chellaiah Nadar and Sons; this is why the appellant only produced a photostat copy in the civil suit (the original being in criminal proceedings).
  • The fourth defendant maintained he acquired the property after satisfying himself about title and seeking assurance from Chandra Bose.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramasamy v. Venkatachalam, 1976 (1) M.L.J 243 Refusal of specific performance where the plaintiff filed a suit making false allegations; falsity of the case undermines essential elements and disentitles the plaintiff from the discretionary equitable remedy. The court relied on this principle to hold that a plaintiff who advances a false case (or relies on a document with interpolations) cannot claim specific performance; this authority supported refusal of the appellant's claim given doubts about Ex. A1.
Vyapuri v. Vijayan, 1978 T.L.N.J 62 Specific performance is an equitable, discretionary remedy and the court must exercise that discretion according to recognised legal principles; a plaintiff who comes with a false case as to material facts cannot obtain equitable relief. The court applied this rule to reinforce that the appellant's alleged falsification/interpolation of Ex. A1 and the misstatement as to payments and material facts disentitled him from the discretionary relief of specific performance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the documentary and evidentiary foundation of the appellant's claim and the chronology of events leading up to the attempted completion of the sale.

  1. Authenticity and beneficiary of Ex. A1: The court observed substantial doubt as to whether Ex. A1, "as it stands", was the agreement entered into between the parties. The recitals of Ex. A1 indicated the sale deed was to be executed within eleven months from the date of the agreement (a contractual time limit that the court emphasized). The court noted that defendants contended originally the document was executed in favour of Chandra Bose alone and that any alteration to show a benefit to Chellaiah Nadar and Sons was an interpolation.
  2. Failure to complete within contractual time and lack of steps by the appellant: The court noted the eleven-month completion period (the opinion records the terminal date as 16.12.1993 as per the recitals) and found from the appellant's own evidence (P.W.1) that the appellant's son had misappropriated or squandered funds entrusted for the sale, leaving the appellant without means to complete the purchase. The appellant did not request the first defendant for an extension nor promptly press for execution of the deed; notably, he sent notice only to the third defendant (Periasami) on 4.7.1974 and admitted awareness in February 1974 of Periasami's attempts to purchase the property. The court concluded the appellant's delay and inactivity were significant.
  3. Allegation of interpolation/forgery and effect on equitable relief: The court considered authorities (Ramasamy v. Venkatachalam and Vyapuri v. Vijayan) which establish that specific performance is an equitable, discretionary remedy and that a plaintiff who comes with a false case or falsified material will be disentitled to such relief. The court found the appellant's reliance on Ex. A1 appeared to involve interpolation to make it favourable to him and that this, by the cited ratio, was a sufficient ground to refuse specific performance.
  4. Cumulative assessment: Combining the doubts about the document's authenticity, the appellant's unexplained delay and failure to take timely steps, and the equitable principle that falsity disentitles a plaintiff to specific performance, the court held that the trial judge's conclusion rejecting specific performance was justified.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED and the appellant's claim for specific performance was refused; costs were awarded against the appellant.

Implications: The direct effect is that the appellant is denied the remedy of specific performance and the trial court's dismissal of the suit with costs stands affirmed. The opinion applies existing equitable principles (as laid down in the cited authorities) to refuse relief on the facts before the court; it does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle or to create a new precedent beyond application of established authorities.

RR/VCS
Show full summary ...

    G. Chelliah Nadar (Died) And 4 Others v. Periasami Nadar And 3 Others

    JUDGMENT — Thangamani, J.

    The appellant is the plaintiff before the trial court. He instituted the suit for specific performance on the basis of Ex. A1 the agreement dated 16.1.1973 entered with Manicka Naicker the first defendant (since deceased). His case is that he is carrying on joint family business under the name and style of Chellaiah Nadar and Sons. The first defendant acting for himself and on behalf of his wife and the second defendant (since deceased) entered into an agreement with him under Ex. A1 for the sale of the premises bearing Door No. 4, Kalmandapam Road, Royapuram, Madras for Rs. 57,000/- on 18.1.1973 So far the first defendant had received Rs. 22,000/- as advance. As per the agreement the appellant who is in occupation of a portion of the house was authorised to receive rents from the other two tenants in the building. Under the terms of the agreement the balance of the purchase money has to be paid and sale deed registered within 11 months from that date. However, the first defendant in collusion with the third defendant/first respondent and Chandra Bose one of the sons of the appellant attempted to resile from agreement. Thereupon, the appellant sent the original of Ex. A3 notice on 4.7.1974 He also caused a publication to be made in ‘Malai Murasu’ dated 7.7.1974, as per Ex. A2. At the instance of the third defendant first respondent, defendants 1 and 2 have conveyed the property in favour of the 4th defendant/2nd respondent under Ex. B1 dated 11.7.1974 This appellant has performed his part of the contract and he is always ready and willing to comply with the terms of the agreement. Ex. B1 sale deed cannot confer any right, title or interest in derogation of the rights of the appellant under Ex. A1. The 3rd respondent is the legal representative of deceased second defendant.

    2. Defendants 1 and 2 resisted the action pleading that they ever entered into any agreement of sale with the appellant. They did not hand over possession of the suit house to the appellant at any time. Their agreement of sale was only with Chandra Bose, the son of the appellant. Since the latter could not complete the transaction within the stipulated time, he expressed his inability to go through the same and released his rights under Ex. B7 dated 25.3.1974 He requested for the return of the advance amount after selling the suit property to third parties and surrendered possession. Thereupon, these defendants conveyed the property in favour of the fourth defendant under Ex. B1 sale deed dated 11.7.1974 and returned the advance amount paid by the Chandra Bose on the same day. Ex. B8 is a receipt passed by Chandra Bose. They also contended that the original agreement entered into between them and the said Chandra Bose differs from their copy of the agreement. It has been forged by the appellant by adding words suitable to him and the same appears to have been filed in criminal proceedings instituted against him and others for forgery. Obviously for this reason the appellant has instituted the suit with a photostat copy of the agreement. The fourth defendant claims that only after satisfying himself of the title deeds and the letters written by Chandra Bose, he got the property conveyed in his favour.

    3. The trial court held that Ex. A1 agreement could have been executed only in favour of Chandra Bose in his individual capacity and he has later on given it up and that the appellant had no funds to complete the sale and so other questions did not arise for consideration. Accordingly, it dismissed the suit with costs of the defendants.

    4. The appellant states in his evidence that Ex. A1 sent for from the criminal court and marked is the agreement entered into between himself and the first defendant. He has based his claim for specific performance only on this document. This purports to be an agreement dated 16.1.1973 executed by first defendant Manicka Naicker in favour of Chandra Bose representing Chellaiah Nadar and Sons. The defendants assailed this agreement on the ground that initially the document was executed in favour of Chandra Bose only. Later on by interpolation and forgery the appellant has introduced suitable words so as to make it appear that it was in favour of Chellaiah Nadar and Sons.

    [Discusstion of evidence is omitted-.]

    xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

    11. So, it is highly doubtful whether Ex. A1 as it stands is the agreement entered into between the parties for the sale of the suit property. In any event, we find from the recitals in Ex. A1 that the sale deed has to be completed within 11 months from the date of agreement which takes us to 16.12.1993 We have already seen that as per the evidence of P.W 1 his son had squandered away the money entrusted by this witness with him for the purpose of sale. Admittedly, he had returned from the village in December 1973 and learnt that money was no longer available. Yet, he had not requested first defendant Manicka Naicker to give him further time to mobilise money. According to him, the first defendant was unwell and he promised to execute the deed later on. However, this witness had not sent any notice to Manicka Naicker asking him to execute the sale deed. He admits that he sent notice only to third defendant Periasami on 4.7.1974 He further concedes that in February, 1974 he became aware of the fact that third defendant Periasami was making attempt to purchase the property. But only on 4.7.1974 he had sent notice to him. So as it has been rightly observed by the trial Judge only because the appellant was not possessed of sufficient funds, he did not take any steps in time to get the sale deed executed.

    12. In Ramasamy v. Venkatachalam (1976 (1) M.L.J 243) Ismail, J. has refused specific performance on the ground that the plaintiff had filed the suit making false allegations. He held that the falsity of the case directly impinged on the essential ingredients and elements necessary for claiming the relief. The falsity of the case put forward by the plaintiff disentitled him from obtaining the discretionary relief of specific performance of agreement. In Vyapuri v. Vijayan (1978 T.L.N.J 62) the court found that a sum of Rs. 11,000/- was not paid as advance as contended by the plaintiff and that what was paid was only a sum of Rs. 1,000/-. The Division Bench comprising of Ismail and Nainar Sundaram, JJ. pointed out that the remedy of specific performance is an equitable remedy and is in the discretion of the court, which discretion has to be exercised according to recognised principles of law and not arbitrarily. The plaintiff who came to the court with a false case in material ingredients necessary for the grant of relief of specific performance will not be entitled to the equitable relief at all. It is obvious that in the present case the appellant has based his relief on Ex. A1 after making interpolation so as to make it appear that he has a right in it. And on the ratio laid down in the decisions referred to above, even this is sufficient to refuse the relief to the appellant. In addition, we have already seen that there is unexplained delay on the part of the appellant in seeking the remedy. In the circumstances, the learned trial judge rightly refused specific performance.

    13. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. with costs.

    RR/VCS

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    Comments

    G. Chelliah Nadar (Died) And 4 Others v. Periasami Nadar And 3 Others
    (Jan 27, 1993)